Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Larry Bradley was convicted of four gun offenses related to the fatal shooting of Thomas Willett. Bradley admitted to shooting Willett but claimed it was in self-defense as Willett allegedly came at him with a hatchet. Bradley was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, stealing a firearm, possession of a stolen firearm, and receiving a firearm while under indictment. He was convicted on all counts.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri initially applied the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) cross-reference for voluntary manslaughter, rejecting Bradley's self-defense claim. The court considered witness testimony and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which contained conflicting accounts of the incident. The court found the testimony of Dena Bunger, a witness to the shooting, credible and determined that Bradley did not act in self-defense. Bradley was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment.Bradley appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the cross-reference and that Counts 2 and 3 were multiplicitous. The Government agreed that it had erroneously described Bunger’s testimony and that Counts 2 and 3 were multiplicitous. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded the case. On remand, the district court dismissed Count 3 and reaffirmed the application of the voluntary manslaughter cross-reference, sentencing Bradley to 108 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the voluntary manslaughter cross-reference, noting that the district court’s credibility determinations and inferences from the evidence were entitled to deference. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

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Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, attempted assault on a law enforcement officer with bodily fluids, and misdemeanor unlawful mischief after an incident where he threatened a bystander and spat on an officer. Following his arrest, the defendant urinated, spat, and rubbed his genitals on various parts of his holding cell, leading to the cell's closure and $75 in clean-up costs.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, granted a judgment of acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge but denied acquittal on the attempted assault and unlawful mischief charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of both remaining charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that his actions did not constitute "damage" under the unlawful-mischief statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c).The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the term "damage" in the statute should be interpreted broadly to include actions that impair the use or function of property, even if they do not cause physical harm. The Court found that the defendant's actions resulted in a substantial impairment of the holding cell's use, as it had to be taken out of service and cleaned, incurring additional costs. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant's conduct constituted "damage" under the statute.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the jury had sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of misdemeanor unlawful mischief. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

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Jeffery Henson was convicted of federal fraud, including aggravated identity theft, money laundering, and wire fraud, for diverting nearly $330,000 from his employer to his personal account. He was ordered to pay $436,495.93 in restitution. Following his arrest, Illinois police found $17,390 in cash in his car. The government sought to apply this cash towards Henson's restitution, but Henson argued that the money was obtained through an illegal search and seizure, as the warrant was issued nine hours after the search.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, through a magistrate judge, granted the government's motion to turn over the cash. Henson appealed, contending that the magistrate judge lacked the authority to issue a final decision on the matter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the magistrate judge acted outside of his authority, as there was no final decision in the case. The Federal Magistrates Act and the local rules of the Central District of Illinois did not authorize the magistrate judge to issue a final decision on the turnover motion without the district court's explicit assignment. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as the magistrate judge's order was not an appealable final decision. View "USA v Henson" on Justia Law

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In March 2021, Jamal Shehadeh was involved in a controlled drug buy orchestrated by the Taylorville, Illinois Police Department. A confidential informant paid Shehadeh for methamphetamine, and the transaction was recorded on video. Shehadeh was arrested shortly after leaving the informant's house, waived his constitutional rights, and admitted to delivering the drugs. Shehadeh claimed he knew the buy was a setup and intended to embarrass the police by taking the buy money without delivering drugs. However, he ended up giving the informant methamphetamine, which he claimed he thought was road salt.A grand jury indicted Shehadeh for delivering methamphetamine. The government moved to preclude cross-examination of a witness, Chief Dwayne Wheeler, about past misconduct, which Shehadeh's counsel did not oppose. The district court granted the motion. Shehadeh later filed a pro se motion to cross-examine Wheeler on additional topics, which the court struck. At trial, Shehadeh testified about his plan, but the jury found him guilty. The district court applied a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement and a career offender enhancement, resulting in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. Shehadeh was sentenced to 92 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Shehadeh waived his evidentiary arguments by not objecting to the district court's rulings and failing to renew objections during the trial. The court also concluded that any error in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement was harmless because the career offender enhancement controlled the length of Shehadeh's sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v Shehadeh" on Justia Law

