Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, while incarcerated in a tribal detention facility, suffered from serious mental health conditions and was awaiting his regularly scheduled medication. When a detention officer arrived to retrieve cleaning supplies, the defendant threw water on him, leading to a physical altercation. The officer, with assistance from others, subdued the defendant, who was then moved to a more secure cell. Still without his medication, the defendant began harming himself, prompting officers to use a restraint chair. During the process of securing him, the defendant kicked one officer in the face, causing pain but no need for medical treatment. The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted by a jury of felony assault on a peace officer.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, presided over the trial and sentencing. At sentencing, the judge commented on the defendant's failure to take responsibility, his decision to go to trial, and the resources expended as a result. The judge imposed a 24-year sentence in the Montana State Prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegally enhanced due to his exercise of constitutional rights, and also sought review of alleged police misconduct under the plain error doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court erred by basing the sentence, at least in part, on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to remain silent, avoid self-incrimination, and have a jury trial. The Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. The Supreme Court also declined to exercise plain error review regarding the alleged police misconduct, finding no manifest miscarriage of justice or fundamental unfairness warranting reversal of the conviction. The conviction was affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and remanded. View "State v. Matt" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated in 2021 and the state sought to enhance his sentence by establishing that he was a chronic offender, which requires proof of four or more prior intoxication-related traffic offenses (IRTOs). To support this, the state introduced evidence of four prior offenses, including a 2002 municipal conviction for “driving while intoxicated” under the Joplin city code. The appellant contested the use of this 2002 offense, arguing the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it involved physically driving or operating a vehicle, as required by Missouri law at the time of the current offense.The Circuit Court of Jasper County admitted the 2002 municipal conviction into evidence and found the appellant to be a chronic offender, determining all four prior offenses qualified as IRTOs. The appellant was subsequently convicted by a jury for the current driving while intoxicated offense and sentenced as a chronic offender to seven years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that only three of his prior offenses qualified as IRTOs and that he should have been sentenced as an aggravated offender rather than a chronic offender.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. It held that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 2002 municipal offense involved physically driving or operating a vehicle, since the record was silent as to the conduct underlying the offense and there was no evidence as to the elements of the municipal ordinance. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment sentencing the appellant as a chronic offender and remanded the case for resentencing as an aggravated offender. View "State v. Peters" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who, while on parole for a prior cocaine dealing conviction, orchestrated the murder of a confidential informant who had previously testified against him, with the assistance of an accomplice. The murder involved luring the victim to an apartment complex, shooting him multiple times, and later threatening potential witnesses to prevent their testimony. After the murder, the defendant made threats against the accomplice and another witness and attempted to solicit the killing of the accomplice. He also admitted his involvement to several individuals and described the crime in written letters.In proceedings before the Wayne Superior Court, the State charged the defendant with murder and sought a life without parole (LWOP) sentence, alleging aggravating circumstances. During jury selection, the defendant, who is African American, objected to the lack of minority representation in the jury venire and ultimately to the empaneling of an all-white jury, but the trial court found the selection process was random and denied his objections. The trial court admitted out-of-court statements by unavailable witnesses after finding the defendant had threatened them, and permitted another witness’s statement as an excited utterance. The jury convicted the defendant of murder and recommended LWOP, which the trial court imposed.On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The Court held that the defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community because he failed to show systematic exclusion of African Americans from the jury selection process. It further found no error in admitting the unavailable witnesses’ statements, as the defendant forfeited his confrontation rights through his threats, and that any error was harmless given other substantial evidence. The Court also found no fundamental error in the jury instructions and declined to revise the LWOP sentence, affirming both the conviction and sentence. View "Carr v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The defendant operated two companies that provided durable medical equipment, both of which were enrolled as Medicare providers under the names of her mother and nephew. The defendant orchestrated a scheme where patient information was used to submit fraudulent claims for unnecessary medical equipment and repairs, with the assistance of other employees and marketers. Over a ten-year period, the companies submitted more than $24 million in claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $13 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. The defendant was indicted and, after a second trial, convicted by a jury of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), based on the use of her relatives’ names during the commission of health care fraud. The district court sentenced her to a total of 180 months in custody, including a mandatory consecutive two-year term for aggravated identity theft. The defendant appealed her convictions for aggravated identity theft.