Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The charges of first-degree sexual assault against defendant-appellant Stephen LeMere arose out of events that occurred after a gathering in the Eau Claire on Friday evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C. LeMere was then 24. Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-old sister. During the gathering, LeMere and another visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition to other alcohol in the house. LeMere also took a narcotic pain killer. Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. Early the next morning, LeMere sent text messages to C.R.C., and when she refused to have sex with her, he placed her in a choke hold, put a knife to her throat, fondled her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what happened. C.R.C. did tell someone about it, and charges were later filed against him. In "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010)), the federal Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assessed "Padilla" in a different context: did the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, when the client entered a plea to a sexually violent offense? LeMere wanted to withdraw his plea, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the possibility of civil commitment following the confinement portion of his sentence under Chapter 980. The Wisconsin Court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient in this case, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Wisconsin v. LeMere" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to strangulation and suffocation and related crimes. After a plea hearing, the parties agreed that Defendant would plead guilty to all five criminal counts against him but that the case would be tried on the mental responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial. During the responsibility phase of Defendant’s bifurcated trial, the circuit court did not conduct a right-to-testify colloquy with Defendant. The court adjudged Defendant guilty of the five counts against him. Defendant filed a postconviction motion arguing that because he did not understand that he had a right to testify at the responsibility phase, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under State v. Garcia for a determination as to whether he properly waived his right to testify. The lower courts denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) upon a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, a circuit court is not required to conduct a right-to-testify colloquy at the responsibility phase of a bifurcated trial; and (2) Defendant in this case was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he did not make the requisite showing for such a hearing. View "State v. Lagrone" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to twenty-five years of confinement and fifteen years of extended supervision. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate the judgment of conviction, asserting that he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. The postconviction court denied relief, concluding that Defendant had been competent during trial and sentencing. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review to the circuit court’s competency finding and improperly weighed evidence rather than giving deference to the postconviction court’s finding; and (2) when the evidence is reviewed under the proper standard, the postconviction court did not commit clear error in finding that Defendant was competent to stand trial and be sentenced. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In four separate, unrelated cases, Appellant was charged with seventeen criminal counts. Pursuant to a single plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty or no-contest to felony theft as a party to a crime, felony bail jumping, burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, and misdemeanor theft. The circuit court accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences totaling twenty-six years. Appellant subsequently filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief, asserting (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object after the State allegedly breached the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences, and (2) there was an insufficient factual basis for the trial court to accept his guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, as the State did not breach the plea agreement by arguing for consecutive sentences; and (2) there was a sufficient factual basis to accept Appellant’s guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. View "State v. Tourville" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of narcotic drugs. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a warrantless draw of his blood. Later testing of Defendant’s blood indicated the presence of opiates and morphine. The circuit court held that the warrantless draw of Defendant’s blood was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on different grounds, determining that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the drug-related evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Parisi" on Justia Law

Police obtained evidence of marijuana production in Defendant’s home while investigating the source of injuries sustained by Defendant’s brother. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of THC, and manufacture or delivery of THC. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence as unconstitutionally conducted without a warrant and without consent. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not exercising a bona fide community caretaker function and that the officers’ search did not constitute a lawful protective sweep. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers reasonably exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they searched Defendant’s home, and therefore, the search was lawful. View "State v. Matalonis" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to various drug-related offenses in three separate cases. The circuit court’s colloquies with Defendant failed to adhere to Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) because neither of the circuit courts warned Defendant that her pleas and subsequent convictions may have immigration consequences. Defendant later filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas. Under section 971.08(2), if a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea and if the defendant shows that the plea is “likely” to result in the defendant’s deportation, the circuit court “shall” permit withdrawal of the plea. In this case, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, concluding that Defendant had not met the statutory standard of “likely” to suffer immigration consequences because she was not presently the object of a proceeding for deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, as the circuit court did not comply with section 971.08(1)(c), and Defendant showed that her guilty pleas were “likely” to result in her exclusion from admission to this country. View "State v. Valadez" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police inside the parking garage underneath his apartment building and subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers’ conduct occurred during a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area - the curtilage of his home. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parking garage under the apartment building did not constitute curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking garage; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest in the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. View "State v. Dumstrey" on Justia Law

While Christopher S. was serving his sentence for mayhem, Winnebago County filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of Christopher for mental health care under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar). The County also filed a petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication and treatment to Christopher. The circuit court granted both petitions. Thereafter, Christopher filed a motion challenging both orders. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 51.21(1)(ar) does not violate an inmate’s substantive due process rights because it is reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness; and (2) the circuit court did not err when if found that the County established by clear and convincing evidence that Christopher was incompetent to refuse psychotropic medication and treatment. View "Winnebago County v. Christopher S." on Justia Law

A state traffic patrol officer stopped Defendant’s vehicle after observing a cigarette butt being thrown from the passenger side of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of drunk driving obtained by the officer during the stop, claiming that the officer lacked authority to seize his vehicle to investigate the violation of a state statute prohibiting littering. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an officer of the state traffic patrol is constitutionally authorized to stop a vehicle based solely on the officer’s observation of the commission of a non-traffic civil forfeiture offense by an occupant of that vehicle; and (2) in this case, the officer had probable cause to believe that an occupant of Defendant’s vehicle had violated the statute prohibiting littering by throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway. Remanded. View "State v. Iverson" on Justia Law