Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man became the stepfather to five children after moving in with their mother on a ranch in Corson County, South Dakota. Over several years, he took on the role of disciplinarian, and his methods escalated into severe physical abuse, including shocking the children with a cattle prod, using shock collars, and physical beatings. He also provided illegal drugs to some of the children and subjected his stepdaughter to repeated sexual assaults, beginning when she was fourteen. The pattern of abuse and cruelty continued even as the family moved around the country, including periods spent in Oklahoma and Sioux Falls.After one of the children disclosed the abuse to a military recruiter, law enforcement became involved, and the man was convicted for related conduct in Minnehaha County. He was later indicted in Corson County on multiple charges: three counts of rape, three counts of aggravated assault, and five counts of abuse or cruelty to a minor. The State sought to admit evidence of similar abusive acts occurring in other jurisdictions. The defense objected, arguing these incidents were irrelevant and too remote, but after a hearing, the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit allowed the evidence, reasoning it showed a common plan and the nature of the familial relationship. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The Circuit Court also denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one rape count.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of acts committed outside Corson County, finding such evidence admissible to show motive, plan, and the relationship between the defendant and the victims. The Supreme Court also concluded that sufficient evidence supported the second-degree rape conviction, determining that the jury could reasonably find the element of force or coercion was met. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

On the night of September 15, 2016, an altercation occurred in Southeast Washington, D.C., during which Andre Becton shot Darnell Peoples in the leg and neck, resulting in Peoples’s death. The incident followed a verbal exchange and physical struggle between the two men, witnessed by Debra Moore. Mr. Becton fled the scene. Police later identified him as the shooter based on eyewitness accounts and a dying declaration by Peoples. Mr. Becton was arrested after police seized his vehicle and, during an interview, he denied involvement despite being informed of the possibility of a self-defense claim. Investigators obtained and searched Mr. Becton’s iPhone after securing a warrant, recovering text messages and other data.Prior to trial, Mr. Becton’s counsel did not move to suppress the cell phone evidence. At trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the court excluded evidence of Peoples’s prior domestic violence allegations, finding them more prejudicial than probative under the factors outlined in Shepherd v. United States. The jury convicted Mr. Becton of second-degree murder while acquitting him of first-degree murder. While his direct appeal was pending, Mr. Becton filed a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress the cell phone evidence. The trial court found counsel’s performance deficient but concluded there was no prejudice because the cell phone evidence was not central to the government’s case.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed both the conviction and the denial of the Section 23-110 motion. The court held that the exclusion of the prior domestic violence evidence was not an abuse of discretion, as the trial court properly balanced its probative value and prejudicial effect. The court also held that Mr. Becton failed to show prejudice from counsel’s performance because the outcome would not likely have changed without the cell phone evidence. Accordingly, the convictions and denial of post-conviction relief were affirmed. View "Becton v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of ten counts of possession of child pornography. After conviction, the State discovered and disclosed impeachment evidence relating to the arresting officer, which had not been available at trial. This disclosure occurred after the defendant’s 30-day deadline to file a motion for new trial had passed. Despite this, the defendant filed an untimely motion for new trial based on the new evidence, while the appeal was already pending and after the trial court had lost plenary power over the case.The defendant then sought to have the First Court of Appeals abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the motion for new trial. The First Court of Appeals, citing emergency COVID-19 orders and appellate procedure rules, ordered abatement and remanded for a hearing. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for new trial. Subsequently, the First Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the State on suppression and sufficiency issues but found the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.On discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether the First Court of Appeals had authority to abate the appeal and order the trial court to hear the untimely motion for new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appellate court lacked authority to do so because the trial court had lost jurisdiction and neither the emergency orders nor appellate procedure rules permitted the creation of jurisdiction where none existed. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the First Court of Appeals and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion, dismissing all other grounds of review as improvidently granted. View "THOMSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case centers on an incident in which Lisa Dawn Oliver was arrested following a violent confrontation involving her former partner, P.L., who had custody of their daughter. After Oliver and her friend attempted to take the child from P.L.’s apartment, an argument ensued. During the altercation, Oliver was alleged to have cut P.L.’s neck with a concealed weapon and was heard threatening to kill him. P.L. required medical treatment for the wound, but the injury did not meet the statutory definition of “great bodily harm.”Initially charged with attempted second-degree intentional murder, Oliver later faced additional charges of attempted first-degree assault-harm and second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon causing substantial bodily harm. A jury acquitted her of attempted murder but convicted her of both attempted first-degree assault-harm and second-degree assault. The Dakota County District Court entered a conviction for attempted first-degree assault-harm and sentenced Oliver to 45 months in prison.The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for attempted first-degree assault-harm, holding that such an offense does not exist under Minnesota law. The majority found that the statutory scheme for assault is based on harm inflicted rather than intended, and that the specific intent required for attempt crimes conflicted with the general intent element of first-degree assault-harm. The appellate court remanded for sentencing on the lesser second-degree assault conviction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that attempted first-degree assault-harm, charged under the attempt statute, is a recognized crime in Minnesota. The Court ruled there is no statutory or logical conflict between the specific intent required for attempt and the general intent required for first-degree assault-harm. The case was remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider other issues not previously addressed. View "State of Minnesota vs. Oliver" on Justia Law

