Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police officers responded to a report that a man in a yellow and black coat was pointing a handgun at people at a Minneapolis light rail station. They found the suspect inside a nearby pizza restaurant, where several other people, including 16-year-old C.T.B., were standing nearby. An officer, based on his experience that weapons can be passed among individuals in a group, conducted a pat-frisk of C.T.B. and found a handgun in his possession. C.T.B. was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a minor and moved to suppress the handgun, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to frisk him.The Hennepin County District Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that C.T.B.’s proximity to the original suspect and the officer’s experience justified the frisk. After a stipulated facts trial, the court found C.T.B. guilty and stayed adjudication. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the totality of the circumstances—including the possibility that the original suspect had handed off the firearm—made the frisk of C.T.B. objectively reasonable.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that C.T.B. was armed and dangerous when they conducted the pat-frisk. The court clarified that mere proximity to a suspect in an alleged crime, even when combined with general knowledge that weapons can be passed among group members, is not sufficient to justify a warrantless pat-frisk under Terry v. Ohio. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.T.B" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who, after responding to an online advertisement posted by an undercover police officer posing as two twenty-year-old women, learned that the supposed women were actually fifteen years old. Despite this, he continued to arrange a meeting for sexual services in exchange for money, drove from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, and was arrested upon arrival. He was found in possession of cocaine and ultimately pleaded nolo contendere in Rhode Island to indecent solicitation of a child, receiving a suspended sentence and probation. The individual also had a prior history of criminal justice involvement, including violations of abuse prevention orders and drug-related charges.Following his conviction, the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) issued a preliminary determination classifying him as a level two sex offender. After a de novo hearing, a SORB hearing examiner confirmed this classification, applying several risk-elevating factors, including targeting children, stranger victims, substance abuse, criminal justice contact, hostility towards women, and number of victims. The individual challenged the classification in the Massachusetts Superior Court, arguing that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly contesting the application of certain risk factors. The Superior Court denied his motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirmed the SORB decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the hearing examiner did not abuse discretion in applying or weighing the challenged risk factors. However, the court found that the hearing examiner’s written decision was ambiguous regarding whether the individual’s information should be disseminated to the public, which is essential for determining the proper classification level. As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to SORB for a clear, written conclusion on both the need for dissemination and the classification level. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528042 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Brewster County, Texas, observed a pickup truck towing a horse trailer near a border patrol checkpoint during a shift change—a time and place known for smuggling activity. The deputy recognized the driver, who had previously been identified as a possible smuggler. Without being signaled or ordered, the driver pulled over to the shoulder, and the deputy parked behind him. During a casual conversation, the deputy noticed an open alcohol container in the truck. The driver gave inconsistent and suspicious answers about the trailer’s contents and ownership, and after further questioning, eventually admitted that there were people hidden in the locked compartment of the trailer. The deputy then discovered three undocumented immigrants inside.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the defendant had been seized with reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search the trailer attenuated any taint from the deputy’s actions. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transporting illegal aliens but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. It found that the initial encounter was consensual, that the deputy’s actions did not constitute a seizure until reasonable suspicion had developed, and that the deputy’s incidental contact with the truck did not amount to a trespassory search. The court also determined that the discovery of the open alcohol container was lawful and that the subsequent evidence was not subject to suppression. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Larremore" on Justia Law

Christopher Skaggs was released on parole in 2019 after serving a prison sentence for felony violations of the Vehicle Code. In December 2020, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole, alleging new criminal conduct, and also filed a related criminal complaint. Skaggs failed to appear for hearings, resulting in bench warrants. He was later arrested in Lake County on these warrants and new charges, convicted, and sentenced to additional prison time. While incarcerated, Skaggs repeatedly requested to resolve the Mendocino County parole revocation and criminal matters. The criminal complaint was dismissed under Penal Code section 1381, but the court declined to dismiss the parole revocation petition, finding section 1381 inapplicable.Skaggs subsequently filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the parole revocation petition on constitutional due process grounds, arguing that delays prejudiced him by preventing concurrent sentencing and prolonging his custody. The Mendocino County Superior Court construed his motion as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied it, reasoning that section 1385 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings. The court then held a contested revocation hearing, found Skaggs violated parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole terminated upon release. Skaggs appealed the denial of his motion and the parole revocation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that Skaggs’s appeal was moot because his parole had already been terminated and no effective relief could be granted. However, the court exercised its discretion to address the trial court’s error, holding that the trial court improperly construed Skaggs’s constitutional due process motion as a section 1385 motion and incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to consider the motion. The appellate court clarified that trial courts have jurisdiction to entertain nonstatutory motions to dismiss parole revocation petitions on constitutional due process grounds. The appeal was dismissed as moot. View "People v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing a machinegun conversion device, known as a Glock switch, which both parties agreed qualified as a machinegun under federal law. He had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute criminalizing possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that his plea agreement did not bar his constitutional challenge and rejecting his Second Amendment argument. The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen had undermined prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(o).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo, as the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute. The appellate court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which relied on District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen. The court explained that Bruen did not overrule Heller or Hamblen, and that the tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” such as machineguns was reaffirmed. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns covered by § 922(o). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Two men were arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2020 and charged with being felons in possession of firearms. Both had prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. One defendant pleaded guilty, while the other was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the government sought to apply the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for offenders with at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, provided those offenses were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, following then-binding Sixth Circuit precedent, determined that the judge—not a jury—should decide whether the prior offenses occurred on different occasions. The court found that both defendants qualified for the ACCA enhancement and sentenced each to fifteen years in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that, in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Erlinger v. United States, the question of whether their offenses occurred on different occasions should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the cases. Applying a harmless error analysis as required by recent precedent, the court found that, for one defendant, the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found his offenses occurred on different occasions, so his sentence was affirmed. For the other defendant, the court concluded that the government had not met its burden to show the error was harmless, given similarities among the offenses and gaps in the record. As a result, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The main holding is that failure to submit the ACCA “different occasions” question to a jury is subject to harmless error review, and the outcome depends on the specific facts of each case. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Several individuals affiliated with the MS-13 gang were charged in connection with the kidnapping and murder of two teenage boys in Northern Virginia in 2016. Both victims, aged fourteen and seventeen, were low-ranking affiliates of the gang’s Park View Locos Salvatrucha (PVLS) clique. The first victim was killed after gang leaders mistakenly believed he was associated with a rival gang, while the second was murdered after rumors spread that he was cooperating with law enforcement. Both murders were carried out in a remote park, involved multiple assailants, and were documented with graphic videos and photographs. The perpetrators received promotions within the gang for their participation.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted the defendants on eight counts, including conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, and kidnapping resulting in death. After an eight-week jury trial, all defendants were convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on the most serious charges. The district court denied various defense motions, including those for acquittal, suppression of evidence, and requests for certain jury instructions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed numerous challenges, including evidentiary rulings, the denial of a duress defense, sufficiency of the evidence, joinder of defendants and counts, and sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences for four defendants. For one defendant, Henry Zelaya Martinez, the court affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence due to inconsistencies between the oral and written pronouncements at sentencing, remanding for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Paul Harmon, who had worked for decades as an accountant and controller at a family-owned electrical engineering firm, embezzled over a million dollars from the company. His actions led to significant financial losses for the business and its employees, including legal and accounting costs, overpaid taxes, and the eventual closure of the company. The president of the company detailed these hardships in a victim impact statement and letter submitted at Harmon’s sentencing.After Harmon pled guilty to wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the court imposed an upwardly varied sentence of 72 months, citing the severe impact of his crimes on the victims and the business. The presentence report and the government did not recommend, and the court did not apply, a sentencing enhancement for causing “substantial financial hardship.” In 2024, Harmon sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on a new, retroactive Sentencing Guideline provision, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which excludes defendants who caused substantial financial hardship. The government did not oppose the motion. The District Court denied the reduction, relying on the earlier victim impact materials to find Harmon ineligible, and did not provide him an opportunity to contest those materials at this stage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It held that due process protections under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)—requiring notice and an opportunity to contest new information—apply to sentence reduction motions under § 3582(c)(2). However, the court concluded that the victim impact statement and letter were not “new information” because they had already been relied upon at the original sentencing to find material facts. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Harmon’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "USA v. Harmon" on Justia Law

In 1988, Darren Arends was convicted of grand theft in South Dakota, resulting in the loss of his firearm rights. In August 2023, after Washington amended its firearm restoration statute to restrict the venue for filing restoration petitions to only the county that originally imposed the prohibition, Arends filed a petition in Snohomish County Superior Court, his county of residence. He argued that he had a vested right to file under the prior version of the statute, which allowed filing in the county of residence. The State opposed, contending that Snohomish County was not the proper venue since the prohibition originated in South Dakota and that Arends had not completed all sentencing conditions.The Snohomish County Superior Court denied Arends’s petition, agreeing with the State’s arguments. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that Arends was required to file in the county that imposed the prohibition, not his county of residence. Arends then sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the statutory venue provisions for firearm restoration petitions are procedural and do not create vested rights. The court clarified that while the legislature may set venue rules, it cannot limit the superior courts’ constitutional jurisdiction to hear such petitions. Therefore, any superior court in Washington retains original jurisdiction to consider firearm restoration petitions, regardless of the venue specified by statute. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Snohomish County Superior Court to consider the merits of Arends’s petition under the amended statute. View "Arends v. State" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours, law enforcement officers in Spearfish, South Dakota, found a man asleep in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with its brake lights on. Upon waking him, the officers conducted field sobriety tests and arrested him for driving under the influence. After being taken into custody, he voluntarily provided blood and urine samples, which were tested by the state health lab and found to contain THC, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. The defendant’s primary defense centered on challenging the reliability of the state health lab’s testing methods, particularly their inability to distinguish between different isomers of methamphetamine, one of which is present in some over-the-counter medications.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, presided over pretrial motions and the trial. The court denied the defendant’s request for a Daubert hearing to assess the reliability of the lab’s methods, finding the chemists qualified and the methods well-established. The court also excluded the testimony of a late-disclosed expert witness and limited another expert’s testimony to her area of expertise. During trial, the defendant was permitted to present some evidence regarding isomers of methamphetamine but was restricted from arguing that the presence of l-methamphetamine, as opposed to d-methamphetamine, was legally significant. The jury convicted the defendant of unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance and being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding or limiting expert testimony, in denying a Daubert hearing, and whether these rulings denied the defendant a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in all respects, found no violation of the defendant’s right to present a defense, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law