Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted on charges including first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possessing pistols without licenses. He reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a maximum sentence of eighty years with fifty years to serve, twenty of which would be nonparolable, and a thirty-year suspended sentence. The defendant pled guilty, and the trial justice accepted the plea and sentenced him to a term of twenty years, a concurrent term of ten years, a consecutive term of twenty years without parole, a consecutive suspended sentence of twenty years, and a concurrent suspended sentence of ten years.The defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35, arguing that the trial justice misconceived material evidence and failed to consider mitigating factors. The state objected, asserting that the defendant had forfeited his right to file a Rule 35 motion as part of his plea agreement. The trial justice denied the motion, finding no grounds for relief, and the defendant appealed.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice did not demonstrate prejudice or personal bias against the defendant, and his decision not to recuse himself was proper. The court also held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion, as the defendant's sentence was below the statutory maximum and the agreed-upon cap. The court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "State v. McLean" on Justia Law

In January 2023, law enforcement officers from the Rosebud Sioux Tribe responded to a report of a man brandishing a firearm at Benjamin Fool Bull's home. Witnesses identified Tyson Quigley as the man with the firearm and Erwin White Lance as the man with a baseball bat. Both men were later found in a gold Chrysler sedan, which contained a firearm, ammunition, and other items. Quigley declined to speak with investigators, but White Lance admitted to being invited into the residence and claimed responsibility for the firearm before invoking his right to remain silent.Quigley and White Lance were charged with first-degree burglary and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Quigley was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. White Lance died during the proceedings, and the charges against him were dismissed. The district court granted the Government's motion to exclude White Lance's statements as hearsay, ruling that they were not admissible under Rule 804 or Rule 807. At trial, Quigley was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm but acquitted of the other charges. He was sentenced to 90 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that White Lance's statement about taking responsibility for the firearm was not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 807. The court noted that the statement was made under circumstances that suggested a motive to protect Quigley and was contradicted by eyewitness testimony. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statement. View "United States v. Quigley" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Hernán Lopez, a top executive at Twenty-First Century Fox, and Full Play Group, S.A., a South American sports marketing company, were convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud related to a FIFA corruption scandal. They were involved in bribery schemes to secure media rights for various soccer tournaments, including the Copa Libertadores, Copa América, and World Cup qualifiers. The government presented evidence that Full Play bribed officials from several South American soccer federations, while Lopez was implicated in a scheme involving T&T Sports Marketing, a joint venture of Fox and Torneos y Competencias, to secure undervalued media rights contracts through bribery.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment but later granted post-trial motions for acquittal under Rule 29(c). The district court reasoned that, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Percoco v. United States and Ciminelli v. United States, the conduct did not fall within the scope of honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in its conclusion. The appellate court determined that the conduct of Lopez and Full Play did fall within the ambit of § 1346, as it involved bribery, which is a core application of the honest services fraud statute. The court noted that the fiduciary duties breached by the bribed officials were established by their relationships with FIFA and CONMEBOL, and these duties were informed by the organizations' codes of ethics. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgments of acquittal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of evading arrest with a prior conviction, making it a state-jail felony. He was present in person for the guilt-innocence phase but appeared remotely via videoconferencing for the punishment phase due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He did not object to this remote appearance during the trial but later argued on appeal that it violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the appellant did not need to object at trial to preserve his complaint about the remote appearance for appeal. The court held that the right to be personally present at sentencing is a waivable-only right, meaning it must be affirmatively waived and is not subject to forfeiture by failing to object at trial. The court found no evidence of such a waiver and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on the State's petition for discretionary review. The court agreed with the lower court that the right to be personally present at the punishment phase is a waivable-only right. The court held that this right cannot be forfeited by inaction and must be affirmatively waived. The court rejected the State's argument that the appellant's failure to object constituted a waiver and affirmed the lower court's decision to remand for a new sentencing hearing. The court clarified that the statutory right to personal presence at trial and sentencing is fundamental and requires an explicit waiver to be relinquished. View "TATES v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Robert Hallman was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his daughter, Amy. During the punishment phase, Hallman moved for a mistrial after discovering that the State had failed to timely disclose thirteen pages of a family violence packet and his then-wife Kim’s handwritten statement related to a domestic assault extraneous to the case. The key issues before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas were the appropriate standard of review for such a violation and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hallman a mistrial.The trial court denied Hallman’s motion for a mistrial, observing that the newly disclosed information was cumulative to the existing evidence. On direct appeal, the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth reversed the conviction, holding that the untimely-disclosed evidence was material under Article 39.14 and prejudiced Hallman’s ability to demonstrate that his accusers were lying. The State then petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Watkins v. State, which defined “material” under Article 39.14. On remand, the Second Court of Appeals again reversed the trial court, applying the Mosley three-factor test to conclude that the non-constitutional harm was severely prejudicial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the non-constitutional harmless error analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) was the appropriate standard of review. The Court found that the State’s failure to timely disclose the documents had only a very slight effect on the jury’s verdict, given the abundance of inculpatory evidence against Hallman. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Second Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s denial of mistrial. View "HALLMAN v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old girl ran away from home and was taken in by the appellant, who coerced her into having sex with men for money, which he kept. The appellant was convicted of trafficking a child by compelling her to engage in prostitution.The appellant appealed, relying on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals' decision in Turley v. State, which held that a 4-year-old could not commit prostitution due to age. The appellant argued that this should extend to children aged 14 to 17, as they generally cannot consent to sex. The State argued that Turley was incorrectly decided. The First Court of Appeals declined to extend Turley to older children and upheld the conviction, noting legislative intent to treat older teens differently regarding consent.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court held that under the plain language of the trafficking and compelling-prostitution statutes, a child under 17 can be a victim of trafficking by compelled prostitution. The court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the statutes criminalize the conduct, not on the child's ability to consent. The court found that the statutes are unambiguous and must be interpreted according to their plain meaning, which supports the prosecution of the appellant. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction. View "MILTON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) loans. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay $3.85 million in restitution. Additionally, a forfeiture judgment of $673,210 was entered against him. On appeal, Philossaint contested the forfeiture amount, arguing it was miscalculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially handled the case. Philossaint pled guilty to the wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, and the court accepted a factual proffer detailing his role in the fraudulent loan scheme. The presentence investigation report (PSI) provided additional details, including the specific companies involved and the amounts of the fraudulent loans. The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, but miscalculated the amount by assuming Philossaint received a 10% kickback on every loan funded, which was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed a clear error in determining the forfeiture amount due to the government's miscalculation. The correct amount of forfeiture should have been $549,226.30, based on the accurate figures of the loan proceeds and kickbacks Philossaint received. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court did not make any factual findings about whether Philossaint was a leader or mastermind of the scheme, which could affect the forfeiture amount under the Honeycutt v. United States hypothetical. View "USA v. Philossaint" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

