Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims. View "Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC" on Justia Law

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

In the early morning of December 14, 2008, after a nightclub event in Providence, Rhode Island, gunfire broke out as patrons were leaving, resulting in the fatal shooting of Anthony Parrish. Two eyewitnesses, Shamair Barboza and Nakia Green, identified Dana Gallop as the shooter. Barboza had known Gallop since childhood, while Green identified him from a lineup eight days after the incident. Gallop was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and related crimes, receiving multiple consecutive sentences.After his conviction was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Gallop filed a pro se application for postconviction relief in the Rhode Island Superior Court, later supplemented by counsel. He argued, among other things, that the state failed to disclose that both eyewitnesses were participating in the state’s witness protection program (WPP) and had received financial assistance, which he claimed constituted violations of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland. The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, hearing testimony from Gallop’s trial counsel and the prosecutor. The judge found the prosecutor’s recollection credible, concluding that the state had disclosed both witnesses’ participation in the WPP and that there was no evidence of undisclosed inducements or material nondisclosure.On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the denial of Gallop’s application for postconviction relief. The Court held that Gallop’s objection to the handling of his summary disposition motion was waived because he did not raise it at the time. It further found that the state had disclosed the witnesses’ WPP involvement, and that there was no rule or order requiring disclosure of specific WPP expenditure amounts. The Court also held that any nondisclosure of WPP expenditures was not material under Brady, as Gallop failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The judgment denying postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Gallop v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A man managed his elderly mother’s finances and care after his father’s death. He was given power of attorney and access to her accounts. Over several years, he arranged for large sums to be transferred from her investment and checking accounts to support his struggling business. Additionally, he mortgaged significant parcels of the family’s farmland—held in his mother’s revocable trust—as collateral for loans used primarily for his benefit. Some of these financial moves occurred while his mother’s cognitive abilities were declining, and she was living in assisted care.After concerns about these transactions were raised by a family member, law enforcement investigated. The State charged the man with multiple counts of theft by exploitation of an elder under South Dakota law, related both to the mortgages and the transfers from his mother’s accounts. At trial in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Spink County, a jury found him guilty on all counts. The circuit court imposed fully suspended penitentiary sentences and probation. The defendant appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of the crimes, and also objected to the jury instructions regarding his claimed good faith defense.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find that the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty to support his mother, was entrusted with her property, and appropriated her property for his own benefit with intent to defraud, not in the lawful execution of his trust. The court also determined that the jury was properly instructed on good faith and the State’s burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Clemensen" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eric Honors, was accused of sexually assaulting his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter, B.J., both in the sleeper cab of his semi-truck outside their Wichita, Kansas home and during a subsequent drive from Kansas to Texas. Throughout these events, Honors held B.J. captive, repeatedly assaulted her, and made various videos documenting the abuse. Three such videos were recovered by investigators, all recorded in Kansas; other videos described by B.J. that were made in Oklahoma and Texas were not recovered.Honors was indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on two counts: transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and production of child pornography. At trial, the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court sentenced Honors to a total of sixty years in prison and ten years of supervised release. It also imposed a special condition prohibiting Honors from contacting B.J. or her family, including his wife and four biological children, during supervised release. Initially, the district court declined to extend the no-contact order to his prison term, reasoning it lacked authority, but later reconvened and imposed the order during incarceration as a civil injunction.Honors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, raising three issues: (1) whether the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by omitting language limiting the offense to Kansas, (2) whether the district court had authority to impose the no-contact order during incarceration, and (3) whether there was sufficient justification for prohibiting contact with his wife and children during supervised release. The Tenth Circuit held that any error regarding the jury instructions was not plain, affirmed the conviction on Count 2, vacated the custodial no-contact order in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, and vacated the supervised release condition prohibiting contact with his wife and biological children, finding no compelling justification. View "United States v. Honors" on Justia Law

