Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In early 2021, United States postal inspectors in Cleveland became suspicious of two packages sent between Ohio and California, both exhibiting characteristics commonly associated with drug trafficking, such as high cash-paid postage, mismatched sender and recipient information, and declined delivery signatures. After a certified narcotics detection dog named Ciga alerted to both packages, inspectors obtained search warrants and discovered a large sum of cash in one package and over a kilogram of fentanyl in the other. Subsequent investigation and a sting operation led to the arrest of Jaavaid McCarley-Connin, who was indicted on federal drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed McCarley-Connin’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the package searches. He argued that, under Florida v. Harris, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the reliability of the canine’s alert, having presented extrinsic evidence to that effect. The government responded that Harris applied only to warrantless searches and that, for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, a defendant must meet the requirements of Franks v. Delaware to obtain such a hearing. The district court agreed with the government, denied the evidentiary hearing and suppression motions, and McCarley-Connin subsequently pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Florida v. Harris does not entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing or consideration of extrinsic evidence regarding a canine’s reliability when the search is conducted pursuant to a warrant. Instead, the Franks v. Delaware standard governs such challenges. Because McCarley-Connin did not request a Franks hearing, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of his motions and concluded that the search warrants were supported by probable cause. View "United States v. McCarley-Connin" on Justia Law

Amir Golestan, founder and CEO of Micfo, LLC, orchestrated a scheme to fraudulently obtain approximately 1.3 million valuable IPv4 Internet Protocol addresses from the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) by creating fictitious companies and individuals. He then resold some of these addresses for profit. The scheme was uncovered when ARIN blocked a large attempted sale. Golestan and Micfo were indicted by a federal grand jury on 20 counts of wire fraud.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Golestan and Micfo’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that IP addresses constituted “property” under the wire fraud statute. During a bench trial, after the government presented substantial evidence, Golestan and Micfo changed their pleas to guilty. The district court accepted the pleas without advising Golestan of possible immigration consequences. Sentencing was delayed for 17 months, during which Golestan moved to continue sentencing pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ciminelli, and later sought to withdraw the guilty pleas, arguing that Ciminelli invalidated the prosecution’s theory and that he was not properly advised of immigration consequences. Micfo also argued Golestan lacked authority to plead on its behalf. The district court denied these motions and sentenced Golestan to 60 months’ incarceration and Micfo to probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court held that the government’s theory of wire fraud did not rely on the “right-to-control” doctrine rejected in Ciminelli, but rather on deprivation of traditional property interests. The court found the district court’s failure to advise Golestan of immigration consequences was harmless error, as he was a naturalized citizen. The court also held that the record supported Golestan’s authority to plead for Micfo and declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. View "US v. Golestan" on Justia Law

Melvin Bilbro was charged after killing Shanna Daniels in her North Saint Paul apartment and setting the apartment on fire. Evidence at trial established that Bilbro and Daniels had a significant romantic and sexual relationship, as shown by their frequent text messages, terms of endearment, and testimony from acquaintances. On the night of the murder, Daniels was found dead with multiple stab wounds, and the fire in her apartment was determined to be intentionally set. Investigators found blood evidence linking Bilbro to the scene, and Daniels’s dog was discovered in Bilbro’s apartment. Bilbro denied involvement and claimed he was not in a relationship with Daniels.The State charged Bilbro with first-degree domestic-abuse murder, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree arson. Bilbro waived his right to a jury trial on guilt but reserved the right to a jury for any facts supporting an aggravated sentence. The trial proceeded in Ramsey County District Court as a bench trial. The State presented evidence of Bilbro’s prior acts of domestic abuse against a former girlfriend, A.B., including physical assaults and an attempted murder for which Bilbro had previously been convicted. The district court found Bilbro guilty on all counts and sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree domestic-abuse murder and a consecutive 57-month sentence for arson, finding that the arson was committed to conceal the murder.On direct appeal, Bilbro argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove a significant romantic relationship with Daniels or a past pattern of domestic abuse, and that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury was violated when the court, rather than a jury, found facts authorizing the consecutive arson sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction and that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury under Blakely v. Washington does not apply to the threshold question of whether a sentence may be imposed for an offense under Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Ramsey County v. Bilbro" on Justia Law

