Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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In the case at hand, the appellant, Melissa Lowe, was convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon involving an incident with her ex-husband's girlfriend. Lowe appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury on simple assault, a misdemeanor, as a lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with Lowe that the district court erred by failing to give a lesser included offense instruction, as there was evidence which could have justified a conviction for simple assault.However, the court noted that under Kansas law, Lowe bore the burden to firmly convince the court that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the district court not failed to give the lesser included offense instruction. Looking at the entire record, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that there was nothing to establish that the jury would have reached a different result. The jury had rejected Lowe's version of events, finding the witnesses' accounts that Lowe swerved her car towards the victim credible enough to convict her of aggravated assault. Consequently, the court held that the failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was not reversible error. The court affirmed both the judgment from the district court and the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

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In this case decided by the State of Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant, Walter Taylor, III, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction and his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the obstruction-of-justice charge. The court affirmed the convictions.The case centered around an event in July 2021 where the defendant had an argument with his ex-girlfriend, which escalated into physical assault, and subsequently attacked a neighbor who was recording the incident on her phone. The defendant claimed that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident and argued that this should have been considered in his defense, as it could have affected his ability to form the necessary mental state for the charged crimes.However, the court held that the evidence did not establish a nexus between alcohol consumption and an effect on the defendant’s mental state. The court noted that there was no evidence regarding the size of the containers of the beverages that defendant had consumed, the timeframe in which they were consumed, or their alcohol concentration. The court found that the evidence of intoxication was insufficient to call into question whether defendant was capable of forming the required intent or whether he actually formed the required intent.On the charge of obstruction of justice, the defendant argued that his conduct could not be considered obstruction as there was no ongoing investigation at the time of the alleged assault. The court disagreed, ruling that the existence of a pending judicial proceeding is not required to prove obstruction of justice. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct, which included assaulting a person who appeared to be recording his conduct after being informed that the police were on their way, fell within the language of the obstruction of justice statute.Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice. View "State v. Walter Taylor, III" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the defendant, Robert Clark Geddes, was charged with trespass as a hate crime. The defendant had trespassed onto various properties, leaving behind anonymous notes that urged the residents to "Burn that gay flag." The homes targeted by the defendant were displaying LGBTQ+ flags or decals. Geddes appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that his convictions violated his rights to free speech and due process.The court rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed his convictions. The court ruled that Geddes was not being punished for his speech, but rather for his conduct—trespassing onto properties with the intent to commit a hate crime. The court found that the statute under which Geddes was convicted does not criminalize speech, but rather conduct with a specific intent—namely, trespassing on property because of the property owner or possessor's association with persons of a certain sexual orientation. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Geddes's conviction.The court held that the defendant's conduct of surreptitiously entering onto properties to post his harassing notes was not protected under the First Amendment rights. The court noted that hate crime laws are designed to punish conduct, not expression, and Geddes's motive or intent led to the more serious criminal consequence. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the trespass law was vague or overbroad, finding that it provides sufficient guidance to those enforcing it and does not intrude on protected freedoms. View "State of Iowa v. Geddes" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the court reviewed the trial and conviction of Robert Krogmann for attempted murder and willful injury causing serious injury. This was Krogmann's second trial after his initial conviction was overturned on appeal due to an improper asset freeze that interfered with his defense rights. In the second trial, Krogmann appealed his conviction on multiple grounds.The court held that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court should have admitted a video recording of Krogmann's interview with law enforcement. Although the video was not hearsay and should have been admitted, the court held that the exclusion of the video did not affect Krogmann’s substantial rights and was therefore harmless error. The video would not have materially aided Krogmann's diminished capacity defense.The court further held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that assault, an element of the crimes charged against Krogmann, is a specific-intent crime, and that diminished responsibility can negate the intent element of assault.The court also upheld the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of a $1.5 million civil settlement between Krogmann and the victim, finding that the evidence was not relevant to the issues in the case.However, the court found that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify to the ultimate issue of intent, stating that it is the job of the court, not a paid expert, to explain criminal law to the jury.Lastly, the Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with Krogmann's contention that the court erred in awarding him to pay an expert witness’s fees and expenses in excess of the $150 per day cap in Iowa Code section 622.72.The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, affirmed the district court judgment, granted and sustained in part the writ of certiorari, and remanded the case for redetermination of costs. View "Iowa v. Krogmann" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the appellant Jean-Michael Kisi appealed from orders dismissing in part and denying in part his application for postconviction relief. Kisi contended that he was wrongfully convicted of a non-cognizable offense, accomplice to attempted murder. He further argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the lower court followed improper trial procedures, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct.The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that an attempted knowing murder is not a cognizable offense. However, the Court found that the erroneous inclusion of "knowing" in the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence presented indicated that the jury convicted Kisi of attempted intentional murder.Kisi's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also dismissed. The Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and the representation of his counsel did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Kisi's claims regarding improper trial procedure and prosecutorial misconduct were summarily dismissed. The Court, therefore, affirmed the lower court's order dismissing in part and denying in part Kisi's application for postconviction relief. View "Kisi v. State" on Justia Law

