Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jessie Farmer pleaded guilty in 2016 to two counts of using a communication facility to distribute methamphetamine, for which he received the statutory maximum sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Farmer began supervised release in 2024. The probation office later alleged that Farmer committed multiple violations of his release conditions, including missing drug tests and testing positive for drugs. The government petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on these violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas reviewed the petition. Farmer argued that because he had already served the statutory maximum prison term for his offense, any additional imprisonment after revocation would violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights unless a jury found the violations beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied Farmer’s motion to dismiss, found by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed ten violations, revoked his supervised release, and imposed a new prison sentence of twelve months, the statutory maximum for his supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether Farmer’s revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3583(g) violated his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. The court concluded that the relevant Supreme Court guidance, particularly the controlling concurrence in United States v. Haymond, does not require application of the Apprendi line of cases to supervised release revocations under these sections. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s revocation and sentence did not violate Farmer’s constitutional rights, because the statutes did not require punishment for a new offense, preserved judicial discretion, and limited the sentence to the original statutory maximum. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Christopher Pence was investigated after arranging, through the dark web, for the murder of Francesco and Christina Cordero, with whom he and his wife had a contentious relationship following the adoption of the Corderos' children. Pence provided the purported hitman with the Corderos' personal information and paid over $16,000 in Bitcoin. The FBI traced the online activity and cryptocurrency transaction to Pence’s Utah residence, but acknowledged that others in the household could have accessed the devices involved. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement executed an early morning raid on Pence’s home, subsequently separating him from his family and inviting him to speak voluntarily in an FBI vehicle parked outside.Following these events, Pence was questioned by agents in the vehicle without being handcuffed or physically restrained and was told he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. After a period of rapport-building, agents confronted him with evidence of his involvement in the murder-for-hire scheme, prompting Pence to confess before receiving Miranda warnings. Over two hours into the encounter, agents read Pence his rights, after which he continued to speak. Pence moved to suppress his pre-Miranda statements in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, arguing he was in custody during the interrogation. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding Pence was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required at the time of his confession. Pence subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Pence’s position would not have believed he was in custody. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pence" on Justia Law

An elderly man named Cornelius Hoffmans, suffering from memory problems, developed a close relationship with the appellant after meeting her at a charity event. Over several years, Hoffmans gave her significant sums of money, purchased a house naming both as joint tenants, and later transferred his interest in the property to her without compensation. The two entered into a domestic partnership, which Hoffmans believed was a step toward marriage, although he was unaware of her sexual orientation and other relationships. Hoffmans’ sons discovered these transactions and, concerned about his wellbeing, initiated a civil action that resulted in the annulment of the partnership, revocation of her power of attorney, and the transfer of contested property to Hoffmans’ sons.Following an investigation, the State charged the appellant with multiple counts of exploitation of an older or vulnerable person, theft, and fraudulent use of a credit card. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions on five counts of exploitation, three counts of theft, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, with acquittals on other counts. The appellant raised several issues on appeal, including improper jury instructions, evidentiary errors, statute of limitations challenges, and the appropriate unit of prosecution under the elder exploitation statute.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the statutory definition of exploitation was ambiguous, and, applying the rule of lenity, determined that the unit of prosecution is one count per victim, not per act. Although the court found error in charging multiple counts of exploitation, it concluded the error was not plain under existing law and did not independently warrant reversal. However, the court found reversible error in the admission of evidence about the appellant’s misuse of charitable funds and the issuance of an erroneous jury instruction regarding undue influence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction on all counts and remanded for a new trial. View "SMITH VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, domestic battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm, and battery with use of a deadly weapon. These charges stemmed from an incident in which the appellant shot his ex-fiancée and struck his landlord with a gun following an altercation in his landlord’s trailer. The appellant did not testify at trial, but his theory of defense was that he acted in self-defense, relying on evidence of his own injuries and the circumstances surrounding the confrontation. He sought to introduce evidence of two prior occasions when the victim had allegedly stabbed him, arguing that this was relevant to his state of mind and the reasonableness of his belief that he needed to defend himself.