Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police officers in Oklahoma conducted a warrantless search of a storage unit rented by an individual whose email and payment information were on the rental agreement, though the agreement was signed by another person. Employees of the storage facility initially entered the unit after finding its door ajar, observing what appeared to be drugs and firearms, and then notified police. Upon arrival, officers looked into the unit, with one officer peeking his head inside to observe suspected contraband, and another officer later entering the unit and opening a drawer before a warrant was obtained. The officers then used their observations to obtain a search warrant for the storage unit, which led to the discovery of drugs and firearms. Based on this evidence, they secured a second warrant to search the renter’s home, where additional contraband was found.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from both searches, finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the officers’ actions. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to drug and firearm charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the officers’ warrantless entry and search of the storage unit violated the Fourth Amendment. The court determined that, after excising the unconstitutionally obtained information from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining content failed to establish probable cause. The court also found that the good faith exception did not apply because the affidavit was so facially deficient that officers could not reasonably rely on it. Consequently, the evidence from both the storage unit and the home was ordered suppressed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Blasdel" on Justia Law

Victor Kearney was indicted for filing a false tax return for 2011 and for conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The government alleged that Kearney, with the assistance of his tax attorney, Robert Fiser, failed to report taxable trust income on his tax returns from 2007 to 2011. Fiser, who was both an attorney and a certified public accountant, prepared Kearney’s returns during those years, reporting negative income despite Kearney’s receipt of trust income. At trial, Kearney argued that he relied in good faith on Fiser’s advice and was unaware of his personal tax obligations. The defense also challenged Fiser’s credibility, highlighting his ethical violations and criminal history.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico conducted the trial. The jury convicted Kearney on both counts: filing a false tax return and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The district court sentenced him to 27 months in prison for each count, to run concurrently, and denied his motion for a new trial. Kearney appealed, challenging only his conspiracy conviction. He argued that the district court erred by misinstructing the jury on the elements of conspiracy to defraud and by failing to include the conspiracy charge in the advice-of-counsel instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found two plain errors. First, the jury instruction for conspiracy did not require the government to prove that Kearney used deceitful or dishonest means, an essential element of conspiracy to defraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Second, the advice-of-counsel instruction was limited to the false return charge and did not inform the jury that this defense applied to the conspiracy charge as well. The court held that these errors prejudiced Kearney’s defense, vacated his conspiracy conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kearney" on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Randolph Jay Forrest worked at a used car dealership in Iowa from 2012 to 2021, where he and the owners engaged in a scheme to roll back odometers on dozens of vehicles, alter their titles, and resell them without disclosing the true mileage. After the scheme was discovered, Forrest was indicted on multiple counts, including odometer tampering, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He ultimately pled guilty to one count of wire fraud under a plea agreement, which required him to pay full restitution to all victims harmed by his conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa was tasked with determining the appropriate amount of restitution. Several methodologies were presented: Forrest’s expert suggested calculating loss based on average vehicle value using industry guides, resulting in a total loss of $38,070; the probation office recommended a 40% loss valuation, totaling $76,690; and the government proposed using either the total purchase price paid by victims or the estimated profit from the scheme. The government’s expert, Howard Nusbaum, calculated loss based on the diminished use value of the vehicles, considering the impact of branded titles and misrepresented mileage, arriving at a total loss of $140,178.56. The district court adopted Nusbaum’s methodology, finding it reasonable and supported by the evidence, and rejected Forrest’s arguments regarding salvage value and the reliability of purchase prices.On appeal, Forrest challenged the district court’s adoption of Nusbaum’s methodology, arguing it was insufficiently individualized and did not account for the actual value retained by purchasers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the restitution award for abuse of discretion and clear error. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in its loss estimation, given the complexity of the scheme and the evidence presented. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Forrest" on Justia Law

