Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police in Pittsburgh responded late at night to two ShotSpotter alerts that indicated five gunshots were fired near a specific residential address. Officer Powers arrived at the scene within seconds of the second alert and saw a parked car with its headlights on, occupied by the appellant in the driver’s seat and a woman in the passenger seat. As the officer approached with emergency lights on, the appellant exited the car and began walking toward a nearby house, while the passenger made movements inside the car. The officer ordered the appellant to return, and when he did not comply, police drew their weapons and forcibly detained him. Evidence subsequently obtained led to charges including driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license.The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding the investigative detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. At trial, the court found the appellant guilty on all charges. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that the combination of the ShotSpotter alerts, the appellant’s proximity in time and space to the reported shots, his presence as one of only two people at the scene, his conduct upon police arrival, and the late hour supported reasonable suspicion for the stop.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the Superior Court gave too much weight to the appellant’s proximity to the ShotSpotter alerts in evaluating reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court held that, although there was insufficient record support to consider the area a high-crime area, the totality of the circumstances—including the ShotSpotter alerts indicating gunfire, the rapid police arrival, the appellant and his companion being the only people present, and their evasive behaviors—provided reasonable suspicion for the investigative detention. The court therefore affirmed the Superior Court’s order upholding the denial of suppression. View "Commonwealth v. Foster" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant participated in two incidents at a North Carolina bank: an armed robbery in which employees were assaulted with firearms, and a subsequent attempted armed robbery where the group was foiled when the bank manager recognized them and secured the building. The defendant was convicted by a jury of both armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), as well as for brandishing firearms during these crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).Following his conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2014, the defendant filed several postconviction motions in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. These were denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question of whether the defendant’s conviction for attempted armed bank robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of supporting his related conviction under Section 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) categorically constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The court held that because Section 2113(d) requires either assaulting another person or putting another’s life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon or device during the course of an attempted bank robbery, the offense necessarily entails the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court also found that the statute requires intentional, rather than merely reckless, conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed that attempted armed bank robbery under Section 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Straite" on Justia Law

The defendant was observed by a police officer driving recklessly in Ukiah, California, nearly hitting pedestrians and engaging in dangerous maneuvers while under the influence of alcohol. After a high-speed pursuit, she was arrested and charged with multiple felonies, including assault and reckless evasion, as well as misdemeanors related to driving under the influence. She had a prior robbery conviction, making her subject to enhanced sentencing under the Three Strikes law. Through a negotiated plea, she pled no contest to one felony and one misdemeanor, admitted her prior strike, and agreed to a stipulated upper-term sentence of three years (doubled to six years), with the remaining charges dismissed.After her conviction, but while her appeal was pending, California amended Penal Code section 1170 to require that aggravating facts justifying an upper-term sentence be either stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant argued on appeal that this amendment should apply retroactively to her nonfinal judgment, requiring reduction of her sentence since the new requirements were not met. The California Court of Appeal rejected her claim, holding that the amendment did not affect stipulated sentences from plea bargains, since no judicial discretion was exercised in those cases.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that defendants with nonfinal judgments who agreed to an upper-term sentence as part of a plea bargain are entitled to seek the retroactive benefit of amended section 1170(b). However, a stipulated upper-term sentence remains valid only if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the new requirements. On remand, the defendant may either waive these requirements and reaffirm the plea (reinstating the original sentence), or invoke them, in which case the parties may renegotiate the plea or the defendant may withdraw her plea and proceed to trial. The Supreme Court of California thus vacated the lower court’s judgment and set forth these remedies. View "P. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

