Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a neighbor in April 2020. The defendant, who had a prior falling out with the victim, was accused of attacking the victim with a skateboard following a brief verbal exchange. In September 2023, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting a recent diagnosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating he suffered from major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. The court acknowledged the recent diagnosis but concluded that because the diagnosis was made three years after the offense, it did not demonstrate that the mental disorder played a significant role in the commission of the crime. The court did not find clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was a contributing factor, and the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. After his plea, the defendant renewed his motion for diversion and sought to withdraw his plea, but both motions were denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that under the amended Penal Code section 1001.36, a qualifying mental health diagnosis made within five years of the diversion request creates a presumption that the disorder contributed to the charged offense. The trial court erred by imposing a stricter timing requirement and by failing to recognize the statutory presumption. Because the prosecution did not present clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the defendant’s suitability for diversion, rather than eligibility. If found suitable, diversion may be granted; otherwise, the conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. Harlow" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant, while on probation, delivered an unexpected punch to a friend, causing the victim to fall and sustain a fatal brain injury. The two had been drinking with others, and after a separate altercation, the victim attempted to calm the defendant. As the victim backed away, the defendant struck him, resulting in the victim’s head hitting the street. The defendant fled the scene. The victim died from catastrophic brain swelling due to the impact.A jury in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for human life. The defendant admitted to a prior serious felony and a prior strike under California’s “Three Strikes” law. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the strike and imposed a 27-year sentence, consisting of the upper term for manslaughter, doubled for the strike, plus an enhancement for the prior serious felony. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the required risk of death for voluntary manslaughter and that the jury instructions were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, instructing reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that the “high degree of probability of death” standard articulated in People v. Reyes applies only to implied malice murder, not to voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for life. The court found no error in the prosecutor’s statements or the jury instructions. However, the court determined that resentencing was required due to statutory changes and recent Supreme Court guidance on sentencing procedures. The sentence was reversed and remanded for full resentencing; the judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who kidnapped his estranged wife by luring her to his home, forcibly taking her keys and phone, and compelling her into his truck, where she saw a gun in the back seat. Throughout the ordeal, the victim was aware of the gun’s presence and testified that it deterred her from attempting escape, as she feared for her safety and the safety of others. The kidnapping followed two prior incidents of violence by the defendant against the victim, one of which also involved a gun. During the kidnapping, the defendant made explicit and implicit threats, including referencing the gun and threatening to drive off a cliff. The victim ultimately escaped and reported the crime to law enforcement, who arrested the defendant and recovered the firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia initially convicted the defendant on three counts: kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The court imposed a sentence that included a mandatory enhancement for the firearm offense. After subsequent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence,” the district court vacated the convictions for interstate domestic violence and the firearm offense, leaving only the kidnapping conviction. At resentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon during the kidnapping, which the district court applied over the defendant’s objection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s conduct—employing the gun to convey an imminent threat, rather than merely intimidating the victim with the possibility of future harm—constituted “use” under the relevant Sentencing Guideline. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the enhancement and the resulting sentence. View "US v. Faulls" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected that the defendant was involved in a drug trafficking operation based out of his apartment in a large, multi-unit building. To investigate further, officers, with the building management’s permission, conducted a warrantless dog sniff in the common hallway immediately outside the defendant’s apartment door. The trained dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and this information was used to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered drugs, firearms, and other evidence. The defendant was indicted on drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting his arguments that the dog sniff constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the dog sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because it only revealed the presence of contraband, and that the area outside the apartment door was not protected “curtilage” since it was a common hallway accessible to other residents and building staff. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to 150 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that a dog sniff at an apartment door in a common hallway does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established by United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, because it only reveals the presence of contraband. The court also held that the common hallway outside the apartment door is not curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had no right to exclude others from that area. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2010, an inmate killed his cellmate in an Arizona state prison, inflicting fatal blunt and sharp force injuries. The defendant was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder. The jury found three statutory aggravating factors: a prior conviction for a serious offense, the especially heinous or depraved manner of the crime, and that the offense was committed while in the custody of the state department of corrections. The jury determined that death was the appropriate sentence.The Arizona Supreme Court previously reviewed the case in 2017, affirming the conviction and the findings in the aggravation phase, but vacating the death sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase to comply with United States Supreme Court precedent regarding jury instructions on parole ineligibility. On remand, the defendant waived his right to counsel and to present mitigating evidence, a waiver the trial court found to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The penalty phase was conducted with the defendant representing himself, assisted by advisory counsel, but he did not present any mitigating evidence or argument. The jury again returned a death verdict, and the superior court imposed the sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case on automatic appeal. The court held that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant to be visibly restrained before the jury without making case-specific findings as required by Deck v. Missouri, but found that this error was not fundamental and did not prejudice the outcome, given the overwhelming aggravating evidence and the defendant’s own choices. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of mitigation was valid and that the trial court was not required to present mitigating evidence over his objection. The court found no abuse of discretion in the jury instructions, no fundamental error in declining to define “moral culpability,” and no prosecutorial error. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v RUSHING" on Justia Law

