Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant Carl Peterson was convicted of second degree sexual abuse of a minor and soliciting a minor to engage in sexual relations. Peterson appealed, raising multiple allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) Peterson failed to demonstrate that counsel's investigation and evaluation of a witness's likely testimony was flawed and outside the realm of professionally competent assistance; (2) Peterson failed to show that counsel was ineffective at the victim's competency hearing; (3) trial counsel was not ineffective in his cross-examination of the victim; and (4) counsel was not ineffective in his questioning of jurors during the voir dire process.

Appellant Wyatt Bear Cloud and two co-defendants were involved in an armed burglary of a residence in which one of Bear Cloud's co-defendants shot and killed one of the home's residents. Bear Cloud, who was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses, ultimately pleaded guilty to felony-murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and aggravated burglary. Bear Cloud was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conviction for felony-murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Bear Cloud's convictions and sentences in their entireties, holding, inter alia, (1) Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective in her representation of Bear Cloud; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to transfer proceedings to juvenile court; (3) a life sentence for a juvenile who did not commit homicide does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution or Wyo. Const. art. I, 14; and (4) Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-101(b) is not rendered unconstitutional by its mandatory sentencing structure, even as applied to a juvenile offender, and particularly in light of the district court's ability to consider mitigating circumstances when considering whether to transfer proceedings to juvenile court.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and robbery. After losing his appeal, Appellant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that Appellant's claim was procedurally barred pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-14-103(a)(iii) because he raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal, which was decided on the merits. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition, holding (1) where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been raised and decided against the appellant in his direct appeal, he may not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon different allegations, in a petition for post-conviction relief, as the claim is procedurally barred by section 7-14-103(a)(iii); and (2) a stand-alone claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not cognizable under the post-conviction relief statutes because post-conviction relief is limited to the alleged denial of constitutional rights during the proceedings that resulted in conviction.

A police officer was presented with an emergency situation when, upon entering Appellant Joseph Owens' motel room, he found Appellant convulsing on the floor. The officer subsequently searched Appellant's backpack and the containers found therein in an attempt to aid Appellant and discovered methamphetamine. Appellant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine. Owens reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of the search that resulted in discovery of the methamphetamine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances presented, the State satisfied its burden of establishing specific and articulable facts showing that the search was justified pursuant to the officer's community caretaker function.

Appellant Derrick Brock, the assistant manager at a restaurant, failed to deposit the restaurant's previous two day earnings at the bank, and afterwards, never returned to work. Following a jury trial, Appellant Derrick Brock was convicted of larceny by bailee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call investigating officers to testify regarding their investigation; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate or interview or call key witnesses with possibly exculpatory information; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the prosecution's objection to cross-examination of a witness regarding statements made to the police.

Appellant, Andy Lovato, entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine. Appellant appealed, claiming the district court incorrectly concluded that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when he was seized by the police. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress evidence because the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying briefly detaining Appellant for further investigation; and (2) the police had probable cause to arrest Appellant for interference when a peace officer after he failed to obey one officer's commands to stop and then struggled with the police officers.

Appellant Timothy Shaeffer was convicted of aggravated assault and battery after he waved around a flare gun during an altercation at a bar. On appeal, Appellant claimed he was subject to numerous errors, which affected his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to appoint Appellant new counsel on the second day of trial; (2) the trial court did not violate Appellant's right to self-representation, as Appellant never made an unequivocal request to represent himself; (3) the trial court did not require Appellant to wear excessive physical restraints, and the trial court's failure to not instruct the jury regarding the shackles did not constitute plain error; (4) after Appellant had been deemed competent to proceed, the circumstances at trial were not such that would have required an additional competency evaluation; (5) the trial court did not exhibit judicial bias against Appellant; and (6) the State did not provide the trial court with inappropriate or incorrect information at the sentencing hearing.

Steven Kruger pled guilty to felony child abuse. At the scheduled sentencing Kruger sought to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Kruger's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, Kruger's plea was knowing and voluntary; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Kruger did not present any "fair and just reason" to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) Kruger's plea was not in the nature of an Alvord plea because Kruger never professed his innocence and did not meet his burden of proving that the victims recanted.

Appellant pled guilty to one count of interference with a police officer. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to six years incarceration. The prison sentence was suspended pursuant to the split sentencing provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-107, and Appellant was ordered to serve 180 days in jail, to be followed by four years of supervised probation. Later, Appellant admitted to violating his probation, after which the district court reimposed the original sentence, giving credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reimposing sentence after Appellant's probation was revoked.

Appellant David Walker was convicted of felony stalking as a result of an encounter with his ex-wife in violation of a permanent order of protection. A conviction for stalking required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error resulted when the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of acts comprising a course of conduct of harassment admitted as Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) uncharged misconduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence where a course of conduct of harassment is an element of the charged offense.