Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted on three charges related to the production and possession of child pornography. He pleaded guilty to one count—production of child pornography—and was sentenced to 256 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. The terms of his supervised release included both mandatory and special conditions. Of particular relevance was a special condition requiring him to submit to substance abuse testing and contribute to the cost of such testing, as determined by a sliding scale approved by the Probation Office.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina imposed these conditions at sentencing. The defendant did not object to the special condition regarding substance abuse testing during the sentencing proceedings. On appeal, he argued that this special condition unconstitutionally delegated a core judicial function—specifically, the authority to determine the number of drug tests—to the Probation Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, given the lack of objection below. The court found that the plain language of the special condition did not delegate authority to determine the number of drug tests to the Probation Office; rather, it addressed only the payment for drug testing ordered by the court. The court concluded that the discretion over the number of drug tests remained with the district court, and the special condition merely facilitated payment. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that there was no error, let alone plain error, in imposing the special condition and affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The government’s motion to dismiss the appeal based on an appeal waiver was denied as moot. View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law

Three masked individuals, including the defendant and his brother, forcibly entered an occupied apartment in Wichita where marijuana was sold. The intruders demanded money, drugs, and guns. During the attempted robbery, one resident fired a warning shot through a bedroom door after the intruders tried to break in. As the intruders retreated, the defendant, who was armed, fired several shots, killing one resident and injuring another. Surveillance footage and witness testimony identified the defendant and his brother as participants, and physical evidence linked the defendant’s firearm to the fatal shot.A jury in the Sedgwick District Court convicted the defendant of felony murder committed during an attempted aggravated robbery, as well as other related offenses. The jury found him guilty as both a principal and, alternatively, as an aider and abettor. The district court denied posttrial motions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of a jury instruction regarding criminal responsibility for the acts of another. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the felony-murder conviction, finding that the killing occurred during the attempted aggravated robbery and that resistance by the occupants was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the armed intrusion. The court also determined that, although the jury instruction on responsibility for crimes of another was legally inappropriate under State v. Mora, the error did not amount to clear error because the defendant was charged and convicted as a principal, and the evidence established his specific intent. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Palmer " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand larceny, unlawful mischief, carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony, and assault and robbery, following an incident in which he ran at a teenager who was leaving a friend’s house, causing the teenager to abandon his belongings out of fear. The defendant then destroyed some of the teenager’s property and took the rest. The complainant testified that the defendant appeared to be holding a knife, which contributed to his fear and decision to flee.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, presided over the trial. After the State presented its evidence, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all but the unlawful-mischief charge, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the presence of a knife and intent to place the complainant in fear. The court granted acquittal on the grand-larceny charge due to insufficient evidence of value but denied acquittal on the remaining charges. The jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony but convicted him of unlawful mischief, larceny from the person, and assault and robbery. The defendant’s post-trial motion to vacate the assault and robbery conviction, based on alleged inconsistency with the acquittals, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of assault and robbery, even without proof that he possessed a knife. The Court also held that the jury instructions did not require proof of a knife and that the verdicts were not inconsistent. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Two Washington County deputies went to a residence to investigate a report of illegal fireworks. The resident, Matthew Meisheid, emerged from his home, angrily confronted the deputies, and demanded they leave his property. During the encounter, Meisheid pulled a handgun from his waist, pointed it straight up, and declared, “I’ll show you a firework: Boom, boom, boom, boom!” The deputies, visibly shaken, retreated and Meisheid was later arrested. He was charged with two counts of assault for displaying a dangerous weapon in a threatening manner toward peace officers, with a felony enhancement for use of a weapon against peace officers.A jury in the Iowa District Court for Washington County found Meisheid guilty on both counts. The district judge sentenced him to prison with a five-year mandatory minimum. On appeal, Meisheid argued that there was insufficient evidence to show he displayed the weapon “toward” the deputies or in a threatening manner, and also challenged his sentence. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed both his conviction and sentence.The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review, focusing solely on whether there was sufficient evidence that Meisheid displayed a dangerous weapon “toward” the deputies. The court held that, under the jury instructions given (to which Meisheid did not object), the jury could reasonably find that Meisheid’s act of showing the gun so the deputies would be aware of it constituted displaying the weapon “toward” them, even though he did not point it directly at them. The court affirmed the decisions of the Iowa Court of Appeals and the Iowa District Court for Washington County. View "State of Iowa v. Meisheid" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with attempted first-degree murder and related offenses in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. Before trial, both the defense and prosecution jointly requested a postponement of the trial date due to the resignation of the defendant’s public defender and the need for additional preparation time. During a status hearing, the defendant’s newly assigned counsel informed the court that the defendant wanted to represent himself and keep the original trial date. The matter was referred to the administrative judge, who questioned the defendant about his wishes. The defendant responded that he wanted an attorney but did not want the trial postponed, emphasizing his desire for a speedy trial and expressing frustration about his continued incarceration.After this exchange, the administrative judge postponed the trial date, and the defendant did not further request to discharge counsel or to represent himself. At trial, the defendant was represented by counsel and was convicted by a jury of attempted second-degree murder, armed robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant had not expressed a present intent to discharge counsel or to represent himself, and that the trial court had provided an adequate opportunity for the defendant to clarify his wishes.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the trial court violated the defendant’s constitutional and procedural rights by not conducting further inquiry into his alleged request for self-representation. The Supreme Court held that when a court is informed that a defendant may wish to represent himself, it must conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine if the defendant clearly and unequivocally asserts that right and must allow the defendant to explain his reasons for discharging counsel under Maryland Rule 4-215(e). However, if the defendant does not express a clear desire for self-representation or to discharge counsel, the court is not required to question him further. