Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Antonio Carrazco-Martinez was investigated by federal authorities for his alleged involvement in a drug trafficking operation with ties to Chicago and Mexico. Law enforcement, after obtaining judicial warrants, used a cell-site simulator to locate his new phone and a closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera to monitor activity in the garage of a stash house. The investigation led to his indictment for conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Carrazco-Martinez sought to suppress evidence obtained from both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera, arguing that their use was unlawful, but these motions were denied.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carrazco-Martinez’s motions to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera warrants. The court found that the government’s warrant applications were not misleading and that the warrants were neither so lacking in probable cause nor so deficient in scope as to invalidate reliance on them. At trial, the court also overruled Carrazco-Martinez’s objection to a jury instruction (Instruction 28), which stated that the government did not have to prove the specific quantity of drugs alleged, only a measurable quantity, to establish guilt. The jury convicted him on both counts, and his post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that Carrazco-Martinez failed to rebut the presumption of good faith regarding both warrants. It further held that the challenged jury instruction, when read with the accompanying instruction, correctly stated the law, as drug quantity is a sentencing factor rather than an element of the charged offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Carrazco-Martinez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant charged with kidnapping his fiancée, L.S., for ransom or extortion. At the time of the alleged offense, L.S. was under a temporary conservatorship due to a probate court’s finding that she was “gravely disabled” as defined by the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (LPS Act), and the San Bernardino County Public Guardian was appointed as her conservator. After the defendant subpoenaed L.S. to testify in his defense at the preliminary hearing, the Public Guardian moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that L.S. was incompetent to testify by virtue of the probate court’s grave disability finding.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted the motion to quash, ruling that the finding of grave disability was tantamount to a finding of incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701, and that the issue did not need to be relitigated. The defendant then petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the trial court’s legal conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that a finding of grave disability under the LPS Act does not by itself establish incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701. The standards for grave disability and testimonial competence are distinct, and incompetence to testify may not be presumed from a grave disability finding or an involuntary medication order. The appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash, to enter a new order denying the motion, and to determine L.S.’s competence to testify under the correct legal standard. The previously ordered stay was vacated upon issuance of the remittitur. View "Esparza v. Super Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting kidnapping after an incident in Detroit. The events began when the defendant was shot during a confrontation involving rival gang members, after which the victim was taken by the defendant’s associates for interrogation. The victim was confined, threatened, and beaten at the defendant’s home, with parts of the incident recorded and later shared in an Instagram group chat. After these events, the victim was driven around, further assaulted, and eventually released.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan oversaw the trial. The court denied the defendant’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from social media accounts, motions to exclude alleged co-conspirator statements, and ruled partially in favor of the government’s effort to limit cross-examination of the victim. After a weeklong trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of conspiracy but found him guilty of aiding and abetting kidnapping. The district court sentenced him to 198 months in prison and imposed several special conditions of supervised release, some of which were only included in the written judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court on four grounds: the denial of suppression motions, the admission of co-conspirator statements, the limitation on cross-examination, and the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction. The appellate court held that the defendant’s constitutional and evidentiary challenges failed. However, it found a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment regarding two special conditions of supervised release. The court remanded the case to the district court to resolve this discrepancy and, if needed, to consider the constitutional challenges to those conditions. View "United States v. Blake" on Justia Law

Brandie Nicole Appleton, along with an accomplice, burglarized a Tennessee pharmacy, stealing substantial quantities of controlled substances, firearm parts, and ammunition. After fleeing the scene and attempting to evade law enforcement, Appleton was apprehended, and the stolen items were recovered from her vehicle. Appleton subsequently pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and possessing stolen ammunition. As part of her plea agreement, she waived her right to appeal any sentence within or below the Sentencing Guidelines range.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee determined Appleton’s Guidelines range to be 41 to 51 months of imprisonment but, noting her progress in overcoming addiction and her personal circumstances, sentenced her to five years of probation. The district court warned her of serious consequences if she violated any probation conditions. Approximately six weeks later, Appleton was arrested for possessing an unprescribed controlled substance, which constituted a violation of her probation. After a revocation hearing, the district court sentenced her to 44 months of imprisonment, within the original Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Appleton’s appeal, in which she argued that the district court erred in imposing her sentence after revoking her probation. The government contended that her appeal was barred by the waiver in her plea agreement. The Sixth Circuit held that Appleton’s appeal waiver applied to any sentence within the Guidelines range, including one imposed after probation revocation for the same underlying offense. The court concluded that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made, encompassed her present claims, and did not fall under any exceptions. Therefore, the court dismissed her appeal. View "United States v. Appleton" on Justia Law

