Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after police officers in Oklahoma City pursued a stolen vehicle he was driving. During the chase, the defendant fled on foot and was apprehended near an alleyway, where a loaded pistol was found within arm’s reach of his arrest location. The firearm was dry and free of debris despite rainy conditions, suggesting it had been recently discarded. The defendant had two prior felony convictions: one for distribution of marijuana and another for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, he stipulated to his status as a felon and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, but denied knowingly possessing the gun.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma initially excluded evidence of the defendant’s prior felon-in-possession conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. However, during trial, the defendant testified about his criminal history, emphasizing that his prior conviction was only for marijuana. The government then sought, and was granted, permission to impeach the defendant with his prior felon-in-possession conviction, arguing that he had created a misleading impression of his criminal background. The district court allowed limited questioning on this conviction and issued a jury instruction to consider it only for impeachment purposes. The jury convicted the defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the prior conviction for impeachment. The appellate court held that, although such evidence can be prejudicial, its probative value increased after the defendant minimized his criminal history. The court found no abuse of discretion, concluded any error would have been harmless given the evidence, and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A New York resident, known as Lucha El, was twice arrested for unlawful possession of firearms. In both instances, the firearms had been purchased in South Carolina by another individual, Keith Vereen, who acted as a straw purchaser. Lucha El paid Vereen, who then transported the firearms to New York, where Lucha El received them. Lucha El did not have the necessary permits to purchase firearms in New York and did not attempt to obtain a federal license to transport firearms across state lines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charged Lucha El with interstate transport of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and conspiracy to transport or receive firearms from outside his state of residency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lucha El moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that § 922(a)(3) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. After a trial, a jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearms. Lucha El appealed, raising only the Second Amendment challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that § 922(a)(3) is a lawful regulation on the commercial sale of firearms that does not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms. The court further found that, even if the statute did impose a meaningful constraint, it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Lucha El’s convictions under § 922(a)(3) did not violate the Second Amendment. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested on drug charges and initially held on high bail, which was later reduced. A bail bondsman posted the reduced bail, agreeing to be liable if the defendant failed to appear in court. The court scheduled a pretrial conference, but due to administrative errors, the defendant and his counsel were misinformed about the date. As a result, they missed the proceeding, leading the trial court to issue a bench warrant and revoke bail. Days later, when the defendant appeared for what he believed was the correct date, the court vacated the bench warrant and reinstated bail, relying on the defense counsel’s oral representation that the bondsman consented to continue as surety, but did not obtain written consent.Months later, the defendant failed to appear for trial, resulting in another bail revocation and notice of intent to forfeit the bond. The bondsman, after being notified of the impending forfeiture, filed a petition to strike or set aside the forfeiture, arguing that the court had failed to obtain his written consent when bail was previously reinstated. The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denied the petition. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, reasoning that written consent was not required because the initial bail revocation was due to court error, not the defendant’s fault.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory requirement for written consent from a bail bondsman applies when bail is reinstated after a revocation caused by court error. The court held that the statute requires written consent from the bail bondsman whenever bail is reinstated after a defendant’s failure to appear, regardless of whether the failure was due to a breakdown in court administration. However, the court found that the bondsman was not entitled to relief because he failed to timely appeal the order reinstating bail. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s result, but on different grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Rondon" on Justia Law

A woman, identified as the victim, lived with her mother and infant sister. The mother’s boyfriend, the appellant, would babysit the children at night. The victim testified that, starting at age 10, the appellant repeatedly entered her bedroom and sexually assaulted her. She disclosed the abuse to family members and a doctor, and later to a teacher, which led to police involvement. The appellant was charged with multiple sexual offenses, including rape of a child and related crimes.Before trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, the Commonwealth proposed a voir dire question to potential jurors, asking if they could follow the legal principle that the testimony of an alleged victim alone, if believed, is sufficient to convict in a sexual assault case. The appellant objected, arguing the question was improper and misstated the law. The trial court denied the objection, and the jury convicted the appellant on all charges, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. The appellant’s post-sentence motion was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing, among other things, that the voir dire question was improper. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, finding the question proper and consistent with Pennsylvania law and jury instructions.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the trial court erred in allowing the voir dire question. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It found the question was designed to ensure jurors could follow the law that a victim’s uncorroborated testimony, if believed, can be sufficient for conviction in sexual assault cases. The Court concluded that such a question is permissible to identify jurors with fixed beliefs contrary to this legal principle. The judgment of sentence was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who pleaded guilty in 2004 to two counts of forgery, both fifth-degree felonies, after depositing counterfeit checks and withdrawing funds from a credit union. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent nine-month prison terms and ordered him to pay $2,663 in restitution to the victim, Mid-State Credit Union, and $408 in court costs. The sentencing entry specified that these amounts were entered as civil judgments. After serving his sentence and completing postrelease control, the individual applied in 2022 to have the record of his convictions sealed, though he had not paid the restitution.