The State of Montana charged John Raymond Welzel with Assault with a Weapon, a felony, on November 14, 2022. On April 4, 2023, Welzel pled no contest during a change of plea hearing. The District Court released him on his own recognizance, with the condition that he reside either at the Recovery Centers of Montana (RCM) or with his father before sentencing. Welzel attended treatment at RCM from April 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023. On June 15, 2023, the District Court sentenced Welzel and credited him with 142 days of time served, excluding the 30 days spent at RCM.The Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County reviewed the case and determined that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM. The court's order did not mandate Welzel to attend or complete treatment at RCM, only to reside there or with his father. The court concluded that Welzel's stay at RCM was not "under the order of the court" as required by the relevant statute for credit for time served.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM because the District Court's order did not require him to attend treatment or impose consequences for not doing so. The court emphasized that the statute requires the time spent in a residential treatment facility to be "under the order of the court" to qualify for credit. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment and sentence. View "State v. Welzel" on Justia Law

Jonah Micah Warr called 911 on July 29, 2020, expressing suicidal intent. Ravalli County Deputy Gregoire responded, and Warr, armed with a knife and experiencing a severe mental health crisis, advanced toward the deputy. Warr was subdued with tasers. On August 10, 2020, the State charged Warr with Assault on a Peace Officer, a felony, alleging he caused reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in Gregoire by use of a weapon. Warr faced a mandatory minimum of two years in prison.Warr initially entered a no contest plea on September 1, 2021, under a plea agreement that included a five-year suspended sentence and an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence due to mental impairment. The District Court rejected this plea agreement on December 1, 2021, doubting the applicability of the mental impairment exception due to evidence of voluntary intoxication. Warr withdrew his plea, and the case was reset for trial. On May 10, 2022, Warr re-entered a no contest plea under the same agreement, providing additional evidence of his mental impairment. On July 28, 2022, the District Court definitively rejected the plea agreement again, ruling that Warr's impairment resulted primarily from voluntary intoxication. Warr's request to withdraw his plea was denied by the court, which required a written motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the mental impairment exception under § 46-18-222(2), MCA, did not apply, as Warr's impairment was influenced by voluntary intoxication. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision regarding Warr's right to withdraw his plea. The court held that the District Court violated § 46-12-211(4), MCA, by not allowing Warr to withdraw his plea immediately after rejecting the plea agreement. The case was remanded to the District Court to afford Warr the opportunity to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Warr" on Justia Law