Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, he had a prior Oregon felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically under the “possession” subsection of the Oregon statute, with an added firearm enhancement. The key issue at sentencing was whether this prior conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would increase the recommended sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the prior Oregon conviction did qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). This finding increased the defendant’s base offense level and resulted in a higher recommended sentencing range. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was below the enhanced guideline range but above what it would have been without the crime-of-violence enhancement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s analysis was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Oregon statutes at issue do not require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The court found that neither the underlying offense nor the firearm enhancement statute required such an element, and that the government’s arguments to the contrary were not supported by the statutory text or Oregon case law. As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prior conviction was not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement. View "USA V. KEAST" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he used Instagram to offer his services as a pimp to someone he believed was a 16-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover officer. The officer, part of a human trafficking task force, had created a fake Instagram account with photos and hashtags suggesting prostitution. The man initiated contact, and their conversations led to a plan to meet in person, at which point he was arrested. He later admitted to attempting to lure a minor into prostitution. He was charged and convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted sexual enticement of a minor.Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the defendant, who is Black, sought discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement based on race discrimination. He argued that similar cases in the district involved only Black men, but his evidence was limited to six cases over ten years. The district court denied his motion for discovery, finding the sample size too small and not reflective of the broader work of the task force. The court also sentenced him to 144 months in prison, rejecting his argument that this sentence created an unwarranted disparity compared to other similar cases.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery and in sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery request, as the evidence presented was insufficient under the flexible standard for selective enforcement claims established in United States v. Sellers. The appellate court also found no procedural or substantive error in the sentence imposed, concluding that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. GREEN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York of transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, all in violation of federal law. The defendant’s conduct involved the use of the Kik messaging application, which uses software to detect and report child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Kik’s detection process relies on a database of known CSAM hash values provided by NCMEC. When Kik’s software identifies a match, a designated employee reviews the file and, if confirmed as CSAM, reports it to NCMEC, which then forwards the information to law enforcement. The defendant was linked to the offending accounts through IP address records and admitted during a post-arrest interview to using the relevant Kik accounts and sharing child pornography.After his arrest, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from Kik’s searches and his own statements to law enforcement, arguing that Kik acted as an agent of NCMEC, which he claimed was a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the motion, finding that while NCMEC might be a governmental entity, Kik was not acting as its agent. The court also found that the defendant had validly waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were not coerced. The jury acquitted the defendant on some counts but convicted him on others. The court sentenced him to 151 months in prison and 15 years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that NCMEC is a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes, but the defendant failed to show that Kik acted as a governmental agent when it searched his accounts. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable. However, the court vacated and remanded in part, instructing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform with its oral pronouncement regarding certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Guard" on Justia Law

Joshua Gaines pleaded guilty in Alabama state court to receiving stolen property in the third degree, a Class D felony under Alabama law. Due to his criminal history, Alabama statutes at the time prohibited the court from sentencing him to any actual prison time for this offense. Instead, Gaines received a 24-month suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years, with the possibility of community corrections or other non-prison alternatives, but not incarceration in a prison or jail. After his conviction, Gaines was notified that federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Six months later, he was found in possession of a gun and admitted ownership.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama tried Gaines on two counts: possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm. After the government rested, Gaines moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the federal statute’s requirement. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on the § 922(g)(1) count but acquitted him on the other. Gaines was sentenced to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 922(g)(1) requires a defendant-specific inquiry: the statute applies only if the defendant was actually subject to a sentence of more than one year of imprisonment in a prison or jail. Because Alabama law precluded any prison time for Gaines’s offense, his conviction did not qualify. The Eleventh Circuit vacated Gaines’s conviction and remanded with instructions to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. View "USA v. Gaines" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including attempted deliberate homicide, criminal endangerment, obstructing a peace officer, and tampering with evidence, following a shooting incident at his home involving law enforcement. The defendant had been target shooting on his property, which led to complaints from neighbors and multiple interactions with police. After a SWAT team arrived and attempted to arrest him, the defendant fired several rounds toward officers and their armored vehicle, believing he and his family were under threat. He was ultimately taken into custody after a standoff.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, presided over the trial. The defendant was represented by appointed counsel, who did not pursue a justifiable use of force defense or request instructions for attempted mitigated deliberate homicide as a lesser included offense. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. After trial, the defendant raised concerns about his counsel’s performance, particularly regarding the lack of mental health evaluation and failure to present certain defenses. The District Court appointed new counsel for sentencing. At sentencing, the court orally pronounced a sentence totaling 46 years of incarceration with 5 years suspended, but the written judgment imposed a longer sentence and included additional conditions not stated orally.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the failure to present certain defenses or request lesser included offense instructions were not record-based and should be pursued, if at all, in post-conviction proceedings, with counsel appointed for that purpose. The court affirmed the denial of the ineffective assistance claim regarding failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the mental state element, finding no prejudice. The court reversed the written judgment to the extent it exceeded the oral pronouncement and remanded for entry of an amended judgment consistent with the oral sentence. View "State v. Arvidson" on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant pled guilty to criminal possession with intent to distribute after a traffic stop revealed marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia, and police discovered an outstanding warrant. He was sentenced to a 10-year term with 8 years suspended, to run consecutively to a separate sentence from another county. After beginning the suspended portion of his sentence in 2017, he repeatedly failed to comply with probation conditions, leading to a first revocation in 2018 and a new sentence of 8 years with 5 years suspended. While serving this suspended sentence, he again violated conditions, including new arrests for drug offenses and failing to report, prompting a second revocation proceeding.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, held hearings on the second revocation. Testimony from the probation officer and law enforcement detailed the defendant’s ongoing noncompliance, including substance use, lack of employment, and failure to maintain a residence. The court revoked the suspended sentence, imposed a 5-year commitment to the Department of Corrections with no time suspended, and denied credit for both time served in detention and for “street time” (elapsed time on probation without incarceration). The court’s oral and written pronouncements did not grant any credit for time served.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by not granting credit for time served in detention, as required by statute, and remanded for a factual determination of the correct number of days to be credited. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of credit for elapsed street time, finding the record supported continuous noncompliance. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding there was no prejudice since the district court considered and properly denied street time credit. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "State v. Shewalter" on Justia Law

