Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant on December 1, 2021, and discovered drug paraphernalia, cash, and various illegal drugs in the car and on her person. The defendant admitted ownership of the drugs. On January 20, 2022, after she used a counterfeit bill to post bail for another individual, police searched her vehicle again and found large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, as well as drug packaging materials and a firearm. The following day, a search of her home uncovered more drugs, cash, firearms, and evidence of drug sales. In total, authorities seized significant amounts of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs and one count of unlawful possession, with the State aggregating the drug quantities across the incidents as part of a continuing scheme.The case was tried before a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket. During closing arguments, defense counsel suggested that some of the drugs belonged to a passenger, referencing evidence that the passenger brought a Walmart bag containing drugs into the car. The State objected, claiming this was not in evidence, and the trial court sustained the objection. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the court entered judgment and ordered forfeiture of property. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court’s ruling during closing argument improperly commented on the evidence and infringed on her rights.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection, as there was evidence supporting the defense’s argument. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the opportunity for the defense to present its theory, and the court’s instructions to the jury. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Quirion" on Justia Law

Two defendants were charged and convicted for their roles in a large-scale ATM skimming operation that spanned the United States, Europe, and Mexico, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to financial institutions and individual account holders. The scheme involved installing skimming devices and hidden cameras on ATMs to steal debit card numbers and PINs, creating counterfeit cards, withdrawing cash from victims’ accounts, and laundering the proceeds overseas. One defendant was primarily involved in sending and receiving skimming devices and laundering money, while the other built and distributed skimming devices, supervised cash-outs, and was found with skimming equipment and counterfeit cards in his garage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. One defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts, while the other pled guilty to most charges and was convicted by a jury of aggravated identity theft. Both received below-Guidelines sentences (92 and 120 months) and were ordered to pay restitution in installments, with the option to use the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP). The defendants appealed, jointly challenging their aggravated identity theft convictions, and individually raising issues regarding the suppression of evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the restitution payment schedule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that debit card numbers and PINs are “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, thus supporting the aggravated identity theft convictions. The court also upheld the denial of the suppression motion, finding the search of the garage lawful as a protective sweep incident to arrest. The court found no procedural or substantive error in the sentences. However, it vacated the restitution order for one defendant and remanded for clarification of the installment payment schedule during incarceration. All other aspects of the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States of America v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was implicated in a fatal shootout between two rival gangs in a District of Columbia housing complex. The incident resulted in the death of a bystander. The government’s case against the appellant relied on evidence that he was either the mastermind behind the gun battle, the first shooter, or that he armed himself and lay in wait for the confrontation. The trial featured conflicting witness testimony regarding who initiated the shooting and the appellant’s precise role. Ultimately, the appellant was acquitted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder but was convicted of voluntary manslaughter while armed and related firearms offenses.After his conviction, the appellant pursued direct appeal, during which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals significantly changed the legal standard for causation in such cases in Fleming v. United States, replacing the “substantial factor” test with a stricter “but-for” causation requirement. The appellant attempted to challenge his conviction based on this new standard, but the appellate court directed him to file a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 in Superior Court. The Superior Court denied his motion, finding that although he had cause for not raising the issue earlier, he was not prejudiced by the instructional error, as the evidence was deemed sufficient for conviction under the new standard.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion. The appellate court found that the instructional error regarding causation was not harmless and that there was a reasonable probability the jury would not have convicted the appellant if properly instructed under the “but-for” standard. The court vacated the convictions for voluntary manslaughter while armed and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Parker v. United States" on Justia Law

