Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a conditional plea to one count each of identity theft relating to a bail agreement, misdemeanor simple possession, and misdemeanor DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the identity theft counts in the indictment because the criminal bail agreement and the affidavit of eligibility for appointed counsel did not, according to Defendant, constitute financial transactions under the provisions of W. Va. Code 61-3-54. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the criminal bail agreement was a financial transaction as contemplated by section 61-3-54. View "State v. Soustek" on Justia Law

Defendant opened a number of fraudulent accounts in her daughter’s name beginning when her daughter was fourteen years old, resulting in her daughter’s credit rating being ruined. Defendant pled guilty to eight counts of identity theft, was sentenced to an effective five-year prison term, and was ordered to pay restitution to six financial institutions and to her daughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s sentencing order, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) sentencing Defendant to prison instead of placing her on probation or home confinement; and (2) ordering her to pay $10,000 in restitution to her daughter. View "State v. Rebecca F." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to prison for one to ten years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) allowing the theft of property taken from three purses to be treated as a single occurrence to support the grand larceny indictment, as the theft of property from different owners at the same time and place may constitute one larceny; and (2) using non-fair market value to establish the value of stolen items, as the owner of stolen property may offer evidence of its value, at the time and place of the crime, based upon the property’s fair market value as well as the purchase price replacement cost, or the owner’s reasonable belief as to its value. View "State v. Jerrome" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree for entering a Wendy’s restaurant and attempting to obtain money by holding a machete against the throat of a restaurant employee. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence of forty years in the penitentiary, holding (1) Defendant’s confession to the police was properly admitted at trial, as it was not given in violation of Defendant’s right to counsel, and the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary; and (2) the employee’s in-court identification of Defendant was properly admitted at trial. View "State v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to truancy, explaining that the reason her child was absent from school was due to illness. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the final order with respect to the sentence imposed, holding (1) although Petitioner testified that illness was the cause of her child’s absences from school, the magistrate court’s acceptance of Petitioner’s guilty plea was proper because it was based on the undisputed fact that Petitioner's child had five unexcused absences from school; and (2) the magistrate court committed reversible error by placing Petitioner on probation and ordering her to perform five days of community service in addition to imposing a fine and court costs. View "State v. Bennett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the facts contained in the affidavit used to obtain search warrants for Appellant’s home and car provided the magistrate with a sufficient basis to demonstrate probable cause of the issuance of the search warrants; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the ammunition and knives found at Appellant’s residence; (3) Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated when the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion for a continuance; and (4) the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Corey" on Justia Law

In 2013, an indictment was returned against Petitioner for breaking and entering and grand larceny. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that the underlying charges were dismissed as part of a plea agreement that had been accepted and approved by the circuit court in 2012. The circuit court denied the motion to quash due to absence of language in the plea agreement to indicate that the dismissal of charges was with prejudice. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent his prosecution and to procure his discharge from custody. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the absence of the words “with prejudice” was a deficiency in the drafting of the plea agreement, and any ambiguity in this regard was required to be construed in Petitioner’s favor and against the State; and (2) the circuit court exceeded its authority in allowing the instant prosecution to proceed through its denial of Petitioner’s motion to quash and seeking specific performance of the plea agreement. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Hon. Pomponio " on Justia Law

Richard Hardison, a licensed lawyer in West Virginia, was indicted on two criminal counts related to an alleged drug transaction. The transaction involved a confidential informant (“CI”), who was sent by the Raleigh County Sheriff’s Department to meet with and attempt to purchase cocaine from Hardison. The CI, who was equipped with a body wire, allegedly discussed and purchased cocaine from Hardison in Hardison's law office. Hardison moved to suppress the audio recording of his conversation with the CI as a violation of the West Virginia Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress. The State subsequently requested a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) W.Va. Code 62.1D-9(d) is intended to prevent attorney-client privileged communications from being intercepted by wiretapping or through electronic surveillance; and (2) because Hardison was not acting as an attorney during his conversation with the CI, the circuit court erred in suppressing the audio recording under section 62-1D-9(d). View "State ex rel. State v. Hon. Burnside" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to the penitentiary for a life term, without the possibility of parole. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion and reaffirmed that ruling in a final order. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence and the circuit court’s final order, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (2) the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue was within the court’s discretion. View "State v. Skeens" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of wanton endangerment and sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his residence because, under the circumstances, the warrantless search of the residence was allowed under the emergency doctrine exception, and even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police officers were entitled to conduct a protective search; and (2) the circuit court did not err in allowing the jury to hear testimony regarding the out-of-court identification of Petitioner made by the victim. View "State v. Kimble" on Justia Law