Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On Super Bowl Sunday, February 5, 2017, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Petitioner Joseph Zamora was walking to his niece’s house when a neighbor called the police to report a possible vehicle prowler. When Zamora reached the driveway of his niece’s home, he was contacted by responding officer Kevin Hake who indicated he needed to speak with Zamora. Hake quickly became nervous because of Zamora’s demeanor. Fearing Zamora had a weapon, Hake grabbed Zamora and attempted to restrain him. A struggle ensued and escalated to include what was described as “extreme acts of violence.” Ultimately, eight officers were involved in subduing Zamora. When responding paramedics arrived, Zamora was handcuffed, hog-tied, and lying face down in the snow with two officers restraining him; he had no heartbeat or pulse. It took the paramedics seven minutes to revive him. Zamora was taken to the hospital and remained in intensive care for approximately four weeks. A jury found Zamora guilty of two counts of third degree assault of a law enforcement officer. This case involved an issue of whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when, during jury selection, he repeatedly asked the potential jurors about their views on unlawful immigration, border security, undocumented immigrants, and crimes committed by undocumented immigrants. The Washington Supreme Court concluded the prosecutor’s questions and remarks apparently intentionally appealed to the jurors’ potential racial or ethnic bias, prejudice, or stereotypes and therefore constituted race-based prosecutorial misconduct. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and Zamora’s convictions vacated. View "Washington v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jeffrey Conaway was prosecuted for felony indecent exposure. The State entered evidence of a docket entry showing that Conaway previously pleaded guilty to misdemeanor indecent exposure, complied with the conditions of a deferred sentence and was allowed to change his plea to not guilty, and had his case dismissed. The trial court determined that Conaway had “previously been convicted” of indecent exposure, making his current offense punishable as a felony. The Court of Appeals affirmed Conaway’s conviction. The Washington Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the dismissal of a previous misdemeanor conviction following completion of a deferred sentence precluded consideration of that conviction under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that it did not. Consistent with Washington v. Haggard, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020), the Supreme Court held that Conaway’s prior guilty plea to indecent exposure was sufficient to establish that he was previously convicted of that crime for purposes of proving the element of a prior conviction under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). View "Washington v. Conaway" on Justia Law

In March 2017, three North Seattle banks were robbed. Police administered a variety of photomontages to witnesses. Some aspects of the photomontage process complied with best practices generally recognized by new scientific research; some aspects of that process did not; and some aspects of that process fell into a gray area on which the scientific literature was in dispute. Defendant John Stites, a/k/a Christopher Lee Derri, moved to suppress the identifications resulting from those photomontages on federal constitutional grounds; the trial court denied his motion, and he was convicted of all three robberies. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review asked whether trial courts had to consider new scientific research, developed after the 1977 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, decision, when applying that federal due process clause test. To this, the Supreme Court answered yes: courts must consider new, relevant, widely accepted scientific research when determining the suggestiveness and reliability of eyewitness identifications under Brathwaite. Considering this research, the Supreme Court concluded all three of the challenged identification procedures were suggestive. Under the totality of circumstances, however, the identifications were nonetheless reliable. Defendant’s convictions were affirmed. View "Washington v. Derri" on Justia Law

On April 9, 2019, Deputy Mark Rickerson was on patrol, driving an unmarked police vehicle through an area where there were “some problem houses.” The deputy noticed a Honda parked near the entry gate to a church parking lot, where residents were “concerned about all the vehicles that were parking there that didn’t belong in the area.” As Rickerson observed the Honda, he saw petitioner Palla Sum, who “was slumped over and appeared to be unconscious in the driver’s seat.” Rickerson conducted a records check of the Honda; the records showed that the car had not been reported stolen, but did not state the name of the current owner. Rickerson approached the car on foot, wearing his full uniform, asking Sum what he and his passenger were doing there, and for identification. Sum provided a false name and date of birth; the passenger gave his true name and birth date. Rickerson walked back to his patrol vehicle to check the names provided. While the deputy was in his vehicle, Sum started the Honda, “backed up quickly, and then took off,” driving partially on the sidewalk and over some grass. Rickerson activated his emergency lights and started pursuing the Honda, soon joined by another deputy in a separate vehicle. Sum drove at a high rate of speed through a stop sign and multiple red lights before ultimately crashing in someone’s front yard. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on the analysis that courts had to apply to determine whether a person has been seized by law enforcement for purposes of the Washington Constitution, and whether all the circumstances” of the encounter included the race and ethnicity of the allegedly seized person. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, the Court held Sum was seized when the deputy requested Sum’s identification while implying that Sum was under investigation for car theft. As the State properly conceded, at that time, the deputy did not have a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or any other lawful authority to seize Sum. As a result, Sum was unlawfully seized, and the false name and birth date he gave to the deputy had to be suppressed. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Sum" on Justia Law