An individual who served as Executive Director of a local economic development authority in Virginia was indicted on thirty-four counts stemming from multiple fraudulent schemes. These included wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant used forged documents and misrepresentations to divert public funds for personal gain. One scheme involved a $2 million wire transfer, where the defendant lied to both her employer and others, using another person’s identity to facilitate the movement of funds. The trial was repeatedly delayed due to health issues experienced by the defendant and her counsel, resulting in significant breaks and several motions for mistrial by the defense.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia presided over the trial, ultimately entering judgments of acquittal on four counts of bank fraud but allowing the remaining convictions to stand. The court denied the defendant’s motions for mistrial, a new trial, and to introduce certain grand jury testimony. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining counts, the defendant was sentenced accordingly. The defendant appealed, challenging the aggravated identity theft conviction, the handling of trial delays, evidentiary rulings, and a supplemental jury instruction given after closing arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under Dubin v. United States, the aggravated identity theft conviction could not stand because the use of another’s identity was not at the “crux” of the predicate wire fraud offense. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on that count and remanded for resentencing. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues, including denial of a mistrial, exclusion of grand jury testimony, and the propriety of the additional jury instruction. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The appellant joined two friends at a Las Vegas recording studio to make music, but an argument ensued. After being asked to leave, the appellant returned outside, and another dispute occurred. Surveillance footage showed the appellant firing nine shots at the two men, resulting in one fatality and serious injuries to the other. The appellant then demanded a vehicle and left the scene, later discarding firearms in the desert. He was charged with multiple offenses including murder, attempted murder, robbery, and grand larceny auto.The case was first heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County. Prior to trial, several delays occurred, including competency evaluations and changes in counsel, mostly prompted by the appellant or for his benefit. The appellant sought to suppress evidence, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and eventually requested to represent himself. After multiple competency assessments, the district court found him competent, allowed self-representation, and provided an investigator for assistance. After an eight-day trial, a jury found the appellant guilty of all charged offenses. The district court denied his motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rights and sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty-eight years.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed claims that the appellant was not competent to represent himself, his waiver of counsel was not valid, his speedy trial rights were violated, evidence was improperly destroyed, compulsory process was denied, and jury instructions were erroneous. The court held that the district court properly found the appellant competent to waive counsel and represent himself, rejected claims of speedy trial violations as the delays were attributable to the appellant, found no bad faith or undue prejudice in evidence destruction, determined compulsory process was satisfied, and concluded any jury instruction error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the convictions. View "DUCKKET VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Paul Engstrom pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and money laundering conspiracy, admitting to involvement in distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine—an offense carrying a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. In his plea agreement, Engstrom acknowledged he was ineligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and agreed not to seek such relief. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the court imposed a 70-month sentence, below the guideline range but above the statutory minimum, citing Engstrom’s difficult pretrial detention and his coconspirators’ similar sentences.Following sentencing, the district court held a resentencing hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, aiming to correct a perceived technical error in considering the mandatory minimum after granting Engstrom safety valve relief. The court concluded that Engstrom was eligible for safety valve relief, finding that his statements in open court were sufficient, and imposed a 46-month sentence, below the statutory minimum. The government moved for reconsideration, arguing Engstrom had not satisfied the statutory debrief requirement and was ineligible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. United States, issued during the appeal, which interpreted § 3553(f)(1) to preclude safety valve relief if any one of three criminal history criteria applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s resentencing decision for plain error and found no error in holding the Rule 35 hearing. However, the Ninth Circuit held that Engstrom was not eligible for safety valve relief because he did not provide a complete debrief to the government as required by § 3553(f)(5), and, under Pulsifer, his prior three-point conviction categorically precluded relief. The court reversed the district court, vacated Engstrom’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without safety valve relief. View "USA V. ENGSTROM" on Justia Law

