Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An undercover law enforcement operation targeted individuals seeking to purchase sex from minors through an online platform known for prostitution ads. An agent created a fake profile of a 45-year-old woman but, upon contact, informed the defendant that "she" was actually 13 years old. Despite multiple text exchanges in which the defendant expressed reluctance to engage with someone underage, he continued the conversation, eventually requesting photos, discussing sexual acts, and arranging a meeting while being repeatedly reminded of the minor’s age. At the meeting site, agents seized his phone, which he attempted to wipe, erasing relevant evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa conducted a trial in which a jury convicted the defendant of attempted sex trafficking of a child and destruction of evidence. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 292 months and 240 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the admission of lay-opinion testimony by the undercover agent regarding the perceived maturity of the fictitious minor’s responses, the denial of his request to contact a juror based on alleged outside influence, and the refusal to grant a downward sentencing variance on grounds of purported sentencing manipulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the agent’s lay-opinion testimony was appropriately admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, as it was based on personal knowledge and aided the jury’s understanding. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying juror contact, as the defendant’s claims were speculative and unsupported by evidence of outside influence. Finally, the court rejected the sentencing manipulation claim, determining that law enforcement had a legitimate goal in targeting those seeking sex with very young minors and that the agent’s actions were not solely intended to enhance the sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Yuri Chachanko and an accomplice committed a series of armed robberies in South Dakota and Montana, leading to federal charges in both states. He was first prosecuted in Montana, where he received a 219-month sentence for Hobbs Act violations and firearm use. After completing that sentence, he faced prosecution in South Dakota, where he pleaded guilty to another firearm offense and was sentenced to 300 months, to be served consecutively after the Montana sentence. Years later, after legislative changes under the First Step Act, Chachanko sought a reduction of his South Dakota sentence, arguing that it was unusually long and that his medical conditions warranted relief.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota considered his motion. The court focused on whether Chachanko had served at least 10 years of the South Dakota sentence, as required for a reduction based on an unusually long sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. It found that, although Chachanko had spent 17 years in custody overall, he had only just begun serving the South Dakota sentence, as the sentences were consecutive. The court also found that his medical conditions were adequately managed and did not meet the standard for extraordinary and compelling reasons, and that no combination of circumstances justified relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the phrase “the term of imprisonment” in the relevant statute and guidelines refers specifically to the sentence imposed by the court reviewing the motion—here, the South Dakota sentence—and not to an aggregate of multiple sentences. As Chachanko had not served 10 years of the South Dakota sentence, he was ineligible for relief on that basis. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying relief based on medical or other circumstances. View "United States v. Chachanko" on Justia Law

After serving more than a decade in the Illinois state legislature, the defendant established a lobbying and consulting firm and also sold life insurance for a private company. For several years, she correctly filed her tax returns and reported her income. However, beginning in 2014, she significantly underreported her income on her personal tax returns or failed to file altogether, despite substantial earnings from her business and insurance work. She was later terminated from her insurance position for fraudulent activity. The IRS discovered unreported income and issued a notice of tax liability, prompting her to amend one return and enter a payment plan, which she later abandoned.A grand jury indicted her on six counts, including making false statements on tax returns and willfully failing to file returns for herself and her company. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, made several evidentiary rulings before and during trial, including excluding evidence of her amended tax return and payment plan, and limiting her expert’s testimony. The jury convicted her on four counts. The court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal and later sentenced her to one year of imprisonment and supervised release. She subsequently filed a motion to modify her sentence to make her eligible for good-time credits, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed her convictions and the district court’s evidentiary rulings de novo and for abuse of discretion, respectively. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find willfulness, affirmed the exclusion of post-offense remedial evidence as within the district court’s discretion, found her challenge to the impeachment ruling waived since she did not testify, upheld the limitation on her expert’s testimony, and agreed that her motion to correct the sentence was untimely and properly denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

