Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, the district court held Appellant Martin Hultgren in criminal contempt due to his failure to comply with the terms of a dispositional order entered in a juvenile case. Despite the fact that the charge had been amended to allege only three violations, in its written judgment and sentence for criminal contempt of court the district court indicated that it held Hultgren in contempt on six grounds. Hultgren filed an appeal. Subsequently, the district court entered a judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc order amending its earlier criminal contempt order to reflect that it found that Hultgren violated the juvenile court order in three ways, not six. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the entry of the nunc pro tunc order, the basis for Hultgren's issue on appeal had disappeared.

Appellant Thomas Stastny was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and attempted sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Appellant challenged the district court's admission of evidence of a prior conviction, accused the prosecutor of committing misconduct during closing argument, and alleged that these cumulative errors required reversal of his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of invited error barred Appellant from raising in his appeal issues concerning the admission of evidence of his prior conviction, (2) plain error did not occur as a result of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (3) as there was no error, the doctrine of cumulative error did not require reversal of Appellant's convictions.

Craig Winstead pled guilty to three counts of third degree sexual assault, and the district court sentenced him to ten to fifteen years on each count with the sentence on the first count to be served first and the sentences on the second and third counts to be served consecutively to the first sentence and concurrently with each other. Winstead filed a motion to correct on illegal sentence, claiming his sentences should have merged and asking the court to order that he serve his sentences concurrently. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Winstead's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Winstead could have raised the issue during the sentencing hearing, on direct appeal, or when he filed a motion for judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc and failed to do so.

Appellant Dana Dickey entered a conditional plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance. Dickey reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in her purse following a traffic stop, claiming the evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of a constitutionally infirm detention under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Dickey's motion to suppress where (1) the detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, (2) the use of a drug dog during Dickey's lawful detention did not violate any constitutionally protected right, and (3) law enforcement officers had probable cause to search the vehicle.

Appellant Marshall Washington, while working as a confidential informant for the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), was charged with and found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The district court's judgment and sentence incorrectly stated that Appellant pled guilty to the offenses, and the parties entered a stipulated motion to modify the judgment and sentence to correct the inaccuracy. Washington appealed, arguing that (1) the district court improperly denied discovery of the confidential informant agreement (CI agreement) between him and the DCI as well as the DCI's policy manual; and (2) the matter should be reversed inasmuch as the modified judgment and sentence did not fully comply with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that no reversible error was committed by the trial court because (1) Appellant had access to the CI agreement prior to trial and referred to the document at trial, and denial of Appellant's motion to compel discovery of DCI's policy manual was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the omissions in the modified judgment and sentence were simply clerical errors that would be corrected on remand to the district court. Remanded.

Myra Jean Ford was convicted of seven counts of forgery. On appeal, Ford contended that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's presentation of evidence, arguing that the evidence the State produced was not sufficient to prove any of the fundamental elements of the crime of forgery. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and sentence, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ford's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford acted with the intent to defraud. Remanded with directions that the information be dismissed with prejudice.

David Baker was convicted on six methamphetamine-related charges. The Supreme Court reversed his convictions on two of the charges and affimed the other four. In these consolidated appeals, Baker (1) challenged the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and (2) claimed the district court erred when it did not grant him access to e-mail correspondence between the department of corrections and the public defender's office. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baker's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and (2) the district court was correct in observing that Baker's motion for subpoena duces tecum asking for the requested e-mail correspondence was not appropriate in the context of Baker's criminal matter.

In this termination of parental rights case, police officers found illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in the room where Mother's two children watched television. The Department of Family Services (DFS) removed the children, placed them in foster care, and agreed on a family service plan with Mother. Mother failed to follow the requirements of her service plan. The district court subsequently terminated Mother's rights to the two children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) Mother was unfit to have custody and control of the children, (2) the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they returned to Mother, and (3) DFS made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family as required by law.

Appellant Kelly Robinson was convicted of three misdemeanors and one felony. All of the crimes arose in a domestic violence context. One of Robinson's misdemeanor convictions was the violation of a protection order, which resulted from Robinson mailing a letter to the victim, who had obtained a protection order. Robinson challenged his conviction for violation of the protection order, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for the crime charged. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the record on appeal lacked evidence to support the conviction as charged. Because the circuit court found that Robinson's conduct constituted stalking as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-506(b), the trial court erred in convicting Robinson under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-4-404(b). Because of the error, the Court reversed the conviction entered pursuant to Section 6-4-404, and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. Remanded.

Defendant Richard Vasco was arrested for interference with a police officer and for driving under the influence of alcohol. Vasco refused to submit to chemical testing, and the Wyoming DOT advised him that it was suspending his driver's license for six months. Vasco requested a hearing, at the conclusion of which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. Vasco sought review in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order. Vasco appealed, claiming the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for interference, and therefore the subsequent search was improper and the evidence obtained in the search that supported the DUI arrest was inadmissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the OAH decision where (1) the officer had probable cause to arrest Vasco for interference with a police officer, and (2) the officer had probable cause to believe Vasco had been driving under the influence of alcohol.