Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Freeman was convicted, along with Miller and Collier, of second-degree murder. The jury had heard the confession of Miller, a non-testifying codefendant, with redactions that replaced the names of Collier and Freeman, with the substitutes “the first guy” and “the second guy.” The court gave a limiting instruction that the statement was to be considered only as to Miller, not as to the other defendants, in order to protect Freeman’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him. Freeman’s objection was overruled and rejected on appeal in state court.The district court concluded that a “Bruton” violation occurred and that the violation was not harmless, and granted Freeman habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed. A Bruton violation occurred. When a statement is redacted— whether by substituting the codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun, a blank space, or a symbol—in such a manner that “[a] juror … need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table” to understand who is being implicated, the introduction of that statement is a Sixth Amendment violation. However, there was ample other evidence against Freeman, and the violative statement was largely duplicative of other evidence; there is no “grave doubt about whether [the error] had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” The error was harmless. View "Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

Rivera, a Newark police officer from 1993-2018, collected $78,941 in bribes from three brothel owners in exchange for protecting the owners from arrest, using law enforcement resources to assist them, and making things difficult for competing brothels. Rivera did not report the income from the bribes, for which he should have paid $17,408 in federal taxes. He was indicted on 14 counts. Rivera pleaded guilty to accepting corrupt payments with the intent to be influenced and rewarded, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B)–(2), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts if Rivera pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 46 months. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver that Rivera attested he read and fully understood.Nine months after the court “conditionally” accepted his plea, Rivera moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the court had deferred acceptance of it until the sentencing, which had not occurred. He argued Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) permitted him to withdraw his plea “for any reason or no reason.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Rivera’s motion. The district court stated that while it had deferred acceptance of the plea agreement, it had accepted the plea itself, which could not be withdrawn absent “a fair and just reason.” The Third Circuit enforce the waiver of Rivera’s right to appeal. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

After a drug-sniffing dog alerted to Defendant Neoal Hayes’ vehicle during a traffic stop, law enforcement officers uncovered 2,505 grams of methamphetamine and 10 grams of heroin inside a duffel bag located behind the driver’s seat. Inside a backpack, also located behind the driver’s seat, officers retrieved a small safe containing: more methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine; Xanax; marijuana; a digital scale; packing material; and a 45 caliber handgun with one round in the chamber and a magazine containing nine rounds. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, to run consecutively. As part of his Rule 11 plea agreement, Defendant reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the drugs and firearm. Defendant appeals, contending the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In its order denying Defendant’s motion, the district court provided alternative bases for why the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Defendant acknowledges the stop of his vehicle was justified based on the officer’s suspicion that his driver’s license was suspended. But Defendant challenged all other aspects of the district court’s ruling: the facts known to the officer did not establish reasonable suspicion that he was transporting drugs, such that the officer’s stop and search of his vehicle could not be justified on that basis. Defendant also argued the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to pursue an investigation into drug trafficking that was unrelated to the original purpose for the stop. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Hayes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of 1,680 months imprisonment for seven counts of child-exploitation and child pornography offenses. Specifically, he challenged the jury selection, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained here the magistrate judge conducted extensive voir dire, and the parties had ample opportunity to examine the jurors. Throughout the process, the magistrate judge took care to rehabilitate wavering jurors by focusing them on what they were being asked to do as jurors—listen to the evidence and fairly and impartially judge the facts. Ultimately, the magistrate judge accepted Juror 3’s responses as indicating that he would be able to put aside his visceral reactions and impartially consider the evidence. On this record, that finding was not a “manifest error,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Juror 3.   Further, the court explained that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors and sentenced Defendant within the guidelines range, the calculation of which Defendant does not challenge. The district court noted Defendant’s “extremely dangerous” conduct in pulling a loaded handgun from his waistband and pointing it at a law-enforcement officer’s head when he was arrested. The court then emphasized that Defendant’s offense conduct was “particularly disturbing.” It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. It did not err in considering this conduct, even though Nosley was acquitted of it in state court. View "United States v. Nathan Nosley" on Justia Law