Nathan Nissenbaum was convicted in Illinois state court of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated domestic battery after an incident involving his former girlfriend, D.K. The evidence at trial included testimony from D.K., physical evidence, and Nissenbaum’s own admissions. Nissenbaum’s defense was that the encounter was consensual, based on their prior relationship and history of “rape play.” He was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.After his conviction, Nissenbaum filed a post-trial motion in the Illinois state court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his attorney failed to properly advise him about the risk of mandatory consecutive sentences and his realistic chances at trial, which he argued led him to reject a plea deal that would have resulted in a lesser sentence. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Nissenbaum had not demonstrated ineffective assistance, concluding he was adequately informed and would not have accepted a plea regardless. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding no prejudice from any alleged deficiencies, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Nissenbaum then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, renewing his ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied the petition, holding that the Illinois Appellate Court had not unreasonably applied federal law in finding no prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Seventh Circuit found that Nissenbaum failed to show a reasonable probability he would have accepted a plea offer but for counsel’s alleged errors, and thus habeas relief was barred. View "Nissenbaum v. Jennings" on Justia Law

On July 21, 2018, Sara Rodriguez and her daughters were carjacked at gunpoint in Chicago as they returned to their parked Chevrolet Equinox. Two armed men forced them out of the vehicle, which was then driven away by the assailants. Later that evening, a shooting occurred at a nearby park, and witnesses saw a man matching the carjacker’s description fleeing in a vehicle resembling the stolen Equinox. Early the next morning, police located the Equinox, but the occupants escaped after a crash. Inside the vehicle, officers found items linking Kashif Dukes to the car, including his cell phone, DNA, and a pistol later connected to the park shooting. Angelica Rodriguez initially gave a tentative identification of Dukes in a photo lineup, but seven months later, she identified him with high confidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Dukes’s trial. The government introduced evidence tying Dukes to the carjacking and shooting, including forensic and social media evidence. Dukes challenged the reliability of the eyewitness identification and objected to the admission of evidence about the uncharged shooting, arguing it was prejudicial. The jury found Dukes guilty of carjacking, brandishing a firearm during the carjacking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court denied Dukes’s motion for acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that evidence of the shooting was admissible as direct evidence of the charged firearm possession and, under Rule 404(b), as relevant to motive for the carjacking. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, noting that the jury could reasonably infer Dukes’s guilt from both direct and circumstantial evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Dukes" on Justia Law

Police arrested the defendant in August 2021 on an outstanding robbery warrant and found a handgun believed to be his. He was charged with several offenses, including first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) and (j), the latter applying when a person with a prior conviction subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) commits an unlawful weapons possession offense. The defendant had a 2017 reckless manslaughter conviction, qualifying as a NERA offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to the first-degree weapons charge, and the State recommended a ten-year sentence with a five-year mandatory parole disqualifier under the Graves Act. Defense counsel reserved the right to argue that the Graves Act did not apply to subsection (j).The Superior Court, Law Division, imposed the recommended sentence, including the Graves Act parole disqualifier. On appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, reasoning that subsection (j) was a grading statute that elevated the degree of the underlying offense and thus permitted application of the Graves Act’s mandatory minimums. The Appellate Division relied on legislative history and policy arguments, concluding that excluding subsection (j) from the Graves Act would produce an “absurd” result.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) creates a distinct, substantive first-degree offense that must be charged and proven independently, not merely a sentencing enhancement or grading provision. Because the Graves Act does not expressly include subsection (j) among the offenses subject to its mandatory parole ineligibility, a conviction under subsection (j) does not trigger the Graves Act’s mandatory minimums. The case was remanded for resentencing without the Graves Act parole disqualifier. View "State v. Cromedy" on Justia Law

In early 2015, Daniel Stewart was stopped by Indianapolis police for a traffic violation, leading to the discovery of a handgun, over $9,000 in cash, and more than 800 grams of illegal narcotics in his car. A subsequent search of his home revealed additional drugs, nearly $500,000 in cash, and five more firearms. Stewart was found to be laundering drug proceeds through sham businesses. He was convicted in November 2016 on multiple counts, including drug distribution, firearm possession, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially sentenced Stewart to life imprisonment plus five years. Stewart appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. He then sought postconviction relief, arguing that recent case law invalidated his sentence enhancements. The government conceded, and the district court ordered resentencing. At resentencing, the court imposed a 360-month term of imprisonment, considering Stewart's efforts at rehabilitation but also the severity of his crimes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Stewart's appeal of his resentencing. Stewart argued that the district court miscalculated his sentencing range under the career-offender guideline and misunderstood its discretion regarding his rehabilitation efforts. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court correctly applied the career-offender guideline and did not err in its consideration of Stewart's rehabilitation. The court also held that the district court provided a sufficient explanation for the increased sentences on the money laundering counts, which did not affect the overall sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Stewart's 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A defendant, Jerome Rogan, was convicted of sexual assault, but his conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i due to prosecutorial misconduct, preventing retrial. Alan Ahn, a former police officer, had his charges dismissed after a deferred acceptance of a no contest plea. Both Rogan and Ahn received expungement orders from the Department of the Attorney General and requested the court to seal their records.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially handled Ahn's case, where a grand jury indicted him on drug-related charges. After procedural complexities, including a motion to unseal records by Nick Grube, Ahn's charges were eventually dismissed. Rogan's case was straightforward, with his conviction being reversed by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the consolidated cases of Rogan and Ahn. The court held that under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 831-3.2(f), judicial records must be removed from the judiciary’s publicly accessible electronic databases (eCourt Kōkua) but remain accessible for in-person review at the courthouse. The court emphasized that the public has a constitutional right to access court records under article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution, which cannot be overridden by automatic sealing. The court also noted that the judiciary has exclusive control over its records under article VI, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. The court denied the motions to seal the records but granted the removal of the records from eCourt Kōkua. View "State v. Rogan." on Justia Law