Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Robert L. Fooks was convicted by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County for violating Section 5-133(b)(2) of the Public Safety Article, which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a common law crime and sentenced to more than two years in prison. Fooks, who had a prior conviction for constructive criminal contempt and a sentence exceeding four years, argued that this statute violated his Second Amendment rights.The Circuit Court denied Fooks's motion to dismiss the firearms-related counts, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. The Appellate Court of Maryland upheld the statute's constitutionality, affirming Fooks's convictions. Fooks then sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Section 5-133(b)(2) is consistent with the Second Amendment. The court noted that the statute is effectively a prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly identified as presumptively lawful. The court also found that such prohibitions are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which has long included disarming individuals deemed to present a special danger, including those who have committed serious crimes. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Fooks. View "Fooks v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, filed a lawsuit against General Motors (GM) and Robert Bosch LLC, alleging that the companies misled consumers about the emissions produced by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. They claimed that the vehicles emitted higher levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) than advertised and that the emissions control systems were manipulated to pass regulatory tests. The plaintiffs sought damages under various state fraud laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims, ruling that those based on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards were preempted by the Clean Air Act. The court allowed other claims to proceed, particularly those alleging that GM's advertising misled consumers about the vehicles' emissions. However, after the Sixth Circuit's decision in a similar case (In re Ford Motor Company F-150 and Ranger Truck Fuel Economy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation), the district court revisited its decision and dismissed the remaining fraud claims, concluding they were preempted by federal law. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the RICO claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court should determine whether the plaintiffs' remaining claims could proceed without relying on a disagreement with the EPA's determinations. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide if the claims were preempted under the analysis described. The court affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claims and the denial of the plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment in part and approve a preliminary settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Counts v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Detectives from the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department observed Edwin Santiago arriving at a car dealership in a vehicle emitting a strong odor of marijuana. Santiago exited the car, and the detectives noticed a pistol on his waistband. Suspecting Santiago of possessing a firearm while under the influence of marijuana, the detectives detained him. During the detention, they discovered Santiago was a felon, leading to his arrest and subsequent indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held a suppression hearing where the detectives and a witness testified about the marijuana odor. The court found the detectives' testimony credible and ruled that the odor provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the arrest. Consequently, the court denied Santiago's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the arrest. Santiago, representing himself at trial, was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 56 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Santiago's appeal, which challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the arrest. The court also found Santiago's within-Guidelines sentence to be substantively reasonable, considering his criminal history and the circumstances of the offense. Santiago's additional pro se claims were not considered, as he was represented by counsel on appeal. View "United States v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The case involves Deliezha Davonte Gravely, who was pulled over by a police officer for speeding. During the stop, the officer discovered that Gravely was driving with a revoked license due to a DUI and found a loaded firearm in his pocket. Gravely was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, based on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery.The Circuit Court of Mercer County ruled that Gravely's prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery qualified as a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" under West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Gravely was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in classifying his conspiracy conviction as a crime of violence.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the elements of conspiracy under West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 include a violent act against a person. The court applied the elements test from State v. Mills, which requires examining the statutory elements of the predicate offense rather than the specific conduct of the defendant. The court found that the elements of conspiracy—an agreement to commit an offense and an overt act to effect the conspiracy—do not require a violent act against a person.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery is not a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" for the purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Consequently, the court reversed Gravely's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, and remanded the case for resentencing on his remaining convictions. View "State v. Gravely" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 28, 2014, Ms. Taylor Hawkridge was shot and killed in the parking lot of her apartment complex. Eyewitnesses reported seeing a man in a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene and entering a dark Dodge Charger. Ms. Hawkridge had a verbal altercation with Nasstashia Van Camp Powell at Vixens Gentlemen’s Club, where she worked. Ms. Powell, after being convicted of second-degree murder, implicated Richard Small and Joseph Mason in the murder, stating they were paid to kill Ms. Hawkridge because she was a police informant. Mr. Small was interviewed by law enforcement multiple times, including a June 2018 interview where he ambiguously mentioned needing a lawyer.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County held a joint trial for Mr. Small and Mr. Mason. Mr. Small filed motions to exclude evidence of Mr. Mason’s gang affiliation and to suppress his June 2018 statement, arguing he had invoked his right to counsel. The court denied these motions, finding the gang affiliation evidence intrinsic to the crimes and Mr. Small’s statement ambiguous. The jury convicted Mr. Small of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Mr. Small argued his constitutional rights were violated by his and his counsel’s absence from critical-stage hearings, the admission of prejudicial evidence, the failure to sever his trial from Mr. Mason’s, the denial of his motion to suppress, and improper comments by the State during the mercy phase. The court found no error, holding that the hearings were not critical stages for Mr. Small, the evidence was intrinsic and relevant, Mr. Small did not properly move to sever, his statement was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and the State’s comments did not constitute plain error. The court affirmed Mr. Small’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Small" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 28, 2014, Ms. Taylor Hawkridge was shot and killed in her apartment complex parking lot. Eyewitnesses reported seeing a man in a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene in a dark Dodge Charger. Ms. Hawkridge had a verbal altercation with Nasstashia Van Camp Powell at her workplace, Vixens Gentlemen’s Club, the night before. Ms. Powell, who was later convicted of second-degree murder, implicated Joseph Mason and Richard Small in the murder, stating they were paid to kill Ms. Hawkridge because she was a police informant.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County sentenced Mr. Mason to life imprisonment without mercy for first-degree murder and a consecutive term of one to five years for conspiracy. Mr. Mason appealed, arguing that the court erred in admitting a photograph of a social media post without proper authentication, allowing evidence of his gang and drug affiliations, permitting hearsay testimony, failing to sever his trial from Mr. Small’s, and denying him a fair trial through cumulative error.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the photograph of the Instagram post was properly authenticated through distinctive characteristics and testimony. The evidence of Mr. Mason’s gang and drug affiliations and his dislike of informants was deemed intrinsic to the charged crimes, providing necessary context. The court also found that Ms. Linton’s testimony about Ms. Powell’s prior consistent statements was admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication. Mr. Mason’s argument for severance was waived as it was not raised in the lower court. Finally, the court found no cumulative error, as none of the individual claims had merit. The court affirmed Mr. Mason’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old girl reported to her school principal that her mother’s ex-boyfriend had inappropriately touched her in a bathtub on tribal land. During a forensic interview, she described being touched on the outside of her vaginal area and feeling the man’s penis on her back. The accused denied the allegations but later admitted to being naked in the bathtub with the children, claiming he left immediately. In a subsequent law enforcement interview, he responded “mmhmm” to statements that he had touched the girl’s vagina, which an agent interpreted as acknowledgments rather than admissions. At trial, the girl testified about two incidents: one in a bathtub when she was seven, and another in a bedroom where she awoke bleeding. The government introduced a recording of the “mmhmm” responses, and the jury was instructed that silence or failure to deny an accusation could be considered an admission.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 12 and abusive sexual contact of a child. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. The district court denied acquittal but granted a new trial, citing concerns about leading questions during testimony, the prejudicial effect of the “mmhmm” responses and related jury instruction, and the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by granting a new trial on grounds not raised in the defendant’s Rule 33 motion, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellate court reversed the order granting a new trial, reinstated the convictions, and remanded the case for sentencing. View "United States v. Drum" on Justia Law

