Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Raymond Ellis Jr. was convicted of robbery and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On August 5, 2023, Ellis, armed with a handgun, and a juvenile accomplice, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, robbed the Big Apple convenience store in Madison. They wore masks, threatened the store clerk, and stole cash from the registers. A third person acted as a lookout. Ellis was sentenced to twenty-five years for robbery, with all but twenty years suspended, and four years of probation, plus a concurrent three-year term for the firearm possession charge.The jury found Ellis guilty of robbery, criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and theft by unauthorized taking. The court found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person after Ellis waived his right to a jury trial on that count. The court merged the criminal threatening and theft counts with the robbery count for sentencing purposes. Ellis appealed, arguing entitlement to a missing-witness jury instruction and errors in the sentencing process.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Ellis contended that the jury should have been instructed to infer that a missing witness would not have corroborated the State’s theory. The court reaffirmed its stance from State v. Brewer, holding that no such inference is permissible. The court also addressed Ellis’s claim of double-counting sentencing factors, noting that the sentencing court improperly considered Ellis’s failure to take responsibility as an aggravating factor. The court vacated Ellis’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the judgment of conviction in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Krystle Hoffman was charged with drug-induced homicide after arranging for her roommate to deliver heroin to Lorna Haseltine, who subsequently died from a heroin overdose. Hoffman entered an open guilty plea and sought sentencing under section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which allows for deviation from mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses involving drug use or possession. The trial court, however, found that this statute did not apply to drug-induced homicide and sentenced Hoffman to the mandatory minimum six-year prison term.The appellate court vacated Hoffman's sentence, holding that drug-induced homicide involves the possession of drugs and thus falls under section 5-4-1(c-1.5), allowing for a potential deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence. The appellate court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and held that section 5-4-1(c-1.5) does not permit deviation from mandatory minimum sentences for drug-induced homicide. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to include such offenses would lead to absurd results, as it would allow for leniency in serious crimes involving drug delivery that result in death or other severe consequences. The court concluded that the statute only applies to offenses involving the mere possession of drugs, not those involving additional conduct like delivery.The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment in part, affirming the trial court's imposition of the mandatory minimum six-year prison term for Hoffman. The case was remanded to the trial court to set the manner and method of paying restitution. View "People v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Mark Stubblefield was charged with multiple offenses related to two separate bank robberies in October and November 2022. He was tried for the October robbery, where he was accused of armed robbery and making threats. The jury found him guilty of both charges. Subsequently, Stubblefield pled guilty to a robbery charge related to the November incident.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Stubblefield was convicted of armed robbery and threats for the October robbery. He later entered a guilty plea for the November robbery. The plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal the convictions, but it was ambiguous whether this waiver applied to the October convictions. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment for the October and November offenses and informed him of his right to appeal the jury trial convictions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plea agreement was ambiguous regarding the waiver of appellate rights for the October convictions and allowed the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the armed robbery conviction. The government failed to prove that Stubblefield was actually armed with a bomb or that the bank tellers subjectively believed he had a bomb. The court reversed the armed robbery conviction and remanded for entry of a lesser included robbery conviction. The rest of Stubblefield's convictions were affirmed. View "Stubblefield v. United States" on Justia Law

Derek J. Morris was convicted of unlawful entry after refusing to leave the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office while attempting to file a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court has specific procedures for in-person filings, requiring documents to be delivered to the Supreme Court Police for security screening. Morris had previously been informed of these procedures but insisted on filing directly at the Clerk’s Office, leading to his arrest after multiple refusals to leave.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia instructed the jury using the model instruction for unlawful entry on public premises. Morris proposed an additional element to the instruction to clarify the need for an independent justification for the order to leave, but he later withdrew this request, agreeing that the existing instruction sufficed. The jury found Morris guilty based on the given instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case, focusing on whether the jury instruction adequately conveyed the requirement for an independent justification for the order to leave public property. The court held that the model instruction failed to clearly explain this requirement, constituting an error. However, the court determined that this error did not affect Morris’s substantial rights, as the parties’ arguments had sufficiently highlighted the need for an independent justification, and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the government’s case. Consequently, the court affirmed Morris’s conviction. View "Morris v. United States" on Justia Law

On August 3, 2020, the Kansas City Kansas Police Department responded to a drive-by shooting at the Butler family's home, associated with the Tasha Gang. The suspected shooter was Isaiah Shields of the rival BBUx2 Gang. Later that night, officers were fired upon by multiple shooters, injuring an ATF agent and a civilian. Officers suspected five individuals from the Tasha Gang, including Nadarius Barnes, were responsible for the retaliatory shooting.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas charged the five individuals with forcible assault of a federal officer and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The defendants moved to dismiss the firearm charge, arguing that the assault charge was not a crime of violence. The district court denied the motion, holding that the assault charge was a crime of violence. Barnes entered an unconditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 156 months' imprisonment, including an upward departure and variance from the guideline range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Barnes argued that his conviction should be vacated because the assault charge was not a crime of violence and challenged the reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that Barnes's unconditional guilty plea waived his right to challenge the conviction on the grounds that the assault charge was not a crime of violence. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward variance, as it conducted a detailed assessment of the relevant sentencing factors. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Barnes's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

