Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of a felony during the guilt phase of a bifurcated criminal trial. Defendant intended to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) during the second phase of trial in which the jury was to determine Defendant’s responsibility for the crime. The trial court, however, concluded that there was no evidence to sustain that plea and dismissed Defendant’s NGI plea before commencement of the second phase. The court of appeals upheld Defendant’s conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) as a general rule, a defendant is not required to present expert testimony to prove the elements of his NGI defense; (2) a defendant is competent to testify as to his mental condition in the responsibility phase of a criminal trial, but a lay defendant does not have an unlimited, categorical right to give opinion testimony on the issue of mental disease or defect; (3) normally, a court should permit a defendant to offer his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial before the court rules on his NGI defense; but (4) in this case, the evidence to support Defendant’s NGI defense was insufficient as a matter of law. View "State v. Magett" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In order to seek commitment of a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 the State is required to allege that the individual has committed a sexually violent offense, referred to a “predicate offense.” At issue in this case was whether a petition filed under Chapter 980 can be invalidated when the predicate offense recited in the petition is later reversed. In the instant case, the State filed a petition in 2010 to commit Joseph Spaeth as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. 980.02 The Petition referred to convictions for child enticement that occurred in 2009. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed Spaeth’s 2009 convictions. The circuit court subsequently dismissed Spaeth’s Chapter 980 conviction, concluding that once the 2009 convictions were reversed and the charges dismissed, the State could no longer rely on those convictions as a predicate offense to support its petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition should be assessed as of the time of filing; and (2) at the time the State’s petition was filed the statutory requirements in section 980.02 were satisfied, and therefore the Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been dismissed. View "State v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

This case involved Wis. Stat. 346.65(2)(am)(6), the penalty statute for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as the seventh, eighth, or ninth offense. The statute states that the “confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence impose on the person…shall be not less than 3 years.” At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires a sentencing court to impose a bifurcated sentence. In the underlying OWI case, Defendant pled guilty to his seventh OWI offense and asked the circuit court to place him on probation. The court determined that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires imposition of a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was mistaken in believing that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) imposes a mandatory minimum period of initial confinement. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 346.65(2)(am)(6) requires sentencing courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years of initial confinement for a seventh, eighth, or ninth OWI offense. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide and other crimes arising from a high-speed collision involving Defendant’s vehicle and two motorcycles. During trial, the State introduced the preliminary breath test (PBT) result obtained from Defendant by an emergency room (ER) nurse for diagnostic purposes. The trial court also admitted testimony from Dr. William Falco, an ER physician who treated Defendant, that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time he was undergoing treatment in the ER. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Falco’s testimony; and (2) assuming without deciding that the circuit court erred in admitting the PBT result into evidence and in instructing the jury in regard to the PBT, the alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Rocha-Mayo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime, with use of a dangerous weapon. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present testimony at trial of potentially exculpatory witnesses, including an eyewitness other than the State's witnesses. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular eyewitness to testify at trial, and prejudice against Defendant resulted from counsel’s deficient performance. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The State filed a criminal complaint alleging ten counts against Defendant. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to three of the charges against him. After he was sentenced, Defendant filed a postconviction motion arguing that the State materially and substantially breached the plea agreement by implying that the court should impose a longer sentence than the term of imprisonment the State recommended and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object and for failing to consult with him regarding the alleged breaches. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecutor’s comments at the sentencing hearing materially and substantially breached the plea agreement and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s comments during the sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement. View "State v. Bokenyi" on Justia Law

Raphael Lyfold Myrick was involved in an incident in which Justin Winston shot Marquise Harris. The State charged Myrick with first-degree intentional homicide as a party to the crime. Myrick subsequently testified at Winston’s preliminary hearing, at which Myrick made incriminating statements about his involvement in Harris’ murder. The circuit court allowed the State to introduce Myrick’s testimony from Winston’s preliminary hearing, concluding that his testimony was not given in connection with an offer to plead guilty but after a plea agreement had been reached. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wis. Stat. 904.10 prohibited the use of Myrick’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial because, while the prosecutor made the initial overture to begin the plea bargaining process, Myrick offered to plead guilty and testified at the preliminary hearing in connection with that offer. View "State v. Myrick" on Justia Law