Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police officers in Boston, conducting surveillance as part of a drug investigation, observed an individual commit a civil traffic infraction while driving a vehicle. At the time, the officer who observed the infraction was in an unmarked vehicle and did not attempt to stop the car, citing safety concerns. The next day, the same officers resumed surveillance and, after locating the vehicle, requested a marked police cruiser to conduct a stop. During that stop, police discovered cocaine on the individual and in the vehicle. The investigation and subsequent search were not based on any new infractions or suspicious activity, but solely on the traffic violation observed the previous day.In the Superior Court Department, the defendant was indicted for trafficking cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the twenty-four hour delay between the observed infraction and the stop rendered the seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The motion judge denied the suppression motion regarding the physical evidence, finding the stop justified by the prior day’s infraction, and the defendant was convicted after a retrial.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. It held that, although some delay in conducting a traffic stop for safety reasons may be reasonable, the Commonwealth failed to justify the twenty-four hour delay in this case. The Court concluded that the stop violated Article 14 because the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to show the delay was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the portion of the order denying the motion to suppress, vacated the conviction, set aside the verdict, and remanded the matter to the Superior Court. View "Commonwealth v. Arias" on Justia Law

A man convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death sought public records from various state agencies related to Florida’s lethal injection protocol and communications between government entities regarding his execution. He first filed a motion for these records before his death warrant was signed and then submitted an additional request after the warrant was issued. He argued that the records were necessary to support a potential claim that the method of execution would violate his constitutional rights, and that communications between agencies might reveal improper conduct or motives regarding the timing of his execution.The Circuit Court denied both his pre- and post-warrant public records motions, as well as a motion for rehearing and an in camera review of the requested records. The court also denied his motion for an extension of time to file a successive postconviction motion, though he was initially granted some additional time. Despite these denials, the man did not file a successive postconviction motion. He then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for relief, arguing that the denials infringed on his rights to due process, equal protection, and access to the courts.The Supreme Court of Florida treated his appeal as a petition for review of a nonfinal discovery order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(c) and denied it. The Court held that the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law because the requested records were not tied to a colorable claim for postconviction relief, but rather constituted a prohibited fishing expedition. The Court further denied his requests for habeas corpus and oral argument, and dismissed the appeal concerning the denied extension of time. The main holding is that public records requests in capital postconviction proceedings must be connected to a colorable claim for relief. View "Willacy v. State" on Justia Law

Law enforcement suspected the defendant of supplying drugs to a gang in Illinois and, after conducting several controlled purchases, arrested him. During his arrest, officers found multiple small bags of drugs in his possession. A search of an apartment he shared with family members revealed additional drugs, items associated with drug trafficking, and four firearms. While in custody, the defendant made a recorded call to his parents referencing the firearms found in the apartment. He was indicted on seven counts, including distribution of controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pleaded guilty to the distribution counts and went to trial on the remaining counts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. The government called a fingerprint analyst who testified that two of the firearms bore fingerprints matching the defendant’s. The defense challenged the analyst’s methodology but was permitted to present its own expert, despite late disclosure. The jury found the defendant guilty on both remaining counts, concluding he possessed all four firearms. The district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, and sentenced him to 123 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm conviction and whether the district court erred in admitting the expert fingerprint testimony. The appellate court held that the evidence—including the recorded phone call and fingerprint analysis—was sufficient for a rational jury to find constructive possession of the firearms. The court also concluded the district court properly applied Rule 702 and Daubert in admitting the expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v Andrews" on Justia Law

