Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of third-degree sexual assault involving young children, with the offenses occurring in 2012. As part of a plea agreement, he was sentenced to two consecutive one-to-five-year prison terms, which were suspended in favor of placement at a correctional center and completion of a sex offender program. He was also ordered to serve a twenty-five-year term of supervised release. After being removed from the correctional center for behavioral issues, he served his prison sentence and began supervised release in 2017. Over the following years, his supervised release was revoked four times due to repeated violations, including unauthorized contact with minors, failure to report relationships, drug use, and dishonesty with probation officers. Each revocation resulted in increasing terms of imprisonment.The Circuit Court of Ohio County presided over each revocation. On the fourth revocation, the court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years’ imprisonment and imposed an additional twenty-five-year term of supervised release to begin after his release from prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and that the additional supervised release term exceeded the statutory maximum under West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(j).The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the twenty-five-year imprisonment sentence was not constitutionally disproportionate, given the seriousness of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s repeated breaches of trust while on supervised release. However, the court found that the circuit court erred in calculating the additional term of supervised release. The statute requires subtracting all prior revocation imprisonment terms from the maximum authorized supervised release period. The court affirmed the imprisonment sentence, vacated the supervised release term, and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "State of West Virginia v. Brautigam" on Justia Law

While serving a federal sentence in Bureau of Prisons custody, the defendant was temporarily housed at a federal facility in Oklahoma. There, he used a distress alarm to summon a correctional officer and, when the officer arrived, exposed himself and masturbated in view of the officer through his cell door window. This was not the first such incident; the defendant had previously been disciplined for similar acts of public masturbation on four occasions at another federal prison. The government charged him with indecent exposure under Oklahoma law, assimilated through federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the case. Before trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior acts, including disciplinary logs and incident reports, to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The district court conducted the required analysis and admitted the logs and incident reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The first trial ended in a mistrial, but at retrial, the evidence was again admitted, and the jury convicted the defendant. The district court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior-acts evidence and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant had waived his argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and forfeited his argument under Rule 803(6), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The court also found no plain error in admitting the evidence as business records and concluded that the district court properly applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

James D. Van Winter moved in with his sister in Wyoming due to financial difficulties. After a family gathering, a dispute arose when Van Winter felt slighted by a guest, leading to a heated argument with his sister. The situation escalated when Van Winter refused to leave, resulting in a physical altercation with his brother-in-law. During the struggle, Van Winter threatened his brother-in-law with a pocketknife, which was later wrestled away, causing a minor injury. Police responded, collected statements and evidence, and Van Winter was arrested. He denied any altercation occurred.The State charged Van Winter with aggravated assault and battery and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent. The District Court of Big Horn County presided over the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on both counts. At sentencing, the court orally imposed an 18–24 month prison term for Count I and a suspended 2–4 year sentence with probation for Count II. However, the written judgment imposed a suspended 3–5 year sentence and specified a three-year probation term. Van Winter appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present fingerprint evidence and challenging the discrepancy between the oral and written sentences.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that Van Winter failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s performance, as the fingerprint evidence would not have changed the trial’s outcome given the consistent witness testimony. Therefore, the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial was affirmed. However, the Supreme Court found a material conflict between the oral and written sentences for Count II. It vacated the probationary term and remanded the case for the district court to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement and to determine the appropriate length of probation. View "Van Winter v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after years of being teased and picked on by his housemates, fatally stabbed one of them during a night of drinking and verbal taunting. The defendant, a member of the Choctaw Nation, lived with several relatives in Oklahoma. On the night in question, the group engaged in typical banter and name-calling, with the victim and another housemate calling the defendant derogatory names, including in the Choctaw language. After retreating to his room, the defendant emerged with a knife, confronted the victim, and, following a struggle, stabbed him multiple times, resulting in the victim’s death. The defendant admitted to the stabbing during a 9-1-1 call, expressing remorse and attributing his actions to the ongoing verbal abuse.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The defendant did not dispute that he killed the victim but argued that he acted in the heat of passion, seeking a conviction for voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. The district court, over the government’s objection, instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. At the government’s request, and over the defendant’s objection, the court also instructed the jury that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the “words alone” instruction was legally correct and whether it improperly affected the jury’s deliberations. The court held that the instruction accurately reflected longstanding legal principles: mere words, no matter how aggravating or insulting, are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute adequate provocation for heat of passion manslaughter under federal law. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sockey" on Justia Law

Lavellous Purcell operated a commercial sex business from 2012 to 2017, recruiting women from across the United States to work as prostitutes and coordinating their interstate travel. He resided primarily on Long Island, New York, and the women involved traveled to at least fourteen states. The government’s case focused on documentary evidence regarding one victim, Samantha Vasquez, showing her work for Purcell in various locations, but not in the Southern District of New York.Purcell was indicted in 2018 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on five counts related to sex trafficking. After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, his conviction on Count One (enticement to engage in unlawful sexual activity) was reversed for lack of venue in the Southern District of New York, but his conviction on Count Two (transporting a victim in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution) was affirmed because his appellate counsel did not challenge venue for that count. The district court reimposed the original sentence after remand. Purcell then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding appellate counsel’s performance reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the denial of Purcell’s habeas petition de novo. The court held that Purcell’s appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge venue as to Count Two, as the omitted argument was significant and obvious and likely would have resulted in reversal of that conviction. The court declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and found Purcell was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Purcell’s § 2255 petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Purcell v. United States" on Justia Law

