Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Andre Hart was convicted of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm following a 1996 jury trial. The incident involved Hart and another individual planning a robbery to obtain drugs. Hart approached the victim, Gary Hendricks, outside Hendricks’s apartment, and after a brief interaction, Hendricks was shot and killed. Witnesses saw Hart crouched over the victim immediately after the shooting, and later, Hart admitted to a friend that he had shot someone. However, the jury found not true an allegation that Hart personally used a firearm during the murder.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Hart filed a petition in the Superior Court of San Diego County under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking to vacate his murder conviction based on changes in California’s felony murder law. At the evidentiary hearing, Hart argued that the jury’s prior finding on the firearm use allegation precluded the court from finding he was the actual killer. The court admitted Hart’s 2021 statements to a forensic psychologist, in which he admitted to being the shooter, and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hart was the actual killer. Alternatively, the court found Hart was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Hart’s statements to the psychologist were admissible and not protected by privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination. It further held that neither section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), due process, nor issue preclusion barred the trial court from finding Hart was the actual killer, as the jury’s not true finding on the firearm use allegation was not an “ultimate fact” necessary for murder liability. The order denying Hart’s petition was affirmed. View "People v. Hart" on Justia Law

A Syrian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, together with a business partner, sought to establish a halal beef slaughterhouse in Colombia and solicited investment for the venture. An FBI confidential informant, suspicious of their activities, connected them with an undercover agent posing as a representative of a wealthy investor. The supposed investor agreed to provide $9 million on the condition that at least five percent be sent to Jabhat al-Nusra, a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. The defendants agreed to this arrangement, took steps to conceal the transfers, and demonstrated knowledge that the funds would support violent acts by the group. The FBI terminated the operation, and the defendant was arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder and maim persons in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and to a designated foreign terrorist organization.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas presided over the trial, where a jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 160 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, raising several issues, including the exclusion of his son’s testimony, limitations on cross-examination, sufficiency of the evidence, denial of a combatant-immunity instruction, the jury instruction regarding the terrorist organization’s designation, and the denial of sanctions for an alleged violation of a preservation order by a government witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the son’s testimony or in its evidentiary rulings, found no reversible error in the jury instructions, and determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The appellate court also concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying sanctions related to the preservation order. View "United States v. Wadi" on Justia Law

Heather M. Hodgson was charged with several offenses following an incident at her home involving her husband and their two children. The dispute began after her husband purchased alcohol, which upset Hodgson. Both consumed alcohol, and an argument ensued. During the altercation, Hodgson pointed a loaded firearm at her husband and fired a “warning shot” at the floor near his feet. The couple’s three-year-old child was present in the home and had come out of the bedroom during the argument. Hodgson was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child.The case was tried without a jury in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket. After the State presented its evidence, Hodgson moved for acquittal on some counts, which the court granted in part. Hodgson testified, claiming self-defense, but the court found her account not credible. The court found her guilty on three counts: domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child. At sentencing, the court declined to impose the mandatory minimum one-year sentence for the reckless conduct charge, instead sentencing Hodgson to three years with all but ninety days suspended and probation.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed both Hodgson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the State’s appeal regarding the sentence. The Court affirmed Hodgson’s convictions, finding the evidence sufficient. However, it held that the trial court erred by not imposing the mandatory minimum one-year sentence required by statute for domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. The Court vacated the sentence for that count and remanded for resentencing consistent with the statutory requirement. View "State v. Hodgson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Maine received a tip from a confidential source about suspicious rental car activity by Calvin Vandine, who was known to use drugs and associate with traffickers. Officers tracked Vandine’s movements and, based on the tip and corroborating information, stopped his car, which was also occupied by Derric McLain. During the stop, officers found drugs and arrested both men. McLain was later identified as having outstanding warrants, including for drug trafficking. The stop lasted about twenty-eight minutes, and a subsequent search revealed significant quantities of controlled substances.Prior to trial in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket, McLain moved to suppress evidence from the stop and statements made during custodial interrogation, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion for the prolonged detention and that he had not waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court (Anderson, J.) denied the motion to suppress, finding the stop justified and the statements admissible. After a jury trial before Justice Murray, McLain was convicted of aggravated drug trafficking and violation of condition of release, receiving a substantial sentence.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the suppression motion. The Court affirmed the lower court’s findings that the stop, search, and arrest were supported by reasonable suspicion and were not unconstitutionally prolonged. However, the Court held that McLain did not clearly waive his privilege against self-incrimination under article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution, as his responses during interrogation were ambiguous and officers failed to clarify his intent. The Court vacated the conviction and the suppression order in part, remanding for further proceedings, and established that a clear and unequivocal waiver is required before custodial interrogation may proceed in Maine. View "State v. McLain" on Justia Law

Maurice Rose was convicted by a jury for attempting to kill a government witness in a federal drug and firearms case, intending to prevent the witness’s testimony against an associate. He was found guilty of two offenses: attempting to kill a person to prevent testimony in an official proceeding, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Rose’s conviction resulted in a 330-month sentence, which was previously affirmed on direct appeal.After unsuccessful prior attempts at post-conviction relief, Rose sought permission to file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions—Sessions v. Dimaya and United States v. Davis—that changed the definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted leave to file without addressing the merits. Rose then moved to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that, under United States v. Taylor, witness tampering by attempted murder does not qualify as a “crime of violence.” The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the motion, finding that attempted killing remains a crime of violence, but issued a certificate of appealability due to the debatable nature of the issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Rose’s offense was a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 924(c). The court held that attempted murder, including attempted killing of a witness under § 1512(a)(1), categorically qualifies as a crime of violence because it requires the attempted use of physical force. The court distinguished this from the Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor, which addressed attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Rose’s motion to vacate his conviction. View "Rose v. United States" on Justia Law

