Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Raymundo Gomez was accused of committing lewd acts against three children at a public swimming pool. The key incidents involved Gomez allegedly bringing a 14-year-old boy’s hand into contact with his genitals and, separately, touching an eight-year-old girl, Katrina, on her buttocks and hip. The prosecution’s case against Gomez relied heavily on Katrina’s prior statements, including her preliminary hearing testimony and a forensic interview, as she did not testify at trial. Katrina’s mother objected to bringing her to court, citing concerns about the emotional impact on her daughter and her reluctance to have Katrina relive the experience in a courtroom setting.The Superior Court of San Diego County found Katrina unavailable to testify after hearing from her mother, who expressed that she did not want Katrina to participate further in the proceedings. The court allowed Katrina’s prior statements to be admitted at trial. The jury convicted Gomez of the offenses against Kane and Katrina but acquitted him of the offense against a third child. Gomez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding Katrina unavailable and admitting her prior statements, thus violating his constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish Katrina’s unavailability as a witness because the record did not show that her mother’s refusal to bring her to court was unequivocal or that all reasonable efforts to secure her testimony had been exhausted. The court found this error prejudicial and concluded that the admission of Katrina’s prior statements violated Gomez’s confrontation rights. As a result, the court reversed the convictions on all three lewd act counts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Eskender Getachew, a medical doctor in Columbus, Ohio, operated a clinic treating patients with opioid addiction. The government alleged that Dr. Getachew unlawfully prescribed controlled substances, particularly Subutex, at rates far exceeding medical norms, often without verifying patients’ claimed allergies to naloxone. Evidence at trial included testimony from an undercover officer, clinic staff, and an expert who identified repeated deviations from accepted medical practice, such as prescribing drugs without documented need and ignoring signs of drug diversion. The jury found Dr. Getachew guilty on eleven counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances and not guilty on four counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio presided over the trial. After conviction, Dr. Getachew was sentenced to concurrent six-month terms and three years of supervised release. He moved for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and requested an evidentiary hearing, which the district court denied. Dr. Getachew appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the deliberate-ignorance jury instruction, the content of that instruction, his absence at the return of the verdict, and the denial of an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Dr. Getachew knowingly issued unauthorized prescriptions. It found no plain error in the deliberate-ignorance instruction or its content. The court determined that Dr. Getachew’s absence at the verdict’s return did not affect his substantial rights and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Getachew" on Justia Law

In 2010, police responded to an assault in which the victim reported being attacked and threatened due to his cooperation in a homicide investigation. The victim and a witness identified the defendant as one of the assailants. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating he confronted the victim over being called a “rat,” and that the victim emerged with a bat. The victim suffered significant injuries. In 2011, a jury convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, threatening a witness, and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court found true several prior convictions, including two strikes, and imposed a sentence of 32 years to life, including enhancements for prior prison terms and great bodily injury.After the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Superior Court of Humboldt County recalled the sentence in 2022. The court appointed counsel and repeatedly continued the resentencing hearing to allow defense counsel to prepare a sentencing brief. Despite numerous continuances and the court’s admonitions, defense counsel failed to file any written argument or present substantial evidence in mitigation, ultimately making only a brief oral presentation at the hearing. The court struck the four one-year prison prior enhancements but otherwise reimposed the original sentence, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing. The court found that defense counsel’s failure to file a sentencing brief or adequately present mitigating evidence or argument fell below professional standards and prejudiced the defendant, as there was a reasonable probability the court could have imposed a lesser sentence. The judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Guevara" on Justia Law

