Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Courtright operated Today’s Growth Consultant (TGC), also known as The Income Store, which promised investors guaranteed, perpetual monthly payments based on website advertising revenue. Investors, called “site partners,” paid upfront fees under Consulting Performance Agreements (CPAs), which stated that these fees would be used exclusively for website-related expenses and that TGC was in satisfactory financial condition. In reality, TGC’s advertising revenue and business loans were insufficient to meet its payment obligations, and Courtright used new investors’ upfront fees to pay existing investors, misrepresenting the company’s financial health and the use of funds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Courtright’s criminal trial for seven counts of wire fraud. The government presented evidence of TGC’s financial shortfall and improper use of upfront fees, including testimony from employees and financial experts. The jury convicted Courtright on all counts. At sentencing, the parties debated the loss calculation, with the court ultimately adopting a $69.3 million loss figure and granting certain deductions, resulting in a final loss amount of $52.5 million. Courtright was sentenced to 90 months in prison and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Courtright’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the loss calculation. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Courtright guilty of wire fraud, as he made material false statements about the use of upfront fees and TGC’s financial condition, and acted with intent to defraud. The court also found that Courtright waived his causation argument regarding loss calculation and that the district court did not clearly err in denying deductions for operating expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v Courtright" on Justia Law

Nita and Kirtish Patel operated two companies that provided mobile diagnostic medical services. To obtain Medicare reimbursement for neurological testing, they falsely represented that a licensed neurologist would supervise the tests. In reality, Kirtish, who lacked a medical license, wrote the reports, and Nita forged a physician’s signature. Their fraudulent scheme generated over $4 million, including substantial Medicare payments.In 2014, a former employee filed a sealed qui tam action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging healthcare fraud and asserting claims under the False Claims Act. The Patels were subsequently arrested and each pleaded guilty to one count of healthcare fraud. Their plea agreements did not address or preclude future civil or administrative actions. After their guilty pleas, the Government intervened in the qui tam action and obtained summary judgment against the Patels, relying on collateral estoppel from their criminal admissions. The District Court trebled the Medicare loss and imposed civil penalties, resulting in a judgment exceeding $7 million. Nita appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed her liability under the False Claims Act.Both Patels later moved to vacate their criminal sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not advise them that their guilty pleas could have collateral estoppel effects in the civil qui tam action. The District Court denied their motions, finding that counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and that the Patels were aware their plea agreements did not preclude civil actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment does not require criminal defense counsel to advise clients of collateral consequences such as civil liability under the False Claims Act. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, concluding that Padilla v. Kentucky’s holding is limited to deportation consequences and does not extend to civil liability. View "Patel v. USA" on Justia Law

