Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Washington Supreme Court
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Petitioner Paul Rivers, a Black man, was convicted on two criminal charges in King County, Washington by a jury drawn from a panel that lacked any Black potential jurors. Rivers argued this venire, as well as certain aspects of the King County jury selection system that produced this venire, violated his state and federal fair cross section rights. “No one in this case disputes that jury diversity is lacking in Washington and that more can and must be done to promote juror diversity statewide.” Because Rivers did not show that the Washington Constitution required the heightened test he proposed for assessing fair cross section claims, the Court analyzed his claim using the existing Sixth Amendment framework, and that Rivers’ venire and King County’s jury selection system satisfied constitutional minimums. The case was remanded for resentencing, because the Court found Rivers was entitled to the benefit of RCW 9.94A.647, which no longer allowed a persistent offender life sentence based on prior second-degree robbery convictions. View "Washington v. Rivers" on Justia Law

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Interlocutory review was granted to challenge a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion of evidence observed during a warrantless entry into a dwelling. The trial court concluded that the entry was justified, applying what cases characterized as the “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement, based on rendering emergency aid and conducting a health and safety check. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court whether the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021), required the Washington Court to reevaluate the state constitution article I, section 7 cases recognizing exceptions to the warrant requirement. Petitioner Ului Lakepa Teulilo argued that the United States Supreme Court invalidated the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement as applied to the home, and therefore, under the supremacy clause, Washington state cases recognizing a health and safety check exception under the same doctrine were invalid. To this, the Washington Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the trial court. View "Washington v. Teulilo" on Justia Law

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These cases concerned whether bail may be denied under article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution for defendants charged with a class A felony. Patrick Sargent was denied bail and was in custody pretrial for charges of first-degree attempted murder, domestic violence, and felony harassment, domestic violence. As charged, and based on his offender score, Sargent faced a determinate sentence of about 20-25 years. Sargent appealed, alleging he was unlawfully restrained because he was unconstitutionally denied bail. He claimed his crimes, as charged, were not punishable by the possibility of life in prison. The Court of Appeals held that article I, section 20 applied to all class A felonies because all class A felonies carried a statutory maximum sentence of life. In the consolidated case, Leonel Gonzalez was similarly denied bail and was in custody pretrial for first-degree felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. As charged, he faced about 34-46 years. In denying bail, the trial court relied on Sargent and the plain language of article I, section 20, concluding that because Gonzalez was facing a class A felony with a maximum of life in prison, the trial court could constitutionally deny bail. Gonzalez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in Sargent’s case and denied Sargent’s personal restraint petition (PRP). In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in Gonzalez’s case. The Court agreed with the State and lower courts that the plain language of the constitution focused on whether the offense in general, not as charged, could possibly be punished by life in prison. The cases were remanded to the trial courts for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Sargent" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Theodore Rhone asked the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a bright line rule establishing a prima facie case of discrimination when the State peremptorily strikes the last member of a racially cognizable group from a jury venire. “Without the benefit of the considerable knowledge we have gained regarding the impact of implicit bias in jury selection,” a “fractured” majority of the Supreme Court declined to adopt Rhone’s proposed rule in 2010. But seven years later, it did, in City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). Although this case came to the Supreme Court as a personal restraint petition (PRP), the central issue was the Court’s 2010 decision in Rhone’s own case. The Supreme Court took the opportunity here to revisit and correct that decision. “Given the unique factual and procedural history of this case and in the interest of justice,” the Court recalled its prior mandate, reversed Rhone’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhone" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Denver Lee Shoop kept a small herd of eight bison on his property. The State charged him with eight counts of animal cruelty in the first degree for his treatment of those eight bison. RCW 16.52.205(2) stated that one commits “animal cruelty in the first degree” when “he or she, with criminal negligence, starves, dehydrates, or suffocates an animal…” and causes considerably suffering or death. The State included “starves, dehydrates, or suffocates” in each of the eight counts. The jury convicted Shoop as charged, but without specifying which of those three means the State actually proved. Shoop appealed, arguing in part that RCW 16.52.205(2) constituted an “alternative means” crime, so either (1) the jury had to achieve unanimity about which means the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the record had to show that sufficient evidence supported each of those multiple means. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 16.52.205(2) described a single crime of animal cruelty in the first degree. “That statutory subsection’s list of ways of committing animal cruelty—negligently starving, dehydrating, or suffocating—constitute “minor nuances inhering in the same act [or omission],” not completely different acts, i.e., not “alternative means.” View "Washington v. Shoop" on Justia Law

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A trial court granted Jeremy Dustin Hubbard’s motion to modify a court-imposed community custody condition approximately 15 years after sentencing based on a change in Hubbard’s factual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Washington Supreme Court found the current statutory framework did not contain a provision authorizing Hubbard’s requested modification. "Outside a direct appeal or a timely collateral attack, a trial court cannot modify court-imposed community custody conditions after sentencing without express statutory authority to do so." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to vacate its order. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Petitioner Zachery Meredith boarded a “Swift Blue Line” bus in Snohomish County. Swift buses used a “barrier-free payment-system[ ].” Snohomish County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Dalton and his partner were also on the Swift Blue Line that day, conducting fare enforcement pursuant to RCW 36.57A.235. In addition to the two deputies, a third officer was “in his patrol car, following [the bus] and acting as the back-up officer.” Meredith was already on the bus when Dalton and his partner boarded the bus; Dalton “never observed [Petitioner] getting on the bus without paying,” either in person or on video. In accordance with his “general practice,” Dalton requested “‘proof of payment or ORCA card’” from each passenger on the bus. On this particular day, Meredith was one of three individuals who “was not able to present proof of fare payment,” so “[u]pon reaching the next stop, Deputy Dalton detained [Meredith] outside at the bus platform.” Meredith “did not possess any identification documents,” but he gave the deputy a name and birth date, which turned out to be false. Rather than issuing a “civil infraction[ ]” for Meredith’s failure to provide proof of payment, the deputy “believed he had probable cause to arrest [Meredith] for theft in the third degree.” The officers ultimately learned he had two outstanding arrest warrants, for which Meredith was arrested and taken to jail. The State charged Meredith with a gross misdemeanor for making “a false or misleading material statement to a public servant.” Meredith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, contending the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Meredith was "disturbed in his private affairs" by the particular method of fare enforcement used here and, if so, whether this disturbance complied with article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, a majority of the Court held Meredith was unlawfully seized. Thus, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Meredith" on Justia Law

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This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

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This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law