Benjamin Carpenter was accused of providing translation and related services to ISIS, a designated foreign terrorist organization. He founded Ahlud-Tawhid Publications (ATP), which translated and published ISIS propaganda in multiple languages. Carpenter personally translated ISIS materials into English, wrote original content, and managed an ATP group on Telegram, where he coordinated translation projects. An undercover FBI agent, posing as an ISIS affiliate, joined the group and interacted with Carpenter, who recommended and facilitated the translation of ISIS propaganda videos at the agent’s request. Carpenter was arrested before completing a second translation assignment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee charged Carpenter with attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. After a five-day trial, a jury convicted him, and the district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison. Carpenter appealed, challenging the statute’s application to his conduct, evidentiary rulings, a protective order allowing an FBI agent to use a pseudonym, jury instructions, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Carpenter’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that translation services constitute “material support” as a “service” under the statute, consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of evidence related to Carpenter’s involvement with ATP and ISIS, the use of a pseudonym for the FBI agent, and the denial of Carpenter’s proposed jury instructions. The court also upheld the application of the terrorism sentencing enhancement and found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in New Mexico were conducting surveillance at a motel to apprehend a fugitive when they observed the defendant, who was not the original target, and another man exit the building. The other man carried a bag with the barrel of a rifle protruding, which he placed in the back seat of an SUV. The defendant was seen cleaning the SUV and, according to an officer’s testimony, picked up and repositioned the rifle. Later, the defendant was arrested at a convenience store while carrying a backpack, which, upon search, was found to contain two loaded handguns. A subsequent search of the SUV, conducted with a warrant, uncovered the rifle and ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officers had probable cause for the warrantless arrest based on the officer’s credible testimony. At trial, the court gave an investigative-techniques jury instruction over the defendant’s objection, and the jury found the defendant guilty on both counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence for one count, the propriety of the jury instruction, and, for the first time in his reply brief, the search of the backpack.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in crediting the officer’s testimony and that there was probable cause for the arrest. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find actual or constructive possession and knowledge of the firearm. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions and declined to consider the new suppression argument regarding the backpack, as it was raised for the first time in the reply brief. View "United States v. Eddings" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm after a shooting incident in which the victim, Bell, was shot in the head while sitting in the passenger seat of a vehicle outside the defendant’s residence. The evidence at trial included testimony from police officers, medical personnel, neighbors, and the defendant’s wife, as well as the defendant’s own statements to police and a recorded jail call. The defendant initially denied involvement but later admitted to shooting Bell, claiming it was accidental. After the State rested its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict, but the trial court reserved its ruling and proceeded to the defense’s case without deciding the motion. The defense ultimately rested without presenting evidence, and the jury found the defendant guilty.The Circuit Court of Rock Island County denied the defendant’s posttrial motion, which argued that the court’s failure to rule on the directed verdict motion prejudiced his right to a fair trial. The court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to 50 years for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding the evidence sufficient and holding that the defendant had forfeited review of the directed verdict issue by failing to object at trial. The appellate court also found no clear or obvious error for purposes of plain error review due to unsettled law on the timing of such rulings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed whether a trial court must decide a defendant’s midtrial motion for a directed verdict before proceeding to the defense’s evidence. The court held that section 115-4(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to decide a midtrial motion for a directed verdict before advancing to the defense’s case. However, the court found that the error in this case did not warrant reversal under the plain error rule because the evidence was not closely balanced and the defendant failed to establish second prong plain error. The court affirmed the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case was on federal supervised release when he absconded, leading to the issuance of a federal warrant for his arrest. Upon being located and arrested in Nebraska, drugs were found in his possession, resulting in state drug charges. After his arrest, he was initially held in a county jail but was soon transferred to federal custody. While in federal custody, Nebraska authorities charged him with a state offense and obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to temporarily transfer him from federal to state custody for prosecution and sentencing on the state charge. He spent 638 days in the county jail under this arrangement before being sentenced in state court.The District Court for Lancaster County considered whether the defendant should receive credit against his state sentence for the time spent in county jail while he was “borrowed” from federal custody. Defense counsel requested such credit, but both the court and counsel acknowledged uncertainty about whether the time should be credited to the state or federal sentence. The district court ultimately declined to award any credit for time served, finding no clear basis in the record to attribute the time exclusively to the state case. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any other sentences, with no credit for time served.