Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was previously convicted of transporting child pornography and, after serving most of his sentence, was released to a halfway house. While there, he engaged in a series of text conversations with his preteen daughter, asking her about his past conviction, her views on sex, and whether she thought there was anything wrong with adults or children engaging in sexual acts, as depicted in pictures or videos. He also instructed her to keep their conversations secret. The defendant’s ex-sister-in-law, who had access to the daughter's phone records, became concerned and forwarded the messages to the FBI. A subsequent investigation of the defendant’s phone, despite his attempts to delete its contents, revealed incriminating text messages, bookmarks to websites with suggestive titles, and 163 images sexualizing children, seven of which were alleged to be child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to exclude most of the images and the website bookmarks, finding them relevant to knowledge and intent. The court also denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds. At trial, the government presented evidence including the images, text messages, and testimony from the investigating agent and the ex-sister-in-law. The defendant argued that others at the halfway house could have accessed his phone and that he only sought “child erotica,” not child pornography. The jury found him guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography and specifically found the seven images met the statutory definition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and held that a rational jury could find the images constituted child pornography. The court also found no error in admitting the website bookmarks or the text messages with the defendant’s daughter, as they were relevant to intent and not unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the statute. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Mercer-Kinser" on Justia Law

An orthopedic surgeon was convicted by a jury in Ohio of two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of tampering with records, following allegations by two patients of inappropriate conduct during medical examinations. The prosecution’s case included testimony from the alleged victims, peer physicians, and investigators, as well as various exhibits such as interview recordings and medical records. The trial court admitted these exhibits, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, resulting in a sentence of jail time, work release, community control, a fine, and sex offender registration.The defendant appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, specifically challenging the proof of sexual gratification and intent to defraud. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that a rational juror could infer the necessary elements from the evidence presented. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case further. The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising several claims and seeking to supplement the record with additional documents, including trial exhibits. The magistrate judge allowed some supplementation but excluded certain trial exhibits. The district court denied both the motion to expand the record and the habeas petition, concluding that the state court record, including the trial transcript, was sufficient for review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the district court erred by adjudicating the habeas petition without including all trial exhibits in the record. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court was not required to review every trial exhibit, as long as it had the relevant portions of the record necessary to evaluate the claims. The court found no error in the district court’s process and affirmed the denial of the motion to expand the record. View "Heiney v. Moore" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after a domestic dispute, shot and killed his partner in the presence of others, including children. He was initially convicted by a jury of murder and several firearms offenses, and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, with additional consecutive sentences for the firearms charges. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i found errors in the trial, including the improper admission of prior bad acts and a failure to give a merger instruction, and remanded for a new trial. Instead of a retrial, the defendant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to manslaughter, use of a firearm in a separate felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. The parties agreed to use the original presentence report, which included mental health evaluations.Before sentencing, the defendant requested over $8,700 in court funds to hire an expert to assess his dangerousness for sentencing and future parole purposes. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit denied most of the request, authorizing only $1,000, finding the request excessive and unnecessary since the expert had already evaluated the defendant. The court sentenced the defendant to forty years’ imprisonment: twenty years each for manslaughter and use of a firearm (to run consecutively), and ten years for felon in possession (to run concurrently). The defendant appealed, arguing the denial of expert fees and challenging the severity and rationale of his sentence.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and declined to address the expert fees issue, finding it unpreserved due to procedural technicalities. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the defendant had preserved the expert fees issue and addressed it on the merits. The court held that expert fees for indigent defendants are generally not required for regular sentencing, unless extended term sentencing is sought or unique circumstances exist. The court also held that the new forty-year sentence was not “more severe” than the original life sentence with the possibility of parole, adopting an aggregate approach to compare sentences. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and sentence. View "State v. Lavoie" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of multiple sexual offenses involving two individuals: his sister-in-law, Nathaly, and a family friend, Evelin. The prosecution charged him with several counts related to alleged assaults on Nathaly when she was a minor, and one count of misdemeanor sexual battery involving Evelin. The jury convicted the defendant only on the misdemeanor count involving Evelin, finding that he groped her after a party. The jury could not reach a verdict on the counts involving Nathaly, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on those charges, which the prosecution chose not to retry.Following the conviction, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sentenced the defendant to 364 days in county jail for the misdemeanor sexual battery, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and issued a protective order under Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), restraining him from contacting Nathaly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the protective order for Nathaly was unauthorized because she was not a victim of the crime for which he was convicted, and that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the current version of Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), a postconviction protective order may only be issued to protect a victim of the specific crime for which the defendant was convicted. Because Nathaly was not a victim of the misdemeanor sexual battery, the trial court lacked authority to issue a protective order for her. The court also found the 364-day sentence unauthorized, as the statutory maximum for the offense is six months. The conviction was affirmed, but the judgment was reversed with directions to vacate the protective order and resentence the defendant to six months. View "People v. Pena" on Justia Law

