Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident in Oklahoma with his girlfriend as a passenger. After socializing with friends and drinking alcohol, and possibly vaping marijuana, he drove his motorcycle at or below the speed limit but lost control on a dark, shoulderless road, resulting in a crash that caused his girlfriend’s death. At the scene, law enforcement observed signs of possible intoxication, such as the odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes, and administered sobriety tests. The defendant’s blood sample, taken shortly after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol level below the legal limit and the presence of other substances, but the forensic toxicologist could not definitively state whether he was impaired at the time.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted the defendant for involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country, predicated on violating the Oklahoma misdemeanor DUI statute for driving under the combined influence of alcohol and other intoxicants. At trial, the jury was instructed using the Oklahoma statutory language but, during deliberations, asked the court to clarify whether “under the influence” required mere presence of substances or actual impairment rendering the defendant incapable of safe driving. The district court declined to clarify, instructing the jury to rely on the given instructions. Shortly after, the jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a sentence of forty-one months in prison.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a clarifying supplemental instruction in response to the jury’s explicit legal uncertainty. The appellate court found this error was not harmless because it likely affected the verdict, given the jury’s demonstrated confusion about the correct legal standard. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kirby" on Justia Law

A man was charged with several federal offenses, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, transporting a minor with intent to engage in prostitution, and possession of child pornography. The charges arose after he met a 16-year-old runaway through Craigslist, transported her across state lines, and engaged in a sexual relationship with her. Law enforcement discovered him with the minor, searched his residence, and found child sexual abuse material and multiple firearms. The defendant admitted to knowing the minor’s age and her mental health issues.He ultimately pled guilty to the firearm charge and one transportation count, with the remaining charges dismissed as part of a plea agreement. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, he received 292 months for transportation of a minor and 180 months for the firearm offense, to run concurrently. Thirteen days later, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the transportation count, arguing that he only learned at sentencing that the minor was missing and that this constituted exculpatory evidence the prosecution should have disclosed. The district court denied his motion, stating it lacked authority to consider post-sentencing withdrawal of a guilty plea except by direct appeal or collateral attack, and found that the minor’s unavailability was not exculpatory since public records of her status were available before the plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial under the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed. The appellate court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) barred post-sentencing withdrawal of a guilty plea except by direct appeal or collateral attack, and that no Brady violation occurred because the information about the minor’s status was publicly available. The court also declined to review the firearm sentence under the concurrent sentence doctrine, as any ruling would not affect the defendant’s time to be served. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

A defendant was indicted on multiple federal charges, including sex trafficking by force, transporting a victim across state lines with the intent of prostitution, and coercing or enticing a victim to travel interstate for prostitution-related activities. During jury selection, a prospective juror with experience in local law enforcement expressed doubts about her ability to remain impartial, suggesting that cases typically proceed only when there is sufficient evidence. Her comments were made in the presence of other prospective jurors.After this exchange, the defendant moved to strike the entire venire, arguing that the comments had irreparably tainted the panel. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion but excused the individual juror for cause. The court reasoned that her experience was limited to a police department unrelated to the case and emphasized that it had already instructed the panel multiple times that an indictment is not evidence of guilt. The defendant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and his motion for a new trial—reiterating his concerns about jury prejudice—was denied by the district court, which found no prejudice resulted from the juror’s comments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to question or strike the rest of the venire and in providing the jury with a redacted copy of the indictment during deliberations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in both respects, noting the low probability of prejudice, the adequacy of curative instructions, and the routine nature of providing indictments with proper safeguards. The court also rejected the argument of cumulative error and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Thomas" on Justia Law

