Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jerele Craig Cothren, Jr., was facing four separate sentences from three courts for unrelated crimes. The most recent sentence, and the one upon which this appeal was based, required that Appellant serve his term of incarceration concurrent with a sentence for which he was then presently incarcerated, as well as consecutive to a probationary period that had yet to begin. Because it was impossible to meet both these requirements, and because the sentence as pronounced would require the period of incarceration to be interrupted by a period of probation, the Supreme Court concluded Appellant's sentence was illegal. Appellant's case was remanded to the district court for resentencing.

After stopping Patrick R. Espinoza for failing to maintain a single lane of travel while driving on Interstate 80 (I-80) in Laramie, an Albany County Sheriff's deputy arrested Mr. Espinoza for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) suspended Mr. Espinoza's driver's license, and he objected. At the contested case hearing, Mr. Espinoza claimed the deputy was not justified in stopping him. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the deputy had probable cause to stop Mr. Espinoza for the traffic violation and affirmed.

Defendant Kevin Kidwell challenged his convictions for false imprisonment and simple assault. He claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to give prior notice of evidence suggesting he had attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely in his favor at trial in violation of W.R.E. 404(b). Defendant was charged with kidnapping and aggravated assault and battery after a 2010 incident where Defendant and his girlfriend got into an altercation. The girlfriend was admitted to the hospital with bruises and other symptoms from having been choked. The defense listed Andrew Scott as a witness. Scott had been Defendant's former cellmate while incarcerated, and reported on another altercation between Defendant and his girlfriend in which the girlfriend had been the aggressor. Although he had been listed as a defense witness, the prosecution called Scott to the stand and had him recount his original plan to testify in Defendant's favor and his subsequent change of heart. Defendant did not object to the State calling Scott as a witness nor Scott's story. A jury eventually returned a verdict "decidedly favorable" to Defendant: they acquitted him on the kidnapping and aggravated assault and battery charges, and the lesser included offense of felonious restraint. They convicted him however, of the lesser included misdemeanor, false imprisonment. The appeal came before the Supreme Court on an unusual procedural stance: although Defendant claimed the evidence of Scott's plan to testify falsely was "other bad acts" evidence and governed by W.R.E. 404(b), he did not specifically challenge the admissibility of the evidence or analyze it under the relevant factors. Instead, Defendant maintained that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to give Defendant notice of Scott's testimony. Finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate a clear violation of law or any prejudice, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.

Defendant Michael Patterson challenged the sentence he was serving on his conviction as an accessory to second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory twenty-year term for his crime. Less than a month later, the State filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentence” in the case. The motion cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-201, which requires that the minimum sentence be no greater than 90% of the maximum. The State asked to change the original sentence of 20-22 years to a sentence of 240-267 months, adding three months to the maximum sentence. The district court granted the motion the day after it was filed, and imposed a new sentence of 240-267 months. A year and a half later, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. He contended that a sentence of 20-22 years was illegal because it violated the requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-201 that the minimum be no more than 90% of the maximum. He asserted that his sentence could not be legally increased after he had begun serving it, and proposed a new sentence of 19-22 years. Four months later, Defendant filed an Amended Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. All of the previous post-sentencing pleadings filed by or on behalf of Defendant had recited that his sentence was 20-22 years. This amended motion was the first to recognize that his sentence had been increased to 240-267 months. Defendant argued that the increase in his sentence violated his rights against double jeopardy, and further, violated his rights to due process because the sentence was increased without notice to him and without an opportunity for a hearing. The Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent Defendant, and it filed a supplemental motion and brief on his behalf. After a hearing, the district court set aside the previous order increasing Defendant's sentence from 20-22 years to 240-267 months, and reinstated the original sentence of 20-22 years. The district court acknowledged that this original sentence was technically illegal because the minimum exceeded 90% of the maximum. It noted, however, that the minimum sentence was only "90.09 percent rather than 90 or less" of the maximum sentence. The district court characterized this as a "small deviation," and concluded that "the original sentence was not illegal because it substantially complied" with the statute. Defendant appealed the district court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's original sentence was illegal and must be set aside. The Court concluded that the reinstituted sentence of 20-22 years was also illegal, and set that sentence aside too. The case was remanded for resentencing.

Appellant Kristen Spreeman was convicted of felony driving while under the influence (DWUI) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and (e). Appellant appealed, claiming that she did not have three prior qualifying convictions as required by section 31-5-233(e) to enhance her DWUI conviction to a felony. Specifically, Appellant contended that driving while "visibly impaired" under Mich. Comp. Laws 257.625(3) did not constitute an "other law prohibiting driving while under the influence" under section 31-5-233(e). The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Wyoming's enhancement provision does not restrict qualifying convictions to offenses that arise from violations of laws that are identical, or even substantially similar, to Wyoming's definition of driving while under the influence; and (2) therefore, Appellant's Michigan conviction for driving while visibly impaired may be used to enhance the current conviction to a felony.

A jury convicted Vincent Scott of first degree sexual assault, aggravated assault, and child abuse. Scott appealed, claiming the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial and imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court in this case had the discretion to deny Scott's untimely request to proceed without counsel, and although it erred in denying the request on the grounds that Scott's decision was not knowing and intelligent, the request was properly denied as untimely; and (2) the sentence imposed was not impossible or illegal because the district court awarded credit for time served, which made the sentencing scheme possible.

A Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper stopped Bryan Phelps and Justin Fitch for a traffic violation, detained them, conducted a drug dog sniff of their vehicle and, after the dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, searched the vehicle and found marijuana. Phelps and Fitch were each charged with three felonies. They moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, and the district court denied the motion. Phelps and Fitch subsequently entered pleas of guilty to one of the counts while reserving their right to appeal the denial of their suppression motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that probable cause existed for the search.

After a jury trial, Appellant Charles Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. Jones appealed, arguing that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and that the prosecutor committed cumulative error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge's failure to give an intent instruction was harmless, as there was no prejudice to Jones; (2) the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Jones of robbery; and (3) Jones was not denied his right to a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of any alleged prosecutorial misconduct that may have occurred.

After entering a conditional plea to one count of felony child abuse, Roman Vance reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, which was premised on grounds of constitutional speedy trial. On appeal, Vance claimed that a six and one-half year delay between charging and arrest raised a presumption of prejudice that the State did not persuasively rebut. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Vance's motion to dismiss based upon a violation of his constitutional speedy trial right, as the court overlooked the question of presumptive prejudice and because no evidence was offered by the prosecution to rebut the presumption of prejudice afforded to Vance.

After a jury trial, Appellant Francis Guerrero was convicted of felony larceny. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to five years of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, claiming the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of larceny and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant's second claim and reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that Appellant's activities constituted a taking, one of the elements of larceny, as opposed to a conversion. Consequently, the Court found that Appellant was entitled to an acquittal on the charge of felony larceny.