Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ryan Barry, a probationer subject to warrantless search conditions, was implicated in drug trafficking by an anonymous tipster who reported that a person named "Ryan" was selling drugs from an apartment in Van Nuys, California. The tipster also mentioned that "Ryan" drove a red convertible Ford Mustang. Officer Giovanni Espinoza of the LAPD investigated and found Barry, who matched the description and was on post-release community supervision for felony convictions. Barry was observed driving a red Mustang near the apartment. During a subsequent encounter, Barry was found with drugs and did not deny living at the apartment when informed of the impending search. Barry's possession of a key to the apartment further supported the officers' belief that he resided there.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Barry's motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the apartment, as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing. Barry entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motion, and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard articulated in United States v. Grandberry, which requires probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at the location to be searched. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Barry's responses to Officer Espinoza, the anonymous tip, and Barry's possession of a key, established probable cause that Barry resided at the apartment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "USA V. BARRY" on Justia Law

Michael Cavagnolo was arrested and charged with making a terroristic threat after repeatedly calling the Hyde Park Police Department emergency line and threatening to commit violent acts against officers, their families, and Police Department property. The County Court set bail pursuant to CPL 510.10 (4) (a), which makes all violent felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02 bailable, except for two specific exceptions. However, CPL 510.10 (4) (g) makes bailable the felony crimes of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 but explicitly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat.The Appellate Division granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered Mr. Cavagnolo's release, holding that the authority to set bail for violent felony offenses under CPL 510.10 (4) (a) does not extend to the crime of making a terroristic threat because it is explicitly excluded under paragraph (g). One Justice dissented, arguing that the "specific trumps the general" canon does not apply because both paragraphs (a) and (g) are specific.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense under CPL 510.10 (4) (a). The Court reasoned that the disjunctive structure of CPL 510.10 (4) indicates that each paragraph sets forth a separate and distinct category of offenses qualifying for monetary bail, and one paragraph does not modify another. The Court found that the legislature did not intend to implicitly import paragraph (g)'s exclusion into paragraph (a). Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the habeas corpus proceeding was converted to a declaratory judgment action, with judgment granted in accordance with the opinion. View "People ex rel. Ellis v Imperati" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested and charged with several felony offenses, including attempted murder, for which bail was set and posted. While out on bail, the defendant was arrested again on charges of theft, larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property. These new charges were not qualifying offenses for bail on their own, but the prosecution requested bail under CPL 510.10 (4) (t), arguing that the defendant committed the new offenses while released on bail for the prior attempted murder charge. The court set bail, citing the defendant's release on bail for a prior violent felony.Defense counsel argued that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) only applies to defendants released on recognizance or non-monetary conditions, not those released on bail. The court rejected this interpretation and denied subsequent bail applications. Defense counsel then sought habeas relief from the Appellate Division, arguing that the statute did not apply to defendants released on bail. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ, holding that "released under conditions" includes bail.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) applies to defendants released on any condition, including bail. The court found that the statutory language did not limit its application to non-monetary conditions and that the legislature intended to create a mechanism for assigning bail to repeat offenders. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the habeas corpus proceeding was converted into a declaratory judgment action, and it was declared that a defendant arrested on new charges after being released on bail on a prior charge is "released under conditions" within the meaning of CPL 510.10 (4) (t). View "People ex rel. Welch v Maginley-Liddie" on Justia Law

In 2020, Brenda WW, a domestic violence survivor incarcerated for killing her partner, applied for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). Brenda had been convicted of manslaughter, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon, and was serving a 20-year sentence. The County Court denied her application, finding that she did not meet the criteria for resentencing under the DVSJA. The Appellate Division, however, found that Brenda satisfied the statutory criteria and reduced her sentences, noting that she had already served more time than the DVSJA maximum for her convictions. The court also stated that the excess time should be credited toward her postrelease supervision term, effectively leaving her with no postrelease supervision to serve.The County Court initially denied Brenda's application for resentencing, concluding that the abuse she suffered was neither substantial nor a significant contributing factor to her offense, and that her sentence was not unduly harsh. Brenda appealed this decision. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court's decision, granted Brenda's application for resentencing, and reduced her sentences. The Appellate Division imposed maximum periods of postrelease supervision but credited Brenda's excess time served toward this supervision, effectively eliminating it.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and addressed two main issues. First, the court held that the Appellate Division has plenary review power and can make its own factual findings, rejecting the People's argument that the Appellate Division should have reviewed the County Court's decision for abuse of discretion. Second, the court found that the Appellate Division erred in crediting Brenda's excess time served toward her postrelease supervision term. The DVSJA requires resentencing courts to impose a term of postrelease supervision, and excess time spent incarcerated cannot be credited toward that term. The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine the appropriate period of postrelease supervision. View "People v Brenda WW" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during a violent altercation. She claimed that she acted in self-defense, citing a history of severe physical abuse by the victim, including multiple incidents of strangulation and a recent sexual assault immediately preceding the stabbing. Several witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account of ongoing abuse, and an order of protection had previously been issued against the victim.The case was tried in Supreme Court, Erie County, where the defendant’s counsel pursued a justification defense under Penal Law § 35.15. During summation, the prosecutor misrepresented the defendant’s testimony by stating that she had never claimed to fear for her life, despite clear testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor also repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, using the term “lies” numerous times. Defense counsel did not object to these remarks. The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was unpreserved and that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. However, the Appellate Division did grant sentencing relief under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was denied meaningful representation due to her counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper summation remarks. The Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence and repeated personal attacks on the defendant’s credibility exceeded permissible advocacy and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any strategic justification for counsel’s silence, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. View "People v T.P." on Justia Law

