Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted by a jury in 1997 of first degree murder, attempted murder, attempted robbery, and second degree burglary. The jury found true several sentencing enhancements, including three 1-year prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The defendant received a sentence that included life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, along with additional terms for enhancements. Years later, changes in the law rendered the prior prison term enhancements invalid except for certain sexually violent offenses, and a statutory procedure was established for recalling and resentencing affected individuals.The Superior Court of Kern County scheduled the defendant’s case for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Before resentencing occurred, the prosecution moved to dismiss the resentencing, arguing that a recent amendment (Senate Bill No. 285, effective January 1, 2025) added subdivision (f) to section 1172.75, which they claimed excluded from resentencing any person serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The defense argued that the amendment only excluded individuals who were both convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or life without parole. The Superior Court agreed with the prosecution and dismissed the resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that subdivision (f) of section 1172.75 must be construed conjunctively. Thus, only individuals who have both been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or life without parole are excluded from resentencing. Because the defendant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remains eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeal reversed the order dismissing resentencing and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

John Chapman, who has multiple neurodevelopmental disorders, maintained a romantic relationship with Jamie Feden for several years, despite being married to another woman. In 2019, Chapman and Feden traveled together from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas. Prior to and during this period, Chapman conducted online searches related to murder and body disposal. While in Nevada, Chapman took Feden to a remote desert location, restrained her with zip ties and duct tape under the pretense of a bondage photoshoot, and ultimately caused her death by asphyxiation. He left her body in the desert and returned to Pennsylvania, where he used her phone to communicate with her friends and family to conceal her death. After suspicions arose, Chapman was questioned by police and confessed to the crime after being read his Miranda rights.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Chapman’s motion to suppress his confession, finding that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. During trial, Chapman argued his mental conditions affected his perception and intent. After lengthy deliberations and substantive jury notes indicating a deadlock, the district court gave an Allen charge and made coercive comments to a holdout juror. The jury returned a guilty verdict for kidnapping resulting in death. Chapman’s post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated Chapman’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding impermissible jury coercion due to the undisclosed jury notes, the coercive Allen charge, and the court’s direct comments to a holdout juror. The court also held, for the first time in the circuit, that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute can be satisfied by non-physical means such as deception. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress Chapman’s confession. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

An inmate, after being sentenced to prison for violating probation on prior guilty pleas, sought postconviction relief challenging his conviction or sentence. He prepared his application while incarcerated and claims he handed it to a prison official for mailing five days before the statutory three-year deadline. The envelope was postmarked two days before the deadline but was not received and filed by the clerk of court until seven days after the deadline had passed.The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed the application as untimely, noting that the application was not filed within the required three-year period. In response to the State’s motion to dismiss, the inmate argued for the adoption of the "prison-mailbox rule," which would treat documents as "filed" when an inmate hands them to prison authorities for mailing. The district court rejected this argument and ruled that the application was untimely under existing Iowa law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa considered whether to adopt the prison-mailbox rule for postconviction relief applications. The court analyzed the relevant Iowa statutes and rules, which consistently define "filing" as receipt by the clerk of court, not delivery to a third party such as a prison official. The court also noted that the legislature has expressly created mailbox rules in other contexts but chose not to do so here. The Supreme Court of Iowa declined to adopt the prison-mailbox rule, holding that postconviction-relief applications are not considered filed until received by the clerk of court. Because the inmate’s application was not filed with the clerk by the statutory deadline, the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Davis v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident was charged in 2015 with possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a class B substance in Massachusetts District Court. About a month after the charges, he admitted to sufficient facts for both offenses. At his plea colloquy, he was given a general warning that a conviction might lead to immigration consequences but was not explicitly warned that an admission to sufficient facts could also have such consequences. He also received a separate, more technical warning under a court rule, but not the specific statutory warning required under Massachusetts law. After the plea, federal authorities initiated deportation proceedings against him based on his admissions, though these proceedings were later dismissed due to a procedural defect, without prejudice.A motion judge in the District Court, who had not presided over the original plea, denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his admissions. The judge reasoned that the defendant did not actually face the prospect of deportation as a result of the admissions. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his admissions to sufficient facts. The court concluded that the defendant did not receive the statutory warning required by G. L. c. 278, § 29D, which must advise noncitizen defendants that an admission to sufficient facts may have adverse immigration consequences. The court also held that the additional, technical warning provided was not a substitute for the statutory warning. Finally, the court found that the initiation of deportation proceedings by federal authorities demonstrated that the defendant actually faced the prospect of deportation. The court reversed the denial of the motion and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Chhieng" on Justia Law