After a late-night robbery in Topeka, Darren Johnson and an accomplice stole a car and fled the scene. Police officers were alerted and began searching for the suspects. Officer Scott spotted the stolen vehicle, activated his lights and sirens, and pursued Johnson, who accelerated and ran a red light to evade capture. After Officer Scott lost sight of the vehicle and turned off his lights and sirens, he continued driving in the same direction. Seconds later, another officer observed Johnson speeding before Johnson crashed into another vehicle, resulting in the death of a passenger in the stolen car.The State charged Johnson with felony murder, reckless second-degree murder, felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and aggravated robbery. The District Court of Shawnee County presided over the trial, where a jury convicted Johnson on all counts. At sentencing, the court merged the felony murder and reckless second-degree murder convictions and imposed a sentence of 25 years for felony murder, consecutive time for aggravated robbery, and other penalties, including restitution and attorney fees. Johnson appealed his convictions for felony murder and felony fleeing or attempting to elude, and the attorney fee order.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the cessation of police lights and sirens during a chase does not, as a matter of law, end a police pursuit under the relevant statute; this is a fact question for the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supported both the felony fleeing or attempting to elude conviction and the underlying felony murder conviction. It ruled the failure to define “reckless driving” for the jury was not clearly erroneous and that “reckless driving” does not have a common meaning, requiring a definition. The court also affirmed the district court’s attorney fee order, concluding it was properly considered. Johnson’s convictions, sentence, and attorney fee order were affirmed. View "State v. Johnson " on Justia Law

Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities.After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied. View "Trump v. Clinton" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was tried on six charges involving sexual abuse of minors. At trial, the jury acquitted him on five counts relating to two minors but convicted him on one count involving a third minor. After the trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal. Subsequently, the Executive Office of the Trial Court issued a notice under the Massachusetts automatic sealing statute, informing him that records relating to the acquitted counts would be sealed unless he requested otherwise. The notice also stated that he would lose access to those records once sealed. The individual did not respond, and some records were sealed.After this, appellate counsel was appointed to represent the individual on appeal. Counsel attempted to obtain the trial records, including those pertaining to the acquitted counts, but discovered that certain documents had been sealed. Counsel then moved for access to these sealed documents, arguing that not having access would hinder effective appellate representation. The motion judge allowed only limited access—counsel could view the documents at the clerk’s office under supervision and take notes, but could not make copies. The individual submitted an affidavit authorizing counsel’s access, but the motion judge maintained the restrictions. Seeking broader access, the individual petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the automatic sealing statute does not preclude a defendant or the defendant’s appellate counsel from accessing the defendant’s own sealed criminal records. The court concluded that the statute’s text, legislative history, and related statutory framework support the view that sealing is aimed at precluding public access—not preventing the defendant and counsel from reviewing the records necessary for appeal. The court vacated the lower court’s order restricting access and remanded for entry of an order providing access to the sealed records. View "Gravito v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Sweeney was involved in a late-night argument with neighbors over stolen marijuana, during which he fired a gun, missing his intended targets but fatally striking a bystander some distance away. At trial, a key issue was whether Sweeney could have been the shooter given his location and the trajectory of the bullet. After the prosecution rested, a juror independently visited the crime scene and reported his findings to the rest of the jury, leading to his dismissal and the continuation of deliberations with the remaining eleven jurors. Sweeney was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges.His convictions were upheld by a Maryland appellate court on direct appeal. Sweeney then pursued postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to question the rest of the jury about possible prejudice following the dismissed juror’s unauthorized crime-scene visit. The state court denied relief. Sweeney repeated this claim in a federal habeas petition before the United States District Court, which also denied relief, finding that the state court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, not on the ineffective assistance claim Sweeney asserted, but on the grounds that a series of failures deprived him of his constitutional rights, and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Circuit erred by granting relief on a claim that Sweeney had never raised, thus violating the principle of party presentation. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to address only the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually raised. View "Clark v. Sweeney" on Justia Law