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In 1992, six-year-old Angelo Garcia, Jr. was kidnapped and murdered after two masked intruders broke into the apartment of his parents, Arturo Rodriguez and Diana Garcia. Diana was sexually assaulted during the incident. The case went cold until 2007 when DNA evidence linked Obel Cruz-Garcia to the crime. Cruz-Garcia was convicted of capital murder in 2013 and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his state habeas applications were denied.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Cruz-Garcia’s federal habeas petition. Cruz-Garcia then sought a certificate of appealability (COA) from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, raising three issues: jurors’ use of the Bible during deliberations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the exclusion of DNA evidence affecting his ability to present a complete defense.The Fifth Circuit denied the COA. The court found that the jurors’ reference to the Bible did not constitute an improper external influence, as it did not relate directly to the facts of the case. The court also determined that Cruz-Garcia’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit, as his counsel’s performance was within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Lastly, the court held that the trial court’s exclusion of certain DNA evidence did not violate Cruz-Garcia’s right to present a complete defense, as he was allowed to introduce other evidence regarding the DNA’s reliability.The Fifth Circuit concluded that Cruz-Garcia failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and denied his motion for a COA. View "Cruz-Garcia v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

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George Peterson was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for illegal firearm transactions at his business, PDW Solutions, LLC, which he operated from his home. The ATF conducted undercover operations where Peterson sold firearms without reporting the transactions as required. Based on this, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Peterson's home and business. During the search, agents found an unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson's bedroom-closet safe. Peterson was indicted for possession of an unregistered suppressor.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Peterson's pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Peterson argued that the National Firearms Act's (NFA) registration requirement for suppressors violated his Second Amendment rights and that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that suppressors are not "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment, as they are accessories and not weapons themselves. Therefore, the NFA's registration requirement does not violate the Second Amendment. Additionally, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, as the officers reasonably relied on the warrant issued by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Peterson's motions to dismiss and suppress. View "USA v. Peterson" on Justia Law

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Javier Chavez Dominguez, a Mexican citizen, was arrested in North Carolina in August 2022 on state drug charges. After confirming his identity and criminal history, he was charged with Illegal Reentry after Removal Subsequent to Conviction for Aggravated Felony under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Dominguez pleaded guilty and received a 48-month prison sentence followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed the sentence, presenting new arguments not raised in the district court.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina handled the initial proceedings. Dominguez faced both state and federal charges, first pleading guilty to state charges and receiving a 10 to 21-month sentence. Upon release, he was detained by ICE and later charged federally. He pleaded guilty to the federal charge without filing any motions and did not object to the presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated his advisory Guidelines range as 30 to 37 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Dominguez raised four main challenges: the classification of his 2015 Arizona conviction as an aggravated felony, the constitutionality of his prior removal proceedings, the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and the substantive reasonableness of his upward variant sentence. The court found no reversible error in the district court's decisions. It held that Dominguez's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior removals and that the district court did not plainly err in its Guidelines calculation or in imposing the upward variant sentence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

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Brant A. Geller pled no contest to three counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of attempted possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The district court orally pronounced his sentences and issued a written sentencing order. A few hours later, the district court issued an amended sentencing order. Geller appealed, challenging his sentences, arguing that the amended sentencing order was contrary to the oral pronouncement and that his sentences were excessive.The district court initially sentenced Geller to 6 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for each possession charge, and 18 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for the weapon charge. The court stated that the sentences for the possession charges would run concurrently, but the weapon charge would run consecutively. The written sentencing order reflected this, but the amended order clarified that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would also run consecutively.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that when an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous, a subsequent written sentencing order can clarify the ambiguity. The court found that the district court’s oral pronouncement was contradictory regarding whether the post-release supervision terms were to run concurrently or consecutively. The amended sentencing order clarified this ambiguity, stating that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would run consecutively to the other charges.The court also reviewed Geller’s argument that his sentences were excessive. It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Geller, as the sentences were within statutory limits and the court considered the appropriate factors. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Geller" on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The incident involved the shooting death of Barbara Williams in front of an apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska. The shooter, identified by some witnesses as the defendant, arrived in a white sedan, fired multiple shots, and fled the scene. The defendant's primary defense was an alibi, claiming he was at a barbecue at the time of the shooting. Several witnesses and photographs supported this alibi, but the State argued he could have committed the crime and arrived at the barbecue shortly after.The trial court admitted cell phone data showing the defendant searched for news about the shooting shortly after it occurred. The defendant's motion to suppress this evidence was denied. On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding the search warrant for the cell phone data was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular.The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failure to object to the printouts of cell phone data, failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses, failure to challenge the investigation of an alternative suspect with dreadlocks, and failure to call a key alibi witness. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that the defendant did not suffer prejudice from these alleged deficiencies.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the defendant's allegations, even if true, did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court noted that defense counsel had effectively cross-examined witnesses, challenged the State's evidence, and presented a cohesive alibi defense. The court also held that the failure to call the alibi witness, Richard, did not constitute ineffective assistance, as his testimony would not have significantly altered the evidentiary picture presented to the jury. View "State v. Goynes" on Justia Law