Moreno Lee Jackson was involved in a series of firearms and drug-related crimes in Michigan between February and July 2024. Following his arrest by federal agents, Jackson, represented by counsel, entered into a plea agreement in which he admitted to illegally possessing a firearm as a felon. As part of this plea, he acknowledged that he had at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, making him subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence under federal law. The presentence report identified four such predicate offenses. At his plea hearing, Jackson reaffirmed his understanding of the plea terms and the sentencing consequences, including the statutory minimum.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan accepted Jackson’s guilty plea. The court calculated his sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, factoring in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on Jackson’s admitted prior convictions. After considering the relevant factors, the court imposed a sentence of 212 months’ imprisonment, which fell within the Guidelines range. Jackson did not object at sentencing to the application of the ACCA enhancement. On appeal, he argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, contending that he did not have the requisite prior convictions for the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jackson had explicitly and repeatedly waived his right to challenge the sentencing enhancement by agreeing, both in his plea agreement and at his plea hearing, that he had the necessary prior convictions. The Sixth Circuit concluded that this constituted a true waiver, not merely an invited error, and therefore declined to review his procedural-reasonableness claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this case, four police officers in Puerto Rico pursued two young men suspected of engaging in a drug deal. One officer shot 17-year-old Calep Carvajal in the back as he fled on a bicycle. Defendant José Cartagena apprehended and handcuffed Carvajal, and was accused of pistol-whipping him while he was on the ground. Additional assaults allegedly occurred during and after transport to the police station. Cartagena later filed a false report about the incident and lied to a juvenile prosecutor about Carvajal’s injuries. Federal charges were brought under various statutes, including civil rights violations and obstruction of justice.After a grand jury indictment, three officers pleaded guilty. Cartagena initially entered a plea but withdrew it and went to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the prosecution introduced a hearsay statement from the victim, who was not available for cross-examination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It found the evidence sufficient to support convictions on most counts but determined that the admission of the victim’s testimonial hearsay statement, offered through a government medical expert, violated Cartagena’s Confrontation Clause rights as to the count involving the alleged pistol-whipping during the arrest. The court vacated the conviction on that count, affirmed the convictions on the other counts, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "US v. Cartagena" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of forcible rape, false imprisonment by menace or violence, and corporal injury on a cohabitant after he assaulted his girlfriend. Following his prison sentence, as a Mexican national who had entered the United States unlawfully, he was removed from the United States through an expedited process based on his conviction for rape, which was deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. Days later, he illegally reentered the country and was arrested near the border.He was then charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, he moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his state rape conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus his removal had been improper. The district court denied his motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the defendant met the statutory requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies and deprivation of judicial review. However, it held that he failed to show that his removal was “fundamentally unfair” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court concluded that the California rape statute under which he was convicted was a categorical match to the generic federal definition of rape, which includes rape by non-physical duress. Therefore, his conviction was properly considered an aggravated felony, making his expedited removal lawful. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-REYES" on Justia Law