On November 25, 2023, a Casper Police Department officer conducted a welfare check on David Wayne Gober, who was found walking in the street. After determining Gober was not in distress, the officer ran his name and discovered an active warrant for failure to pay a fine. Upon arresting Gober, officers searched him and found glass pipes, jeweler’s bags containing a small amount of a crystal-like substance, metal tooter pipes, and unused syringes. The substances in the pipes and bags tested positive for methamphetamine. Gober was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, as it was a third or subsequent offense.The District Court of Natrona County presided over Gober’s jury trial. During the trial, Gober argued that the methamphetamine found was only a trace amount and proposed a de minimis infraction theory of defense instruction, which would allow the jury to acquit if the conduct was too trivial to warrant conviction. The district court refused to give this instruction, reasoning that Wyoming law does not set a minimum amount of methamphetamine for criminal liability and that the proposed instruction was not a recognized defense under Wyoming law. The jury found Gober guilty, and he was sentenced to two to four years’ imprisonment, suspended in favor of two years’ supervised probation.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly refused Gober’s proposed de minimis infraction instruction because Wyoming law criminalizes knowing or intentional possession of any amount of methamphetamine, regardless of quantity. The court found that the de minimis infraction defense is not recognized by Wyoming statute or case law for this offense and that the instruction would have improperly invited jury nullification. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gober v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his wife and second-degree attempted murder of his mother-in-law after a violent attack with a meat cleaver in October 2017. Following his arrest, he was evaluated by multiple mental health experts, all of whom opined that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. The initial prosecution was dismissed without prejudice by the Chittenden County State’s Attorney, who concluded there was insufficient evidence to rebut the insanity defense. After the defendant was released from psychiatric care, the Vermont Attorney General refiled the same charges.In the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved to dismiss the renewed charges, arguing that the prior dismissal barred further prosecution under principles of collateral estoppel and judicial admissions, and that the Attorney General lacked authority to refile. The trial court denied these motions, finding that dismissal without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits and did not preclude reprosecution. The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant raised an insanity defense, but the jury convicted him on both counts.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant raised five claims: (1) the prior dismissal barred the second prosecution; (2) his rights to a public trial and to participate in his defense were infringed; (3) the jury instructions were confusing and incomplete; (4) the court failed to protect jury impartiality by allowing unsupervised access to a graphic video; and (5) the court did not ensure competent language interpretation. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had authority to refile charges, that dismissal without prejudice did not bar reprosecution, and that collateral estoppel did not apply. The Court found no reversible error in the conduct of jury selection, jury instructions, video access, or interpretation services, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Gurung" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, domestic assault, and threats of violence. During jury deliberations, a juror was exposed to COVID-19, raising concerns that continued deliberations might pressure the jury to reach a verdict. After discussing the situation with counsel, the district court decided to end deliberations, take any unanimous verdicts, and declare a mistrial on any deadlocked counts. The defendant’s attorney, at the defendant’s request, asked for a complete mistrial on all counts. The jury ultimately reported no unanimous verdicts, and the district court declared a mistrial on all counts.Following the mistrial, the State refiled the charges. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The Hennepin County District Court denied the motion, finding that double jeopardy did not bar retrial. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the defendant requested the mistrial, double jeopardy would only bar retrial if the government had intentionally provoked the request, which was not the case here.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that when a defendant requests and receives a mistrial, double jeopardy does not bar retrial unless the government intentionally induced or provoked the request. The court found no evidence that the district court or prosecution provoked the defendant’s mistrial request. The court also rejected arguments that the defendant had withdrawn his request or preserved an objection to the mistrial. As a result, the court concluded that double jeopardy did not attach, and the defendant may be retried. View "State v. Lerma" on Justia Law

In 1998, Joel Underwood, III, pleaded guilty to third-degree assault, which is classified as a crime of violence under Minnesota law. He was convicted and placed on probation. In 2000, after completing probation, a Dakota County district court issued an order restoring his civil rights and stating that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm for 10 years, which was consistent with the law at that time. In 2003, the Minnesota Legislature amended the relevant statute to impose a lifetime ban on firearm possession for individuals convicted of a crime of violence. Underwood was not specifically notified of this change. In 2021, he was found in possession of a firearm and charged under the amended statute.After being charged, Underwood waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm. During the plea, he admitted to knowingly possessing a firearm and to his prior conviction but stated he did not know he was still ineligible to possess a firearm. The Anoka County District Court accepted his plea and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum. Underwood later petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction violated due process because he relied on the 2000 discharge order and that his plea was invalid since he did not admit knowledge of his ineligibility. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no due process violation and that knowledge of ineligibility was not required for conviction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that when a court order accurately reflects the law at the time but the law is later amended, the State does not violate due process by prosecuting under the amended statute. The court also held that the offense of ineligible person in possession of a firearm does not require proof that the defendant knew of their ineligibility, only that they knowingly possessed a firearm and had a prior conviction for a crime of violence. View "Underwood v. State" on Justia Law

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law