M.Y.G. was 15 years old when he stole two cars. The State charged him with two counts of theft of a motor vehicle. M.Y.G. moved for and was granted a deferred disposition, but he objected to providing a DNA sample. The trial court ordered M.Y.G. to submit a DNA sample but stayed collection pending appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, upholding the DNA collection. I.A.S. was 17 years old and under the influence of alcohol when he stole a truck, crashed it into a tree, and ran from the scene. The State charged him with one count of second degree burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, second degree theft, driving under the influence, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident. I.A.S. moved for and was granted a deferred disposition. He too objected to providing a DNA sample, but the court ordered him to submit one, staying collection pending his appeal. The Court of Appeal again affirmed the trial court, requiring I.A.S. to give a DNA sample. I.A.S. and M.Y.G. appealed, presenting the question of whether a juvenile was “convicted” when they enter into a deferred disposition. The Washington Supreme Court held that a juvenile is “convicted” when they enter into a deferred disposition. However, the Court held that the juvenile offenses committed by the petitioners in this case did not trigger the DNA collection statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. The orders requiring a DNA sample from M.Y.G. and I.A.S were vacated. View "Washington v. M.Y.G." on Justia Law

In 2012, when Washington voters approved Initiative 502 legalizing recreational cannabis, it modified the driving under the influence (DUI) law and created a prong under which a person can be convicted of DUI depending on the level of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) found in one’s blood. Douglas Fraser III was convicted of DUI under the per se THC prong of RCW 46.61.502(1)(b) for driving with a THC blood level of 9.4 +/- 2.5 ng/mL within two hours of driving. On appeal, Fraser challenged the constitutionality of this prong of the DUI statute, claiming that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of the legislature’s police power, that it was unconstitutionally vague, and that it was “facially unconstitutionally overbroad because no scientific evidence supports the conclusion that there is a per-se concentration of active THC at which all or most drivers would be impaired.” The Washington Supreme Court disagreed with all of Fraser’s contentions raised on appeal and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Fraser" on Justia Law

Ronald Snider, who was convicted of third degree rape in 2003, failed to update his registration when he moved out of a residential treatment facility in mid-2017. This was at least the fifth time Snider had failed to register since 2003. Snider pleaded guilty to failure to register. Snider sought to withdraw his plea, arguing the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court misinformed him about the knowledge element of failure to register. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding the trial court’s descriptions of the knowledge element were accurate and Snider’s plea was constitutionally valid. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed Snider’s conviction. View "Washington v. Snider" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the prosecution was required, under Brady v. Maryland, to turn over to the defense the jail and mental health records of the victims’ mother, who was a codefendant and a State’s witness. Additionally, this case involved whether a Petrich jury unanimity instruction was required for charges of assault of a child. At trial, a jury found Reuben Mulamba guilty of first degree assault of a child, second degree assault of a child, first degree criminal mistreatment of a child, and third degree criminal mistreatment of a child. Mulamba filed a timely personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing multiple grounds for relief, based in part on the newly obtained jail records of a trial witness. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, split decision, granted Mulamba’s petition with respect to his claims of a Brady violation and a Petrich jury unanimity violation. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on both the Brady violation and the jury unanimity claims, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of any unresolved issues. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Mulamba" on Justia Law

Respondent Douglas Arbogast was charged with two counts of attempted child rape as a result of a Washington State Patrol sting operation. Police officers posted an advertisement online and posed as a mother seeking a person to teach her two children about sex. Arbogast answered the ad, exchanged messages with undercover officers, and was later arrested. At trial, Arbogast sought to present the affirmative defense of entrapment and his lack of criminal convictions as evidence that he was not predisposed to commit the charged crimes of attempted child rape. The trial court declined to allow evidence of his lack of criminal record or instruct the jury on entrapment. Arbogast was convicted. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Washington Supreme Court held that to obtain an entrapment instruction, defendants must make a prima facie showing: (1) the crime originated in the mind of the police or an informant; and (2) the defendant was induced to commit a crime that he or she was not predisposed to commit. "The measure of a prima facie showing is whether the evidence offered, considered in a light most favorable to the defendant, is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, Arbogast offered sufficient evidence to justify an instruction. Whether he can establish the defense is ultimately a decision for the jury." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Arbogast" on Justia Law

At trial, a jury found Daviel Canela guilty of attempted first degree murder and of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Canela appealed his conviction on multiple grounds. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction for attempted first degree murder, finding that premeditation was an essential element in a charge of attempted first degree murder. This was the only issue before the Washington Supreme Court: Canela challenged the sufficiency of the information charging him of first degree murder, and whether premeditation had to be alleged in the charging document. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding premeditation was not an essential element that had to be included in the charging document for attempted first degree murder. View "Washington v. Canela" on Justia Law