Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Robert Sylvester Kelly, a music industry professional, who was accused of sexually abusing underage girls in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The victims, referred to as Jane, Pauline, and Nia, were introduced to Kelly through various connections. The abuse, which included explicit phone calls, oral sex, and intercourse, was often recorded by Kelly. The victims' testimonies, along with three videos of Jane and Kelly, were presented as evidence during the trial.Prior to this case, Kelly had been acquitted in a 2008 criminal trial for similar conduct involving different victims. In 2019, federal prosecutors secured an indictment against Kelly, which included thirteen counts of producing and receiving child pornography, inducing minors to engage in sexual activities, and obstructing justice in the state case. The jury convicted Kelly on six counts, including inducing Jane, Pauline, and Nia to engage in sexual activities, and three child pornography production counts corresponding to the three videos in evidence. The jury acquitted Kelly on the other seven counts.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Kelly raised three arguments: a statute of limitations defense, a request for severance of his trial, and a challenge to his sentence. The court rejected all three arguments. It ruled that the current statute of limitations for sex crimes against children, which extends through the life of the victim, applied to Kelly's case. The court also found no error in the district court's decision to conduct a single trial on all charges against Kelly. Finally, the court affirmed Kelly's sentence, which was calculated based on the Guidelines range in place at the time of his offenses, and varied upwards to 240 months considering the nature of his crimes and his history. The court concluded that the sentence was procedurally proper and substantively fair. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

The case involves Elliott Sterling, who was convicted for engaging in a fraudulent scheme to obtain loan and grant funds from the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program. Sterling submitted fraudulent applications on behalf of students, both real and fictional, and also committed fraud in connection with his educational consulting business. He was indicted for multiple counts of wire fraud, financial aid fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. Sterling chose to represent himself during the trial after his request for a new counsel was denied.The district court found Sterling competent to waive his right to counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se in his defense. After a 9-day jury trial, Sterling was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Sterling appealed, raising several Sixth Amendment claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no merit in Sterling’s procedural or substantive challenges. It held that Sterling's waiver of counsel was clear, unequivocal, and voluntary, and that he was competent to represent himself at trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing Sterling to represent himself at his own competency hearing, and that the district court's determination of Sterling's competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law

The case involves Thomas Perkins, who was convicted of one count of distributing child pornography and eight counts of possessing devices containing child pornography. Perkins, who has mental health issues, was deemed competent to stand trial by the district court. He was sentenced to over 157 years in prison, a significant upward variance from the guideline range. Perkins appealed, challenging both the competency determination and the reasonableness of his sentence.Perkins was initially charged with possession and distribution of child pornography. His counsel filed a motion for a mental examination, which was granted. Perkins was evaluated by a psychologist who determined that he was competent to stand trial. Perkins filed a motion for a second competency hearing, supported by a report from a psychologist retained by the defense, who diagnosed Perkins with bipolar-type schizoaffective disorder and autism. The government then moved for another psychological examination. Perkins was evaluated by a second psychologist, who determined that Perkins did not have a mental disease that rendered him unable to understand the nature of the charges or the consequences of the proceeding or to assist in his defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence. The court found that the district court's determination of Perkins's competency was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. However, the court found that the district court erred in its sentencing, as it did not provide a sufficient explanation for the significant upward variance from the guideline range. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Kyle Lamar West was charged with seven counts of production of child pornography. He negotiated a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts in exchange for the dismissal of the other five. The plea agreement included a waiver of most of his appellate rights, but reserved the right to appeal a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment. The probation office recommended a sentence of 720 months of imprisonment and $6,000 in restitution to the victim's mother. The district court adopted these recommendations.West appealed the restitution part of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to conduct a proximate-cause analysis as required by precedent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the district court had cited inapplicable statutes and had not conducted a proximate-cause analysis. The court also noted that the record lacked any dollar amount or range approximating the amount of the victim's losses.The Court of Appeals found that the district court's failure to conduct a proximate-cause analysis was a clear and obvious error. The court also found that this error affected West's substantial rights and undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court concluded that the district court had plainly erred by failing to connect West's offense conduct to the loss suffered by the victim.The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's restitution order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court noted that on remand, the district court could determine whether the government could present new evidence justifying the order of restitution. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