Rochelle Gleason was convicted of aggravated trafficking of a scheduled drug that caused the death of a person. In October 2021, Gleason communicated with the decedent about purchasing fentanyl and heroin. On October 16, 2021, the decedent bought drugs from Gleason, consumed them, and died of acute intoxication from fentanyl and kratom. The Maine Office of the Chief Medical Examiner sent a blood sample to a lab, where several employees conducted tests. A forensic toxicologist, Chelsea Deisher, reviewed the data and documentation and developed a toxicology report indicating the presence of fentanyl and kratom in the decedent’s blood.The State charged Gleason on September 28, 2022, and she pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Deisher testified about the test results, although she did not conduct the tests herself. Gleason objected, arguing that her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her was violated because she could not cross-examine the actual testers. The trial court allowed Deisher’s testimony, and the jury found Gleason guilty. She was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with all but eight years suspended, and four years of probation. Gleason appealed the conviction.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, focusing on the Confrontation Clause issue. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, issued during the appeal, rejected the rationale that allowed experts to testify based on out-of-court statements not admitted for their truth. The court found that Deisher’s testimony relied on the truth of the data and documentation generated by others, which Gleason could not cross-examine. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial to determine whether the statements relied upon by Deisher were testimonial. View "State of Maine v. Gleason" on Justia Law

Aaron A. Robshaw was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket for gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class A), and unlawful sexual contact (Class B) against a minor. The incidents occurred in 2018 and 2019 when the victim was ten and eleven years old. The victim disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2019 and fully revealed the extent of the abuse four years later. During the trial, the State presented expert testimony on child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, which Robshaw objected to, arguing it would improperly bolster the victim's credibility.The trial court allowed the expert testimony, and after the State rested its case, the court granted Robshaw’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of gross sexual assault. The jury found Robshaw guilty on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Robshaw to twenty years' imprisonment followed by twenty years of supervised release. Robshaw appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing improper admission of expert testimony, misapplication of the law in sentencing, and abuse of discretion in imposing supervised release.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was limited to general information about delayed disclosure and did not directly bolster the victim's credibility. The court also found that the trial court properly applied the sentencing analysis, setting the basic term of imprisonment at the legislatively mandated minimum of twenty years and considering aggravating and mitigating factors. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-year period of supervised release, as it appropriately considered the need to protect the public and Robshaw’s history of sexual offenses. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, sentence, and period of supervised release. View "State of Maine v. Robshaw" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Willie James Hardy, was convicted of first-degree murder in 1993 and again in 1996 after being granted a new trial. Hardy has consistently maintained his innocence. In 2020, Hardy filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under Pennsylvania's Section 9543.1, seeking to test evidence from his case using modern DNA technology that was not available at the time of his trials. The evidence against Hardy was circumstantial, and previous DNA testing excluded him as a contributor.The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County denied Hardy's petition, reasoning that the request was untimely based on the precedent set by Commonwealth v. Edmiston, and that further testing would not provide substantially more accurate or probative results. The Superior Court affirmed this decision, emphasizing the delay in Hardy's request and the strength of the circumstantial evidence against him.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on three main issues: the timeliness of Hardy's request, the applicability of Section 9543.1(a)(2) regarding previously tested and untested evidence, and whether Hardy presented a prima facie case that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence. The court noted that the 2018 amendments to Section 9543.1 allow for DNA testing "at any time" and authorize retesting with newer technology.The Supreme Court held that Hardy's petition was timely, as the statute permits requests for DNA testing at any time and there was no indication that Hardy's request was intended to cause delay. The court also found that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of Section 9543.1(a)(2), as the statute allows for retesting with newer technology and does not preclude testing of previously untested evidence. Finally, the court concluded that Hardy met the prima facie burden by demonstrating a reasonable possibility that DNA testing could produce exculpatory evidence establishing his actual innocence.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ahmed Abdalla Allam was charged with possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of school grounds, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). Allam challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. The district court rejected his challenges, and Allam subsequently pled guilty. He then appealed the denial of his as-applied challenge.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas upheld the statute as constitutional, both facially and as applied to Allam, and denied his motion to dismiss. The court applied the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, finding no historical precursor to § 922(q)(2)(A) but concluded that late 19th-century prohibitions on possessing firearms in schools and near polling places were relevantly similar historical analogues. Following the denial of his motion, Allam pled guilty and was sentenced to 60 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Bruen framework, determining that the Second Amendment's plain text covered Allam's conduct. However, the court found that § 922(q)(2)(A) was consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, particularly when considering historical laws like the Statute of Northampton and going-armed laws, which restricted carrying firearms in a manner that posed a threat to public safety. The court also considered historical firearm regulations in educational settings and buffer zones around polling places, which supported the constitutionality of disarming a visibly threatening individual near a school.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Allam's as-applied challenge and upheld his guilty-plea conviction. View "USA v. Allam" on Justia Law