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the statutory and common law principles governing credit for time served, particularly in cases involving multiple sovereigns. The court held that when a defendant is borrowed from federal custody under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the primary jurisdiction remains with the federal authorities, and any credit for time served during that period is attributable only to the federal sentence, not the state sentence. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny credit for time served on the state sentence. View "State v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Benjamin Tariri was charged with multiple counts of embezzlement and larceny, allegedly misappropriating nearly $2 million from clients while working as an attorney. He was arrested at Logan International Airport attempting to board a one-way flight to Iran, where he had recently spent six months. Tariri had longstanding ties to the United States but also significant connections to Iran. After his arraignment in the Boston Municipal Court, he was released on cash bail and required to submit to GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone restricting his movements to certain areas, primarily to mitigate his risk of flight.Following indictment and arraignment in the Superior Court, the bail and GPS conditions were maintained, with the inclusion zone expanded to cover additional areas. Tariri moved to modify or vacate the GPS condition, arguing that it hindered his ability to work and prevented him from visiting his wife and child in East Boston. The motion judge expanded the inclusion zone to address employment concerns but otherwise denied further relief. Tariri then filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, which a single justice denied, finding no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the single justice’s denial for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The court held that GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone, imposed as a condition of pretrial release, was a reasonable and constitutional search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, given the particularized risk of flight and the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring Tariri’s appearance in court. The judgment of the single justice was affirmed. View "Tariri v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Five gang members were present in an alley in 1999 when two were shot, resulting in one death and one injury. A witness observed three young Hispanic males fleeing the scene. Six years later, Jaime Cesar Perez-Tinoco was arrested and admitted to being present but denied knowledge of any plan to kill. He was 18 at the time. In 2005, Perez was charged with premeditated murder, attempted premeditated murder, and gang participation, with additional gang and firearm allegations. At his 2006 trial, the jury was instructed on both direct aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences theory. Perez was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 50 years to life.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. In 2022, Perez filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, but later withdrew it. In 2024, he filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his convictions were invalid under People v. Chiu due to the jury instructions. The Superior Court of Orange County granted habeas relief, vacating the premeditated murder and attempted murder convictions, and later vacated the gang-related convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 186.22. The court gave the prosecution the option to retry the vacated charges or accept reductions. The prosecution did not retry the case or request a stay, and after 60 days, the court dismissed the vacated charges and enhancements, leaving only second degree murder and attempted murder (without premeditation) convictions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that section 1172.6 did not preclude habeas relief for Chiu error, that the trial court properly vacated the gang-related findings due to retroactive statutory changes, and that dismissal of the vacated charges was proper because the prosecution failed to retry within the statutory period or seek a stay. The trial court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "People v. Perez-Tinoco" on Justia Law

Aniano Olea was convicted by a jury in 2009 of 25 counts involving violent acts against his spouse, Jane Doe 1, including torture, aggravated mayhem, inflicting corporal injury, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and dissuading a witness. The jury also found that Olea personally inflicted great bodily injury during one of the corporal injury offenses. The abuse spanned years and included physical violence, psychological control, and severe injuries to Jane Doe. Olea was sentenced to four consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life, plus a determinate term of 20 years, totaling 48 years to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, Olea filed a petition in 2024 in Monterey County Superior Court seeking recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing changes in sentencing laws. He argued that his rehabilitation and changes in the law warranted reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court appointed counsel, reviewed Olea’s prison records, held a hearing, and ultimately declined to exercise its discretion to recall and resentence, finding the original sentence just given the severity of Olea’s conduct.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, first addressed whether the trial court’s denial of Olea’s petition was appealable. The court distinguished this case from others where no hearing was held, finding that the trial court’s actions affected Olea’s substantial rights and thus made the order appealable. On the merits, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence Olea, as the decision was reasoned and based on permissible factors. The order denying Olea’s resentencing petition was affirmed. View "People v. Olea" on Justia Law