Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent in 2017 and sentenced to 40 years in prison, with 20 years suspended. After an appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the improper admission of statistical evidence and remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial, the defendant was released on bail, returned to work, and cared for his mother. At the second trial, both parties presented expert witnesses who testified about general behaviors of sexual assault victims, but did not opine on the specific facts of the case. The State’s expert, Dr. Vanino, remained in the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony, in violation of a witness exclusion order. The District Court allowed Dr. Vanino to be recalled as a rebuttal witness, and the defense was permitted to recall its own expert in response.After the second conviction, a new psychological evaluation indicated the defendant had made progress in treatment and matured. At resentencing, the defendant requested a sentence consistent with a prior plea offer, while the State sought a harsher sentence. The District Court increased the sentence to 50 years with 30 years suspended, citing the defendant’s decision to appeal, retry the case, lack of remorse, and the impact on the victim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed two main issues. First, it held that the District Court erred in interpreting Montana Rule of Evidence 615 to categorically exempt expert witnesses from exclusion orders, but found the error harmless because both parties’ experts were allowed to rebut each other and neither testified to case-specific facts. Second, the Court held that the increased sentence after retrial violated due process, as it was based on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and not on new, objective information. The Court affirmed the conviction, reversed the increased sentence, and remanded for amendment of the judgment to restore the original suspended term. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Gallatin County, Montana, where his Jeep left the road, struck a sign, and then drove away. Witnesses reported the incident, and law enforcement traced the vehicle to the man’s residence using the license plate information. Upon arrival, officers observed damage to the Jeep and encountered the man, who exhibited signs of impairment such as bloodshot eyes and a dazed demeanor. The man admitted to purchasing and inhaling a can of Dust-Off, a product containing difluoroethane (DFE), and acknowledged that he had passed out while driving. Field sobriety tests indicated impairment, and a subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of DFE.The Gallatin County Justice Court denied the man’s motions to suppress evidence, which alleged a lack of particularized suspicion, unlawful search and seizure, and a Miranda violation. After a bench trial, the court found him guilty of misdemeanor DUI (third offense). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirmed the conviction and the denial of the suppression motions, concluding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion, that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway or the exterior of the Jeep, and that no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had occurred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to investigate for DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, including the crash, the man’s behavior, and his admissions. The Court found no unlawful search or seizure, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched, and the man voluntarily provided the Dust-Off can. The Court also determined that no custodial interrogation occurred before arrest, so Miranda warnings were not required. The Court declined to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim and found sufficient evidence supported the DUI conviction. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Gerardo Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder in Rhode Island for the 2005 killing of Lindsay Ann Burke, with evidence at trial showing a troubled relationship and a violent altercation that ended in Lindsay’s death by stabbing. Martinez’s defense attorney, Mark Smith, obtained a PTSD diagnosis from a forensic psychiatrist but chose not to present this expert testimony at trial. Instead, Smith argued that Martinez lacked premeditation and should be convicted of second-degree murder. The jury found Martinez guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole. On direct appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.Martinez then sought post-conviction relief in the Rhode Island Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for Smith’s decision not to present the PTSD-based diminished capacity defense at trial. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found that Smith’s choices were strategic and not constitutionally deficient, and therefore did not address the issue of prejudice. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied Martinez’s petition for writ of certiorari. Martinez subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which was dismissed, but a certificate of appealability was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the Rhode Island court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The First Circuit held that the state court’s decision was reasonable, emphasizing the strategic nature of Smith’s choices and the deference required under federal habeas review. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s habeas petition, finding no constitutional deficiency in counsel’s performance. View "Martinez v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

The defendant, a long-time drug trafficker, was convicted for conspiring to distribute oxycodone in rural Appalachian communities. His criminal history included two prior drug distribution convictions, and he was previously sentenced as a career offender, resulting in a lengthy prison term, supervised release, and a fine. After a series of unsuccessful post-trial motions and appeals, a change in Sixth Circuit law regarding the definition of a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines made him eligible for resentencing. At resentencing, the defendant presented evidence of rehabilitation and mitigating personal history, and requested a sentence within the recalculated, lower Guidelines range.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky had sentenced the defendant above the Guidelines range, citing his recidivism and lack of remorse. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence. However, after the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Havis, which narrowed the definition of a “controlled substance offense,” the defendant successfully moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, leading to resentencing without the career offender enhancement. At resentencing, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of the new Guidelines range, reduced the term of supervised release, and reimposed the fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, in its consideration of sentencing disparities, or in its treatment of mitigating evidence. The appellate court also found no plain error in the imposition of supervised release conditions. The sentence was affirmed, but the case was remanded to the district court for consideration of a retroactive sentencing amendment (Amendment 821). The request for reassignment to a different judge was denied. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Amanda Mire was charged with driving while intoxicated. She filed two motions in the Circuit Court of Greene County: one to suppress statements she made after emergency medical personnel involuntarily administered a tranquilizing drug, and another to suppress the results of a blood test taken when she was unable to knowingly consent. After a hearing, the circuit court orally ruled in favor of Mire on both motions, finding that her statements and the blood test results should be suppressed due to her inability to knowingly and voluntarily consent while under the influence of the drug.On February 26, 2024, the circuit court entered a docket entry reflecting its ruling, which unequivocally stated that the statements made after administration of the drug and the consent to the blood draw were suppressed. The court scheduled the next setting for the case and invited Mire’s counsel to provide a written order consistent with the oral pronouncement. On March 11, the court entered a formal “judgment and order” that repeated the substance of the February 26 docket entry. The state filed its notice of appeal on March 11, identifying the March 11 order as the one being appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that, under section 547.200.4, the state was required to file its notice of appeal within five days of the entry of the order suppressing evidence. The Court held that the February 26 docket entry constituted the operative order with the substantive effect of suppressing the evidence. Because the state’s notice of appeal was filed more than five days after the February 26 order, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "State of Missouri vs. Mire" on Justia Law

