Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Blake Brewer was arrested after stealing a sound system and monitor from a Walmart in Gillette, Wyoming, resulting in a loss of $1,887. At the time, Brewer was on parole for a prior fraud-by-check conviction. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to felony theft in exchange for a recommended sentence of 18 to 36 months and agreed to pay restitution. The plea agreement did not specify whether the new sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to any sentence that might be reinstated following a pending parole revocation for his earlier conviction.The District Court of Campbell County accepted Brewer’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence. During the oral pronouncement, the court was silent regarding whether the sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to any reinstated sentence for the prior offense. In its written judgment, however, the court ordered Brewer’s sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence. After a motion from the State, the court issued an order nunc pro tunc to correct the sentence’s duration but retained the consecutive language. Brewer appealed, arguing that the written judgment imposed an illegal sentence because the oral pronouncement did not specify consecutive sentencing and the written order referenced a sentence not yet reinstated by the parole board.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo, applying its precedent from Keefe v. State, 2024 WY 93, 555 P.3d 492 (Wyo. 2024). The court held that when a sentencing court is silent on whether a sentence runs concurrently or consecutively, Wyoming law presumes the sentences run consecutively. The written judgment merely confirmed this presumption. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Brewer’s sentence was not illegal. View "Brewer v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, a felony under Vermont law. At arraignment, the State sought to have the defendant held without bail pending trial, arguing that the charged offense involved an act of violence, which would permit pretrial detention under Vermont’s constitutional and statutory exceptions to the general right to bail. The parties agreed that the offense was a felony and that the evidence of guilt was great, but the defendant contended that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child did not qualify as a crime involving an act of violence for purposes of denying bail.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, denied the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail. The court concluded that, despite a statutory provision designating lewd or lascivious conduct with a child as a violent act for bail purposes, the offense did not have an essential element involving an act of violence as required by the Vermont Constitution. The court relied on prior single-justice decisions, including State v. Madigan, which interpreted “violence” narrowly to require physical force or contact, and declined to give effect to the legislative designation in 13 V.S.A. § 2602(f).On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the definition of “violence” in the context of bail eligibility. The Court held that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child is a felony with an element involving an act of violence, as the offense inherently involves an abusive or unjust use of power over a child, even if physical contact is not required. The Court overruled the contrary reasoning in State v. Madigan, reaffirmed a broader definition of violence, and concluded that the statutory designation in § 2602(f) was consistent with constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on the State’s request to hold the defendant without bail. View "State v. Shores" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance at a home shared by the defendant, his partner, and their children. During the incident, officers found a rifle in the living room. The defendant admitted ownership of the firearm and acknowledged he was on probation. Several months earlier, he had pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery, a conviction that, under Kansas law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm for five years. The defendant was charged with felony criminal use of a weapon for knowingly possessing a firearm within five years of his domestic violence conviction.In the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant was convicted by a jury. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was constitutional and that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case to address the Second Amendment challenge. The court held that the Kansas statute, which temporarily disarms individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that early American laws, such as surety and “going armed” laws, allowed for the disarmament of individuals who posed a threat of violence, and that a recent conviction for domestic violence is sufficient to establish such a threat. The court concluded that the statute imposes a narrow, temporary restriction and is constitutional both on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law

In this case, two women in Boone, Iowa, reported separate incidents in which a man exposed himself to them in retail parking lots in the spring of 2022. Both women described the perpetrator and his vehicle, and law enforcement investigations led to Pat Kepner as a suspect. The identification process included photo arrays and video footage, with one woman identifying Kepner in a photo array and both later identifying him from video. Kepner was charged with two counts of indecent exposure, and at trial, the eyewitnesses’ identifications were central to the State’s case.At trial in the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Kepner sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Kim MacLin, a psychologist specializing in memory and eyewitness identification. Dr. MacLin’s proposed testimony focused on general scientific principles regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications and the effects of investigative procedures on witness confidence and accuracy. The district court excluded this testimony, reasoning that it would improperly address witness credibility and could confuse the jury. The jury convicted Kepner on both counts, and the district court entered a suspended sentence. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in excluding the expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and held that the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding Dr. MacLin’s generalized expert testimony. The court clarified that such testimony, which does not directly or indirectly vouch for a witness’s credibility but instead provides general scientific context, is admissible and can assist the jury in evaluating eyewitness identifications. The court further found that the exclusion of this testimony was prejudicial given the centrality of identification to the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State of Iowa v. Kepner" on Justia Law