On June 1, 2017, Travis Ridley was fatally shot in a breezeway at an apartment complex in DeKalb County, Georgia. The State alleged that Ridley had planned to purchase a large quantity of marijuana from Abel Asmelash and Edward Tavarez, but that Asmelash and Tavarez intended to rob him. During the incident, Tavarez shot Ridley while Asmelash took a bag of money from Ridley’s girlfriend, Erica Shavers, who was the State’s primary eyewitness. The prosecution presented surveillance video, cell-phone records, and Shavers’s testimony to support its case. Asmelash’s defense was that he was not present at the scene and offered an alibi, but did not call his listed alibi witnesses at trial.A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Asmelash, Tavarez, and Jeanmarie Gonzalez. Gonzalez’s case was severed, and Tavarez was tried and convicted in January 2019; his convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Tavarez v. State, 319 Ga. 480 (2024). Asmelash’s case was severed during Tavarez’s trial due to issues with redaction of Tavarez’s statement. Asmelash was tried separately in May 2019 and found guilty on all charges, including malice murder and armed robbery. He was sentenced to life without parole and additional consecutive sentences. After a motion for new trial was denied by the trial court in April 2025, Asmelash appealed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Asmelash’s claims that the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to review surveillance video and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an alibi witness. The Court held that any error in denying the jury’s request was harmless, as the video was cumulative of other evidence. The Court also found no prejudice from counsel’s failure to call the alibi witness, as her testimony conflicted with other evidence and was not compelling. The Court affirmed Asmelash’s convictions. View "ASMELASH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Richard Merritt, an attorney, was convicted of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime after the death of his mother, Shirley Merritt, in February 2019. Prior to the murder, Merritt had pled guilty to multiple theft-related felonies and was sentenced to prison, but was released on GPS monitoring pending his surrender. On the day he was to report to prison, Merritt met his ex-wife and daughter at a doctor’s appointment, returned to his mother’s house, and later left in her car with both their cell phones. He cut off his GPS monitor and disappeared. Shirley was found dead the next day, having suffered stab wounds and blunt-force trauma. Merritt was apprehended months later living under a false identity in Tennessee. At trial, Merritt claimed two unknown men killed his mother, but the jury rejected this account.The Superior Court of DeKalb County held a jury trial in May 2023, resulting in Merritt’s conviction on all counts. He was sentenced to life without parole for malice murder and a consecutive five years for possession of a knife. Other counts were vacated or merged. Merritt filed a motion for new trial, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing in January 2025.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Merritt’s appeal. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that Merritt failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel regarding cross-examination, closing argument, or other trial strategies. Claims regarding shackling and an alleged Brady violation were deemed waived. The court found no cumulative error and affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Georgia’s judgment was to affirm Merritt’s convictions. View "MERRITT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the shooting death of Darcy Jones at a nightclub in South Fulton, Georgia, on November 14, 2020. Tianvye Stitts, who worked as an unarmed security guard at the club, was present that night. Testimony at trial established that Stitts was seen with a gun, and after gunshots were heard, witnesses observed him exiting the restroom immediately after Jones, who had been shot, and then fleeing the scene in a Jeep. Additional evidence included Stitts’s erratic flight from the club, his subsequent attempt to evade law enforcement, and his use of a false name upon arrest. The prosecution’s case included testimony from Darrence Morgan, another security guard, who admitted to giving Stitts a gun before the shooting.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Stitts on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses. At trial in May 2023, a jury found Stitts guilty on all counts. The Superior Court of Fulton County sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other offenses. The court later merged the aggravated assault count with the malice murder count. Stitts’s motion for a new trial was denied after an evidentiary hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Stitts’s claims, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction, the giving of an Allen charge, the absence of a specific instruction on impeachment by prior felony conviction, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder conviction, that any error in failing to give an accomplice-corroboration charge did not affect the outcome, that the jury instructions were adequate, and that Stitts’s counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "STITTS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Darell Montrell Trotter was charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. Although the indictment alleged that his conduct caused the death of an individual, DS, the plea agreement did not include this allegation. The agreement stipulated that Trotter would be sentenced within the applicable range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but acknowledged that the court was not bound by these stipulations. The presentence investigation report calculated a Guidelines range of 135–168 months, and recommended a sentence at the bottom of the range. Trotter initially objected to the report but withdrew his objections and agreed with the recommended sentence. At sentencing, the Government presented testimony from DS’s father and argued that the Guidelines underrepresented the severity of Trotter’s conduct, urging the court to consider an upward variance.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas sentenced Trotter to 168 months’ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines range, and five years of supervised release. The court did not reference the prosecutor’s remarks in its sentencing decision. Trotter appealed, arguing that the Government breached the plea agreement by undermining the agreed-upon Guidelines range and advocating for a sentence above it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range, that this breach affected Trotter’s substantial rights, and that correcting the error was necessary to preserve the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case, allowing Trotter to either seek specific performance of the plea agreement before a new judge or withdraw from the plea agreement. View "United States v. Trotter" on Justia Law