Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners in these two consolidated appeals were convicted of sexual-related offenses. Both Petitioners were sentenced pursuant to section W. Va. Code 62-12-26, which provides for extended supervision of certain sex offenders. In each case, the lower courts modified Petitioners' supervised release and imposed additional sanctions pursuant to section 62-12-26(g)(3). The primary issue in the appeals was the constitutionality of the portion of section 62-12-26 that permits the revocation of supervised release and additional incarceration when a sex offender violates a condition of supervised release. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' orders in each case, holding (1) section 62-12-26(g)(3) does not violate constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy; and (2) Petitioners' post-revocation sanctions were not constitutionally disproportionate to their underlying convictions. View "State v. Hargus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant's recorded confession was not obtained in violation of his right to be promptly presented before a magistrate following his arrest, and therefore, the trial court did not err by not suppressing the confession; (2) the trial court did not deny Defendant a theory of defense by refusing to give an insanity instruction; (3) W. Va. Code 62-3-15 is not unconstitutional; and (4) the trial court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury on the use of notes and note taking. View "State v. Flournoy" on Justia Law

Lisa Martin filed a domestic violence petition against Chubby Hoston, who was incarcerated. Attorney Colin Cline was appointed to act as Hoston's guardian ad litem. Based on a statement made by Hoston that Cline delivered at the family court hearing, Hoston was charged with intimidation of and retaliation against a witness. The prosecuting attorney in the criminal matter, Scott Ash, issued a subpoena to Cline seeking his testimony on the statement Hoston directed him to deliver at the family court hearing. The circuit court granted Hoston's motion to prohibit the testimony of Cline in the criminal proceeding, concluding that the communication between Hoston and his guardian was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Ash filed a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from suppressing the testimony of Cline. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) an attorney-client relationship is formed when a lawyer acts as an incarcerated person's guardian ad litem in a family court proceeding; but (2) when an incarcerated person directs his guardian ad litem to convey a statement to a third party, that statement is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Ash v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his double jeopardy protections were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder. View "Gerlach v. Ballard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian or custodian, and distribution and display of obscene matter to a minor. The victim, who was four years old at the time of the offenses, was found to be incompetent to testify. During trial, the trial court admitted certain of the victim's out-of-court statements. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) even if the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements was error under Crawford v. Washington and State v. Mechling, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) any error in the State's closing argument did not result in manifest injustice that would require the reversal of Petitioner's conviction. View "State v. Lambert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and malicious wounding. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder count and up to ten years' imprisonment for the malicious wounding count. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of perjured testimony because the jury was made fully aware that a false statement was made to Defendant's grand jury; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the State to introduce two prior acts of violence that Defendant committed against the victim. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Defendant later filed a petition for habeas relief. After an omnibus hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate a confession by a third party that he had killed the victim. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Defendant habeas relief in the form of a new trial, holding that Defendant's counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance and that, but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different. View "Ballard v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, wanton endangerment, and carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was denied his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination when the trial court interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of a key witness and directed counsel to meet with prosecutors and the witness to prepare questions for the continuation of the cross-examiantion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination by requiring defense counsel to prepare the witness in advance for the continuation of cross examination. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child neglect. Thereafter, a jury convicted Defendant on recidivist charges, for which Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court subsequently granted Defendant a new trial on the underlying child neglect felony. After a retrial, Defendant was found guilty of child neglect. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a second recidivist life sentence. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his second recidivist life sentence was invalid because he was not arraigned on the recidivist information during the same term of court in which he was convicted on retrial for the underlying offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the recidivist life imprisonment sentence was void and unenforceable because (1) the State failed to comply with the requirements of W. Va. Code 61-11-19 insofar as Defendant was not arraigned on the information during the term of court in which he was convicted of the principal offense; and (2) a recidivist sentence under section 61-11-19 is automatically vacated whenever the underlying felony conviction is vacated. View "Holcomb v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Amanda Dingess was arrested for DUI after Dingess failed three field sobriety tests. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently revoked Dingess's drivers license for the DUI. Dingess filed a request for an administrative hearing, contending that on the night of her arrest she had not driven a car and was not under the influence of alcohol. The Office of Administrative Appeals (OAH) found that the DMV had established that Dingess had operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol on the night of her arrest and upheld the DMV's revocation of Dingess's license. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the OAH erred in finding that Dingess had driven the car. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's reinstatement of Dingess's driving privileges, holding that that the circuit court failed to afford proper deference to the rulings made during the underlying administrative process and that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the administrative license revocation of Dingess. View "Dale v. Dingess" on Justia Law