Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Brandon Johnson of the Rapid City Police Department stopped a Ford F-150 with an obstructed rear license plate and a tinted windshield. The driver, Evan Brown Bull, and the passenger, Angel Bush, were both arrested based on outstanding warrants. A search of the vehicle revealed a handgun holster, three boxes of ammunition, and a wooden stock to a rifle or shotgun. Brown Bull was charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota held a two-day trial, after which the jury convicted Brown Bull. The district court overruled his motion for judgment of acquittal. Brown Bull appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of knowing possession of the ammunition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the same standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court noted that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition. The court found that the evidence, including testimony from Brown Bull's former girlfriend and Facebook communications, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Brown Bull had constructive knowing possession of the ammunition.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. View "United States v. Bull" on Justia Law

A domestic violence incident involving Jeremiah Gonzalez and his girlfriend led to the girlfriend reporting the incident to the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD). Gonzalez, an SAPD officer, confronted and assaulted his girlfriend again after learning about the report. The girlfriend reported the assault and the leak of her initial report. Detective Aisha Jackson obtained a warrant for Gonzalez’s phone, revealing incriminating messages and a payment to a number belonging to Gonzalez’s friend, Erik Rodriguez, also an SAPD officer. Jackson then obtained a warrant to seize Rodriguez’s cell phone, which he voluntarily handed over. Rodriguez consented to a search, leading to further incriminating evidence and additional warrants.The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the initial warrant lacked probable cause and rejecting the State’s arguments that the evidence was legally obtained. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, deferring to its conclusion that the plain view doctrine did not validate the seizure of Rodriguez’s cell phone.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The court held that the plain view doctrine validated the seizure of Rodriguez’s cell phone. The court determined that Detective Jackson had probable cause to associate the phone with criminal activity and that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

William James Pillans was arrested on February 12, 2018, and charged with Assault with a Weapon. He was released on his own recognizance but was later re-arrested for violating release terms. Subsequently, he faced additional charges for assaulting an officer and threatening corrections officers, leading to multiple arrests and bench warrants. Pillans entered plea agreements in three cases, resulting in concurrent suspended sentences. However, his sentences were revoked multiple times due to further arrests and violations, leading to additional periods of incarceration.The Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County initially sentenced Pillans to concurrent five-year suspended sentences in three cases. After multiple revocations, the court recalculated his credit for time served and elapsed time, ultimately sentencing him to five years with the Department of Corrections with no time suspended. Pillans appealed the District Court's calculation of his credit for time served and elapsed time.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Pillans was not entitled to credit for time served in DC-18-098 between his third arrest and his third release on recognizance, as he was not detained in that case during that period. The court also found that the District Court erred in calculating credit for time served in DC-18-329, as Pillans was not detained in that case until served with a bench warrant. Additionally, the court corrected the calculation of time served between Pillans's original sentencing and first revocation, and between his first and second revocations. The court also determined that Pillans was entitled to additional elapsed time credit for specific periods where no violations were recorded.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court to adjust Pillans's credit for time served and elapsed time accordingly. View "State v. Pillans" on Justia Law

Charles Ament was charged with felony DUI, his fourth or subsequent offense, after a single-vehicle crash in Flathead County. Montana Highway Patrol Trooper Jon Raymond testified that Ament smelled of alcohol, had difficulty balancing, made strange statements, admitted to drinking three beers, and asked not to be investigated for DUI. Field sobriety tests indicated Ament was under the influence, and a blood draw showed a 0.187 blood alcohol content. Ament represented himself at trial with standby counsel and did not testify or offer any witnesses.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District allowed Ament one day to enter a plea, after which he pleaded not guilty. At a pretrial hearing, the court granted Ament’s motion to represent himself, advising that standby counsel could not interrupt proceedings to issue advice. During trial, Ament objected to Trooper Raymond’s testimony as leading, which the judge overruled. During closing arguments, Ament attempted to discuss his version of the facts, leading the court to instruct the jury to disregard statements not made under oath.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ament one day to enter his plea. The court also found that Ament did not preserve his objections to Trooper Raymond’s testimony and thus applied plain error review, concluding that Ament did not demonstrate that the admission of this evidence denied him a fundamental right. Regarding the District Court’s comments during closing arguments, the Supreme Court held that the comments did not compromise the fundamental fairness of the trial or the integrity of the judicial process. Finally, the court found that the jury instructions on the presumption of innocence were proper and did not warrant reversal for plain error. View "State v. Ament" on Justia Law

In 2014, Susan Joanne Pajnich was driving with a .280 blood alcohol content and hit a woman who was stopped on the side of the road, causing severe injuries. Pajnich left the scene without providing aid. She pleaded guilty to negligent vehicular assault and received a ten-year sentence with seven years suspended, along with an order to pay restitution.In December 2017, Pajnich began the suspended portion of her sentence. Less than a year later, the State petitioned to revoke her suspended sentence due to violations, including driving under the influence, consuming alcohol, and failing to pay restitution. Pajnich entered a plea agreement admitting to the violations in exchange for the State dropping the DUI charge. The agreement included a recommendation for a seven-year commitment with five years suspended and 111 days of credit for elapsed time. The District Court revoked her suspended sentence and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.Pajnich completed the non-suspended portion of her sentence and returned to community supervision in June 2020. In March 2022, a report of violation was filed alleging further violations, including consuming alcohol and methamphetamine, and failing to make restitution payments. Pajnich admitted to all violations, and the District Court imposed a five-year commitment with credit for ten months of elapsed time and time served. Pajnich appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that Pajnich could not challenge the calculation of elapsed time on appeal because she did not object to it during the revocation proceedings and there was no mistake of fact. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the sentence was legal and the calculation of elapsed time was supported by the record. View "State v. Pajnich" on Justia Law