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, denied the appellant’s efforts to admit evidence about the prior stabbings and related text messages, ruling that such evidence was inadmissible to show the appellant’s state of mind. The trial court, however, did instruct the jury on self-defense. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior specific violent acts known to the appellant, as such evidence was admissible to show the appellant’s state of mind regarding self-defense, even if the appellant did not testify. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by preventing cross-examination and authentication of text messages about the prior stabbing. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that these errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and it found the appellant’s other arguments unpersuasive. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "CHABOT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged in two separate criminal complaints, filed by different prosecutors, for conduct arising out of the same incident. The first complaint, brought by a city prosecutor in county court, alleged violations of municipal ordinances—specifically assault and battery, and disorderly conduct. The defendant entered a no contest plea to disorderly conduct as part of a plea agreement, and the assault and battery charge was dismissed with prejudice. Shortly before this plea, the county attorney’s office had filed a separate complaint charging the defendant with felony assault based on the same incident. After the case was later amended to charge first degree felony assault, the defendant argued that prosecuting the felony charge would violate double jeopardy protections.In the District Court for Douglas County, the defendant filed a plea in bar, contending that double jeopardy attached to the dismissed municipal assault and battery charge, thus barring the subsequent felony prosecution. The district court denied the plea, finding that jeopardy never attached to the dismissed charge because the defendant did not plead guilty or face trial on that offense, and the dismissal did not entail a determination of the merits.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo. The court held that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal assault and battery charge because the defendant did not enter a plea to that charge, nor did the court make any factual findings regarding it. The court further explained that a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a plea agreement does not amount to an acquittal or the attachment of jeopardy unless the court resolves factual elements of the offense. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the plea in bar, holding that double jeopardy protections did not bar the felony assault prosecution. View "State v. Holland" on Justia Law

Law enforcement responded to a situation at Christopher McKinney’s home after he threatened self-harm and subsequently engaged in an armed standoff. During the incident, Christopher pointed a shotgun at officers and made threats involving several firearms and large amounts of ammunition. Law enforcement executed search and arrest warrants, seizing numerous firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Christopher later pleaded no contest to a charge of terroristic threats, with other charges—including use of a firearm to commit a felony—dismissed as part of the agreement. Following his conviction and sentence, the State sought court authorization to destroy the seized firearms and ammunition.After Christopher’s direct appeal concluded, the State filed a petition in the District Court for Otoe County to destroy the seized property, claiming it had been used in the commission of a crime and was no longer needed as evidence. David McKinney, Christopher’s father, moved to intervene, asserting that Christopher had gifted him all interest in the seized property before sentencing. The State objected, arguing David had no ownership interest and thus lacked standing. The district court allowed David to intervene but ultimately ordered destruction of all seized property, finding that most items were derivative contraband used in the commission of a crime, and that Christopher could not transfer ownership while the property was in custody.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether David had standing and whether the property was properly classified as contraband. The Supreme Court held that David had standing because he claimed ownership. The Court affirmed the destruction order for all items except one firearm—the Marlin .17 HMR—which had not been used in the crime. As to that item, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine if a valid transfer to David occurred, which would determine proper disposition of that firearm. View "State v. McKinney" on Justia Law

An eight-year-old child, N.R., alleged that her father, Gerald Roberson, had sexually abused her over several years, with the most recent incident occurring two months before she was taken by her mother to a hospital for a sexual assault examination. While the examination found no physical evidence of abuse, N.R. gave a detailed statement about repeated abuse and indicated that Roberson threatened her to keep her silent. Roberson was charged with multiple serious offenses relating to sexual abuse of a child.The State moved before trial to allow N.R. to testify remotely using closed-circuit television (CCTV), citing a Delaware statute permitting such testimony for children under certain conditions. After a hearing that included expert testimony from N.R.’s counselor about the child’s fear and likely inability to communicate in her father’s presence, the Superior Court found that remote testimony was warranted and that the statute permitting it did not violate the Delaware Constitution. The court also denied Roberson’s request for a limiting instruction after the prosecutor, during closing arguments, asked the jury to consider why a child would endure the ordeal of reporting and testifying if her claims were untrue. The jury convicted Roberson on all counts, and he was sentenced to 125 years in prison.