Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of terrorizing with a dangerous weapon or firearm and one count of preventing arrest after allegedly threatening to shoot or kill people at a restaurant in Minot, North Dakota. The prosecution claimed that the defendant made verbal threats, stated he had a gun in his backpack, gestured toward the backpack, and was later found to possess a firearm in the backpack after his arrest. The restaurant manager and a patron testified that, while they did not see the firearm, the defendant claimed to have it and threatened to use it.The District Court of Ward County dismissed seven of the eight terrorizing counts before trial. The defendant proceeded to a bench trial on one count of terrorizing and one count of preventing arrest. He stipulated to the essential elements of the terrorizing offense, disputing only whether the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm applied. The trial judge found the defendant guilty on both counts and made a special finding that he possessed a firearm during the offense. The court concluded that the armed offender statute applied, ruling that possession and threat to injure using a firearm sufficed, without requiring the gun to be brandished or displayed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly interpreted and applied N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02.1, which mandates a minimum sentence for certain offenses involving firearms. The Supreme Court held that the statute does not require a firearm to be brandished or displayed; it is sufficient if the offender threatens to injure another through the use or means of a firearm while possessing it. The court found the district court’s interpretation reasonable and supported by the evidence and affirmed the judgment, including the mandatory minimum sentence. View "State v. Reese" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with terrorizing—domestic violence, a class C felony, after an incident involving his ex-wife, who is also the mother of his minor child. The district court imposed a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the victim, initially for thirty days. After the defendant pled guilty, the court sentenced him to two years, including three days to serve (with credit for time served) and two years of supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the court extended the no-contact order for two years, prohibiting all direct or indirect contact with the victim, including communication relevant to their minor child.After sentencing, the defendant requested an exception to allow necessary communications with the victim regarding court-ordered parenting time with their child. The district court declined, stating the defendant was not prohibited from having contact with his child but failed to provide any method for arranging parenting time, given the victim’s residential responsibility and the communication restrictions. The defendant appealed the judgment and the order extending the no-contact provision.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, although the district court acted within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor (so the sentence was not illegal), it abused its discretion by failing to provide a means for the defendant to arrange contact with his child or to explain why no such method was allowed. The court determined that, under these circumstances, the blanket prohibition on contact with the victim—including for purposes of exercising parental rights—was arbitrary and not the result of a reasoned decision. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the criminal judgment and the order extending the order prohibiting contact and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to consider alternatives that would permit the defendant to exercise his parental rights. View "State v. Maher" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted by a Drew County jury in 1996 for capital murder during a robbery, based largely on eyewitness identifications, physical evidence linking him to the crime, and his own conflicting statements about his involvement. At trial, two witnesses identified him as fleeing the scene with a weapon, and forensic testimony indicated that the victim’s blood type matched stains found on the appellant’s shirt. The appellant testified that he was outside during the shooting, but earlier statements placed him inside as a lookout. His conviction and life sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. The appellant subsequently filed multiple petitions for postconviction relief. In 2012, he sought DNA testing under Act 1780 of 2001, claiming actual innocence and arguing that DNA analysis of blood evidence would exonerate him. The Drew County Circuit Court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, finding he failed to rebut timeliness presumptions. In 2020, he filed another petition, seeking new DNA testing using methods not previously available, such as M-VAC technology, on various items from the crime scene. The circuit court again denied the petition, ruling it was an impermissible successive filing and that the issues had already been decided. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed this appeal and affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held the petition was both successive and untimely under Arkansas law. The Court found that the appellant’s request for newer DNA testing did not distinguish his claim from earlier petitions in a way sufficient to overcome legal bars or the presumption against timeliness. Additionally, the Court found the proposed testing would not significantly advance a claim of actual innocence, given the weight of the evidence at trial. The Court also concluded that no evidentiary hearing was required under these circumstances. View "HUSSEY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