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted the application to seal the records, despite the State’s objection that restitution remained unpaid. The State appealed, but the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court reasoned that because the restitution was entered “as a civil judgment,” it was not a criminal sanction that needed to be satisfied before the record could be sealed. The court further concluded that the civil judgment for restitution had become permanently dormant under debtor-protection laws, as it had not been revived within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, regardless of how a restitution order is labeled in a sentencing entry, it remains a criminal sanction that is part of the sentence. Therefore, restitution must be paid before an offender is eligible to apply to have the record of conviction sealed. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the individual’s constitutional arguments. View "State v. T.W.C." on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant pleaded guilty to several first-degree felonies, including rape, attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, for acts committed in 1995. The trial court imposed an aggregate indefinite prison sentence of 15 to 50 years under the sentencing laws in effect before July 1, 1996. Over the years, the defendant challenged aspects of his sentence and conviction, including the indefinite nature of his sentence and the lack of eligibility for judicial release, but these challenges were unsuccessful.After serving more than 26 years, the defendant filed a motion for judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 in December 2021, arguing that he was serving a “stated prison term” and had completed the mandatory portion of his sentence. The State of Ohio opposed the motion, asserting that the defendant was serving an indefinite sentence under pre-S.B. 2 law and was therefore ineligible for judicial release. The trial court granted the motion for judicial release, placing the defendant on community control, and the State appealed. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that amendments to R.C. 2929.20 had expanded eligibility for judicial release to include offenders serving nonmandatory sentences on or after April 7, 2009.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the definition of “eligible offender” for purposes of judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 includes only those serving a “stated prison term,” as defined in R.C. 2929.01. The court concluded that an offender serving an indefinite sentence imposed under pre-S.B. 2 law does not meet this definition and is therefore not eligible for judicial release. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to deny judicial release. View "State v. Staffrey" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of eight sex crimes involving three juvenile girls, including his stepdaughter and two other children in the household. The most serious incident occurred in December 2016, when a six-year-old girl suffered a severe vaginal injury while in the defendant’s care, leading to hospitalization and subsequent disclosure of sexual abuse. Over the following years, two other girls reported that the defendant had also sexually abused them on multiple occasions, with one describing repeated acts of molestation occurring regularly over a period of time.The Sonoma County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, including multiple counts of sexual intercourse or lewd acts with a child under 14, and found true several sentencing enhancements. The defendant appealed, challenging two of the convictions related to one victim. He argued that the prosecution relied on the same testimony to support both charged and uncharged offenses, and that the jury instruction regarding uncharged sex offenses (CALCRIM No. 1191A) improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and confused the jury. He also raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the instruction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the same testimony was used to support both charged and uncharged offenses and the instructions could have been clearer, any potential instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the jury was properly instructed that each charged offense had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence supporting the convictions was substantial. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Dejesus-Galindo" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of the first degree murders of two young children, Tyler and Dylan, as well as assaulting Dylan, a child under eight, with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death. The defendant was in romantic relationships with each child’s mother and lived with them at the time of the children’s deaths. Both children suffered extensive physical abuse and fatal injuries while in the defendant’s care. Medical and forensic evidence indicated repeated, severe trauma consistent with child abuse. The defendant denied responsibility, suggesting others may have caused the injuries, and presented evidence attempting to cast doubt on the mothers’ fitness as parents.After the initial trial in the Kern County Superior Court, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, but the trial court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. At retrial, the jury again convicted the defendant on all counts and returned a death verdict, which the trial court entered as judgment. The defendant was also sentenced to 25 years to life for the assault charge, with that term stayed.The Supreme Court of California automatically reviewed the case. The defendant raised numerous claims, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, denial of motions for change of venue and to sever charges, alleged juror misconduct, evidentiary rulings, and constitutional challenges to California’s death penalty statute. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder, both as deliberate and premeditated and as murder by torture. The court also found no reversible error in the trial court’s evidentiary and procedural rulings, and rejected the constitutional challenges to the death penalty scheme.The Supreme Court of California’s main holding was to strike a $200 parole revocation fine imposed under Penal Code section 1202.45, as the defendant’s sentence did not include a period of parole. In all other respects, the court affirmed the judgment, including the convictions and the death sentence. View "P. v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Charles Christopher, while on supervised release for a prior conviction of attempting to entice a minor, engaged in online communications with someone he believed to be a 15-year-old girl. The individual was actually an undercover law enforcement agent. Christopher made explicit sexual advances, arranged to meet the supposed minor, and brought alcohol to the meeting location, where he was arrested. He was charged with attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and with committing a felony involving a minor while under a sex offender registration requirement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A.After pleading guilty to both counts in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Christopher was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 264 months’ imprisonment. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging the § 2260A charge on the basis that it did not involve a real minor, but rather a government agent. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient and that Christopher was not entitled to relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that § 2260A requires the involvement of an actual minor. The court assumed, without deciding, that counsel’s performance was deficient, but held that Christopher was not prejudiced because § 2260A applies to predicate offenses under § 2422(b) even when the “minor” is an undercover agent. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Christopher’s § 2255 petition. View "Christopher v USA" on Justia Law