Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant David Walker was convicted of felony stalking as a result of an encounter with his ex-wife in violation of a permanent order of protection. A conviction for stalking required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error resulted when the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of acts comprising a course of conduct of harassment admitted as Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) uncharged misconduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence where a course of conduct of harassment is an element of the charged offense.

After a jury trial, Enroe Jealous was convicted of aggravated assault and battery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three to eight years. Jealous appealed, contending that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was not misled or confused as to the elements of the crime; (2) the district court did not plainly err by failing to define the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly"; and (3) it was not plain error for he district court to instruct the jury that it could base its verdict on any and all proven theories of guilt.

A jury found Gloria Landeroz (1) guilty of aggravated assault and battery and (2) not guilty of attempted first degree murder and the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The State subsequently moved for dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge without prejudice. The district court granted the motion. Landeroz appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred in dismissing the charge because in doing so it exposed her to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict but remanded for an entry of an order clarifying that the dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge was "with prejudice" as to that offense, but "without prejudice" as to the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter, holding (1) to the extent the dismissal without prejudice suggested Landeroz could be re-prosecuted for attempted first or second degree murder, the order violated the double jeopardy clause; and (2) Landeroz did not meet her burden of providing a Brady violation occurred, depriving her of due process.

Brodey Burnett was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was properly instructed on the elements of attempted second degree murder; (2) the jury instructions regarding aggravated assault and battery causing serious bodily injury were not in error and caused no prejudice to Burnett; and (3) the fact that the statutory provisions defining the crimes of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault and battery were overlapping did not deprive Burnett of his due process rights because the elements of the two crimes were not identical.

Appellant Jeramie Large was charged with six crimes arising from an incident when he stole and crashed a vehicle. Large appealed, claiming (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) he was denied his right to counsel without being adequately instructed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was afforded a speedy trial as it occurred without the 180-day time period required by Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48, and any delays did not violate Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; and (2) Appellant's right to counsel was not violated as the district court adequately instructed Appellant on the dangers of proceeding without counsel.

A state trooper stopped William Tiernan on suspicion of driving while impaired after he observed Tiernan's vehicle cross the center line and fog line a couple of times. The trooper conducted field sobriety tests and arrested Tiernan for driving under the influence of alcohol. Tiernan refused to submit to chemical testing. The Department of Transportation (DOT) subsequently suspended Tiernan's driver's license. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. The district court affirmed. Tiernan appealed, contending that the trooper failed to present sufficient facts to support the stop for a lane violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's decision.

Appellant Randal Craft entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance and reserved the right to appeal whether he entered a valid waiver of counsel in a prior conviction that was used to enhance the present charge to a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding Appellant's waiver of counsel in the proceeding at issue was knowing and intelligent where the advisements given in the proceeding complied with the requirements of Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11, and there was no indication in the record that Appellent did not understand those advisements, including the advisement that he had a right to an attorney.

In 1999, James Graham was convicted on four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. Graham's appeal challenged the amount of restitution ordered as part of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. In 2010, Graham filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court ruled that Graham's sentence was not illegal and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Graham's appeal was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because he could have raised the majority of his issues in his initial appeal and did not suggest any good cause for failing to do so; (2) because res judicata barred his claims that the underlying sentence was illegal, there was no foundation for his challenge to the subsequent revocation of his probation; and (3) the Court was not compelled to consider Graham's claims in the interests of justice, largely because his claims were without merit.

Appellant Christopher Harrell was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it did not allow him to introduce evidence that he had been acquitted of a previous battery charge and that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was violated because he was deprived of testimony that was vital, material, and relevant to his defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments were not persuasive and that Appellant did not demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from the district court's refusal to allow him to introduce testimony about his previous acquittal for battery.

Petitioner Bobby Jenkins was charged with misdemeanor animal cruelty after a horse he owned was discovered in dire physical condition. A jury convicted him of the charges. The district court affirmed. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of review, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that he was materially prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to (1) object to testimony and argument regarding the arrest and incarceration of both Petitioner and his brother, (2) object to the prosecutor's improper questioning of a witness about the credibility of another witness, or (3) object to the prosecutor's question relating to allegedly irrelevant testimony about the condition of other horses and Petitioner's speeding ticket.