Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Antonio Cousins Jr. was charged in Peoria County with aggravated discharge of a firearm and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon in one case, and being an armed habitual criminal, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon in another case. He remained in custody with a bond set at $150,000. Cousins waived his right to counsel and filed several pro se motions, including for pretrial release under the Pretrial Fairness Act. The State filed petitions to deny pretrial release, asserting that Cousins posed a threat to the community and had a high likelihood of flight.The circuit court of Peoria County denied Cousins' motions for pretrial release, citing his prior felony convictions and the nature of the current charges. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Cousins posed a real and present threat to the community and that no conditions could mitigate this threat. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, found that the circuit court erred in detaining Cousins because the State failed to meet its burden of proving that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by his release. The appellate court reversed the detention order and remanded for a new detention hearing.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court that the State failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the conditions element. The court held that when the State fails to meet its burden, the proper remedy is to remand for a hearing on the least restrictive conditions of release, rather than a new detention hearing. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for a hearing on the conditions of release. View "People v. Cousins" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old high school student was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) of cannabis following a bench trial in the circuit court of Lake County, Illinois. The student was also convicted of improper lane usage, possession of cannabis, and reckless conduct under local ordinances. The incident occurred during a driver's education class, where the instructor noticed erratic driving behavior and reported it to school officials. A subsequent search revealed a marijuana cigarette, and field sobriety tests conducted by a school resource officer and later at the police station indicated impairment.The student appealed to the Appellate Court, Second District, arguing that the Village of Lincolnshire improperly prosecuted him without providing proof of written permission from the State's Attorney, as required by the Illinois Vehicle Code. The student also contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no requirement for the Village to submit proof of its authority to prosecute into the trial record and determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Village needed to establish its written permission to prosecute in the trial record and whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the student was under the influence to a degree that rendered him incapable of driving safely. The court held that the statute did not require the Village to submit its written permission into the record and that the failure to do so did not constitute plain error. Additionally, the court found that the evidence, including testimony and field sobriety tests, supported the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, upholding the student's conviction. View "Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested after his sister-in-law reported to the police that he had raped her while her young child watched. The victim testified that she lived in an upstairs apartment with her family, while the defendant lived downstairs. On May 25, 2017, the defendant entered the victim's room under the pretense of delivering mail and propositioned her for sex, and when she refused, he became aggressive, eventually raping her. The victim's child sought help, leading to the defendant's arrest.The defendant was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree rape. Before the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously attempted to rape two other sisters-in-law. The trial court allowed this evidence, instructing the jury that it could be considered for purposes other than proving the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. The defendant argued that the sexual encounter was consensual, suggesting an affair and rough consensual sex. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting, stating that the evidence was relevant to establish the defendant's use of force and provide background information on the family dynamics.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior assaults. The Court explained that the evidence was relevant to refute the defendant's claim of consensual sex and to establish his intent to rape the victim. The Court also found that the evidence provided necessary background information on the family dynamics and the defendant's relationship with the victim. The Court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudice and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v. Sin" on Justia Law

Ali Tuckett sought damages from the State of New York under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, claiming unjust conviction and imprisonment. Tuckett's 2011 conviction for sexually abusing his minor cousin, N.M., was vacated after N.M. recanted his testimony in 2013, admitting he had lied. Tuckett then filed a claim for damages, asserting his innocence and that he did not cause his conviction.The Court of Claims dismissed Tuckett's claim, concluding he did not prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The court excluded polygraph evidence Tuckett wanted to present and found N.M.'s recantation not credible, relying on testimony from the original investigation and trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that any reliance on hearsay was harmless and that the court's findings were supported by the record. Two justices dissented, believing the court improperly relied on evidence outside the record and hearsay.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court found that any potential hearsay error was harmless given the substantial non-hearsay evidence supporting the Court of Claims' decision. The court also determined that the findings of fact were supported by the record and that the Court of Claims did not improperly rely on evidence outside the record. Additionally, the court rejected Tuckett's argument that the Court of Claims applied an incorrect presumption regarding the reliability of recantation testimony, noting that the court provided specific reasons for finding N.M.'s recantation not credible.The Court of Appeals held that Tuckett failed to prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence and affirmed the dismissal of his claim. View "Tuckett v State of New York" on Justia Law

In 2019, Deshawn Wallace was arrested after police found a handgun in his jacket during a traffic stop. Wallace did not have a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card or a concealed carry license. He was charged with being an armed habitual criminal, among other weapon-related offenses. Wallace had prior felony convictions: a 2008 armed robbery committed when he was 17 and a 2015 unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.The Cook County circuit court denied Wallace’s motion to suppress the handgun evidence. At a bench trial, the court found Wallace guilty of all charges and merged them into a single conviction for being an armed habitual criminal, sentencing him to six years in prison. Wallace appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that his 2008 conviction should not count as a predicate offense for the armed habitual criminal charge because he was 17 at the time.The appellate court rejected Wallace’s arguments, affirming his conviction. The court held that the armed habitual criminal statute only requires proof of two prior qualifying felony convictions, regardless of how those offenses would be treated under current laws.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The court held that Wallace’s 2008 armed robbery conviction could serve as a predicate offense for the armed habitual criminal charge. The court reasoned that the statute’s language does not incorporate the current juvenile adjudication scheme and that the legislature’s use of present tense terms does not imply such an incorporation. The court also distinguished this case from People v. Stewart, noting that the armed habitual criminal statute had not been amended to include age considerations for predicate offenses. View "People v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The defendant, Robert D. Dyas, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 900 grams of methamphetamine. He later moved to withdraw his plea, but the Bureau County circuit court denied the motion. Dyas filed a motion to reconsider, and while it was pending, he filed a notice of appeal. He then moved to dismiss the appeal as premature, which the appellate court granted, dismissing the appeal. The trial court subsequently denied the motion to reconsider, and Dyas appealed again. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s denial of Dyas’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, citing non-compliance with Rule 401(a) regarding the waiver of counsel for postplea proceedings, and remanded for new postplea proceedings.The appellate court, Third District, vacated the trial court’s denial of Dyas’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 401(a) when accepting Dyas’s waiver of counsel for postplea proceedings. The appellate court remanded the case for new postplea proceedings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and found that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over Dyas’s appeal because his notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the denial of his Rule 604(d) postjudgment motion. The court held that a successive postjudgment motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Consequently, the appellate court’s judgment was void. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "People v. Dyas" on Justia Law