In 2023, Charlotte Chemuti was arrested by officers from the Mooresville Police Department for resisting a public officer. To prepare for her trial, Chemuti served a subpoena on the police department requesting body camera footage related to her arrest. The Town of Mooresville responded, arguing that the requested recordings were confidential under North Carolina General Statute § 132-1.4A and could only be released through the procedure outlined in that statute, not by subpoena.Chemuti subsequently filed a motion in the District Court of Iredell County, without notice to the town, seeking release of the recordings. The district court granted her request, finding that while the statutory petition in superior court was the generally accepted practice, it was not the exclusive method for obtaining such evidence, and ordered the town to comply with the subpoena. The town appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not affect a substantial right. The town then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that orders compelling disclosure of information protected by statutory confidentiality are immediately appealable, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4A provides the exclusive procedure for obtaining law enforcement recordings in criminal cases, requiring a petition in superior court, and that district court subpoenas cannot be used to compel their release. The Court further held that this procedure does not violate constitutional rights to present a complete defense, as courts must still ensure defendants’ constitutional protections. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Chemuti" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers investigated a breaking and entering at a market in Fletcher, North Carolina, where cash, cigarettes, and lottery tickets were stolen. Days later, someone attempted to redeem one of the stolen lottery tickets at a store in Edneyville. Security footage showed a woman leaving the store and entering a black Dodge Durango with distinctive features. Detective Diaz traced the vehicle to a nearby residence, discovered it had a fictitious license plate, and observed items inside the vehicle that appeared related to the theft. Officers later conducted a search of the vehicle and the residence, recovering stolen property and tools linked to the crime.The Superior Court of Henderson County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, which argued that law enforcement’s observations at the residence and of the vehicle were improper without a warrant. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to several charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that probable cause existed for the search warrant and that officers acted lawfully at the scene. The majority also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply, while a dissenting judge disagreed on both points.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, even excluding information obtained during the contested “knock and talk,” the remaining facts in the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the vehicle. The Court did not decide whether the officers’ conduct during the knock and talk was unconstitutional, nor did it address the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the search warrant was properly issued based on probable cause supported by untainted evidence. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, stemming from an armed robbery in which two victims were killed and another was left paralyzed. During jury selection at his trial in Cleveland County Superior Court, the State used peremptory challenges to excuse two black female prospective jurors. The defense objected, raising a Batson challenge and arguing that the State’s strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court heard arguments from both sides, including the State’s race-neutral explanations for the strikes, and ultimately denied the Batson challenge, finding no prima facie case of discrimination.Following his conviction on all charges and sentencing to consecutive life terms plus additional imprisonment, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, found that the trial court had moved past Batson’s first step by soliciting and hearing the State’s race-neutral reasons before ruling. The majority held that this rendered the first step moot and remanded the case for a new Batson hearing under the procedural requirements established in State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020). The dissent argued that the trial court had not actually proceeded to Batson’s third step and that the first step was not moot.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Batson’s first step moot and remanding for a new hearing. The Supreme Court held that the mootness exception to Batson’s three-step process is to be applied cautiously and only when the trial court has fully completed all three steps. Because the trial court had clearly ruled at step one and had not proceeded to step three, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of whether the trial court’s step-one determination was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in New Hanover County received information from a confidential source that the defendant was trafficking and distributing large quantities of cocaine. Based on this tip, Detective Wenk applied for a court order to obtain cell-site location information (CSLI) for the defendant’s phone, along with other investigative tools. The trial court found probable cause and granted the order, allowing law enforcement to monitor the defendant’s CSLI. This data showed the defendant’s phone traveling from Wilmington, North Carolina, to Hayward, California, and back, coinciding with suspected drug trafficking activity. Officers later stopped and searched the defendant’s vehicle, discovering trafficking amounts of cocaine. The defendant was indicted on multiple drug-related charges and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the CSLI and subsequent searches.The Superior Court of New Hanover County denied the motion to suppress, finding reasonable suspicion supported the order and the vehicle stop. The defendant entered an Alford plea but appealed the suppression ruling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the order for CSLI was not supported by probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence should be suppressed. The appellate court rejected the State’s argument that a statutory good faith exception applied, citing prior precedent that the North Carolina Constitution did not recognize such an exception.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the statutory good faith exception in N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 applies only to evidence obtained in substantial violation of Chapter 15A, not to evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights. However, the court further held that neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina Constitution required exclusion of the CSLI in this case, and formally adopted a good faith exception under the state constitution equivalent to the federal standard. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, upholding the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Eduardo Ulises Martinez was investigated by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service after a tip that he was traveling internationally and possibly bringing back ivory. Upon his return to Miami International Airport, Customs and Border Protection found three ivory pieces in his luggage, which he initially denied were ivory. Subsequent searches of his home and business uncovered numerous sculptures containing ivory. Martinez, an experienced art dealer, admitted knowing about the legal requirements to declare ivory imports and exports but had not done so. The government charged him with multiple counts of smuggling ivory into and out of the United States, as well as obstruction of justice for attempting to influence a witness’s testimony and misrepresent the provenance of seized items.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Martinez’s pretrial motion to dismiss the smuggling charges, rejecting his argument that the antique and de minimis exceptions to ivory import/export restrictions absolved him of the duty to declare the items. The court also granted the government’s motion in limine to exclude evidence about these exceptions, finding them irrelevant to the smuggling charges. At trial, Martinez was convicted on most counts, except for three on which he was acquitted. His post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, with the court adopting the government’s valuation of the seized statues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Martinez’s convictions and sentence. The court held that the antique and de minimis exceptions did not eliminate the obligation to declare ivory, and evidence about them was properly excluded. The court also found no error in the exclusion of certain interview statements, the sufficiency of the evidence for obstruction of justice, the government’s closing argument, or the sentencing methodology and valuation. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Malachi Moon Seals, at age eighteen, posted graphic and violent threats against federal officials and their families on official websites, causing some recipients to request security protection. A grand jury indicted him on twelve counts: six for threatening or retaliating against federal officials under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1), and six for transmitting threats via interstate communications under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Seals pleaded guilty to all charges. The probation office calculated an advisory sentencing range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment, which made him ineligible for straight probation under the guidelines. Nevertheless, both parties advocated for probation, and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, with hesitation, sentenced Seals to five years’ probation with special conditions.Shortly after beginning probation, Seals violated its terms by posting new threats online. The probation office petitioned for his arrest, and Seals admitted to the violations. The district court revoked his probation and proceeded to resentence him. At the resentencing hearing, the probation office recommended a sentence at the low end of the original guideline range, and the government supported this recommendation. Defense counsel referenced the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Moore, but suggested its holding might be reversed. The district court did not apply the Moore framework and instead sentenced Seals to 36 months’ imprisonment under the original guideline range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred by not applying the two-step resentencing procedure required by Moore I. The court held that, although the district court plainly erred by not following Moore I’s framework, Seals failed to show that the court was required to impose a 0-month sentence at the first step or that this error was plain. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the post-revocation sentence. View "United States v. Seals" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

Kenneth Evans was observed by police engaging in a hand-to-hand transaction in a vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, officers detected the smell of marijuana, searched the car, and found a loaded pistol. Evans admitted to handling the firearm and being on parole. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, to which he pleaded guilty. Evans had prior felony convictions, including one for aggravated robbery under Ohio law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio determined that Evans’s prior aggravated robbery conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This finding increased his advisory sentencing range from 24–30 months to 46–57 months, and the court sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment. Evans appealed, arguing that his aggravated robbery conviction should not be considered a crime of violence for sentencing purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal determination de novo. The appellate court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches to compare the elements of Ohio’s aggravated robbery statute, as applied to Evans’s conviction, with the definition of “extortion” in the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that aggravated robbery under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.01(A)(1), when predicated on theft, categorically matches the Guidelines’ definition of extortion and therefore constitutes a crime of violence. The court rejected Evans’s arguments to the contrary and affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the increased sentence. The court also granted the government’s motion to take judicial notice. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law