G’Ante Butler was convicted of forcible assault of a federal officer and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence following a nine-day jury trial. The incident involved a retaliatory shooting at the home of a rival gang member, during which multiple shooters, including Butler, fired upon law enforcement officers and a civilian. Butler was found with a firearm and cell phone evidence linked him to the crime scene. He denied involvement, but co-defendant Chase Lewis testified against him, corroborated by substantial circumstantial evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas admitted various pieces of evidence, including testimony from a neighbor and law enforcement officers. The jury found Butler guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 190 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Butler appealed, challenging the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction on impeachment evidence, the admission of a neighbor’s testimony, and the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments. He also argued cumulative error and contended that his § 924(c) conviction should be vacated because § 111(b) is not a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction was harmless error due to the substantial evidence supporting the conviction. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the neighbor’s testimony, as it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The prosecutor’s closing statements were not plainly erroneous, and the jury was properly instructed on the government’s burden of proof. The court also rejected the cumulative error argument, as only one error was identified. Finally, the court affirmed that § 111(b) is a crime of violence, consistent with its precedent in United States v. Kendall. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

Matthew A. Zayas was indicted on three counts of money laundering and one count of causing or attempting to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a currency transaction report under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). After a jury trial, Zayas was acquitted of the money laundering counts but convicted of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). The case involved Zayas making three cash withdrawals from his Wells Fargo account, each below the $10,000 reporting threshold, within a short period, which the government argued was an attempt to evade the bank's reporting requirements.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Zayas's motions for a mistrial and judgment of acquittal. Zayas argued that the government constructively amended the indictment by presenting evidence and arguments related to structuring under § 5324(a)(3) instead of the charged § 5324(a)(1). The district court also provided jury instructions that included a definition of "structuring," which Zayas contended was inappropriate for the charge under § 5324(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the government's evidence was consistent with a violation of § 5324(a)(1), as it demonstrated that Zayas made multiple withdrawals exceeding $10,000 in one business day, triggering the bank's duty to file a currency transaction report. The court found that the district court's jury instructions, while including a definition of "structuring," correctly conveyed the elements of § 5324(a)(1). The court also determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to a jury question during deliberations by referring the jury back to the original instructions, which accurately stated the law. View "USA v. Zayas" on Justia Law

A police officer found the defendant behind the wheel of a parked rental van in a municipal lot. The key was in the ignition, the radio was on, and there was a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. The officer observed vodka bottles in the vehicle and asked the defendant to move the van slightly to clear a tree blocking the driver's door. The defendant complied, and upon exiting the vehicle, he struggled with field sobriety tests and was arrested for operating under the influence (OUI).The defendant was tried in the Falmouth Division of the District Court Department and found guilty of OUI, fifth offense. He was also found guilty of OUI with a license suspended for OUI after a bench trial. The defendant was sentenced to three and a half years in a house of correction. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant "operated" the vehicle while under the influence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient, affirming the convictions. The court explained that "operates" under the OUI statute includes any act that sets in motion the vehicle's motive power, such as turning the key in the ignition. The court concluded that the defendant's actions of turning the key and being intoxicated while in the driver's seat met the statutory definition of "operates," even though the vehicle was not moving. View "Commonwealth v. Wurtzberger" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 2, 2021, and into the early hours of May 3, 2021, an incident occurred at the home of Judy Foster involving her adoptive son, Donald Edward Foster, and M.W., an 18-year-old acquaintance. Foster, armed with a knife and later a handgun, threatened both women, restrained and bound them, and moved them to the basement. He isolated Judy in a bathroom and then committed multiple distinct acts of sexual assault against M.W., including oral, anal, and attempted vaginal penetration, each separated by time, location, and intervening events. After several hours, M.W. convinced Foster to leave the house, and he was apprehended by law enforcement.The State charged Foster with multiple counts, including aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and aggravated kidnapping. During jury selection, the State disclosed newly discovered evidence from Foster’s cellmate, leading to an in-chambers discussion from which Foster was absent due to safety concerns. Foster’s counsel moved for a continuance, which the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, granted. Foster later ratified this decision. At trial, the State did not use the cellmate’s evidence, and the jury convicted Foster on all counts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed Foster’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, statutory violations regarding multiple charges from the same transaction, and due process violations for his absence from a critical stage. The court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to multiple charges, as each offense was based on distinct acts. The court also found that Foster’s absence from the in-chambers discussion was harmless error, as he was promptly informed and ratified the decision, and the evidence in question was not used at trial. The court affirmed Foster’s convictions. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Cole Michael Jacob was charged with felony indecent exposure after exposing himself to a minor. Initially pleading not guilty, Jacob later executed a plea agreement to enter an Alford plea in exchange for a recommended 10-year sentence with 6 years suspended and the withdrawal of the State's intent to seek persistent felony offender (PFO) status. However, Jacob requested more time to discuss the agreement and eventually decided not to change his plea. On the day of his trial, Jacob entered an Alford plea under a new agreement, where the State agreed not to seek a sentence exceeding 20 years and to withdraw its PFO notice.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, held a sentencing hearing where the State recommended a 20-year sentence and presented a victim impact statement from the victim’s father. Jacob objected to the statement being read, claiming he had not received a copy. The court allowed the statement, and Jacob was sentenced to 15 years at the Montana State Prison with a requirement to complete sex offender treatment before being eligible for parole.Jacob appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the reading of the victim impact statement and that he should have been sentenced under the initial plea agreement, claiming he was not mentally competent to reject it. The Supreme Court found that Jacob’s due process rights were not violated as he did not allege any false information in the victim impact statement. Additionally, the court determined that Jacob did not preserve his argument regarding the plea agreement for appeal, as he did not raise the issue of his mental competence to reject the agreement before the District Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "State v. Jacob" on Justia Law