A driver in Lake Havasu City rear-ended a Jeep that was stopped at a red light, causing the Jeep to be pushed through the intersection and resulting in the death of one of its passengers. The driver’s vehicle also continued through the intersection while the light was red. Prosecutors charged the driver under Arizona’s enhanced penalty statute, which criminalizes certain traffic violations—including running a red light—if those violations result in an accident causing serious injury or death.After a bench trial, the Lake Havasu Consolidated Court found the driver guilty, reasoning that the entire sequence of events—from the rear-end collision to the vehicles coming to rest—constituted a single “accident” under the statute. On appeal, the Mohave County Superior Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the driver’s red-light violation did not cause the fatal accident because the collision occurred before the vehicle entered the intersection and thus before a red-light violation was committed. The State sought further review, and the Arizona Court of Appeals sided with the State, interpreting the statute to cover a continuous chain of events, so long as the accident ultimately resulted from failing to stop at the red light.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the statute’s scope. The court held that a violation of the red-light statute occurs only when a driver enters an intersection against a red light. Therefore, the enhanced penalty does not apply to an accident that occurs before the driver enters the intersection, even if the vehicle subsequently runs the red light. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order directing an acquittal, holding that the enhanced penalty statute requires the red-light violation to precede the accident causing injury or death. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v GORDON" on Justia Law

The defendant, an adult male in his fifties, was accused of engaging in unlawful sexual contact with his twelve-year-old great-niece while she was staying overnight at his home in October 2020. The victim disclosed the incident to her mother about a year later after family members encouraged her to speak up due to concerns arising from accusations the defendant had made against the victim’s cousin. The matter was reported to law enforcement and later discussed in a forensic interview. The defendant was subsequently indicted and proceeded to a jury trial.During the trial in the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket, significant evidentiary disputes arose. The State sought to introduce testimony regarding a subsequent incident in which the defendant allegedly offered a sex toy to the victim and another individual, arguing its relevance to intent and the relationship between the parties. The defense objected, citing prejudice and late disclosure, and initially, the trial court excluded the evidence but left open the possibility of reconsideration. As the trial progressed and new lines of questioning emerged, the court ultimately allowed this evidence, finding no unfair prejudice. The defense also attempted to introduce evidence that the defendant had threatened the victim’s cousin, theorizing it would demonstrate a motive to fabricate the allegations. The court excluded this testimony, finding it irrelevant because there was no evidence the victim knew of the threats or that her family conspired to fabricate the allegations.The jury found the defendant guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of eight years, with a portion suspended and a probation period. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence of the subsequent sexual behavior and did not err in excluding the evidence of threats toward the cousin due to lack of relevance. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Cardona" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to felony child neglect, the defendant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with three years suspended, credit for 375 days already served, supervised probation, and restitution. Following his release, the State alleged that the defendant violated multiple conditions of his probation. At a probation revocation hearing, the defendant waived his right to counsel and admitted the violations, leading the district court to revoke his probation. The court orally stated the defendant would receive credit for two years plus the time he spent in custody after being arrested on the probation violation warrant, which amounted to twenty-four days.The written order issued after the revocation hearing, however, erroneously recorded the credit for time served as “3 years and 34 days” instead of the correct “2 years and 24 days.” The State moved to correct this mistake under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, arguing it was a clerical error that conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. The District Court of McHenry County granted the State’s motion, found the original written order contained a clerical error, and issued an amended order reflecting the proper credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the correction improperly reduced his credit for time served and conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. He also asserted his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the court did not appoint an attorney to represent him in the Rule 36 proceedings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the correction was a permissible exercise of the court’s discretion under Rule 36 to remedy a clerical error in the judgment so that it accurately reflected the oral pronouncement at the revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not violated because the correction of a clerical error under Rule 36 is not a critical stage of the prosecution. View "State v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

