Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Travis Rockhill was charged with the murder of Gary Matthews, who was shot outside a friend’s home and later died from his injuries. The prosecution presented evidence that Rockhill had a dispute with Matthews over a scooter sale and was angry with him prior to the shooting. The defense argued that another individual, Louie (“Primo”), was involved and that Rockhill was not the shooter. During Rockhill’s first trial, he made incriminating statements to the courtroom bailiff, but the prosecution did not introduce this evidence. The jury deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial.In the second trial, presided over by Judge Emily Cole, Rockhill testified in his own defense. After both sides rested, Judge Cole sent ex parte text messages to a former colleague at the District Attorney’s office, questioning why the prosecutor was not calling the bailiff as a rebuttal witness and suggesting someone should speak to the prosecutor about it. The prosecution did not act on this suggestion, and Rockhill was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. After the verdict, the prosecution disclosed Judge Cole’s ex parte communications to the defense. Judge Cole recused herself, acknowledging the impropriety but maintaining she had been impartial. Rockhill moved for a new trial based on judicial bias, but Judge Denise McLaughlin-Bennett of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion, finding no intent to intervene in the proceedings and no impact on the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Judge Cole’s ex parte communications constituted a due process violation and structural error, as they demonstrated an unconstitutional probability of actual judicial bias. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, directing the lower court to grant Rockhill’s motion for a new trial. View "P. v. Rockhill" on Justia Law

The case concerns Ryan Scott Warner, who was charged with the murder of Kayleigh S., the young daughter of his codefendant, Sara Lynn Krueger. The prosecution alleged that Warner either directly committed the murder or aided and abetted Krueger, with the sole theory presented to the jury being first degree murder by torture. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2017, Warner was found guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill but affirmed the murder conviction, finding ample evidence of intent to inflict extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and imputed malice, Warner petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding Warner had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes. Warner appealed, arguing the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding and that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, independently reviewed the record and affirmed the denial of Warner’s petition. The court held that Warner was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of murder liability—first degree murder by torture—that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. The jury’s findings necessarily established the required mental state for murder under current law, and Warner was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. Therefore, Warner is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "P. v. Warner" on Justia Law

Sara Lynn Krueger was charged with the murder of her young daughter, Kayleigh S., in Napa County, California. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed by torture, and Krueger was tried on the theory that she either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted her codefendant. The jury was instructed only on first degree murder by torture and not on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In May 2017, the jury found Krueger guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child, but the special circumstance finding of torture was later reversed on direct appeal due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill. The conviction for first degree murder was otherwise affirmed, and Krueger was sentenced to 25 years to life.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited certain theories of murder liability, Krueger filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing she was eligible for relief because the jury instructions allegedly permitted malice to be imputed based solely on her participation in torture. The Superior Court of Napa County denied her petition at the prima facie stage, finding she was ineligible for relief as a matter of law since she was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory amendments.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Krueger’s petition. The appellate court held that Krueger was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of first degree murder by torture, which remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. The jury’s findings and instructions required proof of a mental state more culpable than malice, and thus, Krueger could still be convicted under current law. The court concluded she was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Krueger" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested for possession of controlled substances in late December 2021 and released on his own recognizance. The State filed an Information in January 2022, charging him with possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury trials in Bingham County were suspended until late February 2022, creating a backlog of cases. The defendant’s trial was rescheduled multiple times, primarily because of delays in forensic testing and the unavailability of a forensic analyst. The district court repeatedly warned that older cases and limited judicial resources might further delay the trial. Ultimately, the defendant’s trial did not occur within the six-month statutory period, and he moved to dismiss the case, arguing violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District denied the motion to dismiss, finding good cause for the delay due to the backlog of cases resulting from the pandemic and the need to prioritize older cases. The court also noted that the defendant was not in custody, which lessened the prejudice from the delay. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss under Idaho Code section 19-3501 and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court held that court congestion resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the trial delay under the statute. The Court also rejected the argument that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution regarding speedy trial rights, reaffirming the use of the Barker v. Wingo factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Fierro-Garcia" on Justia Law

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law

Federal agents traced downloads of prepubescent child pornography to an IP address at Benjamin Tyler Gentry’s residence in Boone, Iowa. During a search of the home, officers seized electronic devices and firearms. Forensic analysis of a Samsung tablet revealed 181 deleted images of child pornography, stored locally between January 2020 and just before the device was seized. Applications on the tablet were linked to Gentry’s email, and search history included terms related to child pornography. Gentry admitted to downloading pornography involving minors as young as 14.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa indicted Gentry on three counts related to receipt and possession of child pornography, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Gentry pleaded guilty to the firearm charge, and the child pornography charges proceeded to a jury trial. After the government’s case, Gentry moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge regarding the images. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Gentry on all child pornography counts. Post-trial, Gentry again moved for acquittal and a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for knowing receipt; both motions were denied. The court dismissed two possession convictions as lesser included offenses and sentenced Gentry to 168 months.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Gentry argued for the first time that the government failed to prove venue for the receipt offense in the Southern District of Iowa. The Eighth Circuit held that Gentry affirmatively waived any objection to venue by not raising it at trial or in post-trial motions. The court declined to review the venue issue and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The main holding is that a defendant who fails to raise a venue objection at trial waives the issue, precluding appellate review. View "United States v. Gentry" on Justia Law

