Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed assault with intent to murder, following a shooting outside a residence in Boston. Surveillance footage and cell phone records linked him to the scene, and police later recovered clothing matching that worn by the shooter from an apartment where he was staying. The defendant was arrested about a week after the incident. The police obtained a search warrant for the apartment, and the search yielded evidence used at trial.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the apartment, arguing that the search warrant was tainted by a statement he made to police that was later suppressed, and that the warrant affidavit omitted material information. The judge denied both the motion to suppress and the request for a Franks hearing. During jury selection, the judge allowed the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike against a Black juror after finding the prosecutor’s reason was race-neutral and genuine, and excused another juror for cause based on her views about police credibility, which the defendant challenged. The judge also excused two jurors who could not serve due to a religious holiday. At trial, the judge permitted a police officer familiar with the defendant to identify him in surveillance footage, and denied a motion for mistrial after a dispute over the officer’s testimony about prior encounters with the defendant.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant was valid under the independent source doctrine and that the affidavit established probable cause without the suppressed statement. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the jury selection rulings or in admitting the identification testimony. The Court affirmed the convictions for murder, aggravated assault and battery, and armed assault with intent to murder, but vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remanded for further proceedings on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with several felonies stemming from an incident in July 2024, including assault with a weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted person, and tampering with evidence. He was arraigned on these charges in July 2024 and did not seek to substitute the presiding judge at that time. In June 2025, the State filed an Amended Information adding three new felony counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, and the petitioner was arraigned again on these new charges. Within two days of this second arraignment, the petitioner moved to substitute the judge, arguing that the motion was timely because it was filed within ten days of the arraignment on the Amended Information.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, denied the motion, holding it was untimely because the ten-day period for substitution under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, began with the initial arraignment in July 2024, not the subsequent arraignment on the amended charges. The court reasoned that allowing substitution after any arraignment on amended charges could lead to manipulation of the process and disrupt judicial efficiency.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on a petition for writ of supervisory control. The Court held that the right to substitute a judge in a criminal case under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, is triggered by the initial arraignment, not by subsequent arraignments on amended informations, even if new charges are added. The Court concluded that the District Court did not err in denying the motion as untimely and denied the petition for writ of supervisory control, remanding the matter for further proceedings. View "Caye v. 20th Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident between Taylor Jean Carlson and her ex-boyfriend, Shane Dalke, following a wedding they both attended. After a series of arguments and confrontations at Dalke’s home, Carlson physically assaulted Dalke and attempted to take his phone, which he was using to record her behavior. During the struggle, the phone was dropped, and Carlson picked it up, unsuccessfully tried to access it, and then destroyed it by throwing it on the concrete multiple times, rendering it inoperable. Police were unable to recover any data from the phone due to the damage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over Carlson’s trial. She was charged with misdemeanor Partner Family Member Assault and felony Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence. At trial, Carlson’s attorney requested a jury instruction for the misdemeanor offense of Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device as a lesser included offense of the tampering charge. The State opposed, arguing the statutes required different elements. The District Court denied the request, reasoning that the communication device offense contained an element not present in the tampering statute, and thus was not a lesser included offense as a matter of law. Carlson was convicted of tampering with evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the lesser included offense instruction. The Supreme Court held that Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device is not a lesser included offense of Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence because the two statutes have distinct elements, particularly regarding intent and the nature of the conduct criminalized. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "State v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Joel Lee Wilson was charged with aggravated burglary, robbery, breach of peace, property destruction, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance after forcibly entering the Wolf family’s home in Casper, Wyoming. The home was occupied by Alexander Wolf, a sheriff’s deputy, his wife, and their daughter. Wilson and another man, Daniel Hemmer, knocked and scratched at the door before Wilson broke it open. Upon entry, Wilson confronted the residents and engaged in a violent altercation with Mr. Wolf, while Hemmer interacted with the daughter. The incident ended with both men fleeing after Ms. Wolf intervened with a firearm. Evidence included Facebook messages between Wilson and Hemmer discussing an opportunity to make money and plans for the night, as well as Wilson’s statements to police about collecting a debt.The case was tried before the District Court of Natrona County. At trial, Wilson argued he lacked intent to commit theft, a required element for aggravated burglary and robbery, emphasizing that no property was taken and challenging the admission of the Facebook messages as co-conspirator statements. The district court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of intent based on the messages, the forceful entry, and the circumstances of the break-in. The jury convicted Wilson on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of intent to commit theft. Applying the standard of review that favors the State’s evidence and reasonable inferences, the court held that both direct and circumstantial evidence—including the Facebook messages, Wilson’s conduct, and the coordinated entry—supported the jury’s verdict. The court affirmed the convictions, concluding the evidence was sufficient to establish Wilson’s intent to commit theft. View "Wilson v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was stopped by police officers in Aurora, Colorado, for speeding. During the stop, the officers observed the defendant make a dramatic movement toward the passenger side of his vehicle, to the extent that he was no longer visible to them. The officers recognized the defendant as a member of a local violent gang and learned from him that he was on parole for robbery. After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and conducting a pat-down that revealed no weapons, the officers searched the passenger seat area and found a firearm. The defendant was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which argued that the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, based on his furtive movement, gang affiliation, and parole status for a violent crime. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the combination of the defendant’s dramatic movement, his recognized gang membership, and his parole for robbery provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, justifying the protective vehicle search under the officer safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McGregor" on Justia Law