In this case, a man moved in with his girlfriend and her children, including twin daughters who referred to him as their stepfather. After the man lived with the family, one of the twins, M.R., disclosed that he repeatedly sexually abused her when she was six and seven years old. She described being taken to the basement while her mother was asleep, having various sexual acts performed on her, and being shown explicit videos. She did not initially report the abuse due to fear and threats from the man. Eventually, she told her grandmother, which led to a police and medical investigation, forensic interviews, and the discovery of pornography and sex-related items in the home. The man denied the allegations and was indicted on multiple charges. Though the children gave inconsistent statements in family court, at the criminal trial both confirmed the abuse and explained their earlier denial was out of fear and misunderstanding.A Jefferson County jury acquitted the defendant of intimidating a participant in a legal proceeding but convicted him of three counts of first-degree sodomy, two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and one count of distributing obscene matter to a minor. The Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, adopting the jury’s recommendation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony and other acts evidence, denying his motion for a directed verdict on the obscene matter charge, and refusing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected all arguments. It held that the challenged testimony was properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support the obscene matter conviction, the other acts evidence was admissible with proper notice, and the trial court properly declined to instruct on lesser-included offenses. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "MENDEZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case involves an incident in September 2020 where Hartsfield met B.B. at a hotel, and B.B. later accused Hartsfield of rape and assault. Both individuals were interviewed by police, and these interviews were recorded on body cameras. The key evidentiary dispute centered on a portion of the body camera video in which a police officer stated his opinion about whether B.B. was telling the truth regarding her allegations against Hartsfield.The Fayette Circuit Court denied the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, which sought to exclude the officer’s recorded opinion about B.B.’s credibility. The court ruled that the entire body camera video was admissible, reasoning that the officer’s statements provided context rather than being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The Commonwealth appealed this decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the officer’s comments on the alleged victim’s credibility were inadmissible and that the trial court erred in ordering the wholesale admission of the video.Upon discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that it is generally improper for one witness to opine on the veracity of another witness, whether directly or indirectly, and that such opinions are within the exclusive province of the jury. The Court distinguished prior precedent, concluding that the officer’s statements at issue were not part of an interrogation technique but were testimonial and inadmissible. The Supreme Court also clarified that video evidence must be limited to admissible portions rather than admitted in its entirety if it contains impermissible content. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to grant the Commonwealth’s motion in limine. View "HARTSFIELD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with simple assault following an incident in April 2022. Throughout the proceedings, he was represented by a series of court-appointed attorneys. The first attorney was replaced due to a change in employment. The next two attorneys withdrew, one citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the other a conflict of interest. Each time, a new attorney was appointed. Upon the withdrawal of the fourth appointed attorney, due to a deteriorated attorney-client relationship and the defendant’s insistence on pursuing an unethical defense, the defendant was informed by court order that no further counsel would be provided at public expense. He was served with the withdrawal orders but was not present at every hearing. At a pretrial hearing the day before trial, the defendant again requested appointed counsel, but the court required him to proceed pro se if he had not retained a lawyer by the next day. The defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the pretrial proceedings, withdrawals, and trial. The court concluded that, given the repeated breakdowns with counsel and explicit orders, the defendant’s conduct constituted the functional equivalent of a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, and therefore required him to proceed without appointed counsel.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that, although the defendant’s actions amounted to a functional waiver of his right to counsel, the record did not establish that such waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. Specifically, the court noted the absence of a warning or explanation to the defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation prior to his final attorney’s withdrawal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent as required by law. View "State v. Hoff" on Justia Law

An Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper, C.G., was directing traffic at an intersection where the traffic light was out, wearing a reflective vest and visible during daylight hours. Edward Balmert, while driving, struck C.G. as she was directing traffic, causing her serious injuries. At the scene, Balmert provided a urine sample, which showed marijuana metabolite levels far exceeding the legal limit. Balmert admitted regular use of hemp products, including that morning, and failed field sobriety tests administered by certified drug-recognition experts.The case proceeded as a bench trial in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. Balmert was charged with four counts, including aggravated vehicular assault and operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites. The trial court denied his motion for acquittal and found him guilty of aggravated vehicular assault and operating with a prohibited metabolite concentration but acquitted him on other charges. He was sentenced to prison. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated vehicular assault conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding of proximate causation between Balmert’s violation and C.G.’s injuries.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether proximate cause is a separate required element in aggravated vehicular assault cases based on driving with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites, and whether the evidence supported such a finding here. The court held that proximate cause is a distinct element that must be proven beyond a mere violation of the statute. Here, the evidence—viewed favorably to the prosecution—showed that causing injury was a foreseeable consequence of driving with excessive marijuana metabolites. Thus, the court affirmed the conviction and the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The appellant’s other propositions of law were dismissed as improvidently accepted. View "State v. Balmert" on Justia Law