Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a fatal shooting that occurred outside the defendant’s residence, where the defendant admitted to shooting and killing Brandon Adams. The incident unfolded after Adams, following a dispute with his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers, went to the defendant’s home. Tensions escalated between Adams and Rodgers, leading the defendant to ask Adams to leave. Later, after a series of confrontational encounters and threatening messages from Adams, Adams attempted to force his way into the defendant’s home. The defendant, after a physical struggle at the doorway and observing Adams make a sudden movement, fatally shot Adams. The defendant was subsequently charged and went to trial, asserting a defense under North Carolina’s castle doctrine.A jury in the Superior Court of Burke County convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 144 to 185 months in prison. At trial, the defendant requested an instruction on the castle doctrine. The trial court gave a pattern instruction on defense of habitation but did not instruct the jury that the curtilage of the home is protected under the statute. The jury also received instructions that allowed it to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in imminent harm and the necessity of the force used.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the State presented substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of reasonable fear and that the jury instruction was proper.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the correct application of the castle doctrine statute, specifically whether the statutory presumption of reasonable fear could be rebutted by circumstances not listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption may only be rebutted by the five circumstances enumerated in the statute. Because the jury instructions failed to reflect this, and likely affected the trial’s outcome, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Allison" on Justia Law

The case involved a business owner who operated an event rental company in Asheville, North Carolina. On May 17, 2021, while driving a company vehicle with an employee as a passenger, the owner encountered a man who was locally known for panhandling with his cat, Thomas, usually in a stroller. After a brief interaction in which the driver harassed the man by flicking a golf ball at him, the driver drove onto a grassy area and struck the stroller with the cat inside. Witnesses saw the incident, and the cat was shaken but not physically harmed. Police investigation soon focused on the event rental company’s trucks and driver records. When asked by police about driver documentation, the owner first denied having records, then claimed ignorance about who drove the truck, and eventually law enforcement discovered that the physical copy of the key scheduling document for May 17 was missing, though a digital copy was later found on the owner’s phone.The Superior Court in Buncombe County denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss charges of felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals. The jury found him guilty on both counts. On appeal, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding there was sufficient evidence to submit both charges to the jury. The majority used a “knew or should have known” standard for the cruelty to animals charge, while the dissent argued the obstruction charge should have been dismissed due to lack of legal obligation to retain documents and absence of effective obstruction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the motions to dismiss, holding that substantial evidence supported both charges. Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that the felony cruelty to animals statute requires proof of actual knowledge—not just what the defendant should have known—regarding the presence of an animal. The Court modified the Court of Appeals’ analysis accordingly but affirmed the result. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

A forty-year-old man was convicted by a jury of three counts of taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old girl. The charges stemmed from separate instances on a single morning: kissing the girl on the neck outside his van, kissing her on the mouth inside the van, and kissing her on the mouth a second time inside the van—these last two kisses were separated by a six-to-seven-minute interval during which the defendant and the girl engaged in conversation and joking. The defendant denied any sexual acts beyond kissing, while the girl and two neighbors who witnessed parts of the encounter provided differing accounts. The jury acquitted the defendant of additional charges, including statutory sex offenses and kidnapping.Following conviction in Wake County Superior Court, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, concluded that the three kisses did not constitute three sufficiently distinct acts to support three separate convictions for indecent liberties with a child. The appellate court reasoned that only two acts were distinct enough—those occurring outside the van and the first inside the van—so it reversed one conviction, remanded for judgment to be arrested on that count, and ordered resentencing. The dissent argued that all three acts were sufficiently separate for conviction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the lower appellate court erred in drawing a threshold distinction between “touching” and “sexual acts” and by applying the wrong legal test for multiplicity. Instead, the Supreme Court clarified that the correct standard is whether a “distinct interruption” occurred between acts. Applying this test, it held that the six-to-seven-minute interval between the two kisses inside the van was sufficient to constitute separate acts. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating all three convictions. View "State v. Calderon" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, arising from the killings of two victims in August 2001. After pleading guilty to all charges in 2004, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without parole for the murders, as well as concurrent sentences for the robbery and conspiracy convictions. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, the defendant sought resentencing, and his case eventually returned to the trial court for resentencing under North Carolina’s Miller-fix statute.After multiple appeals, including a key decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina (Kelliher I) holding that consecutive life with parole sentences for juvenile offenders violating North Carolina’s constitution, the trial court was instructed to enter two concurrent sentences of life with parole for the murder charges. On remand, the trial court imposed two concurrent life with parole sentences for murder, but also ordered the sentences for the robbery convictions to run consecutively to the murder sentences. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded the scope of the Supreme Court’s mandate. The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and remanded with instructions for the resentencing court to only change the murder sentences from consecutive to concurrent.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that its prior mandate in Kelliher I required only that the murder sentences be made concurrent, leaving the resentencing court with de novo authority over the remaining convictions. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in running the robbery sentences consecutively, so long as the total sentence complied with the forty-year limitation established in Kelliher I. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the 31 March 2023 judgments were reinstated. View "State v. Kelliher" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