Law enforcement conducted an investigation into drug trafficking activities involving Paul Parrow after a confidential informant, N.G., made several controlled purchases of various drugs from him. Surveillance linked Parrow to a residence where drugs and related paraphernalia were later found during a warranted search. At trial, multiple co-conspirators and customers testified to Parrow’s ongoing distribution of methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl. The defense sought to introduce the drug convictions of Clemmie Kirk, co-owner of the searched residence, to suggest Kirk’s opportunity and knowledge regarding the drugs found there, but these convictions were admitted only for impeachment, not for the purpose of establishing opportunity or knowledge under Rule 404(b).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa excluded the convictions as reverse Rule 404(b) evidence and instructed the jury they could only consider them for credibility assessment. The court also addressed a discovery issue when the government failed to disclose that a witness, D.B., was the “concerned citizen” referenced in police notes. As a sanction, the court struck D.B.’s undisclosed testimony about Parrow’s drug trafficking but denied the defense’s motion for a mistrial. Parrow was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and he received concurrent 300-month prison sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s exclusion of Kirk’s prior convictions as reverse Rule 404(b) evidence was an abuse of discretion regarding the possession charge because the convictions were relevant to the issue of who possessed the drugs and their exclusion was not harmless. The conviction for possession with intent to distribute was vacated and remanded for a new trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on all other issues, including the handling of the discovery sanction. View "United States v. Parrow" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in three separate cases with felony offenses in Lake County, Montana, including driving under the influence for a fourth or subsequent offense. The State also sought to revoke a previously imposed suspended sentence in another DUI case. A global plea agreement was reached, and the Twentieth Judicial District Court conducted a combined sentencing hearing. The court imposed consecutive prison terms and, as relevant here, imposed a $5,000 fine for the felony DUI, which it fully suspended after considering the defendant’s financial situation. The written judgment also included a condition allowing the probation office to reinstate suspended fines and fees if the defendant failed to comply with probation terms.The defendant appealed, challenging only two aspects of the judgment: the legality of the $5,000 fine, and the condition permitting the probation office to reinstate suspended financial penalties. The State conceded that the delegation to the probation office was improper but otherwise defended the judgment. The defendant argued that the mandatory minimum fine was unconstitutional, relying on a recent Montana Supreme Court decision. The State countered that the statute at issue was not addressed in that case and urged affirmance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that, consistent with its more recent decision in State v. Cole, it is permissible for a sentencing court to impose the statutory $5,000 minimum fine for felony DUI, provided the court determines the defendant’s ability to pay and uses its authority to suspend the fine as appropriate. The court affirmed the imposition and suspension of the fine, finding the sentence lawful. However, the court held that the district court lacked authority to delegate to the probation office the power to reinstate suspended fines and fees. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment striking that condition. View "State v. Trombley" on Justia Law

After police executed a search warrant at an apartment in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where Heclouis Joel Nieves-Díaz was residing, they found drugs, ammunition, and a machine gun conversion device. Nieves, who was on supervised release for a previous federal drug conviction, pleaded guilty to federal charges including being a felon in possession of ammunition, illegal possession of a machine gun conversion device, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced Nieves to eighty-four months' imprisonment, applying a four-level enhancement for using or possessing ammunition in connection with another felony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that sentence, finding the enhancement inapplicable. On remand, the district court recalculated the guidelines range and resentenced Nieves to sixty-six months—twenty-five months above the top of the new Guidelines range—based on an upward variance. The court justified the variance by citing Nieves’s criminal history, the quantity of ammunition, and the prevalence of gun violence in Puerto Rico.Nieves appealed again, arguing that the district court failed to adequately explain the upward variance, particularly regarding the significance of the ammunition in the absence of a firearm. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court’s explanation for the variance was insufficient, especially in not addressing Nieves’s argument about the lack of a firearm. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, clarifying that while the district court could consider Nieves’s criminal history and community factors, it must provide a more specific explanation if it imposes an upward variance based on the quantity of ammunition. The appellate court declined to limit the sentence on remand or order reassignment to a different judge. View "US v. Nieves-Diaz" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty in 2014 to Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the robbery, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms and concurrent terms of supervised release. Following his release in early 2024, he soon violated several conditions of his supervised release, including testing positive for illicit drugs on multiple occasions, violating location restrictions, and leaving the judicial district without permission. The Probation Officer filed a petition for revocation alleging four violations, including drug testing failures and other conduct, and submitted a supplemental report that incorrectly classified the drug-related violation as a more serious offense.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held a revocation hearing at which the defendant admitted the charged conduct. The court dismissed the felony possession allegation but found that the most serious remaining violation was the drug testing violation. Without explanation, the court classified this as a Grade B violation under the Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The court then imposed a sentence of 19 months’ imprisonment with additional terms of supervised release, exceeding the Guidelines range and possibly the statutory maximum.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in characterizing the drug testing violation as a Grade B violation, rather than the less severe Grade C violation that the record supported. The appellate court held that this misclassification was plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights and impacted the fairness of the proceedings. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for resentencing under the correct Guidelines classification. The court also directed the district court to consider whether the new sentence complies with the statutory limits on supervised release. View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law