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In the State of North Dakota, the defendant, Demetris Haney, was involved in a shooting in a bar's parking lot. Haney was charged with reckless endangerment and terrorizing, among other charges. The trial took place in August 2022, where the state presented surveillance footage showing Haney firing multiple rounds at an individual before they returned fire. Haney testified that he only returned fire when shot at. After the state rested its case, Haney moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied. The jury found Haney not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault and guilty of reckless endangerment and terrorizing.On appeal, Haney argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the terrorizing charge. He claimed that the state failed to prove the terrorizing charge because he did not "threaten" to commit any violent crime or dangerous act. The State of North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that a rational fact-finder could find Haney guilty of terrorizing based on the evidence presented at trial, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.Haney also argued that the district court violated his constitutional right to a public trial by conducting in-chamber conferences without the necessary findings or obtaining a waiver from Haney. The Supreme Court concluded that these conferences were not closures implicating Haney's public trial right and that Haney did not establish obvious error in the district court's failure to create a record of these conferences.Lastly, Haney argued that the district court denied his right to due process, but he did not provide any factual or legal analysis to support this claim. The Supreme Court declined to consider this claim, as Haney did not provide relevant authority or meaningful reasoning to support it.As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Haney's convictions. View "State v. Haney" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Anthony W. Earnest, pled no contest to charges of driving under the influence (DUI) causing serious bodily injury and third degree assault. Following a two-vehicle accident, Earnest was charged and released on bond with specific conditions. However, following another incident where he was found driving under influence, his bond was revoked. The district court sentenced Earnest to 3 years’ imprisonment, 18 months’ post-release supervision, a $10,000 fine, and a 15-year license revocation for the DUI causing serious bodily injury, and 1 year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine for the third degree assault.On appeal, Earnest argued that the district court erred by imposing a $10,000 fine without considering his ability to pay and by imposing excessive sentences. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court was not required to consider Earnest's ability to pay before imposing fines. The court also noted that while the district court misunderstood the law about imposing consecutive sentences, it was not prejudicial to Earnest; the court would have imposed consecutive sentences even if it had understood concurrent sentences were permissible. Additionally, the court rejected Earnest’s argument that the district court failed to consider factors that weighed in favor of a more lenient sentence. Concluding that the district court did not commit any prejudicial error, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "State v. Earnest" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the convictions and sentences of Trenton R. Esch for first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Esch argued that the jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt and intoxication were in error, and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these instructions. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury and were not misleading. Further, the court ruled that there was no plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. The court also determined that Esch's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the instructions or in his handling of the evidence and arguments related to Esch's intoxication. The court rejected Esch's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an insufficient record. The case centered around Esch's killing of his stepmother, with the primary issue at trial being whether Esch shot her purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or whether he acted impulsively under the influence of alcohol. The jury found Esch guilty of first degree murder. View "State v. Esch" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the issue was the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the probable-cause standard for determining whether a juvenile-court offender may be bound over to adult court. The case arose from an incident where a juvenile, E.S., was in a stolen car during a police chase, with his friend E.M., who was driving. After the car crashed, E.M. was found dead from a gunshot wound. A gun was found under the car’s passenger seat where E.S. had been seated, and E.S.'s DNA was found on the trigger and the grip of the gun. A bullet that had been fired from the gun was found in the driver's side front door. E.S. was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses relating to the stolen car, the gun, and E.M.’s death.The juvenile court found probable cause for some charges but not for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. The state appealed the juvenile court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the state had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that E.S. had committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the state’s evidence, both circumstantial and direct, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court held that the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals had erroneously held the state to a higher burden than required for establishing probable cause in a bindover proceeding. The case was remanded back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re E.S." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, defendant Amadi Sosa was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed assault with the intent to rob, and unlawful possession of ammunition in connection with the shooting death of William Serrano. The defendant appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, alleging several errors, including that the trial judge wrongfully denied his motion for relief from a joint trial with his co-defendant, Julio Brian Leiva, and that the judge erroneously allowed the prosecutor to use an unauthenticated video recording during the trial. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with the intent to rob, and the denial of his motion for a new trial. However, the court vacated the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition due to an error in the jury instructions. The court found that there was no reversible error with respect to the defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with the intent to rob, and declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to grant relief or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Sosa" on Justia Law