Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After being suspended from his long-term employment at a Walmart in Southaven, Mississippi, following an incident involving a coworker, the defendant planned and executed a violent attack targeting those he blamed for his suspension. Three days after the suspension, he shot and killed two Walmart managers, set fire to the store, and, during his attempted escape, shot a responding police officer. Surveillance footage captured the events, and the defendant admitted to the killings, arson, and shooting the officer during trial.A jury in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County convicted the defendant of two counts of capital murder and one count of attempted murder. The jury sentenced him to death for each capital murder conviction and to life imprisonment for the attempted murder. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed several claims: that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from locations other than the crime scene; that the evidence was insufficient to support the capital murder convictions because the arson and murders were not part of one continuous transaction; that the verdicts were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and that the court should abandon the M’Naghten Rule as the standard for insanity. The Supreme Court found no error in the admission of evidence, held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under the one-continuous-transaction doctrine, determined the verdicts were not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and declined to abandon the M’Naghten Rule. The court also found the death sentences were not disproportionate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "Abram v. State" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Minnesota, after which law enforcement discovered a self-assembled pistol in his car that lacked a serial number. He admitted to possessing the firearm and not having a permit to carry it. The firearm, a Glock 19-style pistol, was constructed from parts purchased in 2021, before new federal regulations required serial numbers on certain parts kits. He was charged with felony possession of a firearm without a serial number under Minnesota law, as well as carrying a pistol without a permit.The Anoka County District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge related to the serial number, finding that while he knowingly possessed a firearm without a serial number, the relevant Minnesota statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied. The State appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the statute plainly applied to any firearm lacking a serial number, regardless of whether federal law required one, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case. It held that Minnesota Statutes section 609.667(3) criminalizes possession of a firearm without a serial number only if federal law requires that the firearm have a serial number. The court reasoned that Minnesota has no independent serial number regime and that the statute’s reference to federal law means only firearms required by federal law to have serial numbers are covered. Because the defendant’s firearm was not required by federal law to have a serial number, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court. View "State v. Vagle" on Justia Law

An American accountant and financial executive, who worked extensively in Russia, was investigated for failing to timely file U.S. tax returns and for concealing substantial assets in Swiss bank accounts. He received millions of dollars in compensation, which he deposited in Swiss accounts held under nominee names. After being notified by Swiss banks of compliance requirements, he transferred accounts and listed his then-wife as the beneficial owner. He did not file timely tax returns or required Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs) for several years, later attempting to participate in the IRS’s Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures by certifying his failures were non-willful. However, he omitted at least one account from his 2014 FBAR.A grand jury in the Middle District of Florida indicted him on multiple tax-related charges. At trial, the jury convicted him on four counts: failure to file income tax returns for 2013 and 2014, making false statements on his Streamlined certification, and failure to file a compliant 2014 FBAR. The district court sentenced him to 86 months’ imprisonment and ordered over $4 million in restitution to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations for the 2013 and 2014 failure-to-file tax return charges because the government’s application for tolling did not specifically identify those offenses, nor did the court make the required findings. As a result, the convictions on those counts were reversed as time-barred. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the email search, finding no abuse of discretion in deeming the motion untimely. The court also found no constructive amendment or material variance regarding the FBAR charge. The sentence and restitution order were vacated and remanded for resentencing and further findings on restitution. View "United States v. Gyetvay" on Justia Law

Lawrence Florentine killed his wife, Nicole, during an interstate trip that began in North Carolina. After her death, he attempted to conceal the crime by burning her body and burying the remains in a Kentucky cemetery. Surveillance and forensic evidence established that Nicole was already dead when Florentine set her body on fire. The government charged Florentine with several felonies, including interstate domestic violence resulting in death and use of fire to commit a felony, with the latter charge based on his burning of Nicole’s corpse after her death.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge, holding that interstate domestic violence is a continuing offense that had not ended at the time Florentine used fire. Florentine entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss Count 4. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory consecutive sentence for the use-of-fire count, and stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if the use-of-fire charge had been dismissed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the crime of interstate domestic violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), ends when the victim dies. Acts undertaken to conceal the crime after the victim’s death, such as burning the body, are not part of the offense. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge. However, because the district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence regardless, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded solely for entry of an amended judgment, finding resentencing unnecessary. View "United States v. Florentine" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while driving in Memphis, Tennessee, nearly collided with a police vehicle. When officers attempted to stop him, he fired several shots at them, with one bullet striking the police car and narrowly missing an officer. After a pursuit that ended in a crash, the defendant was arrested. A search of his vehicle revealed a loaded Glock 23 handgun equipped with a device that converted it into a machinegun, as defined by federal law. The defendant did not have a valid registration for the machinegun and did not dispute that the weapon met the statutory definition.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the motion, holding that § 922(o) was constitutional. The defendant then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 108 months in prison, after which he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(o) under District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen because Bruen did not alter the relevant aspects of Heller. The court further conducted an independent analysis under the text-and-history methodology set forth in Heller and Bruen, concluding that § 922(o) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(o) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to the defendant. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Jose Farias orchestrated a large-scale drug trafficking operation that brought significant quantities of heroin and cocaine into the Chicago area during 2015 and 2016. He worked with a network of co-conspirators, using tractor-trailers with hidden compartments to transport drugs from Texas to Illinois. Law enforcement, tipped off early by a Texas truck dispatcher, conducted surveillance and seized substantial amounts of drugs at multiple locations. Several co-conspirators were arrested and cooperated with authorities, providing testimony and participating in recorded calls with Farias that further implicated him.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Farias’s trial. The government presented testimony from cooperating witnesses and law enforcement agents, as well as recordings and translated transcripts of Farias’s conversations. The jury convicted Farias of conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court denied Farias’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of voice identification testimony, and the jury instructions regarding translated transcripts. At sentencing, the court attributed 130 kilograms of heroin and 45 kilograms of cocaine to Farias, applied a leadership enhancement, and sentenced him to 300 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Farias’s challenges to the admission of voice identification testimony, the jury instructions on translated transcripts, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the sentencing calculations. The court held that the admission of the agent’s voice identification did not violate Farias’s constitutional rights, that Farias had waived any objection to the jury instructions on translated transcripts, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that the district court did not clearly err in its drug quantity findings or in applying the leadership enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Farias" on Justia Law