The case centers on allegations that Okaloosa County, the sponsor of Destin Executive Airport, and Jay Odom, a fixed-base operator, violated federal and Florida False Claims Acts. The dispute arose after Odom, who owned Destin Jet, allegedly acquired the only competing fixed-base operator, Miracle Strip Aviation (later Regal Air), resulting in a single entity controlling all aeronautical services at the airport. Despite this consolidation, the County continued to certify to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that it was not granting any exclusive rights, a requirement for receiving federal funding. In 2019, Robert Smith, a pilot and relator, sought to establish a competing fixed-base operator but was denied by the County, prompting him to file suit alleging false certifications in grant applications.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed Smith’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar applied because the essential allegations had already been reported in two 2014 news articles, which described the consolidation and the resulting grant assurance violations. The district court also determined that Smith’s complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud and denied his request for leave to further amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that Smith’s claims were barred by the False Claims Act’s public disclosure provision, as the news articles had already disclosed substantially the same allegations. The court further found that Smith was not an original source of the information, as his additional details did not materially add to the public disclosures. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and its denial of leave to amend, concluding that any amendment would be futile. View "Smith v. Odom" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who murdered his girlfriend and their four-year-old daughter in their home. After committing the murders, he disposed of the bodies in separate locations, attempted to clean the crime scene, and then falsely reported the victims as missing to the police. Initially charged with capital murder, the defendant ultimately entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts each of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping. The plea allowed both parties to argue sentencing, present evidence of aggravation, and permitted the court to decide whether sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.The District Court of Ford County, Kansas, after considering testimony, victim impact statements, and other evidence, imposed consecutive hard 25-year sentences for the felony murders, with the aggravated kidnapping sentences to run concurrently. The court also assessed mandatory fees and stated its intent to waive any nonmandatory fees. However, the sentencing journal entry included both a domestic violence special program fee and a DNA database fee. The defendant appealed, arguing that the consecutive sentences were an abuse of discretion and that the nonmandatory fees were improperly imposed.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences, as the decision was reasonable given the aggravating circumstances. The court found that the domestic violence special program fee was erroneously imposed contrary to the court’s stated intent and must be vacated. The court also held that the domestic violence designation was supported by the record, but the required domestic violence assessment was not ordered and must be addressed on remand. The assessment of the DNA database fee was affirmed, as there was no specific finding of indigency. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. View "State v. Peterson " on Justia Law

The defendant killed his wife in the early morning hours after violating a protective order that required him to stay away from her residence. He had consumed a significant amount of alcohol throughout the previous day and provided conflicting accounts of the events leading to the killing, initially telling police he acted out of spite and “blacked out,” and later testifying at trial that the stabbing was accidental during a struggle. Forensic evidence showed multiple stab wounds and no signs of a struggle. After the killing, the defendant disposed of the body and took steps to prevent the children from seeing the scene.The State charged the defendant in the Riley District Court with premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and violation of a protective order. At trial, the defendant requested jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and lesser included offenses of reckless homicide, which the district court denied. The jury convicted him on all counts. At sentencing, the district court pronounced sentences for the non-murder counts but failed to pronounce a sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder conviction. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, raising issues regarding jury instructions, prosecutorial error, and sentencing.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that the district court erred by failing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction and by not considering the minimum evidence required for such an instruction. The court also found error in the prosecutor’s use of “we know” statements regarding contested facts. However, the court concluded that these errors, considered cumulatively, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial given the overwhelming evidence of premeditation and intent. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case to the district court to pronounce a sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder conviction. View "State v. Bobian " on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Sullivan v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing child pornography, following an investigation that began when coworkers reported him for viewing such material at work. A forensic analysis confirmed the allegations, and further investigation revealed that he possessed between 10 and 150 images of child pornography, as well as other images indicating a sexual interest in children. During the investigation, authorities also learned that in 2014, the defendant, then a church treasurer and deacon, had sexually abused two young boys at his church on the same day, in separate rooms and separated by non-criminal conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and, at sentencing, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s abuse of the two boys constituted two separate instances of sexual abuse. The court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and imposed a 20-year term of supervised release, including special conditions restricting contact with minors, limiting him to one internet-capable device, and prohibiting possession of sexually explicit material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the application of the pattern enhancement, the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and the procedural reasonableness of the special conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court correctly applied the pattern enhancement, finding that the two acts of abuse were separate instances under the relevant guideline, drawing on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wooden v. United States. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable and upheld the special conditions of supervised release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with making threats against an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in Fort Wayne, Indiana, on two separate occasions: May 20, 2022, and February 15, 2023. The first incident involved in-person threats at the federal courthouse and the Allen County prosecutor’s office, where the defendant made statements suggesting violent intent toward the AUSA. The second incident involved a threatening message sent to the AUSA’s personal Facebook account after she refused to return his calls. The defendant had a history of erratic behavior, including repeated attempts to contact the AUSA, hostile statements to law enforcement, and social media messages referencing the AUSA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana allowed the government to introduce evidence of the defendant’s other interactions with or about the AUSA under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), to show motive, intent, and context. However, the court excluded testimony from mental health professionals who had evaluated the defendant and from police officers who had experienced threats from him, finding that this evidence was not sufficiently probative of his intent or state of mind regarding the charged threats. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal, rejecting the argument that the Facebook message could not be a threat related to official duties because it was sent to a personal account and received after work hours. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, though it acquitted him of threatening to murder the AUSA on the first occasion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government’s evidence or excluding the defendant’s proffered testimony. It also found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including the finding that the Facebook message could be intended to interfere with the AUSA’s official duties. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law