Frederick Hawkins III was involved in a series of assaults against three women at a church in Ames, Iowa, where a nonprofit organization was serving meals. Over the course of a few minutes, Hawkins assaulted M.B. in a stairwell by grabbing her, rubbing his genitals against her, and putting his hand down her pants. He then slapped or grabbed C.C.’s buttocks as she passed him on the stairs, and shortly after, in an elevator, he touched E.M.’s buttocks while making sexually suggestive remarks and gestures. Hawkins was apprehended at the scene after police were called.The Iowa District Court for Story County, after a bench trial, found Hawkins guilty of three counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, rejecting his diminished responsibility defense and finding sufficient evidence of specific intent for each assault. Hawkins appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence of specific intent to commit sexual abuse regarding the assaults on C.C. and E.M. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings of specific intent, and remanded for resentencing due to a sentencing error.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Hawkins’s specific intent to commit sexual abuse against C.C. and E.M. The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances—including the rapid succession and similarity of the assaults, Hawkins’s conduct, and the context of the events—there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer specific intent for all three assaults. The court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence due to the conceded sentencing error and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State of Iowa v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of theft by shoplifting, third or subsequent offense, after stealing sunglasses from an optometrist’s office, and an additional count of resisting arrest. He ultimately pled guilty to one count of theft by shoplifting, with the other charges dismissed as part of a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court considered evidence of his prior convictions, making the current offense a Class IV felony. The defendant requested a continuance to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment, citing recent efforts to address his addiction, but the court denied the request, noting inconsistencies in his statements about substance use and skepticism about his motives.Previously, the District Court for Lancaster County accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and, after an enhancement and sentencing hearing, sentenced him to a determinate term of two years’ imprisonment. The court found substantial and compelling reasons why probation was not appropriate, including the defendant’s criminal history, risk of reoffending, and doubts about his sincerity regarding treatment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, failing to follow statutory requirements for sentencing, and not providing required advisements.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, as the defendant failed to show prejudice and had control over the timing of his treatment efforts. The court also found that the district court sufficiently stated its reasoning for denying probation and imposing imprisonment, and that any errors in failing to provide advisements were forfeited and, in any event, harmless. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Dawn" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife in 2023. On the night of the incident, the couple went out to dinner and then to a bar, where both consumed alcohol. The husband became angry, accusing his wife of infidelity. After leaving the bar together, they returned home, where two altercations occurred. The next day, the wife was found dead on the bedroom floor, having suffered blunt force head injuries and manual strangulation. The husband admitted to hitting her but denied intending to kill her, and claimed not to remember strangling her. Forensic evidence indicated defensive wounds on the victim, and the husband’s statements and injuries were consistent with him being the aggressor.The District Court for Hamilton County held a jury trial, during which the prosecution introduced evidence of the husband’s prior acts of domestic abuse: one incident in 1997 involving his ex-wife, and another in 2015 involving the victim. The court found these prior acts were proved by clear and convincing evidence and admitted them for purposes other than propensity, such as intent and motive, providing limiting instructions to the jury. The jury found the husband guilty of first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment, initially granting credit for time served. The defendant appealed, challenging the admission of prior bad acts evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence for premeditation, the refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense, and the denial of a change of venue.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior bad acts evidence, as it was relevant for proper purposes and not unduly prejudicial. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of premeditation, and that a self-defense instruction was not warranted by the evidence. The denial of a change of venue was upheld. However, the Supreme Court found plain error in granting credit for time served against a life sentence and modified the sentence to eliminate that credit, affirming the judgment as modified. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

A woman was killed in her Cincinnati apartment on July 31, 2019, after returning home with groceries and a purse. She was attacked in the entryway and strangled with her purse strap. Later that day, her son was stopped by law enforcement in Indiana while driving her car and found in possession of her wallet, which contained her identification, credit cards, and a recent grocery receipt. The son had left his aunt’s home in Georgia days earlier without permission, taking her car, which was later found near the victim’s apartment. Evidence showed the son had traveled from Georgia to Ohio, and surveillance footage placed him near the victim’s home the night before the murder. The victim had been trying to locate her son, believing he was still in Georgia.The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas convicted the son of two counts of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and receiving stolen property. The trial court suppressed some of the son’s custodial statements but admitted others, as well as testimony about his prior acts. The First District Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred by admitting certain custodial statements and other-acts evidence, and held these errors were not harmless. It reversed the convictions for aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence, finding insufficient evidence for tampering and barring retrial on that count, but allowed retrial on the other charges.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, even after removing the erroneously admitted evidence, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly established the son’s guilt for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the trial court’s errors harmless and reversed the appellate court’s judgment, reinstating the convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. The court also concluded that the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Several individuals were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party to serve as potential electors for the 2020 presidential election. After the Democratic candidates won the Nevada popular vote, these individuals challenged the results in state court, seeking to be declared the legitimate electors. Their challenge was denied by the district court, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Despite this, the individuals held a ceremony in Carson City, signed documents purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for the Republican candidates, and mailed these documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada.Based on these actions, the State charged the individuals with crimes under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering forged instruments) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office). The indictment was filed in Clark County, where the federal courthouse is located. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the alleged offenses were complete upon mailing the documents from Douglas County, and thus venue was improper in Clark County. The Eighth Judicial District Court agreed, finding that the crimes were completed upon mailing and dismissed the indictment for improper venue.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the offenses charged were not complete upon mailing, but rather required the delivery and receipt of the documents at the intended location in Clark County. The court concluded that venue was proper in Clark County because the alleged crimes involved the delivery of false documents to a recipient in that county. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. DeGraffenreid" on Justia Law

In 1994, Karl Senser was fatally stabbed during a carjacking, following a series of related crimes. Law enforcement quickly identified Steven Thomas as a prime suspect and later arrested him, but although circumstantial evidence suggested Leon Daniel McInnis was Thomas’s accomplice, authorities did not believe they had enough evidence to charge McInnis with murder at that time. The investigation included interviews, lineups, and early DNA testing, but no physical evidence directly linked McInnis to the murder scene. McInnis ultimately pled guilty to a related carjacking, while Thomas was convicted of Senser’s murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County dismissed the murder charge against McInnis in 2023, after he argued that the 27-year delay in prosecution violated his state due process rights. The court found the delay negligent, reasoning that law enforcement could have tested key evidence, such as a napkin found at the scene, for DNA in 1994. The court also determined that the loss of eyewitnesses due to the passage of time prejudiced McInnis’s ability to defend himself, and that no remedy short of dismissal could cure this prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that, under California Supreme Court precedent, courts may not find negligence by second-guessing prosecutorial decisions about when sufficient evidence exists to file charges, how investigations are conducted, or how resources are allocated. The delay was deemed “investigative,” not negligent, because prosecutors waited until new DNA evidence provided a strong basis for charging McInnis. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to properly balance the prejudice to McInnis against the prosecution’s justification for the delay, and to consider alternative remedies. View "P. v. McInnis" on Justia Law