Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Commonwealth v. McGrath
The case involves a dispute stemming from an incident where the defendant, after having moved out of the victim’s home following an altercation, unlawfully entered the victim’s residence several months later. The defendant had previously been allowed to live in the home rent-free, but was asked to leave after an argument and an arrest. On the date in question, the defendant persistently knocked on the victim’s doors before using keys, believed to have been taken from the victim’s unlocked car, to enter the locked house. Upon entry, the defendant retrieved personal items and, during an ensuing confrontation, drove off with a dog that had been given to the victim, injuring the victim in the process.The defendant was tried in the Westborough Division of the District Court Department, where she waived her right to a jury trial. The judge found her guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, among other charges, though the Commonwealth did not specify which misdemeanor was intended. On appeal, the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence of intent to commit larceny, and the Commonwealth asserted the evidence supported intent to commit either larceny or criminal trespass. The Appeals Court found there was insufficient evidence of intent to commit larceny but affirmed the conviction based on sufficient evidence of intent to commit criminal trespass.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, holding that the Commonwealth is not required to specify the intended misdemeanor at trial, and that proof of intent to commit an unspecified misdemeanor is sufficient under Massachusetts law. The court further held that, in a bench trial, the trial judge could consider any misdemeanor supported by the evidence. The court found sufficient evidence to infer intent to commit criminal trespass and affirmed the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. McGrath" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Walls v Posey
William Walls was found by an Illinois state court to be a sexually violent person in 2015, leading to his civil commitment under Illinois law. The commitment was based, in part, on statements he made or that were made by his treatment providers while he was incarcerated for a prior sexual assault conviction. Walls has argued that these statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. After his commitment, his case involved extensive delays, including a twelve-year period before the initial commitment decision and seven years before the state appellate court resolved the appeal filed by his counsel.After the 2015 commitment order, Walls—sometimes proceeding pro se despite being represented—filed a series of appeals and petitions. The Illinois Appellate Court eventually affirmed both the 2015 and a subsequent 2018 recommitment decision in a consolidated opinion. Walls’s first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois on procedural default grounds. He did not appeal that dismissal. After the 2018 recommitment proceeding, Walls filed a second federal habeas petition, which was dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) because it challenged the same 2015 order or did not raise new claims as required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Walls’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, to the extent Walls was once again contesting the 2015 commitment order, his petition was barred as a successive habeas application. Alternatively, if he was challenging later decisions, he had failed to raise or exhaust federal claims relating to those decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Walls’s petition. View "Walls v Posey" on Justia Law
United States v. McNoriell
DEA agents recruited a drug trafficker, Michael Allen, as a confidential source and discovered Allen was obtaining heroin and cocaine from Joseph McNoriell. Working with agents, Allen arranged a purchase of two kilograms of cocaine from McNoriell in a controlled operation. Shortly before the planned arrest, Allen, without law enforcement’s knowledge, purchased heroin from McNoriell to avoid suspicion. Agents recorded Allen’s subsequent calls with McNoriell arranging the cocaine transaction. On the day of the planned purchase, law enforcement surveilled McNoriell and two co-conspirators, stopped their vehicles, and recovered two kilograms of cocaine.A grand jury indicted McNoriell for conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Throughout proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, McNoriell changed attorneys multiple times and eventually elected to represent himself, with standby counsel appointed. Pretrial, the court conducted Faretta hearings to ensure McNoriell’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary and allowed him to determine the division of trial responsibilities with standby counsel, including decisions about participation in sidebar conferences. At trial, McNoriell and his standby counsel shared duties such as cross-examination and objections. The jury convicted McNoriell on both counts, finding each involved at least 500 grams of cocaine. The court imposed a 110-month sentence, including a leadership enhancement over McNoriell’s objection.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed McNoriell’s claims regarding exclusion from sidebar conferences, duplicity of the indictment, admission of certain testimony and text messages, interpretation of recorded calls, and the leadership enhancement at sentencing. The court held there was no violation of McNoriell’s constitutional rights due to his acquiescence to hybrid representation, no prejudicial duplicity in the indictment, no plain error in admitting testimony or text messages, and no error in interpreting communications or applying the sentencing enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McNoriell" on Justia Law
US v. Castellano
The defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child sexual abuse material and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. Upon release, he was placed on lifetime supervised release with a special condition prohibiting access to any pornographic material, including legal pornography. The defendant repeatedly violated conditions of his supervised release, resulting in multiple revocations and returns to prison. Each time he was released, similar conditions were imposed. The defendant later consented to a special condition that barred him from viewing or possessing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct on electronic devices, but later contested the imposition of a broader ban.After the defendant’s initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (in Castellano I) vacated the district court’s imposition of the pornography ban, finding it was not supported by individualized evidence, and remanded with instructions to strike the special condition. The district court complied. However, after subsequent violations and revocations, the government requested a new special condition banning all pornography, this time presenting testimony and a written evaluation from the defendant’s treatment provider, who offered individualized clinical reasons for the restriction based on years of treating the defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the pornography ban. The court held that the special condition was supported by individualized evidence specific to the defendant and his treatment needs. The court further held that neither the mandate rule from Castellano I nor other legal doctrines barred the district court from imposing the new condition in light of changed circumstances and new evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Castellano" on Justia Law
United States v. Tew
A married couple, Michael and Kimberley, became involved in a fraudulent scheme targeting Michael’s employer, National Air Cargo, a company seeking financial stability after bankruptcy. Michael, initially hired as a contractor and later promoted to CFO, began abusing his position by submitting false invoices, with the help of an internal accomplice, resulting in over $5 million in fraudulent payments. Kimberley, who suffered significant gambling and cryptocurrency losses, played an active role by motivating and coercing the accomplice and leveraging her relationship with Michael. The scheme was uncovered after creditors contacted National, leading to internal investigations and the eventual involvement of federal authorities.After the criminal conduct was exposed, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado became involved. Michael was initially arrested and entered into proffer agreements with the government, as did Kimberley. Both provided statements incriminating the other. The government indicted Michael, Kimberley, and their accomplice, Yioulos, on charges including conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The couple’s legal representation shifted multiple times, with periods of joint and separate counsel, and both filed motions seeking severance of their trials based on antagonistic defenses. The district court denied these motions, finding either no sufficient prejudice or that the motions were untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the Apple cloud search warrant used to obtain Kimberley’s personal data was sufficiently particular and if the district court erred in denying severance. The court found the search warrant lacked sufficient particularity, but concluded the good faith exception applied, so suppression was not warranted. The court also held that neither defendant was entitled to severance, as their motions were untimely and the legal standards for severance were not met. The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Tew" on Justia Law
P. v. Deen
The case arose from the killing of Rachel Deen and Calipatria Police Chief J. Leonard Speer by Omar Richard Deen on April 10, 1998. After an argument at his mother’s equipment yard, Deen shot both victims and fled to Mexico, where he was apprehended the same day and confessed. Evidence presented at trial included testimony about Deen’s strained relationship with his mother, prior threats, disputes over his father’s estate, and his mental health history, including diagnoses of severe thought disorder and schizophrenia, as well as methamphetamine abuse. The prosecution introduced evidence of premeditation and financial motive, while the defense focused on Deen’s mental state and substance-induced impairment.The Imperial County Superior Court conducted a four-phase trial—competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty. Deen was found competent by a separate jury and judge. The main trial jury convicted him of both murders, found true special circumstances (financial gain and killing a police officer in the line of duty), and returned a death verdict. Deen raised multiple issues on appeal, including the denial of several challenges for cause during jury selection, particularly regarding Juror No. 5, who had close associations with Chief Speer and law enforcement, had heard details of the case from police sources, and expressed difficulty in being impartial.The Supreme Court of California found that the trial court erred by denying the challenge for cause as to Juror No. 5. The trial court had misunderstood its authority, relying too heavily on the juror’s assurances of impartiality instead of independently determining whether actual bias existed under the applicable statutes. The Supreme Court held that the trial court must objectively consider the totality of circumstances regarding potential juror bias and remanded for a new trial, reversing the judgment in its entirety. View "P. v. Deen" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Supreme Court of California
United States v. Boyer
