Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Chad Mebane was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and two counts of delivery of methamphetamine. Mebane appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to advise him before he testified that he had a right not to testify and, as a result, his choice to testify was not made intelligently. Mebane appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to advise him at the close of the State's case that he did not have to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mebane was adequately advised by the trial court at arraignment of his right to remain silent; and (2) Mebane voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to remain silent.

Joseph Dax faced state and federal criminal charges arising from a burglary that involved theft of firearms. After the federal court imposed sentence, Dax was transferred to state custody. Thereafter the state imposed sentence. Dax requested credit for time served, which the district court denied. Dax later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, requesting credit for time served and claiming that he should receive credit against his state sentence for time spent in pre-trial detention on his federal charge. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred review of the issue because Dax did not take advantage of the opportunity to raise it multiple times before.

Appellant Jimmy Dean Smallfoot entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Smallfoot reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana discovered inside his residence. On appeal, Smallfoot claimed the drug evidence should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of a constitutionally infirm warrantless entry into his home. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's suppression ruling, holding that the court correctly determined that the officers' warrantless entry into Smallfoot's residence pursuant to the consent of another alleged resident of the home was constitutionally permissible.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Lawrence Silva was convicted for aggravated burglary and attempt to commit kidnapping. The district court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for twelve to fifteen years on each count to be served concurrent. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err by preventing Appellant from introducing certain evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct, as the evidence was irrelevant to Appellant's defense; and (2) the district court properly declined to instruct the jury on the offense of false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of kidnapping because the lesser-included offense required an element not required for the higher felony offense.

Gary James was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and battery and two counts of driving under the influence with serious bodily injury. The district court imposed four consecutive terms of eight to ten years of incarceration. James appealed, contending that the convictions should have merged to two convictions for sentencing purposes because the consecutive sentences violated his constitutional right against multiple punishments for the same offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because James committed two separate and distinct criminal acts against each of two victims, the district court appropriately imposed consecutive sentences for those separate offenses.

Appellant received a sentence of twenty to twenty-two years imprisonment for a crime punishable by a term of twenty years to life. More than four years after starting his sentence, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that his sentenced violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-201 because the minimum term was greater than ninety percent of the maximum term. Rather than decrease the minimum term below the statutory minimum, the district court increased the maximum term from 265 months to 267 months. Appellant appealed, arguing that increasing his sentence after he had begun to serve that sentence violated double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's original sentence was illegal because it violated the statutory requirement that a minimum term may not be more than ninety percent of the maximum term; (2) the district court correctly increased the maximum term; but (3) the corrected sentence should have reflected the appropriate credit for the time appellant had served. Remanded.

Brady Michaels was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Department of Transportation (the State) notified him that it was suspending his driver's license for ninety days. The Office of administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order upholding the license suspension, holding (1) the OAH's ruling that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-5-233(b) (the statute) does not distinguish between alcohol concentration caused by consuming alcoholic beverages and alcohol concentration caused by some other factor was incorrect, as the statute was intended to apply when a person drives or is in actual control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol beyond the legal limit or to a degree rendering him incapable of safely driving; but (2) the State met its burden of proving that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest to believe that Michaels had violated the statute.

The district court terminated Father's parental rights to his three children after finding by clear and convincing evidence that he was incarcerated for a felony conviction and was unfit to have the custody and control of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not plainly err when it allowed a police report and the testimony of the officer who wrote the report into evidence; (2) the district court did not plainly err when it allowed into evidence the officer's testimony regarding the credibility of a victim's statement; and (3) Mother presented clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit to have the custody and control of his children.

After initiating a traffic stop, a highway patrol trooper found marijuana in Jason Holohan's vehicle. Holohan was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Holohan filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle, claiming the trooper lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop at the time he activated his flashing lights and could not use events occurring after activating his lights to justify the stop. The district court agreed and granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Holohan did not submit to the trooper's show of authority in activating his lights, there was no Fourth Amendment seizure until the vehicle pulled off the highway and stopped; and (2) at the point that the vehicle pulled off the highway, the trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle for weaving erratically and a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon Holohan's failure to pull over in response to the flashing lights.

Appellant Roger Snow was convicted of felony burglary and a related misdemeanor. Snow appealed, contending that the district court erred when it denied his request for a new attorney and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court met its obligation to inquire about Snow's request for substitute counsel, and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in addressing Snow's desire for substitute counsel; and (2) Snow failed to show he was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, or that his attorney's failure to request such an instruction so prejudiced him as to require reversal.