An emergency-room physician and his girlfriend were driving on a highway when the girlfriend died under suspicious circumstances. The physician was the only person present with her at the time. He called 911 and told responders that she was having a seizure. Passersby and responders noted that the physician acted erratically and did not attempt to help. Medical personnel observed significant injuries to the girlfriend’s neck, and an autopsy concluded that she died from strangulation, though the defense’s expert disputed the cause. Text messages presented at trial revealed prior threats from the physician toward the girlfriend.The case was tried in the Chicot County Circuit Court before a jury, which heard conflicting testimony from expert witnesses about the cause of death. The defense argued that the cause was undetermined and that death could have resulted from medical intervention or natural causes. The State’s expert concluded the death was a homicide by strangulation. The jury found the physician guilty of second-degree murder and he was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment and fined. After trial, the defense moved for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on an affidavit from a juror. The trial court held a hearing, heard testimony from the relevant jurors, and denied the motion for a new trial, finding no credible evidence of misconduct.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal and held that there was substantial evidence to support the conviction for second-degree murder, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense, and that there was no reversible error in denying the motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the conviction and vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "TAIT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man convicted of first-degree murder and a firearm enhancement following the fatal shooting of his business partner outside her home. The two had operated a food-truck business together, and on the day in question, the defendant was seen at the victim’s home with her truck. Several eyewitnesses, including members of the victim’s family and neighbors, testified about the events surrounding the shooting, identifying the defendant as present at the scene and as the person leaving in the victim’s truck after the shooting. After the crime, the defendant abandoned his business and job and evaded police for months, fleeing from law enforcement in both Texas and West Virginia before being apprehended. The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Seventh Division, presided over the defendant’s postconviction petition, which was filed under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. The defendant, initially pro se and later represented by counsel, alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel on five grounds. At a hearing, the court considered evidence and testimony, including from trial counsel and an investigator. The court found that the defendant failed to show trial counsel’s performance was deficient under the standard established by Strickland v. Washington, and that no prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. The court denied the petition. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard, the court examined the trial court’s findings and the three ineffective-assistance claims raised on appeal: insufficient cross-examination of witnesses, failure to investigate the crime scene, and failure to obtain dashcam footage of the police chase. The Supreme Court concluded that the record showed effective cross-examination, that information about the scene was provided to the jury, and that counsel’s actions regarding the dashcam did not constitute ineffectiveness. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "DORSEY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury in Johnson County, Arkansas, of capital murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property. The evidence at trial included admissions by the appellant that he intended to rob the victim, that he stabbed her in the throat (which was the fatal wound), and that he stole her car and used her credit cards after her death. DNA evidence connected the appellant to the victim, and multiple witnesses, including the appellant’s sister and a friend, testified to his admissions and actions following the crime. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 in the Johnson County Circuit Court. He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate a laptop allegedly containing exculpatory evidence and unidentified DNA found on a knife, asserted a violation under Brady v. Maryland for alleged suppression of the laptop, and argued that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition, finding that the claims were not supported by the record or were not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s denial and dismissal of the appellant’s petition. The court held that the appellant failed to present evidence supporting his claims, and his ineffective assistance of counsel argument lacked factual substantiation. The court also found the Brady claim and the argument regarding false testimony were either unsupported by evidence or not appropriate for postconviction relief under Rule 37.1. The Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded that the circuit court did not clearly err and affirmed its decision. View "OLIGER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in South Dakota, while investigating a drug trafficking operation, asked an officer to stop a car leaving a surveilled apartment building. The officer conducted a traffic stop of the driver, Alex Johnson, for excessive window tint. Johnson admitted his license was suspended. The officer received confirmation of the suspension within six minutes. Although he had all the information necessary to issue a ticket for driving without a license and a warning for the window tint, the officer delayed finalizing and delivering the paperwork. Instead, he waited for a K9 unit to arrive and conversed about unrelated matters. After the K9 alerted to the car, a search revealed drugs and paraphernalia. Police later searched Johnson’s apartment and found additional drugs. