Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, an individual sought certiorari review of a district court order that declined to expunge two parole violation reports from 2006 and 2007. These reports were based on an arrest for driving while barred, a charge that was later dismissed and expunged. The individual argued that the parole violation reports should also be expunged under Iowa Code section 901C.2(1) because they were related to the dismissed charge.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the application for expungement, reasoning that the parole violation reports were administrative matters, not criminal cases, and thus not eligible for expungement under Chapter 901C. The court also denied the individual's alternative request to reclassify the case numbers to avoid the appearance of additional felony charges, stating that the FECR designation had no independent meaning and that reclassification would be a cosmetic remedy.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the individual was not entitled to expungement under section 901C.2(1) because the parole violation reports were administrative proceedings, not criminal cases, and were not dismissed. The court also found that the reports were more logically tied to the original criminal case that resulted in the individual's incarceration and parole, which had not been expunged. Additionally, the court declined to order a reclassification of the case numbers, noting that certiorari relief was not available as the district court had not acted illegally or exceeded its jurisdiction.The Iowa Supreme Court annulled the writ, affirming the district court's decision to deny expungement and reclassification of the parole violation reports. View "Doe v. Iowa District Court For Polk County" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted of third-degree theft after being caught on a store's video footage placing a bottle of liquor under his shirt and leaving without paying. He appealed his conviction and sentence, raising multiple challenges, including the denial of his motion to recuse the judge, the admission of hearsay testimony, the denial of his motion for a new trial, the remote nature of his sentencing hearing, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.The Iowa District Court for Greene County denied the defendant's motion to recuse, finding no evidence of bias or prejudice from the judge's previous representation of the defendant. The court also admitted a police officer's testimony about the defendant's friends' consistent version of events, which differed from the defendant's account, despite the defendant's hearsay objection. The court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, as he failed to raise the issue of a missing witness until after the jury's verdict. The sentencing hearing was conducted remotely due to the judge testing positive for COVID-19, and the defendant did not object to this at the time.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's arguments. The defendant then sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. It held that the defendant did not demonstrate any bias or prejudice from the judge's previous representation. The court found that the hearsay testimony was cumulative and not prejudicial due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. The court also ruled that the defendant failed to preserve error on his challenge to the remote sentencing hearing by not objecting at the time. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the imposition of consecutive sentences, given the defendant's extensive criminal history and the need for rehabilitation and community protection. View "State of Iowa v. Pirie" on Justia Law

In January 2023, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Juan David Cisneros's residence, resulting from a narcotics investigation. They found ammunition in his bedroom but no drugs or firearms attributable to him. Cisneros admitted to using the ammunition previously but claimed his mother-in-law purchased it. He was charged with possessing ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Cisneros's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Cisneros pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal on Second Amendment grounds. The court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, which included a four-level enhancement for possessing ammunition in connection with drug trafficking, and sentenced him to ninety-six months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Cisneros's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by precedent, and his as-applied challenge failed under plain error review. The court affirmed his conviction, finding no clear or obvious error in the application of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.However, the court found that the district court plainly erred in applying the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing ammunition in connection with another felony offense. The court noted that there was no evidence the ammunition facilitated drug trafficking, as required by precedent. This error affected Cisneros's substantial rights, as it likely resulted in a longer sentence. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Cisneros's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cisneros" on Justia Law

The case involves a road-rage incident in Marion County, Tennessee, where William Rimmel, III, aggressively pursued Bobbie Burke on the interstate while riding his motorcycle. Rimmel eventually broke the passenger window of Burke’s car using the slide of a loaded handgun. Although Rimmel never fired the handgun or pointed it at Burke, she was unaware that the object used to break the window was a gun. A jury convicted Rimmel of attempted aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment with a handgun.The Circuit Court for Marion County sentenced Rimmel to two years of probation for the attempted aggravated assault conviction and one year of probation for the reckless endangerment with a handgun conviction, among other sentences for misdemeanor convictions. Rimmel's motions for a new trial and judgment of acquittal were denied. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that a rational juror could conclude that Rimmel took a substantial step toward causing Burke to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury and that his conduct created a reasonable probability of danger.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed Rimmel’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault, concluding that the evidence showed Rimmel intended to place Burke in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury by using a handgun and took a substantial step toward doing so. However, the court reversed Rimmel’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a handgun, finding that the evidence did not establish that Rimmel’s conduct placed Burke in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death. The court dismissed the indictment for felony reckless endangerment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Rimmel" on Justia Law

