Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, a 16-year-old girl and her boyfriend developed a fascination with murder, exchanging letters expressing admiration for notorious killers and a desire to commit murder themselves. In the early morning hours of July 21, 2000, she let her boyfriend into her family’s home, and waited in the bathroom while he fatally stabbed her uncle, three cousins, and seriously wounded her aunt. Her fingerprints were found on weapons and duct tape at the scene. During the investigation, she admitted to planning a staged robbery to bring her family together, but maintained she did not intend for anyone to be killed.A jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted her of four counts of first degree murder under both direct aiding and abetting and felony murder theories. She was sentenced to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed her attempted murder conviction and special circumstance findings but affirmed her murder convictions. Subsequent appeals and resentencing focused on mitigating factors such as her age and psychological condition, but her convictions and sentences were largely upheld.In 2020, she petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows certain defendants convicted under the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found her ineligible for resentencing, concluding that she was a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill, and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed, holding that resentencing relief is not available to a direct aider and abettor who acts with intent to kill, and found no error or ineffective assistance regarding the consideration of her youth. View "P. v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Dixon Dean Cole was originally charged in 1996 with multiple counts of sexual assault and immoral or indecent acts with minors. Through a plea agreement, he pled guilty to one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree (a misdemeanor) and one count of immoral or indecent acts with a minor (a felony). He received suspended sentences and probation, and after fulfilling all court-ordered requirements, he was discharged from probation in 2001. Both convictions required him to register as a sex offender due to the ages of the victims.Years later, Cole was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. While those charges were pending, he sought expungement of both convictions and requested to be relieved of his registration duty. The District Court of Sweetwater County expunged his misdemeanor conviction (applying the felony expungement statute in error) and terminated his duty to register for the felony conviction. The State objected, arguing Cole was statutorily ineligible for expungement due to his registration status.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that although the district court used the incorrect statute for the misdemeanor expungement, Cole was otherwise eligible under the proper statute, and the results would have been the same. The Court declined to consider arguments about whether Cole posed a danger to society, as these were not properly raised in the district court. Regarding the termination of the sex offender registration requirement, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, noting Cole met all statutory prerequisites and that a pending failure-to-register charge did not automatically bar relief.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed both the expungement of the misdemeanor conviction and the order terminating Cole’s duty to register as a sex offender. View "State v. Cole" on Justia Law

Christopher Carroll and Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC (“WDBTR”) were charged with multiple offenses after Carroll, with an associate, falsely represented the use of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds, which were instead used for personal expenses and to start WDBTR. Additional charges included tampering with Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring devices on company trucks and witness tampering related to efforts to impede the investigation. Carroll’s prior parole status was relevant to the government’s allegation that he concealed this on the PPP application by omitting his name and submitting the application in his wife’s name.A United States Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the grand jury had been improperly instructed to use a probable cause standard and that a higher standard should apply. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri adopted this recommendation, referencing Supreme Court precedent affirming probable cause as the standard for grand jury indictments. The district court also denied Carroll’s motion to exclude evidence of his prior conviction and parole status, determining it was relevant to Carroll’s intent to defraud and not unduly prejudicial. After trial, Carroll was convicted on multiple fraud, CAA, and witness tampering counts, and WDBTR was convicted on CAA charges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the probable cause standard governs grand jury indictments, consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Carroll’s parole status, as it was probative of intent and any error would have been harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States v. Carroll" on Justia Law

A police officer in Kalispell, Montana, conducted a traffic stop after observing traffic violations. While the officer was engaged with the driver, the defendant, Sean Doman, stopped on a nearby public sidewalk and began recording the police interaction with his phone. The officer, concerned for safety, called for backup. When the backup officer arrived, he repeatedly asked Doman to move further away from the scene, stating that filming was allowed but Doman’s proximity and engagement were distracting. Doman refused to comply with the officer’s orders to reposition, insisting on his right to film from his chosen spot. After several warnings, Doman was arrested for obstructing a peace officer.The case was first tried in the Kalispell Municipal Court, where a jury found Doman guilty of obstructing a peace officer under Montana law. At trial, the jury was instructed that citizens have a First Amendment right to film police, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, but also that it is not a defense if the officer was acting illegally, as long as the officer acted under official authority. Doman did not raise constitutional objections to the statute during trial. On appeal to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Doman challenged the constitutionality of the obstruction statute as applied to his conduct. The District Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Doman failed to preserve his constitutional arguments for appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction because a rational juror could find that Doman knowingly impeded the officers’ duties by refusing to comply with reasonable orders during a traffic stop. The court declined to address Doman’s constitutional claims, finding them unpreserved and not warranting plain-error review. The Supreme Court affirmed Doman’s conviction. View "City of Kalispell v. Doman" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a theft that occurred in Great Falls, Montana. The defendant, who had been living with her cousin at the cousin’s home and then at the home of another relative, was accused of stealing property from a storage unit rented in the name of the cousin’s daughter and paid for by the cousin’s husband. Surveillance footage and gate access records showed the defendant, along with a co-defendant, accessing the storage unit multiple times and removing property. The defendant acknowledged taking some items that did not belong to her but claimed she believed she had permission to retrieve her own belongings and returned most of the items.The Eighth Judicial District Court held a jury trial where the prosecution introduced text messages between the co-defendant and the complaining witness, which discussed details of the alleged theft and the property taken. Although the defense objected to these messages as hearsay, the court admitted them. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of felony theft of property valued between $1,500 and $5,000 but acquitted her of burglary. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of the text messages constituted an abuse of discretion and that the error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court’s error in admitting the hearsay text messages was harmless. The Court held that the error was not harmless because the messages impermissibly bolstered the prosecution’s case and undermined the defendant’s credibility, contributing to the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the State failed to demonstrate there was no reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence contributed to the conviction. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after being indicted on multiple charges related to mail fraud, theft from an employee benefit plan, and filing false tax returns, repeatedly chose to represent herself rather than accept legal counsel. The charges stemmed from her actions following her grandmother’s death: she continued to receive and conceal pension payments that should have stopped, and she prepared fraudulent tax filings for herself and others, keeping a portion of the illicit refunds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. Throughout the proceedings, the district court made extensive efforts to inform the defendant of her constitutional right to counsel, the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, and the complexity of the charges. The court appointed standby counsel, but the defendant persisted in her wish to proceed without representation and consistently rejected the assistance of counsel, including private and standby counsel. Despite her refusal to participate actively in her trial—declining to make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence—the jury convicted her on all counts.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court should have forced her to accept counsel and that her waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record as a whole and determined that, despite the absence of a formal Faretta hearing, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court carefully examined whether she understood her options and the consequences of self-representation. Concluding that the district court had not erred, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The holding is that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid if the record as a whole shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary, even without a formal hearing. View "USA v Salley" on Justia Law

