Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case arose after a technology company, using hash-matching technology, flagged files uploaded to a user’s cloud storage account as child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and reported them to a national crimes center, as required by federal law. Some of the files were reviewed and confirmed by company employees, while others were not. The report was forwarded to law enforcement in Virginia, but after a delay, the investigation shifted to North Carolina, where the user had moved. There, local law enforcement conducted two consensual interviews with the user, obtained consent to search his devices, and later executed a search warrant at his home, discovering additional CSAM.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the user’s motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud storage files due to the service provider’s privacy policy, the contraband nature of CSAM, and the reliability of the hash-matching process. Alternatively, the district court found that even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, suppression was not warranted because the connection between the warrantless search and the later discovered evidence was too attenuated, citing the exclusionary rule’s attenuation doctrine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in cloud-based accounts, and that law enforcement’s warrantless opening and viewing of such files violates the Fourth Amendment unless a warrant or exception applies. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of suppression, holding that the evidence eventually used against the user was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search due to significant temporal gaps and intervening voluntary acts, such as interviews and consent to search, making suppression unwarranted. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Lowers" on Justia Law

A group associated with gangs in Franklin, Virginia, including members of the “Low Lives” and subsets of the Bloods, became involved in a violent series of events after their leader, Brandon Leonard, was killed. The group, which operated from a house called the “Railroad,” engaged in drug trafficking, shared firearms, and sought control over local drug operations. Tensions with a rival gang, the 00s (Crips), escalated after Leonard’s death, leading to retaliatory shootings against suspected rivals. In addition, one defendant, while detained pretrial, attempted to persuade witnesses to provide false alibis.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia tried the defendants—Jenkins, Brooks, and Newsome—on various charges, including conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR), attempted murder, firearms offenses, and witness tampering. The jury convicted all three on some counts. The district court denied their motions for acquittal and sentenced Jenkins, Brooks, and Newsome to lengthy prison terms. All three defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and their sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the convictions and sentences of Jenkins and Newsome—including upholding the existence of an “enterprise” under VICAR, Jenkins’ attempted murder conviction, and Newsome’s conviction and sentence for witness tampering. However, the appellate court found insufficient evidence to support Brooks’ convictions for VICAR attempted murder (Count II) and the related firearms offense (Count III), concluding the government failed to prove Brooks had the specific intent to kill required under Virginia law. The court reversed and vacated those convictions, vacated Brooks’ sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The remainder of the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The case concerned Jeffrin Cabrera, who was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of attempted first-degree rape, and one count of terroristic threatening. The events leading to these charges involved Cabrera’s repeated threats and coercion against Flor Munoz Coto, with whom he had previously been in a relationship. Cabrera followed, threatened, and extorted Munoz for money, and ultimately sexually assaulted her multiple times between August 20 and August 23, 2023. Forensic evidence, including DNA analysis, corroborated Munoz’s testimony about the assaults.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware presided over Cabrera’s trial. During jury selection, the court did not question prospective jurors about potential bias against individuals with limited English proficiency. The court later instructed the jury that such bias was impermissible. Cabrera did not testify. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 72 years in prison. Cabrera appealed, raising two issues for the first time: the adequacy of the jury instruction about the mens rea required for kidnapping (a predicate felony for two of the rape counts), and the absence of voir dire regarding juror bias against non-English speakers.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case under the plain error standard, since neither issue had been raised below. The court found that, although the kidnapping instruction omitted the statutory definition of “intentionally,” it did not constitute plain error, given the evidence and context. The court further held that the failure to conduct voir dire regarding language bias was not plain error, especially in light of the jury instructions given and the absence of a request by defense counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed Cabrera’s convictions. View "Cabrera v. State" on Justia Law

Carlos Gascot Concepcion was apprehended at the St. Thomas airport while traveling to Puerto Rico with a suitcase containing over one kilogram of high-purity cocaine. The cocaine was vacuum-sealed, wrapped, hidden inside a backpack, and labeled with a trafficker’s brand. Alongside the cocaine, agents found some cash, two cell phones, and small amounts of a green leafy substance. At trial, the government’s expert testified that the quantity, packaging, and purity of the cocaine were consistent with distribution, not personal use. Concepcion’s defense centered on the claim that he intended to consume the cocaine himself, supported only by his father’s testimony about Concepcion’s history of marijuana use.The District Court of the Virgin Islands presided over Concepcion’s trial. After evidence was presented, Concepcion requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple possession, arguing that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider personal use. The District Court denied this request, finding no rational basis for a jury to conclude Concepcion lacked intent to distribute, given the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The jury subsequently convicted Concepcion of possession with intent to distribute, and he was sentenced accordingly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s refusal to give the lesser-included offense instruction for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that a district court need only instruct on a lesser-included offense if the evidence would allow a rational jury to acquit on the greater charge and convict on the lesser. Here, the appellate court agreed that the evidence overwhelmingly established intent to distribute, and that no rational jury could find otherwise. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and conviction order. View "United States v. Gascot Concepcion" on Justia Law