Nikos Sharp was charged with several criminal offenses related to child abuse or neglect following an investigation by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Sharp sought information from DFS reports involving the alleged victim, E.S., which included the identities of individuals who reported the abuse. The district court ordered DFS to disclose this information despite DFS's objections.The district court reviewed the reports in camera and initially released redacted versions to Sharp. Sharp then requested unredacted versions, including the identities of the reporters. The district court granted this request, and DFS's motion for reconsideration was denied. DFS subsequently sought relief through an original writ petition.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 432B.290(4) provides a limited privilege for reporter identities, protecting them if DFS determines that disclosure would harm an investigation or the life or safety of any person. The court found that this limited privilege did not apply in this case because DFS had not made such a determination. Consequently, the district court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the reporter identities. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, affirming the district court's decision. View "Clark County Department of Family Services v. District Court" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Mary Mercedes was accused of animal cruelty based on evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her property. Officers visited her property multiple times after receiving complaints about the condition of her animals. During these visits, Mercedes allowed the officers to view the animals, and based on their observations, a search warrant was later issued. The officers then seized the animals, and Mercedes was charged with two counts of animal cruelty.The trial court granted Mercedes's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the property visits, ruling that the officers' consent to enter was invalid without providing Ferrier warnings, which inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, and revoke consent. The trial court dismissed the charges due to lack of probable cause. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Ferrier warnings were not required for the search of Mercedes's outdoor property and remanded the case to determine if her consent was voluntary.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Ferrier warnings are required only when officers seek to enter a person's home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime. Since the officers' visits to Mercedes's property were for investigative purposes and did not involve entering her home, Ferrier warnings were not necessary. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if Mercedes's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. View "State v. Mercedes" on Justia Law

Lydelle Turner was indicted on multiple counts following a drive-by shooting in Sioux Falls. He filed several motions, including a motion to suppress, a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment of acquittal, and a motion for a new trial, all of which were denied by the circuit court. Turner objected to the introduction of a screenshot photograph from a traffic camera video, but the court overruled this objection. The court also rejected three jury instructions proposed by Turner. Turner appealed these decisions.The circuit court denied Turner’s motion to suppress Driver’s identification, finding the identification procedure suggestive but necessary under the circumstances. The court also denied Turner’s motion to dismiss based on the late disclosure of a ballistics report, instead granting a continuance to allow Turner time to prepare. The court admitted the Milestone photograph into evidence, despite Turner’s objections regarding foundation and hearsay. Turner’s motion for judgment of acquittal was denied, with the court interpreting SDCL 22-14-20 as not requiring the State to prove that the vehicles were occupied at the time of the shooting. The court also denied Turner’s proposed jury instructions related to eyewitness identification and the interpretation of SDCL 22-14-20.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. It held that the show-up identification was necessary and reliable, the continuance was an appropriate remedy for the late disclosure of the ballistics report, and the admission of the Milestone photograph, though an abuse of discretion, was not prejudicial. The court also upheld the denial of Turner’s motion for judgment of acquittal and his proposed jury instructions, finding no abuse of discretion. Finally, the court found no due process violation in the handling of the Milestone video and Flores’ testimony, affirming the denial of Turner’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

Donika Rae Gonzales was convicted in 2014 by a jury of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated assault for beating her boyfriend’s four-year-old son to death. Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the jury district, which included residents from both Brule and Buffalo Counties, diluted the percentage of prospective Native American jurors, violating her constitutional rights. She also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorney’s failure to introduce certain evidence at trial. The habeas court found that the jury district violated both federal and state constitutions and reversed her conviction without addressing the ineffective assistance claims.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit initially sent jury questionnaires to only Buffalo County residents, but due to an inadequate number of responses, included Brule County residents as well, based on a 2011 standing order. Gonzales agreed to hold the trial in Brule County and use a combined jury pool from both counties. The jury pool consisted of 236 jurors, with 22% Native American representation, compared to 29% in the combined population of the two counties. Gonzales appealed her conviction, but it was summarily affirmed by the South Dakota Supreme Court in 2016.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the habeas court’s decision. The court held that the use of a jury district comprising Buffalo and Brule Counties did not violate the South Dakota Constitution’s requirement for a trial by a jury of the “county or district” where the offense occurred. The court also found that Gonzales failed to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, as the absolute disparity in Native American representation was only 7%, below the constitutional threshold. Consequently, Gonzales’ ineffective assistance claims were also deemed without merit, and the order granting habeas relief was vacated. View "Gonzales v. Markland" on Justia Law

Clifton A. Browne was involved in a physical altercation with Luther Brooks in the basement unit of a house owned by Valerie Mann. The altercation began after Browne, who was helping Mann with repairs, confronted Brooks about vacating the unit. During the fight, Browne repeatedly punched Brooks, who later fell and hit his head on concrete. Brooks was taken to the hospital, never regained consciousness, and died from multiple blunt force injuries. Browne was charged with second-degree murder.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia ruled that Browne's prior convictions in Maryland for second-degree assault could be used to impeach his credibility if he testified. Browne objected but chose not to testify. The jury found him not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Browne argued that his Maryland convictions should not be used for impeachment because Maryland law does not allow such use for second-degree assault, and the offense is equivalent to simple assault in D.C., which is not impeachable. The court held that under D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(1), the plain language of the statute allows for impeachment with convictions punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, regardless of the jurisdiction's specific rules on impeachment.The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, stating that the statute's bright-line rule was intended by Congress to avoid the discretionary approach and that the predictable consequences of this rule do not constitute absurdities. Therefore, Browne's conviction for voluntary manslaughter was affirmed. View "Browne v. United States" on Justia Law