Quortez Brown and his cousin broke into Otis Bolden's apartment, shot and killed Bolden, and threatened Ashley Green with a gun. A jury convicted Brown of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The district court judge sentenced Brown to 20-years-to-life imprisonment for felony murder, 34 months for aggravated burglary, and 12 months for aggravated assault. The judge also pronounced that Brown was subject to "postrelease supervision duration of life," although the journal entry of judgment ordered parole rather than postrelease supervision.Brown appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Kansas Supreme Court rejected most of his arguments but remanded the case for further action on two issues. On remand, the district judge held an evidentiary hearing and determined that Brown failed to establish a conflict with his attorney. The judge also corrected the severity level of Brown's second-degree murder conviction. Brown appealed again, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences.In 2023, Brown filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed by a judge instead of a jury. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the illegal sentencing statute does not provide a procedural avenue for considering constitutional claims. Brown appealed, renewing his constitutional argument and raising two new arguments: that the district judge should have considered his motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 and that his sentence was illegal because it imposed postrelease supervision instead of parole.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that a sentence that does not conform to constitutional requirements does not fit within the limited, narrow statutory definition of an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504(c). The court also rejected Brown's argument that the judge erred in failing to consider his motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, as Brown consistently argued for relief under the illegal sentence statute. However, the court vacated the sentencing judge's pronouncement of postrelease supervision, as it was contrary to K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2), and concluded that remand was not necessary because the journal entry of judgment complied with the statute. View "State v. Brown " on Justia Law

A 15-year-old male was charged with a Class II felony for allegedly sexually assaulting a 14-year-old female at a high school in Omaha, Nebraska. The incident was reported by the victim, L.S., who stated that the assault occurred within the school premises. Video footage and interviews with the involved parties, including the accused, Jeremiah T., and a witness, G.G., were part of the evidence. L.S. claimed that Jeremiah forcibly assaulted her despite her resistance, while Jeremiah contended that the encounter was consensual. G.G.'s involvement as a lookout was also scrutinized.The district court overruled Jeremiah's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, citing concerns about public safety and the severity of the offense. The court found that the nature of the crime and the degree of violence involved suggested that Jeremiah might need supervision beyond the age of 19, which the juvenile court could not provide. The court also noted that while Jeremiah was amenable to treatment, the timeline for effective rehabilitation within the juvenile system was uncertain.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the evidence favored Jeremiah's rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the State did not sufficiently prove a sound basis for retaining the case in adult court. The Court of Appeals highlighted the availability of appropriate services in the juvenile system and questioned the district court's interpretation of the evidence.Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to apply the correct standard of review. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the case in adult court, as its decision was supported by appropriate evidence and considerations of public safety. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case with directions to affirm the district court's order. View "State v. Jeremiah T." on Justia Law

Samuel Alejondro Torrez was arrested for driving while impaired and driving after license cancellation. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant to test Torrez’s blood or urine, which he refused. Torrez was charged with first-degree test refusal and driving after license cancellation. Before trial, Torrez requested the district court to instruct the jury that the State must prove the arresting officer had probable cause to believe he was driving while impaired. The district court denied this request, and the jury found Torrez guilty on both counts.The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Torrez’s conviction, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not including a probable cause element in the jury instructions. The court reasoned that the issuance of the search warrant already established probable cause.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2), requires the State to prove that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired. The court held that the plain language of the statute does not require the State to prove probable cause for the refusal of a blood or urine test when a search warrant is involved. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. View "State v. Torrez" on Justia Law