A murder occurred in 2014 when the victim, Justin Triplett, was shot multiple times at his apartment. Jason Johnomar Zapata became a suspect after evidence connected him to the murder weapon and ammunition. Nearly a year later, while in custody on unrelated charges, Zapata was subjected to what is known as a Perkins operation: he was placed in a holding cell with two undercover agents posing as inmates. During the operation, a law enforcement officer conducted a fake lineup and falsely told Zapata that a witness had identified him as the killer. When asked if he wanted to discuss the murder, Zapata invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, the deputy returned Zapata to the cell, announced to the undercover agents that Zapata would be charged with murder, and the agents subsequently questioned Zapata, eliciting an incriminating confession.At trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Zapata moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated because he had invoked his right to counsel before the confession and had not waived it. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the confession into evidence, and Zapata was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the personal firearm enhancement, but Zapata later admitted a lesser firearm use enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel and a known law enforcement officer actively “stimulates” a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to custodial interrogation, any resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible under Miranda and Edwards. The court found the admission of Zapata's statements prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Zapata" on Justia Law

A man was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and seven counts of money laundering after opening numerous bank accounts and using them to launder millions of dollars in fraud proceeds for a group operating romance and business email scams. He also recruited and supervised a co-conspirator, helping that person set up a similar laundering operation. The laundered funds were ultimately sent to Africa. Following his arrest, the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government but did not enter into a plea agreement. At his first change-of-plea hearing, he hesitated and the hearing was postponed. At the second hearing, with two lawyers present, he pleaded guilty to all charges, affirming he did so knowingly and voluntarily.Before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. While in custody, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging one of his lawyers coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was not aware of a co-conspirator’s cooperation with the government. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held an evidentiary hearing, found the attorneys credible and the defendant not credible, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the calculation of the loss amount, several sentencing enhancements, the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, did not err in its application of sentencing enhancements and guidelines, and that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. Mullings" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was accused of touching a minor inappropriately during a trip to the store in October 2021. Two months after the alleged incident, the victim made a separate allegation against her father, claiming he had broken her half-sister’s leg, based on a social media post. This accusation was later determined to be false after investigation, with the victim’s mother and a counselor concluding the report was made due to the victim’s misunderstanding and feelings toward her father. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sexual assault and simple assault, with events alleged to have occurred in Gilford and Laconia.The Superior Court (Attorri, J.) presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about her false accusation against her father, arguing it was relevant to her credibility. The initial ruling permitted this, but upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the court excluded the evidence, finding it not probative of the victim’s character for truthfulness because she believed the accusation was true when made. At trial, the State introduced limited evidence regarding the defendant’s alcohol consumption on the day of the alleged assaults. When the jury inquired about the locations of the alleged offenses, the court declined to provide the indictments, instructing the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the false allegation, as it lacked sufficient probative value and risked confusing the jury. The court also ruled that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was proper and that any error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hodgdon" on Justia Law

The defendant owned a house on Farm Island, New Hampshire, near a summer camp with which he had a history of disputes. After hearing a group outside his house at night, he yelled at them and, when unable to reach the police, left a voicemail for the camp, using profane language and stating, “you better get them the f**k out of here or I will shoot them.” He also accused the group of damaging his property. The State charged him with harassment, alleging that his communication constituted a threat to the life or safety of another, made with the purpose to annoy or alarm.The Superior Court of Carroll County held a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced the voicemail, evidence of the contentious relationship between the defendant and the camp, and testimony from camp staff and police. Over the defendant’s objections, the court admitted testimony from a camp director about security measures the camp undertook in response to the message, including ceasing use of part of the island and enhancing security. The defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the required mental state; the court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant acted with the purpose to annoy or alarm and that the communication constituted a true threat as defined by federal law. However, the court found that admitting testimony about the camp’s security response was error under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403, as its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law