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence from both the car and his apartment. The district court determined that the officer would have completed the traffic stop paperwork by about twenty minutes if he had acted diligently. However, it held that the delay was permissible under the community caretaking exception, as Johnson could not legally drive the car away due to his suspended license. The court further found that the apartment evidence was admissible because it was not the fruit of an unlawful search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violations, as there was no active effort or plan to remove the car for safety reasons. The community caretaking function did not justify the extended detention. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that all evidence from the car and the subsequent apartment search should have been suppressed. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Johnson’s conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to a call about a man, later identified as Xavier Leonard, who was found injured, disoriented, and partially clothed on the ground in a residential neighborhood. Leonard was unresponsive to questions and exhibited signs of being under the influence of drugs. After determining that Leonard lived nearby, officers noticed an open side door at his house and observed signs inside, such as a broken coffee table, that suggested possible violence or distress. The officers announced their presence and, receiving no response, entered the home to check for potential victims or suspects. While inside, they observed drugs and firearms, left after a brief search, and then obtained a search warrant based on their observations.Leonard was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas with firearm and drug offenses. He requested a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his home. After his initial attorney declined to file the motion, deeming it frivolous, Leonard was appointed new counsel who proceeded with the suppression motion. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, finding that the evidence should be excluded. The district court adopted this recommendation and suppressed the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after the government appealed. The government did not challenge the Fourth Amendment issue but argued that the exclusionary rule did not apply due to the good faith exception. The Fifth Circuit held that under its “close enough” doctrine, the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances, and the good faith exception precluded exclusion of the evidence. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in Michigan of assault with intent to murder and various firearm offenses following a shooting incident. The case arose from a dispute involving the vandalism of homes, which led to a confrontation between the families of the victim and the accused. During the incident, several family members of the victim identified the accused as the shooter in photo lineups and at trial. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on these identifications and a recorded prison call, while the defense presented testimony from the accused’s sister, who suggested another individual committed the shooting. No physical evidence linked the accused to the crime.After his conviction, the defendant appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses who could have provided an alibi or implicated another person. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The defendant then moved for post-conviction relief in Michigan state court, raising the same ineffective assistance claim, but the court found counsel’s decisions were reasonable and denied relief. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and Supreme Court denied further review.The defendant subsequently filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court rejected the state’s timeliness objection and conditionally granted habeas relief on ineffective assistance grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the habeas petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as the defendant’s state post-conviction motion did not toll the limitations period under Michigan law, and equitable tolling did not apply. The Sixth Circuit also found that, even if timely, the ineffective assistance claim failed on the merits. The court reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. View "Borns v. Chrisman" on Justia Law

After an undercover police operation responding to an online advertisement for fentanyl, law enforcement negotiated a drug purchase with the defendant using text messages and a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone number. The defendant was identified and apprehended with nearly 1,000 fentanyl pills in his possession, and his cell phone was linked to the communications coordinating the sale. At the time, the defendant was already on probation for a similar drug offense. He ultimately entered a plea of no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale, admitting to an enhancement for a large quantity of contraband.The Alameda County Superior Court, following the plea agreement, placed the defendant on two years of formal probation with electronic monitoring. Over defense objection, the court imposed a “five-way” search condition, allowing warrantless searches of his person, property, vehicle, residence, and all electronic devices under his control, including the obligation to provide passwords. The search clause was justified by the court based on the defendant’s use of electronic devices to facilitate drug sales and obscure his identity. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the probation condition’s constitutionality and reasonableness de novo. The court found the electronics search clause was neither overbroad nor unreasonable, given the direct involvement of electronic devices in the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also rejected proposals from both the Attorney General and the defense to modify or narrow the condition, concluding that the clause was sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case and necessary for rehabilitation and public safety. The judgment was affirmed, and the search condition was upheld without modification. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law