Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Xavier Adams, Jr. was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Sean Peterson. The incident occurred on September 5, 2017, when Peterson, Adams, and Adams's then-wife, Destinee Pannell, were roommates. An argument over rent escalated, leading to both men retrieving firearms. During a struggle, Peterson was shot and killed. Adams attempted to cover up the incident by creating an alibi and preventing Pannell from contacting the police. Adams was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder, and was found guilty by a jury in June 2019.The trial court sentenced Adams to life in prison without parole for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Adams filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing several points, including the trial court's failure to vacate his felony murder conviction under the modified merger rule, mutually exclusive verdicts, improper comments on evidence, and errors in jury instructions.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the modified merger rule did not apply because Adams's possession of the firearm was independent of the killing. The court also found that the verdicts were not mutually exclusive, as felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm does not require intent to kill. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence, did not commit plain error in its jury instructions, and that Adams had affirmatively waived any claim of error regarding the trial court's response to a jury note. View "ADAMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Steven Alford Jacobs was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Curtis Pitts. The incident occurred on September 21, 2018, and Jacobs was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found Jacobs guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, among other sentences for the additional charges.Jacobs filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He appealed, arguing that his constitutional right to be present during a critical phase of the trial was violated when the jury viewed a vehicle connected to the charges without him being present. During the trial, the jury was allowed to view the van involved in the case, and Jacobs's defense objected, questioning whether the van was in the same condition as it was in 2018. The trial court allowed the viewing, and Jacobs's attorneys testified that they had discussed the right to be present with Jacobs, who chose not to attend the viewing.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that even if Jacobs had a right to be present during the jury's viewing of the van, the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Jacobs waived that right. The court found that Jacobs's attorneys had informed him of his right to be present, and Jacobs had explicitly declined to attend the viewing. Therefore, the trial court's finding that Jacobs waived his right to be present was not clearly erroneous, and Jacobs was not entitled to a new trial based on his absence during the jury's viewing of the van. View "JACOBS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Sidney Kimble was convicted of two drug-trafficking felonies. After serving his sentences, he was found in possession of a handgun and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Kimble argued that this lifelong prohibition violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Kimble's motion to dismiss the indictment, stating that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen did not overrule Fifth Circuit precedent upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Kimble then pleaded guilty but retained the right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Kimble. The court reasoned that the Second Amendment allows Congress to disarm individuals deemed dangerous, and drug trafficking is inherently dangerous. The court found that historical and legal precedents support the disarmament of individuals involved in drug trafficking due to the intrinsic violence associated with the drug trade. Therefore, the court affirmed Kimble's conviction under § 922(g)(1). View "USA v. Kimble" on Justia Law

Edison Burgos-Montes, serving a life sentence, sought compassionate release due to serious medical conditions, including severe hypertension and obstructive sleep apnea. He argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to provide adequate treatment for these conditions. Burgos filed a motion with the district court in late 2021, presenting evidence of his ongoing severe hypertension and lack of treatment for his sleep apnea. The district court found that Burgos was receiving adequate medical care and denied his motion without prejudice.Burgos appealed, contending that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. He pointed to evidence that, nearly a year after his sleep apnea diagnosis, the BOP had not provided him with a CPAP machine, the standard treatment for sleep apnea. The district court had relied on a letter from Dr. Gary Venuto, Clinical Director at FCC Coleman, stating that Burgos was receiving adequate care. However, Burgos argued that this assessment overlooked significant evidence of inadequate treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Burgos was receiving adequate treatment for his sleep apnea. The appellate court noted that Burgos had not received a CPAP machine or any other treatment for his sleep apnea, despite a diagnosis and a recommendation from an outside cardiologist. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Burgos had demonstrated an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Burgos-Montes" on Justia Law

Cristian Cabrera-Rivas was convicted by a jury of two drug offenses related to a methamphetamine deal. Cabrera-Rivas, who grew up in Honduras and has limited education and English proficiency, was involved in negotiating a meth deal with a confidential informant named Hector, who was working with the Department of Homeland Security. During the deal, Cabrera-Rivas vouched for the meth supplier, Marco Ramos-Garcia, and was present when the meth was delivered. The police arrested Cabrera-Rivas at the scene and found cash and nearly pure methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found Cabrera-Rivas competent to stand trial based on a government psychologist's evaluation. The court denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal and precluded him from presenting certain affirmative defenses but allowed him to argue entrapment. The jury convicted him on both counts. Post-trial, the district court denied his motions for a new trial and a retrospective competency hearing, finding sufficient evidence for the convictions and no bad faith in the destruction of a recorded interview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court found no clear error in the magistrate judge's competency ruling and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second competency hearing. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, noting that a reasonable jury could infer that Cabrera-Rivas had constructive possession of the meth. The court rejected Cabrera-Rivas's due process claim regarding the destroyed interview recording, as there was no evidence of bad faith. Finally, the court upheld the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the public authority, innocent intent, outrageous conduct, and entrapment by estoppel defenses. View "US v. Cabrera-Rivas" on Justia Law