Five individuals were charged in federal court for their roles in a large-scale drug trafficking operation. The scheme involved purchasing marijuana from states where it was legal, such as California and Oregon, and distributing it to twenty-one other states. The operation used drivers to transport marijuana and related products, with cash proceeds handled outside of financial institutions to avoid detection. Law enforcement investigations included surveillance, traffic stops, and searches of residences, warehouses, and storage units, resulting in the seizure of large quantities of marijuana, THC products, cash, and firearms. The lead investigator analyzed cell phone data to estimate the scope of the conspiracy, concluding it involved over 23,000 kilograms of marijuana.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas indicted the five appellants and ten co-defendants on multiple counts, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and other individualized charges. Eight co-defendants pleaded guilty, while the five appellants went to trial. After an eight-day trial, the jury convicted all five of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kg or more of marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Roberts was also convicted of continuing criminal enterprise and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Sentences ranged from 48 to 240 months’ imprisonment, with some counts dismissed or sentences ordered to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court affirmed the convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and promotional money laundering, but vacated the sentences for certain defendants due to errors in the admission of a summary chart used to estimate drug quantities and clerical errors in the judgments and presentence reports. The court remanded for resentencing under the default penalty provision and correction of clerical errors, while affirming other aspects of the convictions and venue determinations. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Ricky Wilson was implicated in an incident at a Waffle House, where he allegedly brandished a green pistol with a drum magazine during a dispute, causing fear in another customer. The victim identified Wilson, his vehicle, and the weapon. A detective, already investigating Wilson for another matter, learned that Wilson’s girlfriend rented an apartment at 212 Central Avenue, where Wilson’s car was later observed. Two weeks after the Waffle House incident, the detective sought and obtained both an arrest warrant for Wilson and a search warrant for the apartment, based on an affidavit that recounted the Waffle House events and stated that items related to the assault were “believed to be located” at the apartment. The search yielded ammunition, marijuana, and a firearm, leading to federal charges against Wilson.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted Wilson’s motion to suppress the evidence found at the apartment. The court found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish a nexus between the Waffle House incident and the apartment, rendering the warrant unsupported by probable cause. The court also determined that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance on it was unreasonable. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s suppression of the evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that the affidavit was a “bare-bones” statement, offering no facts connecting the alleged crime to the apartment, and thus failed to establish probable cause. The court further held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the affidavit was so deficient that no reasonable officer could believe it established probable cause. The suppression of the evidence was therefore proper. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Victor Arriaga entered into an oral agreement with Gilbert Torres to repair water-damaged drywall in Torres’s home. The project expanded to include additional repairs and a room addition, with Torres paying Arriaga substantial sums by check and cash. After several weeks, Arriaga and his father, who worked with him, left the job unfinished and removed their tools and materials from the property. Torres was unable to contact Arriaga afterward. The Los Angeles Building and Safety Department later issued a stop-work notice due to unpermitted and non-code-compliant work, and the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) discovered Arriaga was unlicensed. The CSLB referred the matter to the district attorney, who filed a felony complaint in 2007 for wrongful diversion of construction funds. However, there was no evidence that law enforcement attempted to contact Arriaga or inform him of the warrant. Arriaga moved to Nevada, and only learned of the warrant in 2022 after a misdemeanor arrest there. He returned to Los Angeles in 2023 to address the warrant and was arraigned.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held a preliminary hearing in 2023, after which Arriaga was held to answer. In 2024, Arriaga moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the 16-year delay between the complaint and his arraignment violated his state and federal speedy trial rights, causing him prejudice due to lost evidence and the death of his father, a key witness. The trial court denied the motion, finding no actual prejudice and concluding that the People had a legitimate justification for the delay.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that Arriaga’s state speedy trial right was violated by the 16-year post-complaint delay, finding that he made a prima facie showing of prejudice due to the loss of his father’s testimony, and that the prosecution failed to provide a legitimate justification for the delay. The court granted Arriaga’s petition for a writ of prohibition and directed the trial court to dismiss the felony count. View "Arriaga v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1988, a man was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Decades later, after exhausting his appeals, he was diagnosed with vascular dementia, a progressive neurocognitive disorder that impairs memory and cognitive function. When the state sought an execution warrant in early 2024, he petitioned the court, arguing that his dementia rendered him incompetent to be executed under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits executing individuals who cannot rationally understand the reason for their execution.