Chad Williams, representing himself, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming he is entitled to elapsed time credit, or street time credit, which the Missoula County District Court did not award. Williams argued that he should receive credit for the time he was on probation from November 25, 2013, to August 16, 2016. The State responded that Williams's petition should be denied, and Williams subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief" regarding the extensions of time granted to the State to respond.Williams entered a guilty plea to attempted deliberate homicide in the Missoula County District Court and was sentenced to fifty years in the Montana State Prison, with twenty-five years suspended, plus a consecutive ten-year term for use of a weapon. He was paroled on May 30, 2007, but his parole was revoked multiple times before he began serving the suspended portion of his sentence on November 25, 2013. The State filed a Petition to Revoke on April 5, 2016, followed by four supplemental petitions. In May 2017, the District Court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence upon revocation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that Williams did not meet his burden to demonstrate a facially invalid sentence. The court noted that the 2015 version of the revocation statute applied to Williams, which allowed the court discretion to award elapsed time credit. The District Court considered the time period Williams claimed but found that he had committed multiple violations during that time, including drug use and absconding. The Supreme Court held that Williams's sentence upon revocation was within statutory parameters and that he had waived any claim of statutory defect by failing to object or appeal the denial of elapsed time credit.The Supreme Court of Montana denied and dismissed Williams's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and his Motion for Relief. View "Williams v. Green" on Justia Law

Arturs Spila, a Latvian national, entered the United States in May 2018 and deposited over $284,000 in cash into three bank accounts over three months. The cash originated from a fraudulent scheme where victims were hired for fake work-from-home jobs, instructed to cash checks, and mail the cash to Spila. The checks bounced, and the victims were not reimbursed. Spila then wired over $200,000 from these accounts, mostly to international recipients, in small transactions to avoid mandatory reporting.A federal grand jury indicted Spila for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The Northern District of Georgia district court admitted emails between Spila and his co-conspirators as evidence and allowed a forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The jury convicted Spila, and he was sentenced to 32 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Spila appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge that the money came from a felony, prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, improper authentication of emails, and improper lay witness testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove Spila knew the money came from unlawful activity, even if he did not know it was a felony. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor's comments were fair responses to defense arguments. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the emails as self-authenticating documents and allowing the forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Spila's conviction. View "United States v. Spila" on Justia Law

Brandon Horton was convicted of stalking and making criminal threats against Seiko H. He was acquitted of making criminal threats against Seiko’s father, John H. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order prohibiting Horton from contacting both Seiko and John, and an order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons. Horton appealed, challenging the inclusion of John in the protective order and the prohibition on possessing deadly or dangerous weapons.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found Horton guilty of making criminal threats against Seiko and stalking her, with the jury finding true several aggravating factors. Horton was acquitted of making criminal threats against John. The trial court sentenced Horton to five years and eight months in state prison, with credit for time served, and issued the protective orders in question.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in including John in the protective order, as there was sufficient evidence that Horton committed or attempted to commit harm against John. However, the court found that the trial court erred in extending the weapons prohibition beyond firearms to any deadly or dangerous weapon. The appellate court modified the judgment to strike the order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections. View "P. v. Horton" on Justia Law

Grant Gambaiani was sentenced to 34 years in prison after being found guilty by an Illinois jury of multiple crimes, including the repeated sexual assault of his minor cousin, D.G. During the trial, the courtroom was partially closed during D.G.'s testimony, which Gambaiani argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied review. Gambaiani then sought postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, but the state courts denied relief.Gambaiani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, claiming violations of his constitutional rights to a public trial and effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that Gambaiani waived his right to a public trial by failing to object to the partial closure was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court also found that the partial closure of the courtroom during D.G.'s testimony did not violate Gambaiani's Sixth Amendment right. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit upheld the state court's determination that Gambaiani's attorneys provided effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, as the state court's credibility determinations were reasonable and supported by the record. View "Gambaiani v Greene" on Justia Law

Defendant Xavier Zamora, then seventeen, shot and killed Jose Hernandez, a U.S. postal worker, during a domestic dispute with his mother. The United States charged Zamora as a juvenile under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA). The U.S. Attorney for the District of New Mexico certified that there was a substantial federal interest in the case, allowing for federal jurisdiction. Zamora was transferred to adult status and pleaded guilty to Second Degree Murder of a U.S. Employee and Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of Such Crime.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico accepted the certification and the transfer to adult status. Zamora pleaded guilty to the charges. On appeal, Zamora challenged the certification, arguing that no substantial federal interest existed and that the certification was facially deficient, thus the district court lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the U.S. Attorney's certification of a substantial federal interest under the JDA is an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The court noted that the plain language of the JDA does not require the Attorney General to identify a specific substantial federal interest, only to certify that such an interest exists. The court joined the majority of other circuits in holding that the certification is not subject to judicial review. The court affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction, finding the certification facially valid as it stated that there was a substantial federal interest in the charges. View "United States v. Zamora" on Justia Law