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the use of her relatives’ names constituted aggravated identity theft under the standard clarified in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). The Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to show that the use of the relatives’ names was “at the crux” of the fraud—meaning that the use itself was fraudulent or deceitful and critical to the scheme’s success, as required by Dubin. The court vacated the defendant’s sentence for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The healthcare fraud and other convictions were not in dispute. View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law

Law enforcement arrested an individual for operating under the influence after stopping him and bringing him to the police station. At the station, the officer explained the consequences of refusing a breath test, including administrative penalties and possible jail if the individual refused. After discussion and clarification that no additional charges would result from refusal, the individual agreed to take the breath test, although he initially stated he did not consent. The breath test was administered, and the individual was subsequently charged with criminal operating under the influence.The individual moved to suppress the breath test results in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket, arguing that his consent to the test was not voluntary due to the officer’s statements and actions. The trial court denied the motion, citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, which held that warrantless breath tests incident to arrest do not require consent under the Fourth Amendment. After this ruling, the individual entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to challenge the suppression ruling on appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the case. The court held that, under Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Fourth Amendment allows warrantless breath tests as searches incident to arrest, and thus, the individual's consent was immaterial to the test’s admissibility. The court further concluded that the officer’s actions did not render the search unreasonable, as there were no false statements or arbitrary conduct, and the incentives provided by the officer were permissible. The court also held that the challenge must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Davis" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old boy shot and killed his former girlfriend, a 17-year-old, after sending her harassing and threatening messages. The confrontation occurred at a park following an exchange with the victim’s cousin, which escalated into a plan to fight. The defendant brought his mother’s handgun to the scene and, during the confrontation, shot the victim in the face as she approached him. He was apprehended shortly after the shooting and confessed to law enforcement.The State originally charged the defendant with first-degree murder and misdemeanor stalking. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second-degree murder and stalking. At sentencing, the prosecutor and defense agreed that an individualized hearing was appropriate, given the defendant’s juvenile status. The prosecution recommended a sentence of 44 to 75 years for the murder conviction, referencing Wyoming’s Bear Cloud line of cases and statutory limits for juvenile offenders. The defense argued that, under Wyoming law and constitutional principles, the maximum allowable sentence for a juvenile convicted of homicide should be 22.5 years to life, or at most a minimum term not exceeding 43 years. The District Court of Natrona County sentenced the defendant to 42 to 75 years for second-degree murder and time served for stalking.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether (1) Wyoming’s juvenile parole eligibility statute applied, (2) the sentence exceeded statutory limits, and (3) the sentence violated the Wyoming Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment. The Court held that the parole eligibility statute applied only to life sentences, not to terms of years. The sentence fell within statutory limits for second-degree murder. Finally, the Court found the sentence was not “unusual” under the state constitution because there was no consensus among legislatures or courts that such a sentence for a juvenile was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Castaner v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case involved allegations that a man sexually abused his stepdaughter, JB, when she was a child and later sexually assaulted his biological daughter, FO, when she was a teenager. After JB disclosed the abuse to her probation officer, both she and FO were interviewed by police and provided accounts implicating the defendant in two separate incidents of sexual intrusion. The State charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.During trial proceedings in the District Court of Campbell County, the court granted the defendant’s motion to sequester witnesses. However, it was discovered that JB and FO overheard brief portions of a livestream of the trial while waiting to testify, in violation of the sequestration order. The district court questioned the witnesses outside the jury's presence, found no intentional or prejudicial violation, and allowed limited cross-examination on what they overheard, but did not permit questioning about their violation of a court order. The defendant also moved for mistrials based on allegedly improper testimony referencing uncharged conduct under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b), but the court either struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it or found the testimony did not reference uncharged acts, and denied the motions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination and denying mistrials, and whether the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion, as the violations of the sequestration order were minimal and non-prejudicial, and the limitations on cross-examination did not infringe on the defendant’s confrontation rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motions for mistrial and found no cumulative error. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the convictions. View "O'Dell v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

