Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Timothy Kramer was convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree murder; (2) Kramer's trial attorneys were not ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions, and counsel's investigation into the timeline of events was sufficient; and (3) the trial court did not err or violate Kramer's confrontation right when it allowed one of the main witnesses in the trial to testify via video conference, as, under the circumstances, presentation of this testimony in that manner was necessary to further an important public policy, and the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured.

Defendant Christopher Counts was convicted of aggravated burglary and kidnapping. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error by the district court in admitting redacted documents and recordings into evidence was harmless; (2) the district court erred by limiting Defendant's cross-examination of the victim, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a bill of particulars; (4) the district court properly instructed the jury; (5) the verdict was consistent; and (6) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the charges of kidnapping and aggravated burglary.

Alfred Baldes, a certified nursing assistant, was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual assault after giving a young man who suffered from muscular dystrophy a sponge bath. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Baldes' conviction, and specifically, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Baldes was in a position of authority and that sexual contact occurred, respectively; and (2) the trial court did not err when, following a Gleason analysis, it allowed the introduction of Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, specifically the testimony of another client of Baldes'.

After being separately cited and arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI), Ricky Miller and Christopher Gonzalez (Petitioners) petitioned the district court for review of agency inaction by the Wyoming Department of Health (WDOH). Miller and Gonzalez requested that the district court require the WDOH to retroactively decertify the chemical test operators who had performed chemical tests of Petitioners' breath to determine the quantity of alcohol in their respective bodies. The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds that Petitioners lacked standing to bring the action and that the matter was not ripe for review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners did not satisfy the three elements of standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Petitioners' petition for review for lack of standing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christina Clark pled guilty to two counts of third degree sexual abuse of a minor. The district court sentenced her to two concurrent terms of six to ten years in prison. Clark appealed from the judgment and sentence, claiming her guilty pleas were not voluntary and she was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court failed to mention probation in the written judgment and sentence in accordance with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded for entry of an amended judgment, holding (1) Clark made a voluntary and informed choice to plead guilty; and (2) the district court in this case clearly considered probation before imposing a prison sentence. Remanded to the district court with directions to enter an amended sentence reflecting that the court considered probation in accordance with Rule 32.

Dennis Poitra and two other assailants were involved in the armed robbery of a residence that ended in the killing of a seventy-six-year-old. A jury convicted Poitra of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Poitra's right to present the defense of involuntary intoxication and in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of involuntary intoxication; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Poitra's motion to change venue and did not violate his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury in doing so; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Poitra to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Appellant Hailey Remmick was convicted of six counts of receiving stolen property and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee. Remmick appealed, claiming that pre-charging delay deprived her of due process of law and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because there was no indication that the delay in bringing charges was motivated by an intentional effort to gain tactical advantage over Remmick or evidence that Remmick suffered any actual prejudice, the district court did not err in denying Remmick's motion to dismiss the charges; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Remmick's convictions on the charges of receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, David Mercer pleaded no contest to three felony counts of sexual abuse of a minor. After he was sentenced, Mercer appealed, asserting that the State breached its plea agreement at sentencing when it misstated facts and argued for a harsh sentence based on Mercer's alleged failure to accept personal responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mercer failed to establish that the State breached the plea agreement where (1) a misstatement made by the prosecutor did not prejudice Mercer or violate any clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (2) the prosecutor properly recommended that Mercer should receive the maximum possible sentence based on Mercer's attempt to minimize his behavior.

Victor Jackson pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in exchange for the state's agreement to request probation. The district court placed him on supervised probation for five years. Six months later, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation. A year later, Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that the victim of the assault had identified someone else as the perpetrator. The district court denied the motion and entered an order revoking probation. The court then imposed a sentence of four to five years. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw, holding that there was nothing in the record indicating that the district court could not reasonably have concluded as it did or that some facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.

Appellant Miachel Maier was convicted of first-degree and attempted first-degree sexual assault. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) he was prejudiced by the admission of hearsay testimony and by prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at trial due to his attorney's failure to object to either the hearsay testimony or the prosecutor's closing remarks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court admitted testimony that included inadmissible hearsay, Appellant was not denied a substantial right and was therefore not materially prejudiced; (2) the prosecutor's statements in his closing argument did not amount to misconduct; and (3) Appellant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was so deficient as to require reversal of his conviction.