The appellant, Michael J. Patschak, was convicted of robbery following an altercation with Officer Davon Todd during a protest. Officer Todd testified that Patschak initiated the altercation by shoving him, causing him to fall, and then twisted and removed Todd's body-worn camera (BWC) from his vest. Patschak then picked up the BWC and placed it in his backpack. Patschak testified that Todd ran into him, causing him to fall, and that he only briefly touched the BWC, which was already twisted. He admitted to picking up the BWC and placing it in his backpack shortly after the altercation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Patschak guilty of robbery. Patschak appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court's responses to two juror notes were inadequate. The trial court had instructed the jury that the act of taking the property must be accompanied by the intent to steal, and later clarified that the intent to steal must exist at the time of the taking.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as a rational juror could find that Patschak's actions constituted a sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching of the BWC from Officer Todd's immediate actual possession. The court also found that the trial court's responses to the juror notes, while not perfect, did not constitute plain error. The court concluded that the trial court's instructions, taken as a whole, adequately addressed the jury's questions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding Patschak's conviction for robbery. View "Patschak v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, Donovan and Orlando Bourrage were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The investigation began in January 2020, involving controlled purchases from Donovan and a wiretap authorized in May 2020. The wiretap captured conversations between the Bourrage cousins and their co-conspirators discussing drug prices and transactions. Evidence included intercepted calls, testimony from a co-conspirator, and a subsequent wiretap in July 2020 that recorded Donovan's dealings with another supplier. Orlando was also found in possession of marijuana and a firearm in September 2020.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained via wiretaps, ruling the motion untimely and the defendants lacked standing. The court also denied a request for a Franks hearing and found the wiretap orders were facially sufficient. The jury found both defendants guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced them, including enhancements for managing or supervising the conspiracy and, for Orlando, possessing a firearm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding the defendants had standing to challenge the wiretaps but the motion to suppress was untimely. The court held that the district court did not err in denying a Franks hearing or in finding the wiretap orders sufficient. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and the sentencing enhancements, concluding that the evidence showed the defendants' involvement in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and that the enhancements were appropriate based on their roles and conduct. The court affirmed the judgments of the district court. View "United States v. Bourrage" on Justia Law

In 2003, the appellant pleaded guilty to the sale or transportation of a controlled substance and was placed on probation for three years. In 2005, after admitting to violating probation, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to three years in state prison. In 2023, the appellant filed a petition for dismissal of his 2003 conviction under Penal Code section 1203.41, which the People opposed.The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the appellant did not successfully complete his probationary term and was not originally sentenced to state prison. The court suggested that if the appellant had been originally sentenced to state prison, he might have been eligible for expungement.The appellant appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 1203.41. The People conceded that the trial court's decision should be reversed. The appellate court agreed, noting that section 1203.41, as amended by Senate Bill No. 731, allows defendants sentenced to state prison to petition for relief, regardless of whether the original sentence was probation. The court found that the statute's plain language does not require an original prison sentence and does not disqualify individuals who violated probation before being sentenced to state prison.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining whether the appellant should be granted relief under section 1203.41. The appellate court did not express an opinion on how the trial court should rule on remand. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Javonte Eddie Mathis led a high-speed car chase in 2015, resulting in a crash that killed his 16-year-old cousin, Torry Hines. Mathis fled the scene, leaving Hines in the burning car. Mathis, who was on parole, later pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, hit and run resulting in death, second-degree commercial burglary, and possessing a firearm as a felon. He received a 14-year prison sentence, which included a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term.In 2023, the Contra Costa County Superior Court recalled Mathis's sentence due to a change in the law invalidating the one-year enhancement for non-sexually violent offenses. The court reduced his sentence by one year but otherwise left the original sentence intact, resulting in a total of 13 years and four months in prison. Mathis appealed, arguing that the court should have applied additional sentencing provisions that could further reduce his term.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Mathis waived his claim under section 654 by not raising it at the time of his plea agreement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to impose the upper term for voluntary manslaughter, citing Mathis's conscious disregard for life, the victim's vulnerability, and Mathis's parole status. Additionally, the court determined that the heightened factfinding requirement for aggravating factors did not apply because Mathis was originally sentenced to the upper term under a scheme that complied with the Sixth Amendment.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had appropriately applied the relevant sentencing rules and changes in the law. View "People v. Mathis" on Justia Law