A woman suffering a heroin overdose in Detroit in 2016 reported to doctors that she was in a dangerous situation linked to her residence at the Victory Inn motel. She disclosed that Darrick Bell supplied her with drugs and coerced her into prostitution at the motel to repay drug debts. Law enforcement investigated and discovered evidence of a large criminal enterprise at the Victory Inn, including multiple women engaged in prostitution, substantial quantities of drugs, and related paraphernalia. Police identified Bell as the ringleader, who controlled the operation, supplied drugs, and used violence and coercion. After a national manhunt, Bell was apprehended in 2019 and tried on drug and sex trafficking charges.At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the government presented extensive surveillance, text messages, and witness testimony. The jury found Bell guilty of conspiracy to distribute drugs, possession with intent to distribute, and maintaining drug-distribution premises, but acquitted him of one sex trafficking charge and was deadlocked on four others, which were later dismissed. The district court sentenced Bell to 336 months, below the guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Bell’s conviction and sentence. Bell argued that the district court erred in admitting text message evidence, that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, that a government witness’s statements warranted a new trial, and that several sentencing enhancements were improper. The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting the text messages, concluded the evidence supported the convictions and drug quantities, and upheld all sentencing enhancements. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old girl disappeared from Floresville, Texas in October 2023. Police discovered that she had communicated online with Jayden Douglas Richard Vacchino before her disappearance. The communications revealed Vacchino’s intention to take her from Texas to Louisiana for sexual purposes. Investigators found evidence that Vacchino’s phone was near the victim’s house on the night she went missing, and security footage confirmed his car in the area. Two days later, authorities located Vacchino and the victim together in Shreveport, Louisiana, where he was arrested.Vacchino pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to transporting a minor interstate with intent to engage in criminal sexual conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not explicitly adopt the presentence report but imposed a sentence of 260 months in prison, 15 years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $25,000 fine. The court recommended sex counseling treatment during incarceration and stated it would impose “standard conditions” of supervised release “plus the sex offender conditions.” The written judgment, however, included additional special conditions from the presentence report and omitted the specific recommendation for sex counseling treatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed several discrepancies between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court held that mandatory supervised release condition 10, which required notification of economic changes, conflicted with the oral pronouncement and must be vacated. The court affirmed the other challenged conditions, finding that they either reflected the district court’s intent or clarified ambiguities. The Fifth Circuit also ordered correction of the written judgment to include the oral recommendation for sex counseling treatment. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Vacchino" on Justia Law