Alvin Boyer developed a relationship with Shayla Tilton, whose estranged husband, Freddie Tilton, confronted Boyer via threatening messages. Over several days, Boyer communicated with both Shayla and Freddie, ultimately sharing with Freddie the details of his plans to meet Shayla at a motel. At Freddie’s direction, Boyer made arrangements for Shayla to enter the motel room, unaware to Shayla that Freddie would be present. When Shayla arrived, Freddie assaulted her with a firearm and other weapons. After the incident, Boyer and Freddie exchanged messages indicating Boyer’s concern for his own safety but also referencing his role in facilitating the meeting.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, where Boyer was charged with kidnapping and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. At trial, Boyer argued he lacked knowledge of Freddie’s intent to assault Shayla. The government introduced evidence of Boyer’s pending assault charges in Arkansas, over his objection. The jury found Boyer guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the district court imposed two concurrent 20-year sentences, below the advisory Guidelines range after considering all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Boyer’s appeal, which challenged the admission of the pending charges evidence, the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The appellate court held that any error in admitting the pending charges was harmless, as the evidence of Boyer’s knowledge and involvement was substantial. The court found the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict on conspiracy. Regarding the sentence, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Boyer" on Justia Law
Duncan v. Bayer CropScience LP
A group of farmers and farming entities brought suit against several manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of seeds and crop-protection chemicals, alleging that these defendants conspired to obscure pricing data for these “crop inputs.” The plaintiffs claimed that this conspiracy, which included a group boycott of electronic sales platforms and price-fixing activities, forced them to pay artificially high prices. They sought to represent a class of individuals who had purchased crop inputs from the defendants or their authorized retailers dating back to January 1, 2014. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various state laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.After the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act because they did not adequately allege parallel conduct among the defendants. The RICO claims were also dismissed with prejudice, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court dismissed the antitrust claim with prejudice, noting that the plaintiffs had prior notice of the deficiencies and had multiple opportunities to amend.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead parallel conduct or provide sufficient factual detail connecting specific defendants to particular acts. It concluded that the complaint’s group pleading and conclusory allegations did not meet the plausibility standard required to survive a motion to dismiss. The court also ruled that the dismissal with prejudice was proper given the plaintiffs’ repeated failures to cure the deficiencies. View "Duncan v. Bayer CropScience LP" on Justia Law
State v. Lutz
A high school softball coach was investigated by a county sheriff after allegations surfaced regarding a sexual relationship between the coach and a student. The sheriff conducted interviews and produced investigation reports, one of which the coach later claimed contained knowingly false statements. The coach was charged with sexual battery, arrested, and ultimately acquitted at trial. Before trial, the coach alleged that the sheriff’s conduct tainted the investigation and later moved for nonsummary contempt proceedings against the sheriff, asserting that the supplemental police report constituted “misbehavior in office” and deceit under Idaho law.The Sixth Judicial District Court for Bear Lake County considered the coach’s motion for nonsummary contempt under Idaho Criminal Rule 42 and Idaho Code section 7-601. The sheriff moved to dismiss, arguing that only a prosecutor could initiate contempt proceedings and that the court lacked jurisdiction. After a hearing and briefing, the district court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the alleged conduct did not constitute contempt under the statute. The court also awarded attorney fees to the sheriff. An amended judgment followed, and the coach appealed.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that a criminal defendant may initiate nonsummary contempt proceedings under Rule 42, clarifying that the district court did have jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the coach’s motion failed to establish probable cause that the sheriff’s conduct amounted to criminal contempt as defined by Idaho law, because there was no violation of a court order or abuse of the judicial process. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of dismissal and award of attorney fees were affirmed, but the sheriff was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "State v. Lutz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
US v. Calderin-Pascual
A man sought to contest the forfeiture of a boat, claiming he was its rightful owner. The boat had been seized and made subject to forfeiture following his brother’s guilty plea to a federal drug conspiracy that began in May 2019. The man submitted a pro se petition in federal district court, asserting under penalty of perjury that he was the sole and rightful owner of the boat at the time it was seized. He attached several documents, all in Spanish, which he described as evidence of ownership and title. Later, with counsel, he provided additional documents purporting to show that he acquired the boat in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had issued a preliminary order of forfeiture following the brother’s plea. After the man’s petition, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege when and how the man acquired his interest in the boat, as required by statute. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and entered a final order of forfeiture. The man appealed, arguing that his submissions sufficed or, alternatively, that he should have been allowed to amend his petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the man’s petition did not satisfy the statutory requirement to state the time and circumstances of his acquisition of the boat, and that untranslated documents could not be considered. However, the appellate court found that the district court did not address the alternative request for leave to amend, and the reasons for denial were not apparent from the record. The First Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to consider the request to amend in light of the liberal construction required by statute. View "US v. Calderin-Pascual" on Justia Law