Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement officers in Baldwin County, Alabama, stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation and discovered three occupants: Timothy Buchanan, Jaleeshia Robinson, and Tyre Crawford. A search of the vehicle revealed forged and stolen identification cards, credit cards, and checks, as well as equipment for producing counterfeit checks. Buchanan admitted to cashing fraudulent checks using stolen or forged identification, and evidence showed he was in frequent communication with his co-defendants about the scheme. Robinson, who cooperated with the government, testified that Buchanan’s role was to cash checks, while she and Crawford created the fraudulent documents and stole checks from mailboxes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama presided over Buchanan’s jury trial. The jury acquitted him of one count of aggravated identity theft but convicted him on conspiracy to commit bank fraud, possession of five or more identification documents with intent to use or transfer, possession of counterfeited or forged securities, a second count of aggravated identity theft, and possession of stolen mail. The district court sentenced Buchanan to 116 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution. Buchanan challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for several convictions, the application of a sentencing enhancement for sophisticated means, and the calculation of restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Buchanan’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his convictions under an aiding and abetting theory, and that his aggravated identity theft conviction was not plainly erroneous under Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023), because the use of another’s identification was central to the predicate offense. However, the court vacated the sentence in part, finding error in the application of the sophisticated means enhancement and in the restitution calculation, and remanded for further proceedings on those issues. View "United States v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in July 2019, orchestrated a plan to lure a man he believed had wronged him to a house in Springfield, Missouri. The defendant rented a U-Haul van, enlisted two friends, and communicated his intent to harm the victim through text messages and conversations. On the night in question, he picked up the victim, brought him to the designated house, and later drove away with the victim, who was bound and injured. The defendant’s subsequent actions included searching online for ways to dispose of a body, coercing others to help clean the van, and attempting to destroy evidence. The victim was never seen again, and his body was not found, but his blood and personal items were recovered from the van and from a bag the defendant tried to have disposed of.After these events, the Circuit Court of Greene County tried the defendant on charges of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping. The jury found him guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court orally pronounced consecutive life sentences: life without parole for murder and life with the possibility of parole for kidnapping. However, the written judgment mistakenly recorded the sentences as 999 days for each count. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for conviction and a material discrepancy between the oral and written sentences.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of both first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping, rejecting the defendant’s arguments regarding the corpus delicti doctrine and the statutory requirements for kidnapping. The court also clarified the correct legal standard for “substantial period” in kidnapping cases. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case solely to correct the written judgment to match the oral pronouncement of sentences. View "State v. Winter" on Justia Law

The defendant, while incarcerated at a federal correctional institution in Petersburg, Virginia, created and possessed obscene visual depictions of the sexual abuse of children. Correctional officers discovered these materials during a routine search of his cell, and the defendant admitted to making and possessing them. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), which criminalize such conduct when committed within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a bench trial after the defendant waived his right to a jury. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg and argued that the prison’s status as federal territory was a legal question for the court. The district court found the government had not established an interstate commerce basis for jurisdiction but concluded that FCI Petersburg was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, relying on the federal government’s practical usage and dominion over the facility. The court took judicial notice of this status and convicted the defendant. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of federal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion and imposed a 180-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while the government must prove to the factfinder where the offense occurred, the legal status of that location as within federal jurisdiction is a question for the court, based on legislative facts that may be judicially noticed. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by not fully analyzing the statutory requirements for federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded for the district court to properly determine FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on three federal charges related to the sexual abuse of a minor family member, with the alleged conduct spanning several years. The charges carried varying statutory penalties, with one count carrying a potential life sentence. The parties negotiated three separate plea agreements. The first agreement involved the defendant pleading guilty to the most serious count in exchange for dismissal of the other two, with a stipulated sentence of thirteen to fifteen years. The second agreement had the defendant pleading guilty to the two lesser counts, with the most serious count dismissed and no agreement as to sentence. The third agreement involved guilty pleas to all counts and a stipulated maximum sentence of 235 months. The victim and her family supported the plea agreements to avoid the trauma of trial.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected the first plea agreement, finding the stipulated sentence insufficient given the seriousness and duration of the abuse. After the parties’ motion to reconsider was denied, they entered the second plea agreement. The district court also rejected this agreement, reasoning that it improperly limited the court’s sentencing discretion by dismissing the count with the greatest sentencing exposure. The court accepted the third plea agreement and imposed a 235-month sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in rejecting the first two agreements. The government agreed that the court erred in rejecting the second agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the first, hybrid plea agreement, but abused its discretion in rejecting the second, which was a charge bargain. The appellate court found that the district court failed to show proper deference to prosecutorial discretion in charge bargains. The court vacated the convictions and sentence, remanding for reconsideration of the second plea agreement, but declined to reassign the case to a different judge. View "United States v. Papke" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

Police responded to reports of gunfire at a rowhouse in Southeast Washington, D.C., where they found spent shell casings but no suspects. Reviewing footage from a recently installed pole-mounted surveillance camera, officers observed a man firing a gun from the rear of the residence and later identified him as Demetrius Green. A search warrant executed that day at the residence uncovered large quantities of narcotics, digital scales, and a firearm. Green attempted to flee but was apprehended inside. Evidence linking Green to the residence included identification cards, personal items, and data from his cellphone, which contained a photograph of a bag of powder on a scale and a text message referencing drug sales.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Green’s motion to suppress the pole-camera footage, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surveilled. The court also admitted the challenged exhibits from Green’s cellphone, determining they were relevant to show knowledge and intent, and that any risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. At trial, Green was convicted by a jury on four counts related to drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment and appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the area surveilled was exposed to public view and the surveillance was brief. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish Green’s constructive possession of the drugs, given his connection to the residence and the items found. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged exhibits were properly admitted, and even if their admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