Three defendants, including the petitioner, were convicted in California state court for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a victim who was forced into a car trunk and subsequently killed. The petitioner, who was 18 at the time, confessed to police after being advised of his Miranda rights. At trial, the judge made several offhand, jocular, and at times insensitive comments, including remarks touching on race, gender, and capital punishment. The petitioner did not testify and raised claims at various points about judicial bias and misconduct, an involuntary confession, invalid Miranda waiver, and the improper admission of codefendants’ statements.After conviction and a death sentence, the petitioner’s direct appeal and two state habeas petitions were denied by the California Supreme Court, which rejected his claims both on the merits and on procedural grounds. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which denied relief. The district court also denied a request to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims regarding his confession and the admission of codefendants’ statements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that the petitioner’s claims of judicial bias and misconduct failed because the trial judge’s comments, while inappropriate, did not demonstrate actual bias or render the trial fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit also declined to expand the certificate of appealability, finding that the petitioner’s claims regarding the voluntariness of his confession, the validity of his Miranda waiver, and any Bruton violation were not debatable among reasonable jurists and that any error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "BURNEY V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in 2012 of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14. As a result, he was classified as a Tier II sex offender, requiring him to register as a sex offender for 25 years under Nevada law. After being honorably discharged from probation in 2016, he was placed under lifetime supervision as mandated for certain sex offenses. Twelve years after his conviction, he petitioned for release from lifetime supervision, claiming he had satisfied statutory requirements: he had complied with registration obligations, had not been convicted of a subsequent offense for over ten years, and was assessed as low risk to reoffend.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, reviewed the petition. The State opposed release, arguing that compliance with registration requirements under NRS 176.0931(3) required completion of the full 25-year registration period for Tier II offenders. The district court accepted this interpretation and denied the petition solely on the basis that the appellant had not completed his entire registration term.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes de novo. The Court held that compliance with sex offender registration requirements under NRS 176.0931(3) does not require completion of the full statutory registration period outlined in NRS 179D.490. Instead, eligibility for release from lifetime supervision depends on conformance to registration requirements up to the time of petitioning. The statutes are not mutually exclusive; registration obligations continue even after release from lifetime supervision. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "DEL TORO VS STATE" on Justia Law

A manager at a truck stop in Idaho observed Gannon Manuelito unconscious in his running vehicle, exhibiting shallow breathing and gurgling sounds. Concerned that Manuelito was experiencing an overdose or had passed out from alcohol or drug use, the manager called 911. Emergency Medical Services and law enforcement responded. Paramedics arrived first and found drug paraphernalia in plain view. When Officer Jaramillo arrived, he observed signs of alcohol impairment in Manuelito and conducted a DUI investigation. Breath tests showed that Manuelito’s blood alcohol content was nearly twice the legal limit. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed over 12 ounces of marijuana, additional controlled substances, and more drug paraphernalia.The State charged Manuelito with possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, possession of a controlled substance (DMT), possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a vehicle under the influence. After the case was bound over from the Magistrate Court to the District Court, Manuelito moved to dismiss the possession charges, arguing that Idaho’s overdose immunity statute barred prosecution because the evidence was obtained as a result of seeking medical assistance for a drug-related medical emergency. The District Court interpreted the statute broadly, finding that a good-faith belief by a bystander that someone needs medical help sufficed to trigger immunity, and granted Manuelito’s motion to dismiss the possession charges.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo, focusing on the correct interpretation of Idaho Code section 37-2739C. The Supreme Court held that the statute unambiguously requires that the defendant actually experience a drug-related medical emergency and be in need of medical assistance for immunity to apply, not merely that a bystander subjectively believes an emergency exists. Because the evidence did not show Manuelito experienced such an emergency or required medical assistance, the Court reversed the District Court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Manuelito" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was previously convicted of second-degree robbery in 1995, stemming from an incident where he feigned injury to gain the trust of a truck driver, then stole the vehicle and some personal items after threatening the victim. He received a sentence of thirty years, with twenty years to serve, ten years suspended, and probation, as well as a consecutive five-year sentence as a habitual offender. Years later, the state alleged that the defendant violated the terms of his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behavior, based on recent conduct in which he repeatedly attempted to contact a woman and her mother through phone calls, emails, and visits to her apartment building, causing her significant fear and distress.The Providence County Superior Court held a hearing on the alleged probation violation. After hearing testimony from the complaining witness, her mother, the apartment complex manager, and a police officer, the hearing justice found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated his probation. The judge found the witnesses credible and noted the serious impact of the defendant’s conduct on the victim. At sentencing, the court considered the severity of the original crime, the defendant’s background, his potential for rehabilitation, the appropriateness of the punishment, and social deterrence. The court ordered the defendant to serve nine years of the previously suspended ten-year sentence.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. The defendant argued that the sentence for the probation violation was excessive and that the court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion and appropriately considered both the original offense and the circumstances of the violation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the nine-year sentence. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law