Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether Wis. Stat. 980 requires the dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition is re-incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or extended supervision. This appeal involved two defendants committed under chapter 980 after their parole and extended supervision was revoked. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and held that dismissal of a Wis. Stat. 980 proceeding was not required when the subject of the petition is transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections before a chapter 980 commitment order is entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may proceed with a chapter 980 commitment after the revocation of a subject individual's parole or extended supervision; and (2) therefore, both of the chapter 980 commitments at issue in this case were valid.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in which Defendant pled no contest to manufacturing THC. Based on a plea colloquy, the circuit court determined that the plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The circuit court accepted Defendant's plea and placed Defendant on probation for a period of two years. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice because did not admit to having more than four marijuana plants at the time of the plea colloquy, but rather admitted to having only four plants. The circuit court denied Defendant's post-conviction motion, determining that Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record, when viewed in its totality, did not support withdrawal of Defendant's plea, as Defendant did not meet his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing the withdrawal of his no contest plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

In this case, an officer conducted a traffic stop of Dimitrius Anagnos's vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped, the officer determined that Anagnos was intoxicated and arrested him for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). The circuit court determined that the traffic stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos's operating privileges should not have been revoked on account of his refusal to take a chemical test to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer pointed to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop; and (2) because the stop of Anagnos's vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that the stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos was not lawfully placed under arrest. Remanded.

As a result of an investigatory stop and search, police discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in a vehicle driven by Defendant Joseph Miller. The circuit court denied Miller's motion to suppress the evidence and statement obtained from this stop, and Miller pleaded no contest to possession of between five and fifteen grams of cocaine with intent to distribute as a party to a crime. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and therefore, the circuit court did err in denying Miller's motion to suppress.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, battery to a police officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and DUI. For the battery conviction, Rowan was sentenced to initial confinement followed by extended supervision. Among the conditions of extended supervision imposed by the sentencing court was the condition that Rowan's person, residence, or vehicle was subject to search for a firearm at any time by any law enforcement officer without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the condition the circuit court imposed on Rowan's extended supervision may have impinged on constitutional rights, it did not violate them; and (2) the evidence in regard to Rowan's conviction for battery to a police officer was sufficient to support the conviction.

Defendant Douglas Williams pled no contest to manufacturing THC. Williams appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that the search warrant that was issued for his home by a circuit court commissioner was invalid as beyond the lawful authority of court commissioners, and that the evidence obtained upon the execution of the warrant should be suppressed. Williams' argued that any exercise of power by unelected persons, such as circuit court commissioners, violated the Wisconsin Constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Wis. Stat. 757.96(1)(b), which grants specific statutory authority to circuit court commissioners to issue search warrants, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Williams' motion to suppress, holding (1) section 757.69(1)(b) is constitutional, as it does not impermissibly intrude upon the judicial power granted to the courts by Wis. Const. art VII, 2; and (2) therefore, the circuit court commissioner's search warrant was validly issued.

Defendant Devin Felix was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals reversed, holding that statements and physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home after Miranda warnings were given and waived following a warrantless in-home arrest made in violation of Payton v. New York were not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest as to be lawful. At issue before the Supreme Court was which analysis governed the admissibility of such evidence, Brown v. Illinois or New York v. Harris, both decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals after adopting the Harris exception to the exclusionary rule for certain evidence obtained after a Payton violation, holding that, where police had probable cause to arrest before the unlawful entry, a warrantless arrest from Defendant's home in violation of Payton required neither the suppression of statements outside of the home after Miranda rights were given and waived nor the suppression of physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home.

The circuit court found William Dinkins guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute, which required Dinkins to provide the address at which he would be residing ten days prior to his release from prison. The court found that Dinkins attempted to comply with the statute but was unable to find housing for himself prior to his release. The court of appeals reversed. The State appealed, contending that homelessness was not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location as the place he would be residing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registrant cannot be convicted of violating the statute for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he is unable to provide this information.

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of misdemeanor retail theft in the circuit court. On appeal, the court of appeals (1) affirmed the conviction; (2) denied Defendant's request to remand the cause to determine whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; and (3) concluded that Defendant could raise the issue of postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in a Wis. Stat. 974.06 motion. The court did not remand the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in ruling that Defendant had an avenue of relief through section 974.06, and the court's error deprived Defendant of any opportunity for review of an on-its-face deficient jury trial waiver colloquy or the clear error by postconviction counsel in filing a defective postconviction motion. Remanded to reinstate Defendant's direct appeal rights and to remand the matter to the circuit court to allow counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction relief.

An accountant and the company he owned (collectively, MBS), filed suit against Defendants, telecommunications companies, asserting claims for damages under Wis. Stat. 100.207 and other statutes, arguing that Defendants' telephone bills contained unauthorized charges. The circuit court dismissed MBS's claims for relief, determining that although the complaint properly alleged violations of section 100.207, the voluntary payment doctrine barred any entitlement to monetary relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Supreme Court had not decided whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute; and (2) under the circumstances, the conflict between the manifest purpose of section 100.207 and the common law defense left no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute. Remanded.