In 2004, Clemente Javier Aguirre-Jarquin was arrested and later convicted for the murders of his neighbors, Cheryl Williams and Carol Bareis, in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The investigation by Seminole County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) focused on Aguirre after bloody clothing and a knife were found near his residence, and forensic analysis by Donna Birks, a latent print examiner, identified Aguirre’s palm print on the murder weapon. Aguirre was tried and sentenced to death in 2006. Over the next decade, new evidence emerged: a 2007 investigation revealed misconduct in the SCSO Latent Print Unit, undermining the reliability of the fingerprint identification, and post-conviction DNA testing failed to link Aguirre to the crime scene but implicated Samantha Williams, the victims’ daughter and granddaughter, who later confessed to involvement in the murders.The Seminole Circuit Court denied Aguirre’s initial motion for a new trial, finding the evidence against him overwhelming. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this denial. However, after further post-conviction investigation and new DNA evidence, the Supreme Court of Florida vacated Aguirre’s convictions and ordered a new trial. In 2018, the State dropped all charges against Aguirre.Aguirre then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against Birks, lead investigator Robert Hemmert, crime scene analyst Jacqueline Grossi, and the Seminole County Sheriff, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. The District Court denied qualified immunity to Birks, Hemmert, and Grossi on several counts and denied state-law immunity to Hemmert and Grossi.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Birks on the fabrication of evidence claim and affirmed the denial of state-law immunity to Hemmert and Grossi for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Birks and Hemmert on the malicious prosecution claim and to Hemmert and Grossi on the claim of inadequate investigation, finding no clearly established law requiring the investigation to eliminate all doubts. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguirre-Jarquin v. Hemmert" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of third-degree sexual assault involving young children, with the offenses occurring in 2012. As part of a plea agreement, he was sentenced to two consecutive one-to-five-year prison terms, which were suspended in favor of placement at a correctional center and completion of a sex offender program. He was also ordered to serve a twenty-five-year term of supervised release. After being removed from the correctional center for behavioral issues, he served his prison sentence and began supervised release in 2017. Over the following years, his supervised release was revoked four times due to repeated violations, including unauthorized contact with minors, failure to report relationships, drug use, and dishonesty with probation officers. Each revocation resulted in increasing terms of imprisonment.The Circuit Court of Ohio County presided over each revocation. On the fourth revocation, the court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years’ imprisonment and imposed an additional twenty-five-year term of supervised release to begin after his release from prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and that the additional supervised release term exceeded the statutory maximum under West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(j).The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the twenty-five-year imprisonment sentence was not constitutionally disproportionate, given the seriousness of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s repeated breaches of trust while on supervised release. However, the court found that the circuit court erred in calculating the additional term of supervised release. The statute requires subtracting all prior revocation imprisonment terms from the maximum authorized supervised release period. The court affirmed the imprisonment sentence, vacated the supervised release term, and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "State of West Virginia v. Brautigam" on Justia Law

While serving a federal sentence in Bureau of Prisons custody, the defendant was temporarily housed at a federal facility in Oklahoma. There, he used a distress alarm to summon a correctional officer and, when the officer arrived, exposed himself and masturbated in view of the officer through his cell door window. This was not the first such incident; the defendant had previously been disciplined for similar acts of public masturbation on four occasions at another federal prison. The government charged him with indecent exposure under Oklahoma law, assimilated through federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the case. Before trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior acts, including disciplinary logs and incident reports, to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The district court conducted the required analysis and admitted the logs and incident reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The first trial ended in a mistrial, but at retrial, the evidence was again admitted, and the jury convicted the defendant. The district court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior-acts evidence and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant had waived his argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and forfeited his argument under Rule 803(6), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The court also found no plain error in admitting the evidence as business records and concluded that the district court properly applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

James D. Van Winter moved in with his sister in Wyoming due to financial difficulties. After a family gathering, a dispute arose when Van Winter felt slighted by a guest, leading to a heated argument with his sister. The situation escalated when Van Winter refused to leave, resulting in a physical altercation with his brother-in-law. During the struggle, Van Winter threatened his brother-in-law with a pocketknife, which was later wrestled away, causing a minor injury. Police responded, collected statements and evidence, and Van Winter was arrested. He denied any altercation occurred.The State charged Van Winter with aggravated assault and battery and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent. The District Court of Big Horn County presided over the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on both counts. At sentencing, the court orally imposed an 18–24 month prison term for Count I and a suspended 2–4 year sentence with probation for Count II. However, the written judgment imposed a suspended 3–5 year sentence and specified a three-year probation term. Van Winter appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present fingerprint evidence and challenging the discrepancy between the oral and written sentences.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that Van Winter failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s performance, as the fingerprint evidence would not have changed the trial’s outcome given the consistent witness testimony. Therefore, the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial was affirmed. However, the Supreme Court found a material conflict between the oral and written sentences for Count II. It vacated the probationary term and remanded the case for the district court to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement and to determine the appropriate length of probation. View "Van Winter v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law