Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) sought to revoke Keyo Sellers's probation based on five alleged violations, including entering K.A.B.'s home without consent, sexual assault, theft, trespassing, and providing false information to his probation agent. Sellers admitted to the fifth violation, and a revocation hearing was held for the remaining allegations. The DOC did not present K.A.B. as a witness, relying instead on her written statement and the testimony of a police officer. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the allegations substantiated and revoked Sellers's probation.Sellers appealed to the Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) administrator, who reversed the ALJ's decision, citing the reliance on hearsay evidence without good cause to deny Sellers's right to confront adverse witnesses. The administrator found that without K.A.B.'s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court reversed the administrator's decision, but the Court of Appeals reinstated it, agreeing that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence and made according to law.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The court concluded that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence, as the non-hearsay evidence presented was not compelling enough to establish the violations. The court also determined that the administrator correctly applied the law by excluding hearsay testimony without a finding of good cause. The decision to not revoke Sellers's probation was affirmed. View "Department of Corrections v. Hayes" on Justia Law

The defendant endured years of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by her husband. On the night in question, after a violent attack in which her husband threatened her and chased her with a heavy object, she fled their home by car, despite having consumed alcohol earlier. She intended to reach the couple’s lake house, which she considered a safe place. While en route, she passed a police car but did not stop, later explaining that she distrusted the police due to prior negative experiences. She was stopped by police before reaching her destination and was found to have a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. She was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration as a second offense.The Waukesha County Circuit Court conducted a bench trial. The defendant stipulated to her blood alcohol level but raised the statutory coercion defense, arguing that she reasonably believed driving was the only way to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The circuit court found that the defense applied when she initially fled but concluded that, by the time she passed the police car, she knew other means of safety were available and thus the elements of the defense were no longer met. The court found her guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the circuit court’s finding that her belief in the necessity of continued driving was no longer reasonable once she was out of immediate danger and had other options.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the elements of the coercion defense must be met throughout the entire duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act, not just at its inception. The court also held that a defendant’s personal history can be relevant to the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity of her actions. Finding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standards and that its decision was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Stetzer" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

Carl Lee McAdory was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance (OWI) and operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance (RCS) in his blood, both as eighth offenses. A jury found him guilty of both charges. At sentencing, the circuit court dismissed the RCS charge and sentenced McAdory only on the OWI charge.The Court of Appeals later reversed McAdory's OWI conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on the OWI charge. Instead of holding a new trial, the circuit court reinstated the previously dismissed RCS charge and guilty verdict, and sentenced McAdory on the RCS charge.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the circuit court was permitted to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court held that the circuit court had implicit statutory authority under WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(c) to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court also concluded that the State did not forfeit its right to seek reinstatement by failing to raise the issue in the initial appeal. Additionally, the court found that reinstating the RCS charge did not violate the Court of Appeals' mandate or McAdory's double jeopardy rights.The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, allowing the reinstatement of the RCS charge and guilty verdict. View "State v. McAdory" on Justia Law