Simmonds ran a drug-trafficking conspiracy. During traffic stops, officers seized large quantities of fentanyl from co-conspirators acting under Simmonds’s instructions. Investigators also searched an apartment and four storage units associated with Simmonds, where they seized cash, cell phones, fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, xylazine, and suspected marijuana, plus shipping and packaging supplies. At one unit, investigators seized a firearm, ammunition, and Simmonds’s passport and birth certificate.Simmonds pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs, possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and using a cell phone to facilitate a felony drug offense. In the plea agreement, Simmonds agreed that “sentencing rests within the discretion of the Court,” that the guideline range would be determined by the court after a PSR was prepared, and to a base offense level 32. The government would seek two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm, and for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity but “no other specific offense characteristics, Guideline adjustments or Guideline departures.” The PSR departed from that recommendation. The district court followed the PSR, set the base offense level at 36, and accepted four recommended enhancements, bringing the offense level to 43. Simmonds’ Guideline range was life imprisonment. The court sentenced Simmonds to 250 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simmonds cannot show that the prosecution breached the plea agreement nor can he show that the court committed reversible error by failing to notice and rectify a breach of the agreement. View "United States v. Simmonds" on Justia Law

Officer Sandoval encountered inmate Hacker, who is almost totally deaf, and ordered him to return to his bed. Hacker, unable to hear, did not comply. Sandoval shoved Hacker, who awoke handcuffed to a bed. He filed an administrative grievance and received notice that it had been referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Divisional Superintendent, with a form allowing Hacker to appeal within 15 days. Neither document gave any timeline for OPR’s disposition of Hacker’s grievance. More than three months later, an OPR investigator concluded he could not substantiate Hacker’s claims; his superior officer signed the memorandum to approve the closure of the referral. The document does not state that the grievance process as a whole had ended, nor mention an appeals process. Hacker apparently received no communication from the Superintendent.Hacker had already filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing failure to exhaust claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and to comply with other PLRA requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The jail’s grievance procedures became unavailable to Hacker after the jail involved OPR; various communications forced Hacker to “go beyond the established system and guess” what he needed to do. One of Hacker’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act failed because his grievance did not give fair notice that he was requesting a personal listening device; his other claim, concerning missing medications, was not tied to a physical injury as required to recover damages under the PLRA. View "Hacker v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of rape in the first degree, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to prompt prosecution under the due process clause of the New York Constitution was violated in this case.The complainant reported to the police that she had been raped a few hours earlier by Defendant, whom she identified. The complainant submitted to a sexual assault examination, but Defendant, who was questioned by the police the same day, but refused to provide a DNA sample. Years later, a sample of Defendant's DNA sample was obtained via a buccal swab, which disproved Defendant's claim that he and the complainant had not had sex. More than four years after the complainant reported the assault, the People filed an indictment against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the excessive preindictment delay violated his due process right to prompt prosecution. County Court denied the motion, and Defendant was convicted. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the indictment, holding that the delay of the police and prosecutors violated Defendant's constitutional right to a prompt prosecution. View "People v. Regan" on Justia Law

In 2018, Petitioner Zachery Meredith boarded a “Swift Blue Line” bus in Snohomish County. Swift buses used a “barrier-free payment-system[ ].” Snohomish County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Dalton and his partner were also on the Swift Blue Line that day, conducting fare enforcement pursuant to RCW 36.57A.235. In addition to the two deputies, a third officer was “in his patrol car, following [the bus] and acting as the back-up officer.” Meredith was already on the bus when Dalton and his partner boarded the bus; Dalton “never observed [Petitioner] getting on the bus without paying,” either in person or on video. In accordance with his “general practice,” Dalton requested “‘proof of payment or ORCA card’” from each passenger on the bus. On this particular day, Meredith was one of three individuals who “was not able to present proof of fare payment,” so “[u]pon reaching the next stop, Deputy Dalton detained [Meredith] outside at the bus platform.” Meredith “did not possess any identification documents,” but he gave the deputy a name and birth date, which turned out to be false. Rather than issuing a “civil infraction[ ]” for Meredith’s failure to provide proof of payment, the deputy “believed he had probable cause to arrest [Meredith] for theft in the third degree.” The officers ultimately learned he had two outstanding arrest warrants, for which Meredith was arrested and taken to jail. The State charged Meredith with a gross misdemeanor for making “a false or misleading material statement to a public servant.” Meredith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, contending the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Meredith was "disturbed in his private affairs" by the particular method of fare enforcement used here and, if so, whether this disturbance complied with article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, a majority of the Court held Meredith was unlawfully seized. Thus, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Meredith" on Justia Law

This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law