Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Susan Embert was arrested in February 2015 for charges related to the shooting death of her husband, William “Jake” Embert. She was indicted on June 24, 2015, on five counts, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Her trial took place in December 2019, nearly five years after her arrest, and she was found guilty on all counts. However, over three years later, it was discovered that one of the jurors was a convicted felon, making him ineligible for jury service. Embert raised this issue in her third amended motion for a new trial, which the trial court granted based on the juror’s ineligibility.The trial court then dismissed the case on constitutional speedy trial grounds, determining that the December 2019 trial was void due to the ineligible juror, and thus did not count for the speedy trial calculation. The court found that the delay from Embert’s arrest to the present exceeded nine years, violating her constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court attributed most of the delay to Embert but concluded that the presumptive prejudice from the nine-year delay warranted dismissal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in finding the December 2019 trial void for speedy trial purposes. The court clarified that a trial with an ineligible juror results in a voidable verdict, not a void trial. Consequently, the December 2019 trial should be considered for the speedy trial analysis. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the speedy trial analysis, instructing the trial court to reweigh the factors using the correct factual and legal analysis. View "THE STATE v. EMBERT" on Justia Law

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Luis Javier Matta Quiñones was convicted of possession of firearms and ammunition as a prohibited person and possession of a machinegun. Matta claimed he was wrongfully accused by police officers who found contraband nearby. He attempted to discredit the officers' testimony that he threw a feed sack containing guns and ammunition onto a roof while fleeing. Matta argued on appeal that the district court hindered his defense in several ways, including allowing the government's case agent to be present during jury deliberations.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico oversaw Matta's trial. The jury found Matta guilty on both charges. Matta moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and improper jury contact by the case agent. The district court denied both motions, reasoning that Matta had waived objections to the case agent's presence and that the contact was brief and non-prejudicial. Matta was sentenced to 96 months' imprisonment, with an additional 18 months for revocation of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support Matta's convictions but agreed that the district court erred by allowing the case agent to be present during jury deliberations without proper investigation into potential juror misconduct. The appellate court vacated Matta's convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court also vacated the revocation of supervised release sentence and remanded for resentencing. Additionally, the court addressed evidentiary issues likely to recur, ruling that Matta should have been allowed to cross-examine Officer Vidal about prior statements and that the Receipt Form could be admissible under the business records exception. View "United States v. Matta-Quinones" on Justia Law

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Gregory Wilson was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including human trafficking of a minor by force or fear, human trafficking to commit another crime, kidnapping, and criminal threats. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 31 years and eight months, followed by an indeterminate term of 30 years to life. Wilson appealed, arguing that his defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp" during closing arguments, which he claimed violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA).The trial court had found Wilson guilty based on substantial evidence, including testimonies from victims B.W., K.W., and B.C., who described being forced into prostitution through violence and threats. The jury found Wilson not guilty of rape and forcible oral copulation but convicted him on other charges. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp." The court reasoned that the term is a recognized term of art in the sex trafficking subculture, describing a pimp who uses force and violence. The court also noted that the issue of ineffective counsel should be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where defense counsel can explain their conduct.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding substantial evidence supporting Wilson's convictions for human trafficking and kidnapping. The court also rejected Wilson's claims regarding sentencing, including the argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated section 654's prohibition against multiple punishments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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Lavonce Makiri Smith was stopped by police in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and a gun was found in his pocket. Smith moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him. The incident began when Detective Garza was involved in a car accident, and Lt. Jonathan Wu, who was also at the scene, noticed a silver Chrysler that matched a stolen vehicle report. The Chrysler circled the area multiple times, and Wu observed three young Black men, including Smith, walking towards his car from the direction of the Chrysler. Wu suspected they were associated with the stolen car and might be planning a carjacking or robbery.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan held an evidentiary hearing where Wu testified. The court found Wu's testimony credible and concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Smith. The court ruled that the stop was lawful due to the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the frisk was justified based on the totality of the circumstances suggesting Smith was armed and dangerous. Smith entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court found that Wu's observations and the behavior of Smith and his companions, combined with the context of the stolen vehicle and the high-crime area, provided a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. The court also rejected Smith's arguments challenging the district court's factual findings and application of the law, concluding that the totality of the circumstances justified the stop and frisk. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

