Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted for failing to provide notice of sex offender registration changes, which was his third or subsequent offense. After a jury convicted him of the substantive charge, he admitted to having at least two prior convictions for similar offenses. The circuit court continued his bond with the condition of home incarceration and referred the case for a presentence investigation and report. However, the defendant absconded by removing his ankle monitor and failed to appear for both his presentence interview and the initial sentencing hearing. He was later apprehended and brought before the court for sentencing.The Circuit Court of Summers County held a sentencing hearing after the defendant’s apprehension. At this hearing, defense counsel requested a continuance because no presentence investigation or report had been completed, and objected to sentencing without it, especially since the defendant was seeking probation. The circuit court found that the defendant’s escape constituted a waiver of his right to a presentence investigation and report, denied probation, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of ten to twenty-five years’ incarceration. The defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by sentencing him without a presentence investigation and report.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that while there is no constitutional right to a presentence investigation and report, West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1) requires a presentence report unless specific conditions are met. The court found that the defendant’s escape only waived his right to participate in the investigation, not his right to have a report prepared. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case, directing the circuit court to order a presentence investigation and report and to conduct a new sentencing hearing in accordance with Rule 32. View "State of West Virginia v. DePriest" on Justia Law

The defendant, an enrolled member of a Native American tribe, was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse against his minor stepdaughter, D.P., occurring over several years in Indian Country. The alleged abuse began when D.P. was about six years old and continued until she was over twelve, with a brief pause when her mother was more frequently present. D.P. disclosed the abuse following a suicide attempt at age twelve, and her mother and medical professionals testified about her outcry. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on D.P.’s credibility, as there was no physical evidence corroborating her allegations. The defense sought to challenge D.P.’s credibility, highlighting her mental health history, medication use, and possible suggestibility, and attempted to introduce four sexually suggestive, fictionalized YouTube videos created by D.P. at age eleven.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted the government’s motion in limine under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, excluding any mention or introduction of the YouTube videos at trial. The court found the videos constituted evidence of “other sexual behavior” or “sexual predisposition” and did not fall within any of Rule 412’s exceptions. The defense argued the videos were relevant to impeach D.P.’s credibility, not to prove sexual behavior or predisposition, and that exclusion violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling and constitutional claims. The Tenth Circuit held that Rule 412’s bar applies to evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition, even if the purpose is impeachment, and that no exception for general impeachment exists. The court further held that exclusion of the videos did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as the Constitution does not mandate admission of general impeachment evidence absent a showing of bias or motive to lie. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Ryan VanDyke was subject to a civil protection order and a no-contact order in Idaho after persistently harassing a woman, violating both probation conditions for a prior telephone-harassment conviction and earlier court-ordered protections. In October 2022, after being charged with felony stalking for continued unwanted contact and harassment, a state court issued a no-contact order that explicitly prohibited VanDyke from using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against the victim. In May 2023, while still under these orders, VanDyke entered a courthouse carrying a loaded revolver.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the federal indictment against VanDyke, which charged him with illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court found that, as applied to VanDyke, this statute did not fit within the historical tradition of firearm regulation required by the Second Amendment, and therefore held the statute unconstitutional in this context.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional as applied to VanDyke. The court reasoned that there is a historical tradition of both individualized and categorical disarmament of persons deemed dangerous, including those subject to judicial findings of threat or facing serious criminal charges. The court found that the procedures and justifications for VanDyke’s disarmament were analogous to those recognized in Rahimi and related precedent. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. VANDYKE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, whose legal permanent resident status in the United States had been revoked, was previously removed from the country multiple times following a criminal conviction. In August 2023, he entered the United States from Mexico by bus, intentionally seeking arrest in order to challenge his prior deportation and potentially regain legal status. Upon arrival at the port of entry in El Paso, he bypassed a pedestrian turnstile, was quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers, and admitted his intent to be arrested. He was indicted for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a jury trial. The defendant did not dispute the factual basis of his entry but argued that he was not “free from official restraint” and therefore had not “entered” the United States in the legal sense. He requested a jury instruction defining “official restraint,” which the district court denied, reasoning that the concept was not an additional element of the offense and that the pattern jury instructions sufficed. The jury found him guilty of illegal re-entry, and the court entered judgment for attempted illegal re-entry, sentencing him to 18 months’ imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit held that while “freedom from official restraint” is part of the definition of entry for § 1326(a), the pattern jury instruction given was a correct statement of law and adequately covered the issues. The court found that the defendant was able to present his defense theory to the jury, and thus, the absence of the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Adame" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a Boston-based drug trafficking organization that distributed fentanyl from March 2020 to March 2021. He played a leadership role, coordinating large drug sales and organizing the movement of proceeds to Mexico, where he resided for much of the relevant period. The organization operated out of a specific apartment, used vehicles with hidden compartments to transport drugs and cash, and relied on encrypted communications. Law enforcement conducted extensive surveillance, culminating in searches and seizures of drugs, cash, and related paraphernalia. The defendant was arrested in the Dominican Republic and extradited to the United States.A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant and several co-defendants for conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his arrest abroad constituted outrageous government conduct, but the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion. At trial, the defendant challenged various evidentiary rulings, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and objected to aspects of the jury instructions and sentencing. The jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. His co-defendant, who cooperated with the government, later received a significantly shorter sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the defendant’s claims, including the denial of his motion to dismiss, evidentiary objections, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, jury instruction issues, and sentencing challenges. The court held that the arrest did not constitute outrageous government conduct, the evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were not reversible error, and there was no plain error or prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial. The court also found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on three charges related to the production and possession of child pornography. He pleaded guilty to one count—production of child pornography—and was sentenced to 256 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. The terms of his supervised release included both mandatory and special conditions. Of particular relevance was a special condition requiring him to submit to substance abuse testing and contribute to the cost of such testing, as determined by a sliding scale approved by the Probation Office.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina imposed these conditions at sentencing. The defendant did not object to the special condition regarding substance abuse testing during the sentencing proceedings. On appeal, he argued that this special condition unconstitutionally delegated a core judicial function—specifically, the authority to determine the number of drug tests—to the Probation Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, given the lack of objection below. The court found that the plain language of the special condition did not delegate authority to determine the number of drug tests to the Probation Office; rather, it addressed only the payment for drug testing ordered by the court. The court concluded that the discretion over the number of drug tests remained with the district court, and the special condition merely facilitated payment. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that there was no error, let alone plain error, in imposing the special condition and affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The government’s motion to dismiss the appeal based on an appeal waiver was denied as moot. View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law

Three masked individuals, including the defendant and his brother, forcibly entered an occupied apartment in Wichita where marijuana was sold. The intruders demanded money, drugs, and guns. During the attempted robbery, one resident fired a warning shot through a bedroom door after the intruders tried to break in. As the intruders retreated, the defendant, who was armed, fired several shots, killing one resident and injuring another. Surveillance footage and witness testimony identified the defendant and his brother as participants, and physical evidence linked the defendant’s firearm to the fatal shot.A jury in the Sedgwick District Court convicted the defendant of felony murder committed during an attempted aggravated robbery, as well as other related offenses. The jury found him guilty as both a principal and, alternatively, as an aider and abettor. The district court denied posttrial motions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of a jury instruction regarding criminal responsibility for the acts of another. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the felony-murder conviction, finding that the killing occurred during the attempted aggravated robbery and that resistance by the occupants was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the armed intrusion. The court also determined that, although the jury instruction on responsibility for crimes of another was legally inappropriate under State v. Mora, the error did not amount to clear error because the defendant was charged and convicted as a principal, and the evidence established his specific intent. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Palmer " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand larceny, unlawful mischief, carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony, and assault and robbery, following an incident in which he ran at a teenager who was leaving a friend’s house, causing the teenager to abandon his belongings out of fear. The defendant then destroyed some of the teenager’s property and took the rest. The complainant testified that the defendant appeared to be holding a knife, which contributed to his fear and decision to flee.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, presided over the trial. After the State presented its evidence, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all but the unlawful-mischief charge, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the presence of a knife and intent to place the complainant in fear. The court granted acquittal on the grand-larceny charge due to insufficient evidence of value but denied acquittal on the remaining charges. The jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony but convicted him of unlawful mischief, larceny from the person, and assault and robbery. The defendant’s post-trial motion to vacate the assault and robbery conviction, based on alleged inconsistency with the acquittals, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of assault and robbery, even without proof that he possessed a knife. The Court also held that the jury instructions did not require proof of a knife and that the verdicts were not inconsistent. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Two Washington County deputies went to a residence to investigate a report of illegal fireworks. The resident, Matthew Meisheid, emerged from his home, angrily confronted the deputies, and demanded they leave his property. During the encounter, Meisheid pulled a handgun from his waist, pointed it straight up, and declared, “I’ll show you a firework: Boom, boom, boom, boom!” The deputies, visibly shaken, retreated and Meisheid was later arrested. He was charged with two counts of assault for displaying a dangerous weapon in a threatening manner toward peace officers, with a felony enhancement for use of a weapon against peace officers.A jury in the Iowa District Court for Washington County found Meisheid guilty on both counts. The district judge sentenced him to prison with a five-year mandatory minimum. On appeal, Meisheid argued that there was insufficient evidence to show he displayed the weapon “toward” the deputies or in a threatening manner, and also challenged his sentence. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed both his conviction and sentence.The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review, focusing solely on whether there was sufficient evidence that Meisheid displayed a dangerous weapon “toward” the deputies. The court held that, under the jury instructions given (to which Meisheid did not object), the jury could reasonably find that Meisheid’s act of showing the gun so the deputies would be aware of it constituted displaying the weapon “toward” them, even though he did not point it directly at them. The court affirmed the decisions of the Iowa Court of Appeals and the Iowa District Court for Washington County. View "State of Iowa v. Meisheid" on Justia Law