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment. View "Goodrich v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was apprehended after two separate incidents in which he was found in possession of firearms and drugs. In the first incident, after a car accident, he attempted to dissuade the other driver from calling the police due to the presence of contraband in his vehicle, then fled but was quickly caught. In the second incident, a traffic stop led to the discovery of additional firearms, ammunition, and drugs. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and pleaded guilty.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines as twenty-two, based in part on a prior Kentucky conviction for second-degree manslaughter, which the court classified as a “crime of violence.” The defendant did not object to this calculation at sentencing and was sentenced to 145 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, applying plain error review because the issue was not raised below. The court held that the Kentucky statute’s “wantonness” mens rea is functionally equivalent to “recklessness” as defined in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and does not meet the standard for a “crime of violence,” which requires purposeful or knowing conduct. The court found that the district court’s reliance on this conviction to enhance the sentence was plain error, affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and undermined the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Tooley" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both members of the Gangster Disciples gang, were prosecuted for their roles in a series of violent crimes in Georgia. The Gangster Disciples is a national criminal organization with a hierarchical structure, engaging in various illegal activities. The case centered on the aftermath of a gang member’s murder, which led to retaliatory killings. One defendant, Green, was implicated in the murders of two individuals believed to have violated gang rules, while the other, Chambers, was involved in orchestrating and carrying out another murder, as well as enforcing gang discipline.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia presided over the joint trial of Green, Chambers, and a third co-defendant. The jury convicted Green of participating in a RICO conspiracy, finding he committed or aided in two murders. Chambers was convicted of RICO conspiracy, violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR murder), use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and causing death with a firearm. Chambers received two consecutive life sentences plus an additional term, while Green was sentenced to life imprisonment. Chambers’ attempts to delay the trial, including self-representation and last-minute requests for counsel, were denied by the district court, which found his actions to be calculated efforts to disrupt proceedings. Both defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on various grounds, including evidentiary rulings, jury procedures, and sentencing issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support Green’s RICO conspiracy conviction and that the admission of wiretap evidence, co-conspirator statements, and other challenged exhibits was proper. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying Chambers’ motion for a continuance or in the use of an anonymous jury and shackling procedures. Sentencing and restitution decisions were also affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who was initially charged with second-degree murder by information and who, through counsel, invoked his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under ORS 132.320(12)(a). The defendant requested to appear in person before the grand jury, but the prosecutor stated that only remote testimony would be permitted. The defendant then moved the Douglas County Circuit Court for an order requiring his in-person appearance before the grand jury, arguing that he had an absolute statutory and constitutional right to do so.The Douglas County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to dictate the manner in which the grand jury received testimony, other than ensuring the defendant’s rights were upheld. The court stayed the trial court proceedings pending appellate review but expressed uncertainty about its authority to stay the grand jury proceedings themselves. After the grand jury returned an indictment while the stay was in place, the defendant filed additional motions, including to dismiss the indictment, but the trial court declined to lift the stay to consider those motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has unilateral authority to determine whether a defendant’s grand jury testimony must be in person or remote. Instead, the decision regarding the manner of witness testimony before the grand jury is, at least initially, for the grand jury itself to make, as provided by statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not have a nondiscretionary duty to order the defendant’s in-person appearance and therefore mandamus relief was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "State v. Wall" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder and other offenses. Facing a potential minimum sentence of 15 years to life if convicted at trial, she entered into a plea agreement. Under this agreement, she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for sentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) to 10 years’ incarceration and five years’ post-release supervision (PRS), and she agreed to waive her right to appeal. The Supreme Court determined, based on the record and submissions, that she would have qualified for DVSJA sentencing and imposed the recommended sentence.On appeal, the defendant argued to the Appellate Division, First Department, that the five-year PRS term was illegal because the Penal Law did not authorize PRS for class A felonies sentenced under the DVSJA. She also contended that her sentence was excessive and that her appeal waiver was invalid, allowing review of her excessive sentence claim. The Appellate Division held that the appeal waiver was valid and barred review of the excessive sentence claim, but that the legality of the sentence could still be reviewed. The court concluded that the relevant statutes did not prohibit the imposition of a five-year PRS term for a class A felony under the DVSJA and affirmed the judgment.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that Penal Law §§ 60.12 and 70.45, when read together, require a five-year PRS term for a defendant convicted of a class A felony and sentenced under the DVSJA to a determinate term. The Court also held that the defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and thus barred her excessive sentence claim. View "People v Hernandez" on Justia Law

The defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint and faced a statutory speedy trial deadline under CPL 30.30. The prosecution was required to announce readiness for trial by August 1, 2022. On that date, at 5:03 p.m., the prosecution submitted a certificate of compliance and a statement of readiness through the court’s Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS), after the clerk’s office had closed. The next morning, the clerk’s office marked the statement as filed as of August 1 and notified the prosecution. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statement of readiness was untimely because it was filed after business hours and not reviewed by the clerk until the following day.The Criminal Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the prosecution’s filing was invalid because it occurred after the court’s close of business and the prosecution must be capable of actually beginning a trial when announcing readiness. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the prosecution’s readiness and the court’s ability to commence trial are separate issues, and that documents submitted through EDDS can be deemed filed as of the date of electronic submission, even if reviewed later by the clerk.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court of Appeals held that electronic submission of a statement of readiness before midnight on the due date satisfies CPL 30.30, regardless of the time of day or whether the clerk’s office is open. The court further held that CPL 30.30 regulates only the prosecution’s submission of the statement of readiness, not the timing of the clerk’s review or acceptance of the filing. Thus, the prosecution’s use of EDDS to deliver the statement at 5:03 p.m. on the last day of the speedy trial period met the statutory requirements. View "People v Licius" on Justia Law