Police in Cheyenne, Wyoming, responded to a call about an unconscious man in a vehicle and arrested Derek Ascherin after finding drug paraphernalia and nearly 24 grams of suspected fentanyl pills. During the investigation, law enforcement suspected that Traquevis Dewayne Hardy was supplying fentanyl to Ascherin. Officers obtained a warrant to search Hardy’s Facebook messages, which revealed communications about fentanyl transactions. Hardy was later arrested in April 2023 with nine fentanyl pills in his possession.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming indicted Hardy for conspiracy to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl between July and December 2022. After a three-day trial, a jury found Hardy guilty. At sentencing, the district court attributed 1,773 grams of fentanyl to Hardy, relying in part on statements from a confidential source, and sentenced him to 168 months in prison. Hardy objected to the drug quantity calculation, arguing it was based on unreliable hearsay, but the district court overruled his objection. Hardy appealed his conviction and sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed three issues: whether Hardy’s absence from an in-chambers evidentiary ruling violated due process, whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of his later possession of fentanyl under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and whether the sentencing court erred in relying on uncorroborated hearsay to determine drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit held that Hardy’s absence from the in-chambers conference did not violate due process and that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence did not affect the verdict. However, the court found clear error in the sentencing court’s reliance on uncorroborated hearsay for drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Hardy’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Hardy" on Justia Law

A resident of Lucas County, along with his nephews, was involved in a drug-selling enterprise known as the Tecumseh Street Gang, which operated primarily on the 800 block of Tecumseh Street in Toledo. The group was a subset of a larger gang, the Southside Gangster Disciples. Law enforcement, using a confidential informant, discovered that a woman named Armijo was distributing cocaine for the Tecumseh Street Gang. On several occasions, Armijo purchased cocaine from one of the nephews in Lucas County and then traveled to Henry County to resell the drugs. She often bought the drugs on credit, keeping a portion of the profits after paying the supplier.The defendant was charged in the Henry County Court of Common Pleas with engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. At trial, he argued that venue was improper in Henry County because Armijo was not part of the same enterprise. The trial court denied his motion for acquittal, and the jury found him guilty, also finding that venue was proper. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the evidence supported the finding that Armijo was associated with the same enterprise and that her activities in Henry County established proper venue.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether venue in Henry County was appropriate for prosecuting the defendant under R.C. 2923.32. The court held that venue was proper in any county where a member of the enterprise conducted activity on behalf of the enterprise, even if the defendant himself did not act there. The court found sufficient evidence that Armijo was associated with the enterprise and that her drug sales in Henry County were part of its activities. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

A man who had attended elementary school with a woman, but had never been friends or even acquaintances with her, began contacting her more than a decade later. The woman, A.P., posted on her public Instagram account for her 29th birthday, and the man, Dorian Crawl, commented with a “sad emoji” and a message expressing affection and a desire to meet. A.P. did not respond. Days later, Crawl commented again on another post, asking if the video showed her house. Less than a month after these online interactions, Crawl appeared uninvited at A.P.’s apartment, knocked on her door, identified himself as her “friend,” and turned the doorknob. A.P., frightened, locked the door, hid her daughter, and called the police. Crawl later admitted to police that he had found A.P.’s address online and continued to message her even after being confronted by law enforcement. A.P. testified that these events caused her significant anxiety and changes to her daily life.The Miamisburg Municipal Court found Crawl guilty of menacing by stalking under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Crawl’s pattern of conduct—including the social media messages and the uninvited visit—along with A.P.’s testimony about her mental distress, was sufficient to support the conviction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. The court held that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of menacing by stalking were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court clarified that explicit threats, a prior relationship, or notice from the victim are not required to establish the offense. The court concluded that Crawl’s actions constituted a pattern of conduct, caused mental distress, and were done knowingly. View "State v. Crawl" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Jamaal Smith during an attempted robbery at an apartment complex in Warner Robins, Georgia, on November 16, 2020. On the night of the incident, Smith and two friends, Moss and Brown, accompanied Terrence Rouse to the complex, where Rouse intended to buy marijuana. Testimony established that Rouse, armed with a gun, persuaded Smith to accompany him to an apartment, where a confrontation and shooting occurred. Smith was shot and later died at the hospital. Moss and Brown, who were present at the scene, identified Rouse as the perpetrator. Physical evidence included a handprint on the car used to transport Smith and ballistics evidence, though the latter was inconclusive as to the fatal bullet’s source.After the incident, Rouse was indicted on multiple counts, including three counts of felony murder predicated on different felonies, as well as related charges. He was tried individually in the Superior Court of Houston County and found guilty on all counts except for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which was nolle prossed. The trial court sentenced Rouse to life with the possibility of parole on one count of felony murder, merging the remaining counts. Rouse’s motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Rouse argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that his trial counsel was ineffective for not publishing certain jail letters to the jury, and that the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a prior drug deal. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence was sufficient, counsel’s actions were reasonable trial strategy, and the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "ROUSE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law