Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that testimony given by Catherine Gainey, the social worker who conducted a cognitive graphic interview with the child victim, violated the Haseltine rule and that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gainey’s testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule and was therefore admissible, and accordingly, Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Gainey’s testimony; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. View "State v. Maday" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive life terms in prison. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and order denying postconviction relief. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial due to errors pertaining to jury selection and the jury he received. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each of Defendant’s claims on appeal failed, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Lepsch" on Justia Law

Appellant was adjudicated delinquent or convicted of sexually violent offenses three times, resulting in his incarceration. Before Talley was released on his last offense, the State filed a petition for Chapter 980 commitment. In 2005, the circuit court ordered Talley committed to the Department of Health and Family Services. In 2012, Talley filed the discharge petition underlying the Court’s current review. The circuit court denied Talley’s petition seeking a discharge hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. Talley appealed, arguing that his petition alleged enough facts to warrant a discharge hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Talley’s petition for a discharge failed to satisfy the statutory threshold for a discharge hearing, and therefore, the circuit court appropriately denied Appellant’s 2012 petition without holding a discharge hearing. View "State v. Talley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw on the basis that the deputy that arrested him lacked probable cause to do so and that the deputy violated Defendant’s rights by obtaining the blood draw. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant but that the section of Wisconsin’s implied consent statutes that permits a blood draw from an unconscious individual is unconstitutional unless exigent circumstances exist, and exigent circumstances did not exist in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy’s warrantless search was permissible under the exigent circumstances doctrine that relates to the risk of destruction of evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Howes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1982, Defendant and his brother were found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2014, Defendant filed a motion requesting forensic DNA testing of evidence taken from the crime scene pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.07 and asking the circuit court to order that the testing occur at public expense or, in the alternative, at Defendant’s own expense. The circuit court denied Defendant’s postconviction motion for DNA testing. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for forensic DNA testing at private or public expense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s postconviction motion for forensic DNA testing, as the requirements of section 974.07(7)(a)2 were not met. View "State v. Denny" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of burglary as a party to a crime. The judgment of conviction provided that Petitioner submit to a DNA sample and pay a $250 DNA analysis surcharge. At the time Petitioner committed the offense Wis. Stat. 973.046, which provided that the decision of whether to impose a DNA surcharge was within the circuit court’s discretion, was in effect. Thereafter, Wis. Stat. 973.046(1r)(a) took effect. When Petitioner was sentenced, the amended statute made the imposition of a DNA surcharge mandatory. Petitioner filed a postconviction motion seeking to vacate the $250 DNA surcharge, arguing that imposing the mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because imposition of the DNA surcharge was discretionary at the time she committed the offense. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not meet her burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the amended statute is unconstitutional. View "State v. Scruggs" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for delivering heroin that caused the death of S.L. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of a toxicology report at trial through a medical examiner’s testimony, without testimony by the analyst who signed it, violated his confrontation rights. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the admission and use at trial of the toxicology report did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the toxicology report as not “testimonial” under the primary purpose test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Clark. In so holding, the Court overruled State v. VanDyke, which reached the opposite conclusion. View "State v. Mattox" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle resulting in great bodily harm. When sentencing Defendant, the sentencing court considered the fact that Defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case where the record of conviction had been expunged. Defendant filed a postconviction motion requesting a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the circuit court erred when it considered his expunged record of conviction at sentencing. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion for resentencing. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that under State v. Leitner, a sentencing court is permitted to consider all of the facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, and not only those facts underlying the crime itself. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the fact that Defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case where the record of conviction had been expunged. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(a), second offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court to suppress the evidence obtained from Defendant’s blood, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the emergency medical technician (EMT) who drew Defendant’s blood was operating “under the direction of a physician” as required by Wis. Stat. 343.305(5)(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EMT who drew Defendant’s blood was a “person acting under the direction of a physician” and that Defendant’s blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner. View "State v. Kozel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of drunk driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying Defnednat’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrantless entry by a deputy with the sheriff’s department into Defendant’s garage was not justified by the exigent circumstance of the deputy’s “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy’s warrantless entry into Defendant’s garage and subsequent arrest of Defendant were constitutional because they were justified by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law