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the statutory procedure allowing child witnesses to testify by CCTV violated the state constitutional right to confront witnesses “face to face,” and whether the prosecutor’s closing argument constituted impermissible vouching for the witness’s credibility. The Court held that the statute does not violate the Delaware Constitution, relying on precedent that interprets the confrontation right to allow such procedures in the interest of protecting child victims while preserving the defendant’s right to cross-examination. The Court also found that the prosecutor’s comments did not amount to misconduct. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Roberson v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who, after being arrested and brought to jail by police officers, was found to have a small canister of pepper spray in his pocket. The defendant was impaired at the time of his arrest and was passively noncompliant, which led officers to skip some standard search procedures and place him directly in a cell. Several hours later, the defendant discovered the pepper spray in his pocket and alerted officers to its presence but did not immediately relinquish the item. Instead, he attempted to use the pepper spray as leverage for demands such as a phone call and a cell transfer and only surrendered the canister after officers deployed pepper spray into his cell.The State charged the defendant with felony possession of material capable of causing bodily injury by an incarcerated person under Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-7. At trial in Elkhart Superior Court, a jury found him guilty, and the court imposed a four-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed the pepper spray in jail, since he had not voluntarily brought it into the facility or received a reasonable opportunity to relinquish it. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, reversed the conviction, and found that he had not received a reasonable opportunity to purge himself of the item.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The Indiana Supreme Court held that under Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-7, an incarcerated person is prohibited from knowingly retaining possession of prohibited material after receiving a reasonable opportunity to relinquish it, regardless of how the item entered the facility. The Court found sufficient evidence that the defendant failed to surrender the pepper spray at the earliest reasonable opportunity and affirmed his conviction. View "Gary v. State" on Justia Law

In 2016, the defendant was convicted of multiple felonies and misdemeanors for violent offenses against his wife and a neighbor. He received a sentence that included a lengthy state prison term for the felonies and a consecutive county jail term for the misdemeanors. After a direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed one felony conviction but affirmed the rest and remanded the case for further proceedings on the reversed count. On remand in 2019, the trial court resentenced the defendant, but a clerical error led to the inclusion of misdemeanor jail time in the calculation of the total state prison term.Following this, a records analyst from the Department of Corrections notified the trial court in 2024 about the error in the abstract of judgment. The Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing to address the issue. During this hearing, defense counsel requested a full resentencing, a Romero motion to dismiss a strike, and reconsideration of the upper term on one count. The court denied these requests, determining that only a clerical correction was required. However, the court also modified the misdemeanor sentences, reducing their terms and making them concurrent, changes for which it lacked jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the error in the 2019 sentence was clerical, not judicial, and thus did not entitle the defendant to a full resentencing. The appellate court affirmed the denial of resentencing and the Romero motion. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the misdemeanor sentences and vacated that portion of the order. The case was remanded with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the original 2019 sentence. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man convicted of the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter in Arizona. He was found guilty by a jury and subsequently sentenced to death by a judge. The sentencing judge identified multiple aggravating factors, including the especially cruel nature of the crimes, multiple victims, and prior violent felonies. The judge also found statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s impaired capacity, troubled childhood, and psychological issues. After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, the defendant sought postconviction relief in state court through three separate petitions. His first petition did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim and was handled by counsel later conceded to be ineffective. A second petition, raising the IAC claim, was denied as untimely. A third petition argued he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution, but that claim was rejected after an evidentiary hearing.In federal court, the petitioner’s IAC claim was initially deemed procedurally defaulted by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, including Martinez v. Ryan, allowed for the possibility that ineffective postconviction counsel could excuse such defaults. The Ninth Circuit originally remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal courts may not expand the state court record based on ineffective state postconviction counsel.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered only evidence properly submitted in state court under procedural rules. The Ninth Circuit found the petitioner demonstrated “cause” to excuse the procedural default but failed to show “prejudice,” as his underlying IAC claim was not “substantial.” Although counsel’s performance was deficient, the new mitigating evidence was unlikely to have changed the sentencing outcome, given the weight of aggravating factors and Arizona precedent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "RAMIREZ V. THORNELL" on Justia Law