Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. Defendant appealed, contending that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed a state crime lab analyst to testify that an out-of-state lab produced DNA profiles of semen found on the victims' swabs, which the analyst discovered resulted in a match to Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the DNA profiles produced by the out-of-state lab were not testimonial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) even assuming that the admission of the expert's testimony violated Defendant's right to confrontation, the error was harmless in light of Defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse with the victims. View "State v. Deadwiller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

Defendant was a suspect in two arsons committed in a nearby town. On March 30, a detective met with Defendant and asked him about the two arsons. Defendant requested counsel, and the detective ceased questioning him. On April 20, the detective arrested Defendant for the arson fires. Defendant asked if his attorney could be "present for this" before being brought into an interrogation room. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant made incriminating statements to the detective. Defendant was charged with the arsons and moved to suppress the statements he made after he waived his right to counsel on April 20. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the detective violated Defendant's right to counsel on April 20 when he interrogated Defendant after Defendant unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because nineteen days had passed between when Defendant was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the March 30 invocation did not bar the interrogation on April 20; but (2) after Defendant's request for an attorney on April, police should have ceased questioning him, and because they did not, Defendant's statements made after that request must be suppressed. View "State v. Edler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant had previously entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect but later withdrew the not guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement. After he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error because he was not informed about the possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial focused on the issue of his mental responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim alleging ineffective assistance was insufficient, as Defendant never alleged (i) his trial counsel failed to inform him that he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or (ii) if trial counsel had informed him of the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, he would have chosen that option; and (2) Defendant's second claim was also insufficient because Defendant failed to state that, due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Mother and Father chose to treat their eleven-year-old daughter's undiagnosed illness with prayer rather than medicine. Their daughter subsequently died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. In separate trials with different juries, Mother and Father were each convicted of second-degree reckless homicide. The parents appealed, arguing (1) their convictions for choosing treatment through prayer violated due process fair notice requirements; and (2) their convictions should be reversed because the real controversy was not fully tried due to erroneous jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, inter alia, (1) the second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute provided sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died; (2) the jury instructions on parents' duty to provide medical care were not erroneous, as the statutory provision protecting treatment through prayer does not negate the legal duty to provide medical care in a second degree reckless homicide prosecution; (3) trial counsels did not provide ineffective assistance; and (4) the controversy was fully tried where the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the parents' sincerely held religious belief in prayer. View "State v. Neumann" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood alcohol concentration. Defendant filed a request for a refusal hearing but did not file his request within the required ten-day time limit. Defendant then sought to extend that time limit. The circuit court denied the motion to extend the ten-day time limit and dismissed Defendant's request for a refusal hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was without competency to hear Defendant's request to extend the ten-day time limit, as the time limit is a mandatory requirement that may not be extended due to excusable neglect. View "Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by fraud of property in excess of $10,000. The charges stemmed from Defendant's conspiracy, while in prison, that defrauded AT&T out of approximately $28,000 of phone services by furnishing the company with fraudulent information. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant made "false representations" to AT&T under the theft-by-fraud statute by submitting fictitious names and stolen personal identifying information; and (2) "property" under the theft-by-fraud statute is all forms of tangible property, including electricity, and therefore, because Defendant stole electricity from AT&T , the conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T deprived the company of its property. View "State v. Steffes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, claiming that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his residence and viewing suspicious files on his computer after the woman he was dating invited the officer to enter the residence. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the woman had the authority to extend the invitation to the officer to cross the threshold and validly consented to the officer's entry and search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the woman had actual authority to consent to the officer's entry into the home and the living room and to consent to the officer's search of the laptop. View "State v. Sobczak" on Justia Law