Luis A. Ramirez, an inmate serving a lengthy sentence for felony convictions, attacked a corrections officer with a sharpened pencil. He was charged with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Due to multiple continuances and rescheduled trial dates, Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury 46 months after the charges were filed.Ramirez moved for postconviction relief, claiming the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The postconviction court denied his motion, and Ramirez appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, concluding that Ramirez's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordered the charges dismissed. The State sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The court found that while the 46-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not long enough to declare prejudice as a matter of law. The reasons for the delay were attributed to neutral factors, such as the orderly administration of justice and the State's negligence, but not deliberate or bad-faith conduct. Ramirez's significant delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his failure to demonstrate particularized prejudice weighed against him.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Lauren, a thirteen-year-old girl, alleged that her father, Jobert Molde, sexually assaulted her between January 2011 and January 2012. These allegations surfaced in 2017 after Lauren attempted suicide. Molde was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under twelve and incest with a child. The key evidence against Molde included Lauren's in-court testimony and a recording of her forensic interview.The Dunn County Circuit Court allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert, but she was unavailable, so Dr. Alice Swenson, a licensed child abuse pediatrician, testified instead. Dr. Swenson supervised Lauren's forensic interview but did not personally evaluate her. During the trial, a juror asked Dr. Swenson about the frequency of false sexual abuse disclosures, to which she responded that false disclosures are extraordinarily rare, around one percent. Molde's counsel did not object to this testimony. The jury found Molde guilty on both counts. Molde then moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to Dr. Swenson's testimony. The circuit court denied the motion.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Dr. Swenson's testimony constituted impermissible vouching and that Molde's attorney was ineffective for not objecting. The state petitioned for review, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted it.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Swenson's statistical testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule, which prohibits witnesses from vouching for another witness's credibility. The court held that statistical evidence alone about the prevalence of false reporting does not constitute impermissible vouching. Since Dr. Swenson did not opine on Lauren's truthfulness, Molde's counsel was not deficient for failing to object. Therefore, Molde's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, and the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Molde" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, Kordell L. Grady was charged with multiple criminal offenses. He accepted a plea deal, pleading no contest to three charges. The dispute arose over whether Grady's due process rights were violated during a restitution hearing, where he was ordered to pay for damages caused to a law enforcement vehicle during the chase. Grady's counsel argued he lacked the ability to pay, and Grady, attending via Zoom, interrupted the proceedings. The court allowed him to speak with his attorney but warned that the conversation could be heard by everyone in the courtroom. Grady's statements undermined his counsel's argument, and the court ordered him to pay the full restitution amount.Grady filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he could not consult confidentially with his counsel, and that the Assistant District Attorney improperly used his statements. The circuit court rejected these arguments, finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation to be confidential. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and deferred to the circuit court's factual finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation with his counsel to be confidential. The Supreme Court held that Grady's due process rights were not violated, as he did not seek a confidential conversation. Consequently, his conversation was not privileged under Wisconsin Statute § 905.03(2). The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who fell asleep in a McDonald's drive-thru lane. An employee woke him up and called the police. The responding officer observed the defendant driving normally and without any signs of impairment. However, the officer decided to pull the defendant over due to the report of him falling asleep. The defendant explained that he was tired from a 24-hour shift. Despite not observing any signs of impairment, the officer prolonged the stop to investigate further. The officer eventually ordered the defendant out of his truck, at which point the defendant showed signs of intoxication, leading to his arrest and charges.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the stop and further investigation were justified as a permissible "community caretaking function." The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's decision.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, even if the traffic stop was permissible as a community caretaking activity, the court held that the stop was unreasonably prolonged when it transformed into an unjustified criminal investigation. The court stated that the scope of caretaking stops should be guided and limited by the justification for the stop. This means that, absent another permissible reason to detain someone, the detention must end when the original community caretaking justification is resolved. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the motion to suppress. View "State v. Wiskowski" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Antonio S. Davis, who was charged with misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct. Davis had applied for representation from the State Public Defender (SPD) and while his application was still being processed, he was arraigned. Consequently, Davis pleaded not guilty and further proceedings were scheduled. It was not until 65 days later that the SPD appointed counsel for Davis. Six days after counsel was appointed, Davis filed a request for substitution of judge, which was denied by the Circuit Court for Dane County as untimely.Davis then filed a petition for supervisory writ, arguing that the Circuit Court had a plain duty to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely. The Court of Appeals denied his petition and the case was brought before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for review. The Supreme Court needed to decide whether Davis had forfeited the issues he brought forth and whether he was entitled to a supervisory writ directing the lower court to treat his request for substitution of judge as timely.The Supreme Court concluded that even if Davis had forfeited the issues, they would exercise discretion to address them to clarify the procedure for appealing a denial of a request for substitution of judge as untimely. However, the court found that Davis was not entitled to a supervisory writ, asserting that the lower court did not have a plain duty to treat Davis's request as timely under Wisconsin Statute § 971.20(4), Dane County Local Rule 208, a government-created obstacle exception, or a theory of equitable tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the State Claims Board awarding Appellant $25,000 in compensation after finding Appellant was innocent of a crime for which he was imprisoned, holding that Wis. Stat. 775.05(4) does not compel the Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.Appellant pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide and spent approximately twenty-six years in prison. After his second guilty plea was vacated Appellant petitioned the State Claims Board for compensation, seeking more than $5.7 million. The Board awarded the maximum under Wis. Stat. 775.05(4). Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that the Board should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of the amount awarded. The circuit court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals grafted onto the statute a process the legislature did not sanction. View "Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd." on Justia Law