Federal and state law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the home and business of George Peterson, a federally licensed firearms dealer operating out of his residence in Louisiana. The warrant was supported by an affidavit detailing months of investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), including undercover purchases where Peterson failed to report firearm sales as required and sold firearms under circumstances suggesting knowledge of illegal transactions. During the search, agents discovered a homemade, unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson’s closet safe. The suppressor lacked a serial number and was not registered as required by the National Firearms Act (NFA).A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana indicted Peterson for possession of an unregistered suppressor in violation of the NFA. Peterson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the NFA’s registration scheme violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to him, and also moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied both motions. Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal those rulings. He was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that, assuming suppressors are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s “shall-issue” licensing and registration regime is presumptively constitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and related precedent. Peterson failed to show that the NFA’s requirements denied him his rights or were applied abusively. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the officers reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a magistrate judge, even if probable cause was disputed. Thus, both denials were affirmed. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The defendant was residing at a hotel managed by the Department of Mental Health when the hotel’s general manager entered his room to deliver a meal. After discovering the entry, the defendant accused the manager of theft. This confrontation escalated when the defendant returned to the manager’s office and threatened him with a knife. As a result, charges were filed for assault with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats, with allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions and aggravating sentencing factors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss one of his previous strike convictions but later granted the prosecution’s request to dismiss one strike as inapplicable. The court bifurcated the trial on the prior conviction and aggravating factors. After the prosecution rested its case, the defendant stipulated to having a prior strike conviction and to the existence of aggravating factors, without being advised of his right to a jury trial on these issues or the penal consequences of his admission. The jury convicted the defendant of making criminal threats but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge. The court sentenced the defendant to the upper term, doubled under the three strikes law, based on his stipulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by failing to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights—including the right to a jury trial—before accepting his stipulation to the prior conviction and aggravating factors. The appellate court found these errors prejudicial under the totality of the circumstances. While the conviction was affirmed, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The People were allowed the option to retry the prior conviction and aggravating circumstances. View "P. v. Kinnear" on Justia Law

Donald Sims was serving a term of supervised release after a prior federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, following an earlier similar conviction. After his release from prison in 2021, Sims initially showed signs of improvement, including negative drug tests and stable employment. However, he later admitted to drug use and, in 2024, was found by police to be in possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia during a traffic stop. Sims pleaded guilty in state court to felony cocaine possession and received a nine-month sentence. His probation officer then cited him for violating his supervised release by unauthorized drug use, cocaine possession, and failure to report police contact.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio conducted a revocation hearing. Sims admitted violating his supervised release but denied ownership of the cocaine. The district court found his denial not credible, citing his guilty plea and the circumstances of the stop. Although the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was seven to thirteen months, the court imposed an 18-month sentence to run consecutive to his state sentence, citing Sims’s pattern of violations and the need for deterrence. Defense counsel objected to the upward variance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error by considering Sims’s state sentence or by finding that his conduct amounted to trafficking based on the evidence. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its reasons for an above-Guidelines sentence and properly weighed the relevant sentencing factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the 18-month consecutive sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

Two brothers sought multimillion-dollar loans from a bank to fund oil and gas investments. Because the bank required collateral, one brother arranged for a third party to create fraudulent documents making it appear that a securities account was worth millions. The brothers paid the third party for these fake statements, and, over several years, borrowed millions from the bank. They used some of the loan proceeds for improper purposes, including personal expenses and paying for the fake account statements. The bank eventually discovered the fraud after questioning the third party, who confessed and cooperated with the government, leading to indictments for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering.Prior to trial, the case was assigned to a district judge who had previously represented the victim bank in unrelated civil matters. One brother pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud before trial, while the other, Phillip, went to trial. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, sever the defendants, and for the judge’s recusal. It also admitted certain evidence and denied several of Phillip’s proposed jury instructions. After a jury found Phillip guilty on all counts, he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. He appealed, raising issues related to the judge’s recusal, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial delay, instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district judge was not required to recuse himself due to his prior, unrelated representation of the bank. The court found no reversible error in the handling of co-conspirators’ pleas or other evidentiary rulings, found no grounds for dismissal due to prosecutorial delay, and held that the jury instructions were adequate. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions and rejected the cumulative error argument. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA v. Page" on Justia Law

The case concerns Holly Ann Elkins, who, along with her fiancé Andrew Beard, engaged in stalking and harassing Beard’s ex-girlfriend, Alyssa Burkett. Their actions included installing a GPS tracker on Burkett’s car, making false police reports, and plotting to plant incriminating evidence. These efforts were intended to gain custody of Beard’s child. Ultimately, Beard murdered Burkett, with Elkins providing assistance, such as purchasing materials used in the crime. Elkins was subsequently convicted by a jury of conspiracy to stalk, cyberstalking resulting in death, and using a firearm during a crime of violence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas sentenced Elkins to five years for conspiracy, a life sentence for cyberstalking resulting in death, and a consecutive life sentence for the firearm offense. Elkins appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, focusing on the firearm conviction and its associated life sentence. She argued that the underlying cyberstalking offense could not serve as a predicate “crime of violence” for the firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the relevant cyberstalking statute, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B), is not categorically a “crime of violence” because it does not require as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, even if death results. Consequently, the court vacated Elkins’s conviction and life sentence for the firearm charge. The court affirmed her convictions and sentences on the other counts, rejecting challenges related to the Commerce Clause, jury instructions, and alleged judicial bias. View "USA v. Elkins" on Justia Law

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law