After a high-speed police chase in Colonial Heights, Virginia, Melvin Myrick abandoned a crashed vehicle and fled on foot. Law enforcement officers recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms from the car. Documents in the vehicle linked Myrick to the scene, and he was later identified and arrested. A federal grand jury initially indicted him for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and a superseding indictment later added two firearms charges and expanded the drug charge to include cocaine.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia managed the pretrial proceedings, during which Myrick changed counsel, filed motions to suppress evidence, and requested continuances, resulting in various delays. On the day his trial began, Myrick moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by not commencing trial within the required 70 days. The district court denied the motion, finding that excludable periods of delay brought the trial within the statutory timeframe. The jury convicted Myrick on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 270 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Myrick’s challenges to the denial of his Speedy Trial Act motion, aspects of his sentencing, and the sufficiency of the evidence for one firearms charge. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly excluded certain periods of delay under the Speedy Trial Act, making the trial timely. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements, the calculation of criminal history points, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearms conviction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Myrick" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Onslow County, North Carolina, identified an individual as the leader of a White supremacist gang and conducted surveillance on his residence. After stopping vehicles leaving the residence and finding drugs, cash, and paraphernalia, officers obtained and executed a search warrant, recovering firearms, drugs, and related items. The individual was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and later for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. He pleaded guilty to these charges, first without a plea agreement and then with one. While detained awaiting sentencing, he was involved in smuggling drugs into jail and assaulted sheriff’s deputies, leading to an additional federal indictment for assaulting persons assisting federal officers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted his guilty pleas after thorough Rule 11 colloquies. After discovery revealed that the government had initially provided an incomplete copy of the search warrant affidavit, the defendant moved to withdraw his first two guilty pleas, arguing the omission rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary and that he lacked competent counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the missing pages immaterial, and denied the motion. At sentencing, the court also denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to the defendant’s post-plea conduct and imposed a downward variant sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, below the advisory Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the incomplete search warrant affidavit was not material to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, that he had the close assistance of competent counsel, and that the district court did not err in denying credit for acceptance of responsibility or in imposing the sentence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Milam" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania prisoner sentenced to death sought to reopen his federal habeas corpus proceedings to present expert evidence obtained in 1999, which he argued would support his claim that he was incompetent at the time of his guilty plea and sentencing. This evidence was not presented during his initial state postconviction proceedings due to his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. The prisoner contended that a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. Ryan, should allow him to introduce this evidence in federal court, despite statutory restrictions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the prisoner’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), finding it untimely and concluding that Martinez did not apply because the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim had already been adjudicated on the merits and was not procedurally defaulted. The District Court also determined that no extraordinary circumstances justified reopening the habeas proceedings and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and reviewed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, while the prisoner could use Rule 60(b)(6) to challenge the District Court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, his motion was timely. However, the court concluded that Martinez does not permit reopening the case to introduce new evidence where the underlying claim was already decided on the merits. Furthermore, even if Martinez applied, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) bars the introduction of new evidence unless strict statutory requirements are met, which the prisoner could not satisfy. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the portion of the motion constituting a successive habeas petition. View "Taylor v. Commissioner of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

A man living with his partner and her two young children in Indiana was convicted of murdering the children and setting fire to their home. Prior to the incident, he exhibited suspicious behavior, including quitting his job, withdrawing his savings, and making threatening statements. On the night of the crime, he bound one child, gathered belongings, and fled the state. The children’s bodies were found after the house fire, and he was apprehended in Kentucky following a police chase. After being read his rights in the hospital, he gave a brief, largely uninformative statement to police.He was charged with two counts of murder and arson. At trial, the jury found him guilty and recommended the death penalty, which the judge imposed. During the trial, a juror brought a note and cookies from his wife, referencing the victims, but the court found this did not prejudice the jury after questioning them and dismissed the juror. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. The defendant then sought postconviction relief in Indiana state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, but the trial court denied relief, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, with some justices partially dissenting on the prejudice issue.The defendant filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, raising over 30 claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias, and evidentiary issues. The district court denied most claims as procedurally defaulted and found the rest without merit, also denying requests for stays and additional funding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that most claims were procedurally defaulted, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying stays or funding, and the Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions were neither unreasonable applications of federal law nor based on unreasonable factual determinations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and related motions. View "Weisheit v Neal" on Justia Law

Robert Gafford, a rural mail carrier for the United States Postal Service in Scott County, Missouri, was observed by residents Karen and Doug Ressel to be failing to deliver their mail over several months in 2021 and 2022. Despite road construction initially being suspected as the cause, the problem persisted after construction ended. The Ressels reported the issue to postal supervisors, who repeatedly instructed Gafford to deliver the mail, but he claimed the mailbox location was unsafe. Both a supervisor and a union representative inspected the mailbox and found it safe. The Ressels used the USPS “Informed Delivery” service and an Apple AirTag to track their mail, ultimately discovering that undelivered mail was ending up at Gafford’s residence. A postal inspector then conducted a controlled test with a tracking device, which led to the discovery of the Ressels’ mail in Gafford’s personal vehicle.A grand jury indicted Gafford for delay and embezzlement of mail under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1703(a) and 1709. At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, a jury found Gafford guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced him to fourteen months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Gafford’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of testimony regarding the AirTag device, and the length of his sentence. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence for both convictions, finding that a reasonable jury could infer Gafford’s intent to convert the mail for his own use and that he unlawfully detained the mail. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the AirTag testimony and determined that sentencing challenges were moot due to Gafford’s release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Gafford" on Justia Law

After being stopped by police in Council Bluffs, Iowa, for running a red light, George Kitchen was approached by officers who detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from his vehicle. When informed that his vehicle would be searched, Kitchen initially agreed but then fled the scene, leading officers on a high-speed chase. During the pursuit, law enforcement observed packages being thrown from the vehicle, which were later recovered and found to contain significant quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Kitchen and his passenger were apprehended after police used stop sticks to disable the vehicle. A search of Kitchen and his car uncovered cash, drug paraphernalia, and cell phones with evidence of drug transactions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Kitchen’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified by the observed traffic violation and that the odor of marijuana provided probable cause to extend the stop and search the vehicle. After a jury trial, Kitchen was convicted on both counts of drug possession with intent to distribute and sentenced to 260 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion for clear error regarding factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions. The appellate court held that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and that the district court’s credibility determinations regarding the officer’s testimony were not clearly erroneous. The court also upheld the admission of co-conspirator hearsay and other bad act evidence, finding no abuse of discretion and determining that any potential error was harmless given the weight of the evidence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Kitchen’s convictions. View "United States v. Kitchen" on Justia Law