The case concerns Isaiah Brown, who, along with Rayshawn Tucker and Fatima Alabusalim, was implicated in the murder and first-degree robbery of DaMani Dulaney in Louisville, Kentucky. Alabusalim, who had relationships with both Tucker and Dulaney, testified that Tucker was upset about her relationship with Dulaney and devised a plan to rob him, enlisting her and Brown’s help. On the night of the incident, Alabusalim lured Dulaney to a park, where Tucker and Brown confronted him. Brown broke the driver’s side window with a gun, and after Alabusalim was pulled from the car, a single gunshot was fired, resulting in Dulaney’s death. The trio fled to Florida after the crime. Evidence included text messages, cell site data, and testimony from Alabusalim, who initially gave false statements to police but later admitted her involvement.The Jefferson Circuit Court tried Brown alone after his co-defendants entered plea agreements. The jury found Brown guilty of murder (complicity) and first-degree robbery (complicity), recommending concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for murder and ten years for robbery. The court sentenced Brown accordingly. Brown appealed, raising issues about the admission of certain evidence, including hearsay regarding phone number attribution, the foundation for text messages, improper opinion testimony by a detective, the admission of co-conspirator statements, and cumulative error.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that while the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence identifying Brown’s phone number and in allowing improper opinion testimony about a witness’s credibility, these errors were harmless or did not result in manifest injustice. The court found that the text messages were properly authenticated and that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was satisfied. The cumulative effect of the errors did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. View "BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A police officer observed an individual walking in the middle of a street at night near a location known for drug activity. The officer, believing this to be a violation of Kentucky’s jaywalking statute, attempted to stop the individual by asking him to approach the patrol car. The individual ignored the officer’s verbal commands, turned away, and increased his pace. The officer then physically seized the individual by grabbing his arms and escorted him back to the patrol car. During this process, the officer observed the individual discard drugs, which led to his arrest. Additional drugs were found in the individual’s possession after the arrest.The Nelson Circuit Court held a suppression hearing, during which the officer and the defendant’s mother testified. The court found that the officer had probable cause to believe a jaywalking violation had occurred and concluded that the officer’s actions were justified. The court denied the motion to suppress the drug evidence. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to amended charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, reasoning that an officer may detain a pedestrian for a traffic law violation to issue a citation, and distinguished the case from prior precedent involving different circumstances.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The court held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when police physically seize a person for an observed violation, such as jaywalking, for the purpose of issuing a citation if the person fails to comply with verbal commands. The court found the officer’s use of minimal force to be objectively reasonable under the circumstances and concluded that the subsequent discovery of contraband was not the result of an unreasonable search or seizure. The denial of the motion to suppress and the convictions were affirmed. View "BUECHELE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Darrell Strunk participated in two robberies on the same day in December 2011: first, a home invasion, and then a business robbery. He was indicted for the business robbery, and later, with his consent, additional charges from the home robbery were added. Strunk entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of second-degree robbery, each enhanced by his status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The agreement called for consecutive sentences of 20 years and 10 years, totaling 30 years’ imprisonment.The Fayette Circuit Court accepted the plea and imposed the 30-year sentence, despite Strunk’s counsel raising concerns that this exceeded the statutory maximum under KRS 532.110(1)(c), which limits the aggregate sentence for Class C felonies to 20 years. Strunk later filed a motion under CR 60.02 to correct his sentence, arguing it was illegal. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the plea agreement treated the two robberies as separate cases and that Strunk had knowingly accepted the deal. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 30-year sentence violated the statutory cap and that the statutory limit could not be waived, remanding for resentencing within the legal maximum.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Strunk’s aggregate sentence of 30 years was illegal under KRS 532.110(1)(c), as the statutory maximum for his offenses was 20 years. The Court further held that, because Strunk sought only correction of his sentence and not withdrawal of his guilty plea, the proper remedy was to remand for resentencing with instructions to impose the highest legal sentence—20 years’ imprisonment. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. STRUNK" on Justia Law