A man drove his ten-year-old daughter from Oklahoma to Texas so she could participate in a gymnastics competition. While staying in a hotel together, he sexually abused her in the bathtub and later in bed. After the girl disclosed the abuse to her peers, three others—two of her half-sisters and her uncle, all minors at the time of their respective incidents—came forward with their own accounts of sexual abuse or inappropriate conduct by the same man. The evidence included testimony about prior incidents and hidden cameras used by the defendant to record his daughters.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the defendant with three crimes: transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 2241(c), and coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a jury trial, he was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for each, to run concurrently. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for transportation of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse, arguing specifically that the government failed to prove that his “dominant purpose” in transporting his daughter was sexual activity and failed to establish his non-Indian status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, under § 2423(a), the government must prove only that the defendant transported the minor “with intent” that she engage in illegal sexual activity, not that this was his dominant purpose, and found the evidence sufficient. The court also held that unchallenged testimonial evidence from family members was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After successfully completing his probation nearly a decade earlier, the defendant began harassing his former probation officer through daily text messages, blaming him for personal misfortunes. The probation officer eventually blocked the defendant’s number, but the defendant later called 911 to make threats against him. Subsequently, the defendant appeared outside the probation office, made a threatening hand gesture, and sent numerous threatening text messages suggesting violence toward the officer and his family. These actions led to the probation office being locked down and evacuated, with staff sent home.The State charged the defendant with felony terroristic threats and misdemeanor stalking. The trial was held in the District Court of Uinta County, where a jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced him to consecutive terms of confinement. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge committed judicial misconduct during voir dire by making remarks to a prospective juror about bias in front of the jury panel, which he claimed undermined his right to a fair and impartial jury. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his terroristic threat conviction, specifically whether he acted in reckless disregard of the risk of causing evacuation.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the trial judge did not commit misconduct during voir dire; the judge appropriately inquired into the prospective juror’s bias and did not discourage candid responses by other jurors. The Court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction for terroristic threats, concluding that the defendant’s conduct demonstrated reckless disregard for the risk of causing evacuation of the probation office. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and convictions. View "Pinegar v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

After being released from prison on federal convictions including possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, the defendant was subject to supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested when police seized a rifle and ammunition from his residence and a pistol from a discarded bag. There was no direct evidence linking him to the rifle beyond its presence in his home, and the officers did not observe him handling it. The terms of his supervised release barred him from possessing firearms or ammunition.Following his arrest, a probation officer notified the court of alleged violations of supervised release. The defendant waived a preliminary hearing; a magistrate judge found probable cause and referred the matter for final revocation. Meanwhile, the government brought new criminal charges for firearm possession, including possession of a machine gun. At trial on the new charges, expert testimony addressed whether the seized rifle functioned as a machine gun. The court later dismissed these charges due to government discovery violations. The government then relied on selected excerpts from the trial and suppression hearing transcripts as evidence of a “Grade A” supervised release violation—possession of a machine gun—at the revocation hearing. The government expressly limited its evidence to these exhibits.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun, basing its conclusion on the visible features of the firearm and the defendant’s prior conviction. The court revoked supervised release and imposed the statutory maximum sentence. The defendant objected, arguing the government had not proven knowledge or mens rea. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court committed procedural error by relying on evidence outside the revocation record. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing limited to the existing record. View "US v. Fernandez-Santos" on Justia Law

Over a period of six years, the two defendants participated in a scheme involving the creation of multiple business entities and bank accounts, which were used to facilitate the transfer of large sums of money. One defendant directed friends and family members to register businesses and open accounts on his behalf, while the other registered a business and opened accounts at his request. The operation purported to involve purchasing goods domestically and exporting them overseas, but most of the funds came from a single victim who was deceived in an online romance scam. The defendants withdrew substantial amounts of cash from these accounts and used the funds for personal expenses, while maintaining little to no legitimate business records.After law enforcement began investigating, both defendants were questioned about their activities. They denied knowledge of any illegal source of funds and claimed to believe the business was legitimate. Nonetheless, evidence showed inconsistent statements, continued operation after warnings from banks and law enforcement, and a lack of documentation for the purported business transactions. A grand jury indicted both defendants for conspiracy to commit money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, both defendants testified that they were unaware of the illegal origins of the funds, but a jury found them guilty. One defendant also challenged the government’s arguments at trial and the sentencing calculation.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, both defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding willful blindness and good faith. The First Circuit held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and that the willful blindness and good faith instructions were proper. The court also found no error in the government’s arguments or in the sentencing calculation, and affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. View "US v. Sepetu" on Justia Law