In the early morning of May 27, 2021, Aaron Shepherd and his wife, Megan, were collecting scrap metal in Topeka when they encountered a Chevy Trailblazer driven by Brandon Croskey, with Jeremy Volle as a passenger. After a confrontation at a car wash, Croskey called Volle for backup. The SUV chased Shepherd’s car, and during the pursuit, Shepherd exited his vehicle. A single gunshot fired from the Trailblazer struck Shepherd, who later died. Investigation and witness statements led police to Croskey and Volle. Croskey identified Volle as the shooter, while Volle claimed Croskey fired the shot. The State charged Volle with criminal possession of a weapon, first-degree felony murder, and premeditated murder, with the felony-murder count predicated on criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.The case was tried in the Shawnee District Court, where both Croskey and Volle testified, each implicating the other. Croskey had previously pleaded guilty to related charges and testified for the State. Volle was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, reckless second-degree murder (as a lesser included offense), and criminal possession of a firearm. Before sentencing, Volle moved to be sentenced for reckless second-degree murder, arguing it was more specific than felony murder. The district court denied the motion, merged the murder convictions, and sentenced Volle to life without parole for felony murder.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Volle raised multiple trial and sentencing errors, including claims of improper evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, sufficiency of evidence, and cumulative error. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the search warrants and evidence suppression rulings were proper, the aiding and abetting instruction was factually appropriate, and there were no cumulative errors. The court affirmed that sufficient evidence supported Volle’s felony-murder conviction and ruled that sentencing for felony murder, not reckless second-degree murder, was correct. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Volle " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant committed crimes in Kansas in February 2016 and later pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, the presentence investigation report counted a prior Illinois conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm as a person felony, which affected the defendant’s criminal history score and sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that the Illinois law on third-party liability was broader than Kansas law and that this should preclude the Illinois conviction from being counted as a person felony under Kansas law.The Saline District Court rejected the defendant’s argument and classified the Illinois conviction as a person felony, holding that the proper inquiry was whether the elements of the Illinois offense were comparable to a Kansas person felony, not whether the theory of liability in Illinois was broader. The defendant was sentenced accordingly and appealed. The Kansas Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court, reasoning that neither state treats third-party liability as a separate crime and that the conviction itself, not the underlying theory of liability, should be compared. The panel found the Illinois aggravated discharge statute was at least as narrow as, if not narrower than, the comparable Kansas statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals and the district court. The court held that, for crimes committed before May 23, 2019, the proper method is to compare the elements of the out-of-state offense with the Kansas offense. The court concluded that the Illinois crime of aggravated discharge of a firearm is comparable to Kansas’ criminal discharge of a firearm and should be classified as a person offense. The court further held that sentencing courts are not required to consider theories of liability, such as aiding and abetting, when conducting this comparability analysis. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The case involves the criminal prosecution of a defendant who was convicted by a jury of second degree assault and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The incident took place in December 2023 at an apartment complex where the defendant, after an intoxicated and unwelcome visit to his cousin’s apartment, became involved in a confrontation with a neighbor. Testimony established that the neighbor attempted to use a baseball bat to keep the defendant away, resulting in a physical altercation. The neighbor suffered multiple injuries, and there was evidence of an escalating struggle, including the neighbor retrieving a shotgun and a fight over the weapon. Both parties claimed self-defense, and the defendant testified to a different version of the events, stating that he was attacked first and responded only to defend himself.After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Court for Scotts Bluff County sentenced the defendant to concurrent prison terms. The defendant, represented by new counsel on appeal, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel before the Nebraska Court of Appeals. The appellate brief listed alleged failures by trial counsel, such as not subpoenaing certain witnesses, failing to introduce beneficial evidence, not advising the defendant about attending a deposition, inadequately pursuing a plea deal, and poor trial preparation. However, the Court of Appeals found most claims of ineffective assistance were too vague or lacked necessary specificity in the assignments of error, except for the plea agreement issue, which could not be resolved on the record.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict, rejecting the self-defense claim as a matter for the jury. The court clarified that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be specifically stated in the assignments of error; general or vague claims are procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Rupp" on Justia Law

The case concerns an engineer who worked for a microchip design company. While employed, he downloaded proprietary design files, including a file for a microchip known as the HMC1022A, and retained them after leaving his employer. Shortly after his departure, he started a competing business that marketed and sold microchips bearing strong similarities to his former employer’s products, using some of the appropriated design files in the manufacturing process. He concealed the origins of these files by renaming them and sought to keep his new business secret from his former employer.A federal grand jury indicted him on a range of charges, including possession of stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, export violations, visa fraud, and unlawful procurement of citizenship. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the jury trial. The defendant was convicted on only one count: unlawful possession of a trade secret, specifically the design layout and GDS file for the HMC1022A microchip. He was acquitted of all other charges, and the court dismissed related charges against his business partner and spouse. Post-trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing selective enforcement and prosecution on the basis of his Chinese ethnicity, but the district court denied these motions.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the file in question was both a trade secret and that the defendant knew it to be so. The court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the selective prosecution and enforcement claims, determining that the defendant had not shown similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently, nor that the investigation or prosecution was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The conviction and sentence were therefore upheld. View "United States v. Yu" on Justia Law