Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man was stopped by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding on Interstate 680. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not have a valid driver’s license, instead presenting a fake one. During an inventory search of the impounded car, the officer found a loaded handgun and a large sum of cash. The firearm was determined to be registered to several previous owners, but not to the man. He was charged with carrying a concealed, loaded firearm in a vehicle and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him.Before trial in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, the defendant filed a demurrer arguing that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The trial court denied the demurrer. The defendant then pled no contest to the charges and appealed, with the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that California’s licensing scheme for carrying concealed firearms, even as it existed prior to recent amendments, was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm is a reasonable means of screening for ineligible individuals, such as felons, and does not require a finding of dangerousness for each applicant. The court found that the statutes at issue are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and rejected the argument that the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the statutes unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and assault with a firearm, with several enhancements found true, including prior convictions and use of a firearm. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years and four months, later reduced to 21 years and four months after some enhancements were struck on remand. The sentencing court imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine, court operations assessment, criminal conviction assessment, and a booking fee. The defendant previously challenged the imposition of these fines and fees on due process grounds, but the California Court of Appeal found any error harmless, as he could pay from future wages.After his conviction became final, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the fines and fees, arguing that statutory changes rendered some unenforceable and that others were unconstitutional without an ability-to-pay hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief through a freestanding postjudgment motion and suggested that a writ petition would be the proper procedural vehicle.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s postjudgment motion because his conviction was final and he had begun serving his sentence. The court explained that, absent express statutory authorization, a defendant cannot challenge fines and fees through a standalone motion after judgment is final. The court also rejected arguments that recent statutory amendments or case law provided jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Lawrence Rudolph was convicted for the fatal shooting of his wife, Bianca Rudolph, during a 2016 hunting trip in Zambia. The couple, married for nearly thirty-five years, had substantial marital assets and maintained significant life insurance policies. Their marriage was troubled by infidelity, including Mr. Rudolph’s long-term affair with Lori Milliron, a partner at his dental practice. After Bianca’s death, which Mr. Rudolph claimed was accidental, he collected nearly $4.8 million in life insurance proceeds and purchased several high-value assets. Less than two weeks after returning to the United States, he arranged for Ms. Milliron to join him in Arizona, and they began living together.The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Denver initiated an investigation in 2019, reviewing the Zambian authorities’ findings and conducting its own forensic analysis. In December 2021, Mr. Rudolph was arrested in Denver after being deported from Mexico, and indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on charges of foreign murder and mail fraud. He moved to dismiss for improper venue and to sever his trial from Ms. Milliron’s, arguing that the government engaged in forum shopping and that a joint trial would prejudice his defense. The district court denied both motions, admitted certain statements by Bianca under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, and ordered forfeiture of assets purchased with the insurance proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that venue in Colorado was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, as Mr. Rudolph was both “arrested” and “first brought” to the district in connection with the charges. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying severance, admitting Bianca’s statements under Rule 804(b)(6), or ordering forfeiture of the assets, including interest and appreciation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and forfeiture order. View "United States v. Rudolph" on Justia Law

A masked assailant entered a jewelry store in Delaware, assaulted the owner with a gun and hammer, smashed display cases, and stole jewelry before fleeing. The owner, Chang Yen Suh, suffered significant injuries requiring hospitalization and months of rehabilitation. Calvin Ushery was indicted for multiple offenses, including first-degree robbery, first-degree assault of a person over 62, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and other related charges. After a mistrial in the first jury trial, a second jury trial resulted in Ushery’s conviction on three counts. The State dismissed several other charges, and Ushery was sentenced as a habitual offender to substantial prison terms.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware presided over both trials and sentencing. Ushery appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to properly admonish the jury against pre-deliberation discussions and exposure to extrajudicial information, and that the court erred by not investigating or excusing an alternate juror who submitted a note raising questions about the evidence and his own hearing difficulties. Ushery claimed these failures violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and requested the adoption of a presumption of juror misconduct when admonishments are lacking.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case for plain error, as Ushery’s claims were not raised at trial. The Court held that, although daily admonishments are recommended, the instructions given were sufficient and did not constitute plain error. The Court also found no evidence of juror misconduct or bias, and that the trial court acted within its discretion regarding the alternate juror. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. View "Ushery v. State" on Justia Law

Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a noncitizen who had previously been removed from the United States, pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the country in violation of federal law. After his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that included a list of standard and special conditions for supervised release. At sentencing, Lezama-Ramirez’s counsel indicated there were no objections to the PSR, and the district court adopted it. The court imposed a one-year term of supervised release, referencing compliance with standard and special conditions, but did not read these conditions aloud. The written judgment later included the same conditions as those in the PSR.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered the judgment, and Lezama-Ramirez appealed, arguing that there were discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions at sentencing and those listed in the written judgment. He specifically challenged the imposition of certain standard and special conditions that were not read aloud, as well as differences between the oral and written versions of two particular conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because Lezama-Ramirez had notice of the supervised release conditions through the PSR and did not object at sentencing, there was no reversible error in imposing the conditions that were not read aloud. However, the court found that the written version of one special condition (Special Condition 2) imposed an additional reporting requirement not included in the oral pronouncement, which constituted an impermissible conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the imposition of Special Condition 2 and remanded for the district court to conform it to the oral pronouncement, while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Lezama-Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 1990, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery after abducting a woman from a bar, fatally stabbing her, and leaving her body by a dirt road. Physical evidence, including fingerprints, blood, and items from the bar found near his home, linked him to the crime. The jury recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed, finding multiple aggravating factors. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal.Over the following decades, the defendant filed numerous postconviction motions and habeas petitions, all of which were denied by various courts, including the Florida Supreme Court. In his third and fourth successive postconviction motions, he raised claims based on alleged newly discovered evidence, including declarations that a serial killer confessed to the murder, a witness’s willingness to recant, and purported evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. He also asserted claims under Jones v. State, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, and Massiah v. United States, as well as a due process claim regarding a prior appellate decision. The Circuit Court for Walton County summarily denied all claims, finding most to be untimely or procedurally barred under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and rejecting others on the merits.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the summary denial de novo and affirmed. The court held that the defendant’s claims were untimely and procedurally barred because he failed to demonstrate due diligence in discovering the alleged new evidence or to show that the claims could not have been raised earlier. The court also found that the purported new evidence was inadmissible or would not probably produce an acquittal at retrial. Additionally, the court concluded that the due process claim was meritless and that the circuit court correctly denied relief. The summary denials of the third and fourth successive postconviction motions were affirmed. View "Suggs v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence investigation report determined that the defendant’s offense level was increased due to two prior Louisiana felony convictions: aggravated battery and distribution of cocaine. The report also applied enhancements for a stolen firearm and use of the firearm in connection with another felony. The defendant objected to these enhancements and the classification of his prior aggravated battery conviction as a “crime of violence.” The district court overruled the objections, adopted the report’s findings, and sentenced the defendant to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, and that the district court erred in treating his prior aggravated battery conviction as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. The defendant had not raised these arguments in the district court, so the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.The Fifth Circuit held that, under existing precedent, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not constitute plain error, and there has been no development in the law to suggest otherwise. Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the court found that the defendant failed to show a “realistic probability” that Louisiana courts would uphold an aggravated battery conviction based on reckless or negligent conduct, as required to demonstrate clear or obvious error under the categorical approach. The court concluded that neither the conviction nor the sentence was reversible under plain error review and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Sereal" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

Marquis Smalls pleaded guilty in 2013 to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to 110 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. His supervised release was conditioned on compliance with certain terms, including not committing new crimes or illegally possessing controlled substances. After his release in December 2020, Smalls repeatedly violated these conditions, resulting in multiple periods of home detention. In June 2024, he was arrested by state officials on heroin-trafficking charges, and the United States Probation Office charged him with eight violations of supervised release, successfully petitioning for a federal arrest warrant. Upon release from state custody, Smalls was transferred to federal custody and presented before the District Court for an initial appearance, where he was ordered detained pending a final revocation hearing. Smalls waived his right to a preliminary hearing.Smalls later moved for release from custody, citing a district court opinion from the District of Connecticut in United States v. Mercado, which held that no statute authorized pre-revocation detention for supervised release violations. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Smalls’s motion, finding it had authority to detain him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), based on flight risk and danger to the community. Smalls appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which denied his motion for release in a summary order. Smalls then filed a petition for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the petition for rehearing to provide a precedential explanation but again denied Smalls’s motion for release. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes detention of a defendant alleged to have violated supervised release pending revocation proceedings, as such detention is part of the execution of the original sentence. The court affirmed the District Court’s authority to detain Smalls pending his final revocation hearing. View "USA v. Smalls" on Justia Law