Jason Servil was charged with murder and aggravated assault after he fatally stabbed his ex-girlfriend and attacked a man accompanying her with a crowbar. Following his indictment, Servil entered into a plea agreement with the State, capping his potential sentence for murder at forty-five years, though he was permitted to argue for a lesser term. He pleaded guilty to both charges, and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing, during which it heard statements from the victims’ family members, a mental health professional, Servil’s relatives, and Servil himself.The Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket accepted Servil’s guilty pleas and, after the sentencing hearing, imposed a forty-five-year sentence for murder and a concurrent ten-year sentence for aggravated assault, along with restitution. During sentencing, the court conducted the required two-step analysis for murder convictions, considering aggravating and mitigating factors. Notably, the court independently obtained and read the victim’s obituary into the record as part of its analysis of the subjective effect on the victim. Servil appealed, arguing that the court’s use of the obituary constituted an abuse of discretion and violated his rights. The Sentence Review Panel granted his application for leave to appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the sentencing court abused its discretion by relying on information from the victim’s obituary, which it had obtained independently and was not disclosed to the defense prior to sentencing. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this reliance on extrajudicial information was impermissible and that the error was not harmless. As a result, the Court vacated Servil’s sentences and remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge. View "State of Maine v. Servil" on Justia Law

The case concerns Neil T. MacLean, who was convicted by a jury of attempted murder and two counts of arson after he set fire to his bed in an apartment building where he and his wife lived, along with other residents. On the night of the incident, MacLean had been drinking and was aware that his wife was sleeping nearby. After the fire started, his wife called 9-1-1, and police officers evacuated her and eventually removed MacLean from the burning apartment. No fatalities occurred, but two officers suffered smoke inhalation. MacLean later admitted to an investigator that he intended to kill himself, his wife, and the other residents.Following the incident, MacLean was charged and underwent mental health evaluations. He pleaded not guilty, and after unsuccessful settlement discussions and further mental health examination, the case proceeded to a jury trial in the Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years, with all but fifteen years suspended, for attempted murder, and concurrent fifteen-year sentences for the arson convictions, plus probation. MacLean appealed, raising issues regarding jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and prosecutorial conduct.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not commit obvious error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of abnormal condition of the mind, as the evidence did not warrant such an instruction. The court also found that any error in admitting testimony from MacLean’s wife was harmless, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or curative instruction after the prosecutor referred to the wife as a hostile witness. However, the court agreed with both parties that the convictions should have been merged for sentencing, so it vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, while affirming the judgment of conviction in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. MacLean" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after a bench trial of several offenses, including attempted murder, domestic violence aggravated assault, domestic violence criminal threatening, assault on an officer, and violating a condition of release. The convictions arose from an incident in which the defendant, following a period of repeated contact with his former partner, attacked her in a hotel parking lot. The attack involved strangulation, threats to kill, and physical violence, resulting in significant injuries to the victim. Bystanders, including a hotel clerk and a van driver, intervened, and police officers ultimately subdued and arrested the defendant after a struggle in which an officer was bitten and his firearm was nearly taken.The Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket (Murphy, J.) found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses. At sentencing, the court imposed a thirty-year sentence for attempted murder, with all but eighteen years suspended and four years of probation, and additional sentences for the other convictions. In determining the sentence for attempted murder, the court considered the brutality and persistence of the attack as aggravating factors, as well as the defendant’s lack of criminal history and acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. The court declined to treat the defendant’s “blind jealous rage” as a mitigating factor, finding it was not a biologically based mental illness.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed two arguments: that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment by not considering the defendant’s “blind rage” as a mitigating factor, and that the court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the defendant assaulted the hotel clerk. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require a sentencing court in a noncapital case to consider unprovoked “blind rage” as a mitigating factor. However, the Court found plain error in the trial court’s reliance on an unsupported finding that the defendant assaulted the hotel clerk as an aggravating factor. The judgment of sentence for attempted murder was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "State of Maine v. Goncalves" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a Rosebud Sioux Tribe police officer stopped a black Chevy Impala after observing it attempt to avoid his patrol car and learning that its license plates were registered to a different vehicle. The driver, Lydia Stead, and the passenger, Tevin Thin Elk, Sr., could not provide ownership documents. While the officer checked the vehicle’s VIN and their licenses, another officer arrived with a trained drug-detection dog, Iwan. During the stop, Iwan alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Shortly after, the officer learned that Stead had an outstanding warrant and arrested both Stead and Thin Elk. A search of the vehicle revealed a firearm, and a search of Thin Elk uncovered marijuana and a pen testing positive for methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota held two hearings on Thin Elk’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches. The court denied the motion, finding that Thin Elk lacked standing to challenge the vehicle search as a mere passenger, that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged, and that the canine alert provided probable cause for the search. The court credited the officers’ testimony and found the drug-detection dog to be reliable, despite expert testimony to the contrary.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that Thin Elk did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the stop was not unlawfully extended, and the dog’s alert established probable cause for the search. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s credibility determinations regarding the officers and the reliability of the canine. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Tevin Thin Elk, Sr." on Justia Law