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County held an evidentiary hearing, where multiple experts agreed he had vascular dementia and noted a decline in his cognitive abilities. However, the court found he was still competent to be executed, concluding he could rationally understand the reason for his death sentence. The defendant appealed and requested a stay, which was denied. Subsequently, he filed a new petition for reevaluation, supported by recent expert reports and observations indicating a rapid decline and new inability to understand the connection between his crime and punishment. The district court denied this petition, finding no substantial change in circumstances or significant question about his competency, and issued an execution warrant.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. It held that, under Utah law, a successive petition to reopen competency proceedings must make a prima facie showing of a substantial change in circumstances and raise a significant question about competency. The court found that the district court erred by weighing rebuttal evidence at the threshold stage and by concluding the new petition did not meet the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying reevaluation, vacated the execution warrant, and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal of the initial competency order and one extraordinary writ petition were deemed moot. View "State v. Menzies" on Justia Law

A woman was found dead in her apartment after her boyfriend, who had spent the night elsewhere, returned and discovered her body hidden in a closet. The apartment was in disarray, and drugs and a cell phone were missing. The defendant, who knew the victim and her boyfriend through drug transactions, was identified as having been at the apartment the night of the murder. Forensic evidence linked the defendant to the crime scene, including blood matching the victim on his clothing and blood matching the defendant at the scene. The defendant was arrested shortly after the murder, and additional evidence was gathered, including statements from jailhouse informants.The defendant was first convicted of murder in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New London, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed that conviction and ordered a new trial due to the improper admission of evidence obtained in a warrantless search. Before the second trial, the defendant requested a new probable cause hearing, which the trial court denied, reasoning that the reversal did not invalidate the original probable cause finding. The trial court also denied motions to exclude testimony from two jailhouse informants: one, who had suffered a stroke and claimed memory loss, and another whose reliability was challenged.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to a second probable cause hearing after reversal and remand for a new trial, as neither the state constitution nor the relevant statute required it absent a jurisdictional defect. The court also held that admitting the prior written statement of the former cellmate did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights, as the witness was present, took an oath, and answered questions, even if he claimed memory loss. The court further found no abuse of discretion in admitting the statement as a prior inconsistent statement or in finding the jailhouse informant’s testimony reliable. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Jacques" on Justia Law

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of robbery in the first degree following a guilty plea, filed a habeas petition in 2018 challenging that conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In 2020, the petitioner was deported to Jamaica. After deportation, his habeas counsel was unable to contact him or his family members. In early 2021, the habeas court scheduled a hearing to consider dismissing the petition due to the petitioner’s failure to appear and prosecute the case with due diligence. Following the hearing, the court dismissed the habeas petition for lack of prosecution.Approximately fifteen months after the dismissal, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment, arguing that he had not received notice of the hearing and that his counsel had failed to make reasonable efforts to notify him or communicate effectively. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the petitioner had not established a recognized basis for opening the judgment beyond the four-month period prescribed by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-212a. The petitioner appealed, and the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed, holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel was sufficient to invoke the habeas court’s common-law authority to grant a late motion to open a judgment.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether ineffective assistance of habeas counsel could serve as a common-law exception to the four-month deadline in § 52-212a. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” in § 52-212a does not include a new judicially created common-law exception for ineffective assistance of habeas counsel. The Court reasoned that such an exception would conflict with the statutory scheme governing habeas corpus, including requirements for expedient resolution and custody status. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and directed affirmation of the habeas court’s denial of the motion to open. View "Clue v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law