In 2009, the defendant and two co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, including two young daughters, and robbed them of $30,000. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted the defendant of four counts of kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to kidnap, and one count of possessing and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The convictions for kidnapping the children were central to the sentencing dispute.Following the initial sentencing, which totaled 600 months, the defendant challenged his convictions and sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously remanded the case for resentencing after the government conceded that the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be vacated, in light of Johnson v. United States, which found the residual clause of “violent felony” unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the district court conducted a de novo resentencing. The government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2) required mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentences for each kidnapping conviction involving a child. The district court agreed and imposed concurrent 300-month sentences for each remaining count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2). The appellate court held that kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Therefore, § 3559(f)(2) did not mandate a twenty-five-year minimum sentence for each conviction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing consistent with its decision. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

George Jimenez was charged after sending sexually explicit messages and images to his girlfriend’s minor daughter, MV-1, and other minors, while pretending to be a thirteen-year-old boy. Over several weeks, Jimenez requested nude photographs from MV-1, specifically asking for images of her breasts and pubic area. The conduct was discovered when MV-1’s mother reported her suspicions to the FBI, who then obtained and searched both Jimenez’s and MV-1’s phones. A grand jury indicted Jimenez on multiple counts, but only the charge of coercing and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a one-day bench trial on Count One. Jimenez moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his requests amounted to a “lascivious display” and that the statute only covered physical conduct. The district court denied the motion and found Jimenez guilty, sentencing him to 240 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. Jimenez appealed, challenging the interpretation of “sexual activity” under § 2422(b) and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding lascivious exhibition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. The court held that “sexual activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) includes nonphysical conduct, such as the solicitation of sexually explicit images, and is not limited to interpersonal physical contact. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support that Jimenez attempted to coerce MV-1 to engage in the lascivious exhibition of her genitals or pubic area under 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "USA v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

A man was charged with and convicted of raping a woman who was intoxicated. The incident occurred after the two met at a bar, where the woman had consumed significant amounts of alcohol and experienced a blackout, leaving her with little memory of the events. The defendant, who was known for dressing as a pirate and living in his van, accompanied the woman home, where sexual intercourse occurred. The woman later reported the incident to the police after learning from the defendant that they had sex, which she did not remember. Medical examination revealed injuries consistent with intercourse, but expert testimony indicated such injuries could result from either consensual or nonconsensual sex.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court conducted a jury trial, during which the jury found the defendant guilty of rape of an intoxicated person and found true certain aggravating factors. The defendant was sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of battery, and by admitting prejudicial evidence regarding his homelessness. He also raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that battery is a lesser included offense of rape of an intoxicated person and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on this lesser offense. The appellate court found there was substantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded the defendant did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the victim was too intoxicated to consent. The court determined this instructional error was prejudicial and reversed the conviction, remanding the case for a possible new trial with proper jury instructions. View "P. v. Mirabal" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petition for resentencing filed by Safoloooi Sam Taito, who was convicted in 1994 of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance, as well as second degree robbery, for the killing of Librado Godoy Lopez. The evidence at trial showed that Taito and a codefendant repeatedly punched and kicked Lopez, stabbed him in the head with a screwdriver, and took his personal property. Lopez died from both blunt force trauma and the stab wound. Witnesses testified to Taito’s direct involvement in the attack and theft.Following the charges, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County instructed the jury on theories of premeditated murder and felony murder, including aiding and abetting. The jury convicted Taito of first degree murder and found true the felony-murder special circumstance and a weapon enhancement. He was sentenced to life without parole. The California Court of Appeal previously affirmed his conviction in 1997.In 2021, Taito petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to California’s felony-murder law made him eligible for relief. The Superior Court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the record conclusively established that the jury’s findings met the requirements of current law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the denial de novo. The court held that Taito was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury’s true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance demonstrated he was convicted under a theory consistent with current Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e)(2). The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Taito’s petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Taito" on Justia Law

Jose Haro Nevarez was involved in a fatal collision on Interstate-15 after driving while intoxicated at excessive speeds. His SUV became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane with its lights off. Minutes later, a motorcyclist, Robert Cole Sutton, struck the rear of Nevarez’s SUV and was killed. Nevarez admitted to officers at the scene that he was drunk and on DUI probation, and subsequent tests confirmed his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. Nevarez had previously been convicted of DUI and received a Watson advisement, warning him of the potential for a murder charge if he killed someone while driving under the influence.Following the incident, the People charged Nevarez with second-degree murder and other related offenses in the Superior Court of San Diego County. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for all charges, distinguishing the facts from People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499. Nevarez’s defense moved to set aside the murder charge under Penal Code section 995, arguing that Chagolla precluded liability because he was not driving at the moment of the fatal collision. The trial court denied the motion, finding Chagolla factually distinguishable.Nevarez then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of prohibition to overturn the trial court’s order. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that probable cause supported the murder charge. The court clarified that liability for second-degree murder under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end when an intoxicated driver ceases driving. Instead, a fact-specific analysis of implied malice and proximate cause is required. The court rejected a rigid rule and affirmed that the circumstances supported probable cause for both implied malice and proximate cause in Nevarez’s case. View "Nevarez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law