The defendant, the former mayor of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, was indicted on three federal charges: conspiracy to commit federal-program bribery, federal-program bribery and aiding and abetting, and extortion under color of official right. The indictment alleged that while serving as mayor, he used his authority over municipal contracting to steer contracts to a local construction company owned by another individual, in exchange for cash payments. Some of these payments were characterized by the government as bribes, while the defense argued they were campaign contributions intended to pay off campaign debt.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment and later denied his motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release, and rejected his arguments regarding defects in the indictment, prejudicial variance, improper jury instructions, and jury bias.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, as well as other challenges. The First Circuit held that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the payments in question were not campaign contributions, and thus the requirements of McCormick v. United States did not apply. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo and that the timing and nature of the payments did not convert them into mere gratuities. The court also concluded that there was no prejudicial variance, the jury instructions were not impermissibly biased, and the defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. View "US v. Perez-Otero" on Justia Law

Richard Knight was convicted of the first-degree murders of Odessia Stephens and her four-year-old daughter, Hanessia Mullings, with evidence including Knight’s presence at the scene, forensic findings tying him to the crime, and his confession to a fellow inmate. After a jury unanimously recommended the death penalty for both murders, the trial court imposed two death sentences, finding multiple aggravating factors and limited nonstatutory mitigation.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Knight’s convictions and sentences. Subsequent postconviction and habeas proceedings in both state and federal courts were unsuccessful. After the Governor signed Knight’s death warrant, Knight filed a successive postconviction motion in the Circuit Court for Broward County, raising three claims: that unidentified fingerprint evidence constituted newly discovered evidence, that Florida’s lethal injection protocol was unconstitutional, and that the expedited death warrant process deprived him of due process. The circuit court summarily denied all claims and related motions.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the summary denial de novo and affirmed. The court held that the unidentified fingerprint claim was untimely, procedurally barred, and without merit, as the evidence was known at trial and did not undermine the case against Knight. The lethal injection claim was also found untimely, procedurally barred, and legally insufficient, as Knight failed to show a substantial risk of harm or propose a feasible alternative method. Lastly, the court rejected the due process claim, finding that Knight received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. The court denied the request for a stay of execution, and ordered that no oral argument or rehearing would be permitted, with the mandate to issue immediately. View "Knight v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with and convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, based on allegations that she fraudulently collected over $5,000 from the State of West Virginia for foster care services while the child was in the custody of another adult. After a one-day jury trial, the defendant was found guilty, sentenced to probation, ordered to pay restitution, and perform community service. Immediately after the verdict, the defendant raised concerns about the impartiality of one juror, Carrie Collins, alleging that Collins failed to disclose personal relationships with key participants in the case, including witnesses and the county circuit clerk, who is also her sister. The defendant argued that these undisclosed relationships suggested bias and prevented a fair trial.Following the verdict, the defendant moved to vacate the jury verdict and dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, for a new trial, based on alleged juror misconduct. The Circuit Court of Gilmer County held a hearing, allowing questioning of trial witnesses but barring any questioning of jurors, including Juror Collins. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that Collins’s relationship with the circuit clerk did not automatically disqualify her, and found no evidence of juror misconduct or prejudice. The court also determined that questioning jurors post-trial was improper under its interpretation of evidentiary rules.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to permit questioning of Juror Collins during the post-trial hearing. The Supreme Court held that when there is an allegation that a juror failed to truthfully answer material questions during voir dire, a hearing with the opportunity to question the juror is required. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for an additional hearing, directing that Juror Collins be subpoenaed and questioned regarding the alleged misconduct. View "State v. Frymyer" on Justia Law