Cissy Deen Manyhides was placed on probation after pleading guilty to Endangering the Welfare of a Child. As a condition of her probation, she agreed to make her residence open and available to probation officers for home visits or searches upon reasonable suspicion, and to refrain from possessing illegal drugs. In February 2022, probation officers conducted a home visit at her apartment. During a walkthrough for safety and compliance, one officer observed drug paraphernalia in plain view in her bedroom. This led to a further search of her belongings, revealing additional contraband and suspected methamphetamine. Manyhides was subsequently charged with drug possession and possession of drug paraphernalia.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Montana reviewed Manyhides’s motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers’ actions constituted an unlawful search. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the officers’ conduct during the home visit did not amount to a search under the law. Manyhides then pleaded guilty to felony drug possession while reserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that a standard probation home visit, conducted pursuant to explicit probation conditions, does not constitute a search requiring reasonable cause. The Court found that Manyhides had no reasonable expectation of privacy precluding such visits, as she had agreed to the conditions of her probation. The officers’ actions remained within the permissible scope of a home visit until contraband was observed in plain view, at which point reasonable cause existed for a further search. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Manyhides" on Justia Law

A native Spanish speaker with limited English proficiency responded to an online advertisement for commercial sex in November 2022. After exchanging text messages with the poster, who was actually an undercover federal agent, he arranged to meet at a hotel, bringing $200, his phone, and condoms. The agent’s messages indicated that the sex would be with minors, specifically describing two girls as ages 14 and 12. The defendant arrived at the hotel, met the agent, received a room key, and was arrested. During booking, when told he was charged with paying for sex with a minor, he expressed surprise and denied speaking to any minor. In a subsequent interview conducted in Spanish about thirty minutes later, he stated he believed he was arranging sex with an adult.A grand jury indicted him on attempted sex trafficking of a child and attempted coercion and enticement of a child to engage in prostitution. His first trial ended in a hung jury, but the second resulted in convictions on both counts. The defense argued he did not intend to have sex with a minor and misunderstood the agent’s messages due to his limited English. The district court admitted his immediate booking statement as an excited utterance but excluded his later interview statements. The court also gave jury instructions distinguishing motive from intent and explaining the interstate commerce element, using examples that paralleled the government’s evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings. The appellate court held that the exclusion of the post-arrest interview statements was not an abuse of discretion, as the statements were made after a significant time lapse and under circumstances suggesting reflection. The court also found no error in the jury instructions regarding interstate commerce or the distinction between motive and intent. The convictions were affirmed. View "US v. Medina" on Justia Law

In 2020, an incident occurred in which Jacob Frederick Ball, while stopped at a traffic signal on a parkway, pointed a handgun in the direction of another driver after the driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate due to his reckless driving. Ball then sped away onto a freeway onramp. The driver called 9-1-1, and police later found Ball at his home, recovering a handgun and black gloves from his vehicle. Ball was charged with felony brandishing of a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle, along with two misdemeanors.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Orange County, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Ball to answer on all charges. Subsequently, the trial judge granted Ball’s motion to dismiss the felony brandishing count under Penal Code section 995, reasoning that there was no evidence the victim actually experienced subjective fear as a result of Ball’s actions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the victim subjectively experienced fear; rather, the statute sets forth an objective standard, requiring only that the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm. The court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the count based on the absence of evidence of subjective fear. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the felony brandishing count be reinstated. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested in Montana in 2019 in connection with a burglary, during which officers found methamphetamine and syringes in his possession. He admitted to being addicted to methamphetamine. He was charged in state court with felony drug possession, and his pretrial release conditions prohibited firearm possession. In 2022, while those charges were still pending, he was found in possession of a stolen firearm and again admitted to daily methamphetamine use. He was subsequently indicted in federal court for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and for illegally receiving a firearm while under felony indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that both statutes were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district court relied on prior Ninth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court language in District of Columbia v. Heller, concluding that the statutes were consistent with longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by certain groups, such as felons and the mentally ill, and that the defendant had sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit held that both § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n) are facially constitutional under the Second Amendment, as there are circumstances in which their application is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court also held that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. STENNERSON" on Justia Law