The defendant, Takeya Lashay Koontzy, pleaded no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to the victim's delay in providing documentation of her damages and failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before the termination of Koontzy's probation. More than two years post-termination, the court ordered Koontzy to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution. Koontzy argued that the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following the termination of probation.The trial court had suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Koontzy on formal probation for three years, including that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to various delays, the amount was not determined until after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The prosecution sought a determination of restitution, and over Koontzy's objection, the trial court concluded it retained jurisdiction to modify the victim restitution order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five agreed with Koontzy's argument. The court held that the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The court reasoned that the restitution order in this case was not issued pursuant to section 1202.4, because the victim's damages were not due to Koontzy's criminal conduct. Therefore, modification of the restitution order after termination of probation could not be based on the express retention of jurisdiction in section 1202.46. The court concluded that the restitution order was a condition imposed under section 1203.1, and it was subject to the limitations in section 1203.3 permitting modification of probation conditions only during the term of probation. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to modify the restitution order following termination of probation. The trial court's restitution order was reversed. View "People v. Koontzy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Dylan Ostrum, who was under investigation for drug dealing and possession of firearms. During a search of his home, Ostrum revealed that he had moved his belongings, including his car, to his father's house. However, the car, which was reported stolen by a rental company, was found nearby with Ostrum's belongings inside, including a gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana, all stashed in two safes. The key issues on appeal were whether Ostrum had standing to challenge the search of the stolen car and whether the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The investigation into Ostrum began after law enforcement agents found text messages between him and another individual, Ricky Blythe, showing that they repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on this evidence and information from confidential informants, law enforcement obtained a valid warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. However, the search turned up little, and Ostrum informed the officers that he had moved his belongings to his father's house. The officers later located the car, which was reported stolen, and discovered the safes inside.Ostrum was charged with multiple counts related to drug possession and distribution, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence found inside the car, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, finding that Ostrum lacked standing to challenge the search because the car was stolen, and that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Ostrum was convicted on all counts and received a 240-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Ostrum failed to meet his burden on standing and that the existence of probable cause justified the search under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court concluded that Ostrum had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car or its contents, and thus no standing to object to its search. View "USA v. Ostrum" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Louise Adkins, who was charged with one felony count of driving under the influence causing death, along with four misdemeanor charges. Adkins entered a Kennedy plea in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, under the impression that she would be sentenced to home confinement, based on off-the-record plea discussions with the court. However, the court sentenced her to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration. Adkins objected, stating that she entered the plea because the court had promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied Adkins's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and resentenced her for the purpose of this appeal following her conviction for DUI causing death. Adkins appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that she would not have accepted the plea had the court not promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the lower court's participation in plea discussions was a violation of Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly prohibits judicial participation in plea discussions with criminal defendants. The court concluded that this violation constituted plain error, affecting the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The case was remanded with directions to allow Adkins to withdraw her plea and for assignment to a different circuit court judge. View "State of West Virginia v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Lashaun Casey was sentenced to life imprisonment after being found guilty by a jury of carjacking and murdering an undercover police officer. Casey sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial attorney failed to seek exclusion of inculpatory statements he made during a period of improper delay in bringing him before a magistrate judge following his arrest and detention. The district court rejected this claim, concluding that while a delay occurred, it was reasonable and necessary for legitimate law enforcement purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Casey's presentment was justifiably delayed. However, the court agreed with Casey that admission at trial of one of the two contested sets of statements was improper. Despite this, the court concluded that Casey had not demonstrated that his trial counsel's failure to press that error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because his showing of prejudice fell short of the Sixth Amendment standard. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus. View "Casey v. US" on Justia Law

The case involves Alice Chu, who was indicted in September 2019 and convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and five counts of health care fraud. Chu's trial was initially set for February 22, 2021, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chief Judge of the District of New Jersey issued multiple standing orders that delayed trials and excluded these delays from Speedy Trial Act (STA) calculations. Chu's trial eventually commenced on March 1, 2022.Chu moved to dismiss multiple times on STA grounds, arguing that the delays denied her right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and that the government abused the grand jury process causing inexcusable delay. The District Court denied these motions. After her conviction, Chu filed two motions for a new trial, claiming she was unfairly prejudiced by trial testimony about prior bad acts and that newly discovered evidence could change the probability of a conviction at trial. The District Court denied both motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the exclusions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic did not violate defendants’ rights under the STA. The Court also found no clear error in the District Court’s adoption of the factual findings contained within the COVID Standing Orders. The Court of Appeals further agreed with the District Court that Chu failed to show that the government’s “sole or dominant purpose” was to impermissibly delay her trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chu's motions for a new trial and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove Chu’s knowledge and intent to commit health care fraud. View "United States v. Chu" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court. View "People v Franklin" on Justia Law