An individual reported to police that a debit card had been stolen from his car and used at a Southaven, Mississippi, Best Buy. The Southaven Police Department obtained receipt evidence and surveillance footage but did not immediately identify a suspect. Separately, police in another Mississippi county arrested Stephen Lewis for an unrelated burglary and searched his cell phone without a warrant, discovering images of receipts from the Southaven Best Buy. The investigating officer from the Washington County Sheriff’s Department shared these images with Detective Walley of the Southaven Police Department, informing her that a search warrant had been completed, though in reality, no warrant had been issued at the time. Walley reviewed the images, which matched the fraudulent purchase, and secured an arrest warrant for Lewis, who was later indicted; charges were eventually remanded.Lewis brought multiple constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Walley in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed all but one claim, allowing Lewis’s Fourth Amendment search claim to proceed. The district court found that Walley’s review of the photographs constituted a warrantless search, violating the Fourth Amendment, and denied Walley’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, as well as her qualified immunity defense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court held that it was not clearly established at the relevant time that reviewing images of receipts from a phone, sent by another officer, constituted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant. The court found that Walley’s reliance on information provided by the other officer was objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered a judgment of dismissal in Walley’s favor. View "Lewis v. Walley" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Anthony M. Shea was involved in a series of bank and armored-car robberies in New Hampshire. In 1997, following a federal jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, Shea was convicted on fourteen counts, including two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The § 924(c) convictions were based on underlying predicate offenses, including substantive Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and bank robbery with a dangerous weapon. The jury returned a general verdict, finding Shea guilty of all counts.After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Shea filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his § 924(c) convictions and to be resentenced, arguing that subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly United States v. Davis and Johnson v. United States, rendered his predicate conspiracy offenses invalid for purposes of § 924(c). The District Court denied relief as to the § 924(c) convictions, finding any error in the jury instructions harmless, but granted resentencing because Shea’s "career offender" designation was no longer applicable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the partial denial of Shea’s § 2255 motion and the amended judgment after resentencing. The First Circuit held that the District Court did not err in its harmless error analysis, finding that even though the jury was instructed on both valid and invalid predicate offenses, the valid predicates were so interrelated and coextensive with the invalid ones that the instructional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The First Circuit affirmed both the denial of relief as to the § 924(c) convictions and the amended judgment. View "Shea v. United States" on Justia Law

Three individuals were prosecuted for their roles in a murder-for-hire scheme that resulted in the deaths of Holly Williams and William Lanway in Nashville. After one of the defendants, Maund, was blackmailed by Lanway following an affair with Williams, he hired Peled to address the situation. Peled then recruited Brockway, Carey, and others to surveil the victims, ultimately leading to their murders in March 2020. Substantial evidence was presented at trial, including recorded conversations, testimony from co-conspirators, financial records, and surveillance footage linking the defendants to the crimes.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee presided over the joint trial. The jury convicted all three defendants on various counts, including murder-for-hire conspiracy, and convicted Brockway and Carey on kidnapping-related charges. After the verdict, the district court discovered a critical error: the jury had received ten unadmitted exhibits—including recordings and transcripts not presented at trial—and had not received three admitted exhibits. Notably, among the unadmitted exhibits were statements concerning Carey’s knowledge of the crimes that had been excluded at trial. Following a post-verdict hearing, the district court concluded that this error was structural and required a new trial for all defendants, reasoning that the effects of the error were too difficult to measure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of a new trial. The appellate court held that the erroneous jury exposure to unadmitted exhibits was not a structural error and was subject to harmless-error analysis. Applying the strictest harmless-error standard, the court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the minimal prejudice to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a new trial and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Maund" on Justia Law