An individual was indicted in Oregon for unauthorized use and possession of a stolen vehicle, alleged to have occurred in August 2021. After the charges were initially dismissed without prejudice in October 2022 due to the state's inability to appoint counsel, the same charges were refiled in April 2024. Upon arraignment, the defendant requested appointed counsel and was found eligible, but no attorney was available. Despite multiple hearings over several months to appoint counsel, the defendant remained unrepresented and subject to pretrial release conditions, including mandatory court appearances and restrictions on travel.In December 2024, a volunteer attorney entered a limited appearance to file a motion to dismiss based on the lack of counsel, arguing violations of Oregon's constitutional right to counsel. The Multnomah County Circuit Court denied the motion, noting the case was in "suspended animation" due to the absence of counsel. The defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for mandamus relief. While briefing was ongoing, the trial court ultimately dismissed the criminal case without prejudice in April 2025, citing lack of available attorneys.The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the mandamus petition and found the case was moot since the underlying criminal charges had already been dismissed. However, the court exercised its discretion under ORS 14.175 to address the recurring legal issue. On the merits, the court held that the state violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution by failing to appoint counsel post-arraignment for an extended period. The court determined that dismissal without prejudice is an appropriate remedy for such violations and established a general rule: if an eligible defendant is unrepresented for more than 60 consecutive days in a misdemeanor case or 90 consecutive days in a felony case post-arraignment, dismissal without prejudice is required. The alternative writ of mandamus was dismissed as moot. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The case concerns an altercation in Sheridan, Wyoming, during which Cody McCalla and his friend encountered Patrick Mudd and Mudd's girlfriend over a parking dispute. After a verbal confrontation, McCalla and his friend moved their vehicle and proceeded toward the fairgrounds. Mudd stood on the sidewalk, and a second confrontation ensued between McCalla and Mudd, escalating into physical violence. After several exchanges, McCalla ultimately punched Mudd, causing him to fall, hit his head, and later die from his injuries. McCalla was charged with involuntary manslaughter.The District Court of Sheridan County reviewed several pretrial motions. McCalla moved to compel production of unredacted law enforcement reports, which the district court denied, finding the redacted portions exempt from disclosure under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. McCalla also moved to dismiss the charge, claiming immunity from prosecution under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-602(f) on grounds of self-defense. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, requiring McCalla to proceed first, as his motion alone did not establish a prima facie case. After testimony, the district court found McCalla met his prima facie burden, but the State proved by a preponderance of evidence that McCalla was the initial aggressor in the second altercation and did not use reasonable defensive force, denying immunity.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeal. It held the district court did not err in requiring McCalla to proceed first at the evidentiary hearing, found no error in the district court’s determination that McCalla was the initial aggressor and thus not entitled to self-defense immunity under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-602(f), and declined to address the discovery issue, as it was not properly preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Mccalla v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with first-degree murder after the fatal shooting of an individual at a bar. The investigation initially yielded no suspect, but the defendant voluntarily approached police, admitted being present at the scene, and expressed concern about possibly doing something “bad.” Over several days, police recovered relevant evidence, including a firearm and clothing linked to the defendant, and conducted multiple interviews. After a polygraph test indicated deception, detectives confronted the defendant, leading to a confession. The defendant was subsequently indicted, and his counsel moved to suppress the confession, arguing it was coerced and a false confession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, denied the suppression motion, finding the confession was not the result of improper coercion. Defense counsel then disclosed a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Manlove, as an expert on false confessions. The State objected to the admissibility of Dr. Manlove’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and requested a Daubert hearing. After the hearing, the circuit court allowed Dr. Manlove’s testimony on certain general topics related to false confessions but imposed restrictions prohibiting him from relating his testimony to the specific facts of the case or opining that the defendant’s confession was coerced.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling. Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Court held the circuit court erred by admitting Dr. Manlove’s testimony. The Court found the proffered expert opinions lacked reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and that the testimony was not helpful to the jury given the restrictions imposed and absence of a reliable methodology. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order permitting the expert testimony and remanded for further proceedings. View "State V. Huante" on Justia Law