Over a fourteen-month period, the defendant and his wife engaged in a scheme to purchase seven high-end used vehicles from Kansas dealerships, financing the purchases with bank loans obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations on loan applications. After acquiring the vehicles, they altered title documents to remove the banks’ liens, enabling them to obtain false clear titles. These clear titles were then used to either sell the vehicles or secure title loans for cash. The defendant made few or no payments on the original car loans, and the fraudulent activity involved both Kansas and Georgia vehicle registrations.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially indicted both the defendant and his wife on seventeen counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The court severed the wife’s case after she agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for dismissal of her charges, though she ultimately did not testify. At trial, the government dismissed one count and renumbered the remaining charges. The jury convicted the defendant on all sixteen counts, and the district court imposed concurrent forty-six-month sentences. After sentencing, the government dismissed all charges against the wife.On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence for seven of the defendant’s convictions. The court reversed the bank fraud conviction on Count 2, finding no evidence that the defendant aided or abetted his wife’s fraudulent loan. It also reversed the wire fraud conviction on Count 9 due to insufficient proof of the interstate commerce element. However, the court affirmed the money laundering convictions on Counts 12 through 16, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s transactions were designed, at least in part, to conceal or disguise the proceeds of bank fraud. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on two counts of rape and one count of sexual battery involving a coworker. After a night out, the alleged victim claimed that she awoke in the defendant’s home to find him having intercourse with her. At trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed to prove the offenses occurred in Cuyahoga County, thus failing to establish venue. The trial court granted the motion based on insufficient evidence of venue and entered a judgment of acquittal.The State of Ohio appealed the trial court’s decision to the Eighth District Court of Appeals both as of right and by seeking leave to appeal. The defendant argued that, under the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decision in State v. Hampton, the state could not appeal a judgment of acquittal based on lack of venue. The Eighth District dismissed both appeals in brief entries, relying on Hampton.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and overruled its prior decision in State v. Hampton. The court held that venue is not an element of a criminal offense, and a judgment terminating a prosecution based on insufficient evidence of venue is not a judgment of acquittal but rather a dismissal of the indictment, complaint, or information. Therefore, under R.C. 2945.67(A), the state has a right to appeal such a dismissal as of right. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s judgment dismissing the state’s appeal as of right and remanded the case for further consideration. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state’s discretionary appeal as unnecessary. View "State v. Musarra" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, after selling fentanyl-laced Percocet pills that resulted in the death of an Army soldier, L.G. The Presentence Investigation Report initially calculated a sentencing range of 210–240 months under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, based on the finding that death resulted from the drug offense. At sentencing, the government presented evidence linking the defendant’s sale to L.G.’s fatal overdose, including communications and undercover purchases. The district court overruled the defendant’s objection to the application of the enhanced guideline and imposed a 240-month sentence.On appeal, the government conceded that applying the enhanced guideline was plain error under United States v. Greenough, because the death was not part of the crime to which the defendant pled guilty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, the government acknowledged the lower guideline range of 10–16 months. The district court considered arguments for and against an upward variance, ultimately imposing the same 240-month sentence, citing the seriousness of the offense and other statutory factors, but did not inform the defendant of his right to allocute. The defendant’s counsel did not object after sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found that the district court’s explanation for the upward variance was insufficient, constituting clear error, but held that this did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The court also held that considering L.G.’s death as a sentencing factor was permissible under precedent. Finally, the court found that the failure to allow allocution at resentencing did not warrant reversal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 240-month sentence. View "United States v. Horton" on Justia Law

A man was charged with illegal possession of ammunition after police stopped a car in which he was a passenger late at night, citing a non-functioning license plate light and tinted windows. During the stop, officers asked both occupants if they were on parole or probation, ordered them out of the vehicle, and conducted pat searches, citing low lighting and baggy clothing as reasons. A search of a backpack near the passenger seat revealed ammunition and documents with the passenger’s name. The passenger, who had prior felony convictions, was arrested. During the encounter, officers used slang and whistled at both the passenger and two Latino men passing by.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially denied the passenger’s motion under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), finding he had not made a prima facie showing that the officers’ actions were motivated by racial bias. After the California Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ requiring reconsideration and a detailed ruling on all claims, the trial court again denied the motion, concluding that the allegations were conclusory or unsupported.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the passenger had made a prima facie showing under the RJA. The court found that, when considering the totality of the facts—including expert testimony, statistical evidence, and the officers’ language and conduct—there was a substantial likelihood that law enforcement exhibited bias based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. The court clarified that at the prima facie stage, the trial court should not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations, but should accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are conclusory or contradicted by the record. The appellate court issued a writ directing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the RJA motion. View "Hernandez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law