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In December 2020, Gavin Smith's grandfather discovered Smith's mother, stepfather, and two younger brothers shot to death in their home. Smith, who was sixteen at the time, was later found at his girlfriend's grandmother's house and arrested. Smith's girlfriend, Rebecca Walker, was also charged but entered a plea agreement to testify against Smith in exchange for a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County transferred Smith from juvenile to adult criminal jurisdiction. A grand jury indicted him on four counts of first-degree murder and four counts of using a firearm during a felony. During the trial, Walker testified about her plea deal and the events of the murders. Smith's counsel cross-examined her about the life sentence she avoided, leading to a court instruction clarifying that Smith would be eligible for parole after fifteen years due to his age at the time of the crime.The jury convicted Smith of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of using a firearm during a felony. The court sentenced him to three life terms with mercy plus fifty years, all to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. Smith argued that the circuit court erred by informing the jury about his parole eligibility, which prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the circuit court's instruction on parole eligibility was improper and prejudicial. The court held that outside the context of cases involving a recommendation of mercy, it is improper to inform the jury about sentencing possibilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Smith's convictions and the circuit court's sentencing order, remanding the case for a new trial. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Roger Snake, an elder member of the Ho-Chunk tribe, pleaded guilty in 2011 to two counts of abusive sexual contact with minors. After completing his prison sentence in 2020, he began a lifetime term of supervised release. Snake violated several conditions of his release, including having unapproved and unsupervised contact with minors and traveling outside the judicial district without permission. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, which was above the recommended range in the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin initially addressed Snake's violations informally, reminding him of the conditions of his supervised release. However, after further violations, including being found alone with minors in his home, the court issued a summons. Snake admitted to the violations, and his lawyer requested home detention instead of prison, citing his role as a tribal elder. The district court rejected this argument, emphasizing the severity of his violations and the risk he posed to minors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Snake argued that the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for imposing a sentence above the guideline range. The appellate court, applying a highly deferential standard of review, found that the district court had sufficiently explained its decision. The court noted that the district judge had considered the relevant statutory factors and the egregiousness of Snake's violations. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing the need for clear explanations in sentencing and the importance of addressing potential procedural errors promptly. View "United States v. Snake" on Justia Law

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Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

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Jacob McWaters was stopped by law enforcement in January 2023, and they found 19,910 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle. During a post-Miranda interview, McWaters admitted to transporting methamphetamine from Texas to Minnesota and had done so on two prior occasions. He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa sentenced McWaters to 240 months in custody, followed by five years of supervised release. McWaters objected to the Presentence Report’s (PSR) calculation of his Guidelines range, arguing for a reduction in his offense level due to his mitigating role. The district court overruled his objection and calculated his Guidelines range at 292 to 365 months. However, the court granted a partial downward variance, resulting in a 240-month sentence.McWaters appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in not applying a role reduction under USSG § 3B1.2. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual finding for clear error. The court noted that McWaters needed to prove his conduct involved more than one participant and that his culpability was minor compared to others. McWaters emphasized his role as a low-level courier with minimal knowledge of the drug operation but failed to provide evidence comparing his conduct to other participants. The court found no clear error in the district court’s decision and upheld the denial of the role reduction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, maintaining McWaters’s 240-month sentence. View "United States v. McWaters" on Justia Law

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A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

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DeShawn Gervin was on probation in Georgia with the sole condition that he not return to the South Georgia Judicial Circuit. He moved to North Carolina but was later imprisoned there for various crimes. A Georgia probation officer, Pamela Florence, learned of his North Carolina offenses and sought a warrant for his arrest in Georgia, falsely claiming he had violated probation by failing to report. Gervin was arrested in North Carolina and extradited to Georgia, where he spent 104 days in jail before a court found he had not violated his probation and ordered his release.Gervin sued Florence and another probation officer, Tandria Milton, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment claim, characterizing it as a malicious-prosecution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that Gervin presented enough evidence to support his Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. The court found that Florence and Milton recklessly made false statements and omissions that led to Gervin's arrest and prolonged detention, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the probation officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional violations were clearly established at the time of their actions. View "Gervin v. Florence" on Justia Law