On the night of June 23, 2019, a group of minors, including the defendant, traveled around Louisville discussing a planned burglary. Later that evening, two minors, J.M. and R.O., were shot and killed, while a third, S.H., survived her wounds. S.H. testified that the defendant shot her and R.O. after the group had driven to various locations and after an incident involving J.M. in an alley. The defendant was indicted for the murders of J.M. and R.O. and for the first-degree assault of S.H. He did not testify at trial.The Jefferson Circuit Court conducted a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of the murder of R.O. and the first-degree assault of S.H., but acquitted of the murder of J.M. The jury recommended a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the assault conviction, which the trial court reduced to life in prison. The defendant appealed, raising several claims, including challenges to the admission of cell phone location evidence, the handling of prospective and seated jurors, and the admission of a recorded jail call.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case as a matter of right. The Court held that the trial court did not err in permitting a detective to testify about cell phone location data, finding that the detective’s testimony, though based on specialized training, was sufficiently disclosed and did not require exclusion or a Daubert hearing since the defense did not challenge the methodology’s reliability. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions regarding juror challenges and the admission of the jail call, concluding that there was no evidence of juror bias or prejudice and that the recorded call was properly admitted for the jury’s consideration. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "HOLLINGSWORTH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several offenses, including attempted gross sexual imposition, gross sexual imposition, two counts of child neglect, and indecent exposure, based on allegations that he forced two minor children to consume Nyquil and, in one case, marijuana/THC gummies. The State alleged these actions constituted child neglect under North Dakota law. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the defendant moved for acquittal at the close of the State’s case and again after the defense rested, but both motions were denied. The jury found the defendant guilty on the two counts of child neglect, and the district court entered judgments of acquittal on the remaining charges.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over the trial and sentencing. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the child neglect convictions, contending that the statute criminalizes only omissions, not affirmative acts, and that his conduct, if criminal, would constitute child abuse rather than neglect. He also challenged the admission of jail call recordings, arguing improper authentication and hearsay.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the child neglect statute is not limited to omissions but can include affirmative acts that constitute a willful failure to provide proper parental care. The court found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that the district court did not err in denying the motions for acquittal. Regarding the jail call recordings, the court concluded that the State provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the recordings and that the defendant’s failure to object on hearsay grounds at trial precluded reversal on that basis. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including second degree assault – domestic violence, kidnapping – domestic violence, criminal threatening, and simple assault – domestic violence, following an incident with his spouse in August 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by financial disputes and prior altercations. During the charged incident, the defendant physically assaulted and threatened the complainant, leading her to obtain a restraining order the next day. While incarcerated, the defendant later attempted to contact the complainant in violation of that order.Before trial in the Superior Court, the State sought to introduce evidence of a prior assault by the defendant in July 2020, the complainant’s acquisition of a restraining order, and the defendant’s subsequent violation of that order. The defendant objected, but the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) admitted all three pieces of evidence, reasoning they were relevant to the defendant’s intent and the context of the relationship. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on one count of simple assault but convicted him on all other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Supreme Court held that the probative value of the July 2020 incident was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the evidence of the restraining order and its violation improperly relied on propensity inferences. The Court further found that these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given their potential impact on the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

Jorge Diaz was charged with conspiracy to possess and attempted possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on events in late 2016. The government’s case relied heavily on Maria Bonilla, a cooperating witness who had previously identified Diaz as a drug-trafficking associate and provided audio recordings of their meetings. At trial, however, Bonilla claimed to have no memory of her involvement, her cooperation, or her prior testimony. The government introduced her grand jury testimony as a prior inconsistent statement and played the audio recordings for the jury, with a DEA agent identifying Diaz’s voice on the tapes. Diaz was convicted by a jury on both counts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, overruled Diaz’s objections to the admission of Bonilla’s grand jury testimony and the audio recordings. Diaz argued that the admission of the grand jury testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, that the recordings lacked proper foundation, and, for the first time on appeal, that the voice identification was unduly suggestive in violation of due process. The district court found that the requirements for admitting prior inconsistent statements and authenticating the recordings were met, and that Diaz had the opportunity to cross-examine Bonilla.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that admitting Bonilla’s grand jury testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause because Diaz had the opportunity for effective cross-examination. The court also held that the foundation for the audio recordings was sufficient under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and that the voice identification was not unduly suggestive or unreliable under due process standards. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law