Law enforcement agents were surveilling a motel room in Charles Town, West Virginia, to arrest a woman. They saw Dehaven Craig leave the room and drive off. Craig had a significant criminal history, including prior felony convictions. After Craig left, agents entered the motel room, arrested the woman, and found a loaded .380 caliber pistol. The woman claimed the gun belonged to Craig. When Craig returned, officers stopped him and found 0.8 grams of cocaine base in his SUV. Craig was indicted on two drug charges and one charge for unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon.Craig and the government reached a plea agreement where Craig would plead guilty to the firearm charge, and the government would drop the drug charges and recommend a sentence within the Guidelines range. The plea agreement included a stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing. At the plea hearing, the government stated that the stipulation contained Craig’s total relevant conduct. The court accepted the plea, and the probation officer calculated Craig’s Guidelines range. The government sought two enhancements based on facts not included in the stipulation, which Craig objected to, but the probation officer and the district court overruled his objections, resulting in a higher Guidelines range and a 100-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the plea agreement stipulated to Craig’s total relevant conduct for sentencing purposes and that the government breached the agreement by seeking enhancements based on facts outside the stipulation. The court held that the government’s duty of candor did not excuse it from its commitments under the plea agreement. The court vacated Craig’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district court judge. View "US v. Craig" on Justia Law

Kelvin Rosa, a state prisoner, sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial for burglarizing a check-cashing store and shooting a responding police officer. Rosa was captured after a high-speed chase, during which he and others threw burglary tools and a stolen gun out of their car. The state presented extensive prior-bad-acts evidence, including details of other burglaries Rosa allegedly committed, to link him to the gun used in the check-cashing store burglary.The state habeas court denied Rosa's claim, concluding that his counsel was effective and that any deficiencies did not prejudice him. Rosa then filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief, raising the same ineffective-assistance claim. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted habeas relief, finding that the state habeas court had unreasonably applied the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court. The Third Circuit held that Rosa's trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence and for not requesting timely and specific limiting instructions to mitigate its prejudicial impact. The court found that the state habeas court's conclusion that counsel was effective was unreasonable, as it did not consider whether counsel should have taken further action during the trial.The Third Circuit also found that the state habeas court unreasonably concluded that Rosa was not prejudiced by his counsel's deficiencies. The court noted that the evidence against Rosa was not overwhelming, and the extensive prior-bad-acts evidence likely influenced the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas relief, concluding that Rosa's trial was unfair due to his counsel's ineffective assistance. View "Rosa v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

Dimaryn Ware was indicted on multiple firearms-related charges. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statutes violated the Second Amendment both on their face and as applied to him. The district court denied his motion, and Ware pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal the denial. He now appeals the denial and several sentencing decisions.The district court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, denied Ware's motion to dismiss the indictment. Ware pled guilty to two counts, and the remaining counts were dismissed on the government's motion. At sentencing, the court applied the Base Offense Level from the United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2K2.1(a)(3), concluding that the offense involved a firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months but varied upward to 144 months' imprisonment, ordering the sentence to run concurrently with a state sentence for a related shooting but consecutively to other state sentences for unrelated offenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ware's arguments against the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 932(b)(1) were foreclosed by precedent, specifically citing United States v. Jackson and United States v. Sharkey. The court also held that the district court did not err in considering conduct underlying an acquitted charge when determining Ware's sentence, as permitted by precedent. Additionally, the court found no clear error in the district court's application of USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) based on the evidence of the firearm's capability to accept a large capacity magazine. Finally, the court upheld the district court's decision to impose Ware's federal sentence consecutively to his unrelated state sentences and to not reduce his federal sentence based on time served for those unrelated state sentences.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers stopped John Michael Sherwood for a suspected violation of Idaho Code section 49-456 because the Rhode Island license plate on the car he was driving was registered to a different vehicle. During the stop, a deputy discovered over 100 pounds of marijuana, leading to Sherwood's arrest for trafficking in marijuana. Sherwood moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was illegal as his license plate complied with Rhode Island law. The district court denied the motion. Sherwood also moved to dismiss the case, claiming his speedy trial rights were violated due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court denied this motion as well, citing the pandemic and related orders as good cause for the delay. A jury found Sherwood guilty of trafficking in marijuana.Sherwood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that Idaho Code section 49-456 only applies to vehicles registered in Idaho and that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss without evaluating the factors in Idaho Criminal Rule 28. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 49-456 applies to all vehicles driven in Idaho, regardless of where they are registered, and affirmed the district court's denial of Sherwood's motion to suppress. The court also held that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the delay in Sherwood's trial, affirming the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Sherwood's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In March 1988, Isaiah Harris, a sheriff in Montgomery County, Alabama, was killed. His wife, Louise, was having an affair and conspired with her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to have Harris killed for insurance money. McCarter recruited Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood to carry out the murder. Sockwell was later convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced to death.Sockwell appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude Black jurors in a discriminatory manner, violating Batson v. Kentucky. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) affirmed his conviction, finding no clear error in the trial court’s denial of the Batson challenge. The Alabama Supreme Court also affirmed, stating that the prosecutor’s identification of a juror’s race was merely descriptive and not a race-based reason for the strike.Sockwell then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which was denied. The district court found the strike of a Black juror, Eric Davis, problematic but concluded that the Alabama Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Batson. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on the Batson issue, and Sockwell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Alabama Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law by not properly considering all relevant circumstances under Batson’s third step. The court found that the prosecutor’s history of Batson violations, statistical evidence of disproportionate strikes against Black jurors, and the comparison of Davis to similarly situated white jurors indicated purposeful discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and directed it to issue a writ of habeas corpus, allowing Alabama the right to retry Sockwell. View "Sockwell v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law