Police in Chicago responded to a report of shots fired on the city’s west side and discovered a two-car crash, with one vehicle, a minivan, bearing bullet damage. The minivan’s driver, Derrick Davis, exited and was observed approaching a nearby parked car. An eyewitness alerted officers that Davis had a gun. When officers detained him, they found a loaded handgun under the parked car, which Davis had tossed there. Davis had a significant felony record and was on state parole at the time. After his arrest, he made a jail phone call in which he discussed details of the incident and his actions, suggesting he had intentionally driven to the scene.Initially, Davis faced charges in state court, but these were dismissed when federal authorities indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The presentence report did not recommend a sentencing enhancement for Davis’s involvement in another felony (the shoot-out) due to insufficient evidence. The district judge, however, imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 84 months, relying in part on Davis’s jail call. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated that sentence, citing a procedural error: the judge had adopted the presentence report’s findings but also credited the government’s argument that Davis participated in the shoot-out, which was inconsistent.On remand, the district judge clarified that he did not find Davis had fired his gun, but based the above-Guidelines sentence on Davis’s criminal history and his jail call, which showed reckless disregard for the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this was procedurally and substantively reasonable, and affirmed the 84-month sentence. View "USA v Davis" on Justia Law

Sean Eori was charged with multiple offenses, including unlawful sexual contact and possession of sexually explicit material, based on allegations that, between 2019 and 2022, he engaged in inappropriate conduct with a minor who was between twelve and fifteen years old. The minor was the child of Eori’s friend, and their relationship involved frequent communication and meetings. The evidence at trial included text and Instagram messages, physical gifts, and photographs, some of which depicted the minor nude or partially clothed, and some of which the minor sent to Eori at his request.After his arrest and indictment, Eori challenged several pretrial rulings in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket. The court granted the State’s motion for a protective order, limiting Eori’s access to a Child Advocacy Center interview with the victim, so that he could only review it under his counsel’s supervision. The court also denied Eori’s motion in limine to exclude certain photographs, reasoning that whether the images were sexually explicit was a question for the jury. At trial, the court overruled Eori’s objections to the admission of these photographs, and after the State’s case, denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. Ultimately, the jury convicted Eori of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of possession of sexually explicit material, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the conviction. It held that the protective order was appropriate under state law, which mandates confidentiality for such interviews. The court found no error in admitting the photographs, concluding they were relevant and their probative value was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court further held that, under a totality of the circumstances approach, the jury could reasonably find the images met the statutory definition of “sexually explicit material.” The conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Eori" on Justia Law

A man was arrested in November 2022 after a Burger King manager reported to 9-1-1 that he saw the man with an open alcoholic beverage container in his vehicle and believed he had been drinking and driving. Police responded, blocked the man's vehicle from leaving the parking lot, and saw an open can of alcohol. Both the man and his passenger provided false names, and the driver ultimately admitted his real identity after being informed he was under arrest. A search incident to arrest yielded methamphetamine, fentanyl, drug paraphernalia, and cash on his person and in his vehicle.The Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket initially granted the defendant's motion to suppress, concluding the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because the vehicle was not on a public way. The State moved for further findings and reconsideration, arguing that the parking lot was only accessible from a public way and that the officers reasonably believed a violation had occurred or was imminent. Upon reconsideration, the court added findings about the lot's access, denied the motion to suppress, and concluded the stop and subsequent searches were lawful. The court also denied suppression based on Miranda grounds and found the cash subject to forfeiture as drug proceeds or intended for drug trafficking.Reviewing the case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in reconsidering its suppression ruling. It found that the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, the searches and seizure of evidence were lawful, and the forfeiture of the cash was supported by sufficient evidence and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Martin" on Justia Law

A police officer in Lincoln, Maine, observed a vehicle that appeared to be speeding and conducted a traffic stop. The driver, Kenneth Rhoades, was uncooperative and displayed signs of impairment, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. During the encounter, Rhoades initially denied drinking but eventually admitted to consuming two alcoholic beverages. After Rhoades behaved aggressively toward the officer, he was transported to the police station, where he ultimately submitted to a breath test that showed a blood alcohol concentration of .16 grams per 210 liters of breath.Following the incident, the State charged Rhoades with operating under the influence with two prior OUI offenses within ten years. Rhoades filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop. The trial court (A. Murray, J.) denied the motion. Before trial, Rhoades also sought discovery sanctions due to the State’s delayed disclosure of impeachment information regarding a potential witness. The trial court (Roberts, J.) declined to impose sanctions after finding no prejudice to Rhoades, as the witness in question did not testify at trial. At trial, Rhoades objected to the admission of his breath test results, arguing insufficient foundational reliability and a Confrontation Clause violation. The trial court admitted the results.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the officer’s visual estimation of Rhoades’s speed, given the officer’s training and experience, provided reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. The court also held that the breath test results were properly admitted, as the State established their reliability through expert testimony, and the admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause since the breath test was machine-generated data. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying discovery sanctions due to a lack of prejudice. View "State of Maine v. Rhoades" on Justia Law

In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims. View "Ayestas v. Harris County" on Justia Law

In 2017, a Kentucky jury convicted Ricky Lee Welch of robbery, kidnapping, burglary, and being a persistent felony offender. Welch was sentenced to 50 years in prison. He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Subsequently, Welch sought post-conviction relief in Kentucky state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied his motion in May 2020. Although Kentucky law generally requires appeals to be filed within 30 days, Welch’s court-appointed attorney missed this deadline due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Six weeks after the deadline, Welch moved for a belated appeal based on a state law exception for attorney error; the state court granted this motion and considered his appeal on the merits.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, and the Kentucky Supreme Court declined review in June 2023. Welch then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed his petition as untimely, reasoning that the period during which he pursued the belated appeal did not toll the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that under Kentucky law, Welch’s belated appeal fit within a well-established exception to the state’s timeliness rules for appeals when delay results from ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Kentucky courts accepted and adjudicated his belated appeal under this exception, his post-conviction application remained “pending” for purposes of federal law, and the federal habeas statute of limitations was tolled during this period. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and found Welch’s federal habeas petition timely. View "Welch v. Plappert" on Justia Law