Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reinstating Defendant’s conviction for sexually assaulting a young girl after the circuit court set the conviction aside on the grounds that Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court held (1) the court of appeals properly conducted the analysis required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and found that Defendant’s counsel performed as required by the Constitution; (2) expert testimony at a Machner hearing regarding the reasonableness of trial counsel’s performance is not admissible; and (3) the circuit court did not improperly rely on Defendant’s lack of remorse when it fashioned his sentence. View "State v. Pico" on Justia Law

2013 Wis. Act 20 (Act 20) eliminated a circuit court’s discretion to waive imposition of the $250 DNA analysis surcharge for felony convictions.Before the legislature adopted Act 20, the relevant statute said that the court “may” impose the $250 DNA surcharge on a defendant convicted of a felony. Act 20 changed the language of the statue, saying that the court “shall” impose the surcharge. Defendant in this case filed a postconviction motion requesting vacation of the DNA surcharge. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “shall” as used in Wis. Stat. 973.046(1r) is mandatory, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to remove the DNA surcharge from his judgment of conviction. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

Applying the teachings of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 473 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officers in this case lawfully entered Defendant’s residence to execute two valid warrants for Defendant’s arrest and lawfully seized evidence discovered in the search incident to Defendant’s arrest.Defendant was convicted of obstructing an officer and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest and the subsequent search were unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the hot pursuit doctrine allowed the lawful enforcement officers to follow Defendant from his driveway into his home to effectuate his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) because this case is governed by Payton, the applicability of the hot pursuit doctrine need not be addressed; and (2) applying Payton to the undisputed facts of this case, the police officers’ entry into Defendant’s home to execute two valid warrants for Defendant’s arrest was constitutionally permissible. View "State v. Delap" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that the mandatory $250 DNA surcharge the circuit court ordered Defendant to pay violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions and affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling that the circuit court did not rely on an improper factor when it sentenced Defendant.Defendant was convicted of felony murder and felon in possession of a firearm. The circuit court imposed the mandatory DNA surcharge under the DNA surcharge statute, Wis. Stat. 973.046, and sentenced Defendant to a period of initial confinement of ten years and extended supervision of seven and a half years. The court of appeals upheld Defendant’s sentence but reversed on the DNA charge, concluding that the circuit court should have applied the discretionary DNA surcharge statute in effect when Defendant committed his crime rather than the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when Defendant was sentenced. The Supreme Court (1) reinstated the $250 surcharge as part of Defendant’s judgment, holding that the mandatory DNA surcharge statute is not an ex post facto law because the surcharge is not punishment under the intent-effects test; and (2) affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Circuit courts possess statutory competency to proceed in criminal matters when the adult defendant was charged for conduct he committed before his tenth birthday.Defendant was charged with four counts of criminal misconduct. Defendant was nine through twelve years old during the time period charged in count one and fourteen through eighteen years old during the time period charged in counts two through four. Defendant was nineteen years old when the charges were filed. The jury acquitted Defendant of count one but convicted him of counts two through four. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a pre-trial motion to dismiss count one. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant’s age at the time he is charged, not his age at the time the underlying conduct occurred, determines whether charges are properly brought as a criminal matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court possessed statutory competency to hear Defendant’s case as a criminal matter because he was an adult at the time he was charged; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a meritless motion. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The intent-effects test is the proper test used to determine whether a sanction is “punishment” such that due process requires a defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of guilty.In the instant case, the circuit court failed to inform Defendant that his plea of guilty to second-degree sexual assault would subject him to lifetime GPS tracking pursuant to Wis. Stat. 301.48. The circuit court concluded that lifetime GPS tracking is not punishment and therefore denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the intent-effects test to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the intent nor effect of lifetime GPS tracking is punitive. View "State v. Muldrow" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court ruling that Defendant’s trial counsel’s failure to object to an exhibit sent to the jury during deliberations constituted ineffective assistance with respect to only one of the six counts for which Defendant was convicted.On appeal, Defendant argued that all six of his convictions should be vacated due to his trial counsel’s deficient performance and that the State forfeited its right to argue the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test at his Machner hearing. In affirming, the Supreme Court held (1) circuit courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following multiple-count trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only one of the multiple convictions; and (2) the State did not forfeit its right to challenge the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test when it did not petition the Supreme Court for review following the court of appeals’ original decision remanding for a Machner hearing. View "State v. Sholar" on Justia Law

In finding Appellant to be a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. 980.02(1)(a) the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it admitted expert testimony based on the results of the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R) and the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) tests, which are instruments designed to measure an offender’s risk of reoffending.The State filed a petition to commit Appellant as a sexually violent person. Prior to the commitment trial, Appellant filed motion in liming to exclude the expert testimony, arguing that the testimony as to the results produced by the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR was not admissible under Wis. Stat. 907.02 because it was not based on sufficient facts or data, was not the product of reliable principles and methods, and was not reliably applied to the facts of the case. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court evaluated the relevant facts under the proper standard and articulated a reasonable basis for its decision and thus did not erroneously exercise its discretion. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

At issue was the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), as amended by 2013 Wis. Act 84, which establishes the discharge procedure for a person civilly committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.David Hager, Jr. and Howard Carter both filed petitions for discharge from commitment as sexually violent persons. Both petitions were denied. The court of appeals reversed in Hager but affirmed in Carter. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals as to Hager and affirmed as to Carter, holding (1) under Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), circuit courts are to carefully examine, but not weigh, those portions of the record they deem helpful to their consideration of a petition for discharge, which may include facts both favorable and unfavorable to the petitioner; (2) section 980.09(2) does not violate the constitutional right to due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions; and (3) Carter’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge retroactive application of Act 84 to Carter. View "State v. Hager" on Justia Law

In this commitment-extension proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order denying J.M.’s motion for post-disposition relief in which J.M. claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court answered (1) J.M. had a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in his Chapter 41 commitment-extension hearing, and the Strickland standard is the correct standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a commitment-extension hearing; (2) J.M. did not show that a reasonable probability existed that the result of the proceeding would have been different had his trial counsel’s performance not been allegedly deficient regarding J.M.’s appearance in prison garb; and (3) J.M. did not establish that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that his wearing of prison garb during the trial so distracted the jury that justice was miscarried, and the circuit court’s conflicting jury instructions did not entitle J.M. to a new trial in the interest of justice. View "Winnebago County v. J.M." on Justia Law