Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted and sentenced under 2009 Wis. Act 28, which allowed inmates the opportunity to earn “positive adjustment time,” by which inmates could obtain early release from prison. 2011 Wis. Act 38 retroactively repealed positive adjustment time. Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the new legislation violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it delayed inmates’ release from prison by up to ninety days. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retroactive application of 2011 Wis. Act 38 was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time is an ex post facto violation, and (2) 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it results in a longer period of incarceration and, consequently, makes the punishment for an offense more burdensome after it was committed. View "State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. Defendant’s presentence investigation report included an attached COMPAS risk assessment, an evidence-based risk assessment tool that provides decisional support for the Department of Corrections when managing offenders. The circuit court referenced the COMPAS risk score along with other sentencing factors in ruling out probation for Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing violated his right to due process.The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if used properly, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a defendant’s right to due process; (2) the circuit court’s use of the COMPAS risk scores in this case was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in considering read-in charges in the plea agreement. View "State v. Loomis" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to reexamine State v. Shiffra, modified by State v. Green, (hereinafter Shiffra/Green), under which a defendant can acquire a complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records via a motion for in camera review if the defendant demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence….” Here the complainant alleged that Defendant sexually assaulted her as a child. Defendant filed a pretrial motion pursuant to Shiffra/Green, seeking an in camera inspection of the complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records. The circuit court granted the motion. Further, the court informed the complainant that if she refused to turn over the records, her testimony would be barred at trial. The complainant refused to give up her mental health treatment records, and the circuit court barred her from testifying at trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court overruled Shiffra/Green and its progeny, holding that Shiffra/Green improperly relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie when it invented a right to access privileged information via a motion for in camera review and cannot be grounded in any other legal basis. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was convicted in Minnesota of a first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). In 1992, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court entered a civil forfeiture judgment against Defendant for another first-offense OWI. In 2014, Defendant filed a motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment because it was a second OWI offense improperly charged as a first offense, thus implicating subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court voided Defendant’s 1992 Eau Claire County conviction on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant forfeited her right to challenge her 1992 first-offense OWI judgment by failing to timely raise it; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted Defendant’s motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment. View "City of Eau Claire v. Booth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to first-degree recklessly endangering safety as domestic abuse. In the plea colloquy accepting Defendant’s plea, the circuit court misstated the potential punishment if Defendant were convicted. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion. In so doing, the court relied on the remedy set forth in State v. Bangert for cases where a circuit court fails to comply with Wis. Stat. 971.08(1) or other mandatory duties at a plea colloquy and the defendant does not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court’s defect could be remedied by reducing the sentence to the punishment Defendant was informed and believed he could receive or whether Defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of the present case, Bangert and State v. Brown governed, and Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. Remanded with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and operating without a license, causing death. The convictions arose after Defendant killed an individual while he was driving under the influence of alcohol in the wrong direction on a freeway. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years of initial confinement followed by seven years of extended supervision. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that the sentencing court improperly considered his immigration status at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s comments at sentencing did not deny Defendant due process in the form of reliance on an improper sentencing factor. View "State v. Gayton" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant moved to suppress her incriminating statements made during a six-hour interrogation conducted without a Miranda warning and evidence of the search of her house conducted after the interrogation. The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s statements and the physical evidence obtained from her house, which the court concluded was fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the officers searching Defendant’s house would have discovered the incriminating physical evidence during their search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not require that the State prove the absence of bad faith by the officers who intentionally engaged in the misconduct that provides the basis for exclusion; and (2) the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that officers inevitably would have discovered the physical evidence at issue. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an element of Wis. Stat. 948.075(1r) - use of a “computerized communication system” - was satisfied when Defendant used his cell phone to exchange texts with, and receive picture messages from, the fourteen-year-old victim. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime in violation of section 948.075(1r). The court of appeals reversed, sua sponte holding that a jury instruction misdirected the jury by asking it to determine whether the cell phone itself constituted the computerized communication system rather than asking whether Defendant’s uses of the cell phone constituted communication via a computerized communication system. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the jury instruction here accurately stated the law, and even if the instruction was erroneous, it was harmless error; (2) section 948.075 is not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the court of appeals erred when it exercised its discretion authority to reverse Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. McKellips" on Justia Law

Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant would plead no contest to certain counts brought against him, while other counts would be dismissed and read into the record for purposes of sentencing and recitation. At a plea hearing, the court concluded that Defendant’s pleas were made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion and ordered judgments of guilt. Defendant was then sentenced. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his no contest pleas. Specifically, Defendant claimed that his pleas were unknowing because he did not understand the effect the read-in charge could have at sentencing. The postconviction court denied Defendant’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determined whether Defendant had entered his pleas in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he was correctly informed of and understood the effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. View "State v. Sulla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's review was whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted the State's motion to join intimidation charges involving two victims, a mother and her daughter, with already-pending sexual assault charges where the daughter was the victim. The circuit court held that joinder was proper under Wis. Stat. 971.12(1)(2009-10); the court of appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. After review, the Supreme Court held that joinder was proper because the charges joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the charges were "connected together," and the charges constituted parts of a "common scheme or plan." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the jury's verdicts finding Luis Salinas guilty of: (1) repeated sexual assault of a child; (2) second-degree sexual assault; (3) second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16; (4) intimidation of witness, M.S.; and (5) intimidation of witness, V.G. View "Wisconsin v. Salinas" on Justia Law