A woman was kidnapped and raped in her rural home after her husband left for work. The perpetrator bound, gagged, and blindfolded her, then drove her to another location where he assaulted her. After being released in a field, the victim contacted police, who collected DNA evidence but initially could not identify the assailant. Investigators suspected the crime was premeditated due to the remote location, timing, and other factors, and obtained a “reverse keyword search warrant” for Google records of searches related to the victim’s name and address. Google identified two searches for the victim’s address made just before the attack, both linked to the same IP address, which was traced to John Edward Kurtz. Surveillance and DNA from a discarded cigarette butt confirmed the match, and Kurtz confessed to this and other assaults.Kurtz moved to suppress the evidence from the Google search, arguing the search warrant lacked probable cause individualized to him and that his internet search records were protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas denied the motion, and a jury found Kurtz guilty on all charges. He was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that Kurtz lacked an expectation of privacy in his Google search records or IP address, reasoning that he voluntarily provided this information to a third party and had agreed to Google’s privacy policy allowing cooperation with law enforcement.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their unprotected internet search queries and IP addresses. The court held that the average user does not have such an expectation, as using a search engine like Google involves voluntarily providing information to a third party with clear notice that the information may be shared, including with law enforcement. The judgment below was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident outside a restaurant in 2003, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses, as well as having weapons while under disability. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. The defense suggested that another individual, who was at the scene and arrested shortly after the shooting, was the actual perpetrator. The defendant was found guilty on all counts and received consecutive prison sentences.The defendant’s convictions were affirmed by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, although the case was remanded for resentencing due to the trial court’s failure to state facts supporting the consecutive sentences. Nearly two decades later, the defendant discovered a previously undisclosed police report indicating that the victim initially identified the other individual as the shooter. The defendant filed for leave to move for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The trial court granted leave, but ultimately denied the motion for a new trial without holding an oral hearing. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without an oral hearing.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a trial court must conduct an oral hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The court held that while an evidentiary hearing is required—meaning the court must consider affidavits or sworn statements—there is no requirement that this hearing be oral. The decision to hold an oral hearing is left to the trial court’s discretion. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Bostick" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, while severely intoxicated, drove her vehicle into oncoming traffic, resulting in a collision that killed another driver and seriously injured two passengers, one of whom was partially paralyzed. At the time of the incident, her blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. The defendant had three prior drinking-and-driving convictions and was charged with felony DUI, vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and related offenses. She pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide-DUI and vehicular assault-DUI in exchange for a sentencing range of eight to thirty-three years, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-nine years, including a twenty-four-year sentence for vehicular homicide-DUI.After sentencing, the defendant sought a proportionality review, arguing that her sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The district court denied her motion, finding that vehicular homicide-DUI was per se a grave or serious offense. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed with this designation, holding that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious because it does not require proof of criminal intent, but nonetheless upheld the sentence, finding it was not grossly disproportionate.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether vehicular homicide-DUI should be classified as per se grave or serious and whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. The court held that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious for proportionality review purposes due to its strict liability nature, lacking a mens rea requirement. However, the court also held that, given the facts of the case—including the harm caused, the defendant’s history, and the sentence’s statutory authorization—the twenty-four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "People v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Two individuals who held leadership positions at a local public housing authority in South Bend, Indiana, orchestrated a scheme in which they collaborated with several contractors to submit false invoices for maintenance work that was never performed. The contractors cashed checks issued by the housing authority for these fictitious services and shared the proceeds with the two employees. This fraudulent activity came to light after a casino employee observed the pair gambling large amounts of cash and reported the suspicious behavior to law enforcement. Following an investigation, both individuals were indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, several counts of bank fraud, wire fraud, and federal program theft.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana presided over their trial. After the government presented its case, both defendants moved for judgments of acquittal on the wire fraud charges; the court reserved ruling, and the jury ultimately convicted both individuals on the majority of counts, although one was acquitted on a wire fraud count. The district court denied the motions for acquittal, imposed prison sentences, and ordered substantial restitution. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the appeals. It held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the bank fraud convictions because the government failed to prove that any false statement was made to a bank, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), and therefore reversed those convictions. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, finding that a rational jury could conclude the fraudulent scheme furthered the transmission of funds via interstate wire. The court also affirmed one defendant’s sentence enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, finding no clear error or harmless error. The case was remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the restitution order. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

A man used a social media application to communicate with what he believed to be a minor. In reality, he was interacting with a law enforcement officer posing as a 14-year-old girl. Their exchange included plans to meet for sexual contact, and when he arrived at the agreed location, law enforcement apprehended him. Physical evidence found in his vehicle supported the allegation that he intended to engage in sexual activity. At trial, the defendant asserted that he did not know he was interacting with a minor and claimed he had deleted the relevant message thread, losing access to the initial messages where age was mentioned.The Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, conducted the trial, where a jury found him guilty of meeting a minor for lewd purposes, contacting a minor for a sexual offense, and attempted lewd act upon a child. The trial judge sentenced him to probation. The defense argued that the jury instructions regarding mistake of fact were erroneous, specifically that they required any mistaken belief about the minor’s age to be reasonable. The prosecution conceded the instructional error but asserted it was harmless.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a mistake of fact as to the minor’s age must be reasonable, when the charged offenses require only an actual belief due to their specific intent elements. The appellate court found the error was prejudicial, emphasizing that the jury might have credited the defendant’s testimony but was prevented from considering an unreasonable yet genuinely held belief. Consequently, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "P. v. Ismaiel" on Justia Law

Milder Escobar-Temal, a Guatemalan national, unlawfully entered the United States in 2012, living and working in Nashville, Tennessee. In October 2022, Nashville police responding to a domestic incident found three firearms at his residence. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of firearms by individuals unlawfully present in the United States. Escobar-Temal had no prior criminal convictions except a dismissed charge for driving without a license.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied Escobar-Temal’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(5)(A) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied. The district court reasoned that, while the Second Amendment’s protections may extend to unlawfully present persons, historical tradition supported disarming those who had not sworn allegiance to the state. After denying the motion, Escobar-Temal pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does protect individuals unlawfully present in the United States if they have developed sufficient connections to the national community. However, it further held that there is a longstanding historical tradition of disarming groups lacking a formal relationship with the government, such as unlawfully present noncitizens, due to regulatory difficulties rather than inherent dangerousness. Therefore, the court concluded that § 922(g)(5)(A) does not violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Escobar-Temal, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Escobar-Temal" on Justia Law

Police in Wilmington, Delaware, were monitoring social media when a detective saw a video on Instagram that appeared to show Marvin Swanson, a person legally prohibited from possessing firearms, mimicking shooting motions and possibly displaying what looked like a gun magazine in his waistband. Shortly after, a confidential informant, known to be reliable, sent the detective the same video and claimed to have personally observed Swanson in the area with a firearm. The police responded to the location, saw Swanson in the described clothing, conducted a pat down that did not reveal a weapon, but found a loaded handgun in a recycling bin about 25–30 feet away. Swanson was handcuffed and transported to the police station, where he voluntarily provided a DNA sample. DNA testing later matched Swanson to the gun, leading to his arrest for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person prohibited.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware denied Swanson’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence, finding that officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and that the continued detention and transport to the station were reasonable, necessary, and related to the investigation. A jury later convicted Swanson.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that while the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop based on the informant’s tip and corroborating observations, the subsequent transport of Swanson to the police station amounted to a de facto arrest. The Court held that this arrest was not supported by probable cause because the evidence linking Swanson to the gun was insufficient at the time of the arrest. As a result, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted. View "Swanson v. State" on Justia Law